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SUMMARY 
This di~sertation attempts to close a substantial gap in local 
historiography and simoultaneously offer for comparison a study 
. of a radical workers' movement over a turbulent period of German 
history, which experienced severe political ruptures. So far, the 
Remscheid Workers' Movement has been largely ignored, despite its 
sign'ificant role in the course of regional and national politics 
at various conjunctures. To my knowledge this is the first attempt 
to trace the movement's development over this particular period. 
The dissertation is based on mainly unpublished material gleaned 
from files, newspaper articles and interviews, and research was 
carried out in archives in Remscheid, Solingen, Wuppertal-Elber-
feld (city library), Dilsseldorf and Berlin. 
The local workers' movement was already established as a radical 
force in local politics at the beginning of the period uQder scru-
tiny. This study, however, traces the movement's radical tradition, 
paying particular attention to the relationship between the insti-
tutions and the rank and file members in the working-class districtf 
of the town. The social and economic situation of the local workin~ 
class is analysed.to explain, by way of Kocka's three-tier model of 
class conflict, how and why local workers repeatedly sought a radici 
solution to the question of political power. 
The dissertation comprises of six chapters. Chapter I reveals the 
radicalising experience of war which led to polarisation in a perio( 
of intense class hostility within local society. Chapter 11 deals 
with the years 1918 to 1924, which was a period of intense class 
hostility punctuated by overt class conflict. Despite temporary 
victories in \918 and 1920, and despite holding a majority on the 
town council, the local workers' movement was not able to seize 
and hold power, owing to lack of unity of aims and action amongst 
the three workers' parties, the failure to resolve the question of 
the ownership of production in the workers' favour, and the close 
cooperation between the local authorities, the employers and ex-
ternal counter-revolutionary forces. Chapter III analyses the pro-
cess of bolshevisation and stalinisation in the local KPD group 
which had emerged between 1920 and 1924 to take control of the 
Remscheid workers' movement. This chapter also shows by several 
. examples how members were recruited into and integrated in the 
movement by way of important institutions. , 
Chapter IV traces the development of the extreme right in the 
town, and a close analysis of the NSDAP and SA before 1933 de- . 
monstrates A very weak proletarian participation in the party 
and paramilitary group. Chapter V shows how during the period 
of depression from 1929 to 1933 the town was split into two oppo-
sing camps with the bulk of the workers supporting the KPD,:and 
the middle classes supporting the NSDAP. Chapter VI reveals the 
considerable complicity of the middle classes in the Nazi seizure 
of power and shows how the Nazis succeeded in suppressing the local 
workers' movement by a combination of terror, propaganda and con-
cessions. 
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I N T ROD U C T ION 
The following study is an attempt to trace the development of the 
working-class movement in Rem~cheid during the period under scru-
tiny and to explain how and why this radical left-wing tradition 
declined in the post-1945 years. The study is concerned also with 
the growth of cl ass-consci ousness amongst a 1 arge section of the 
town's workers, which led to a high degree of political mobilisa-
t i on that affected the course of po 1 it i ca 1 events in Remschei d 
throughout the period in question. 
It approaches the problem on two di fferent but not unconnected 
levels, namely one which may be termed organised institutional 
life, comprising parties, trade unions, clubs and other institu-
t ions, and one whi ch we may .call the everyday common experi ence, 
which occurred inter alia at the place of work, the corner shop or 
the local pub. If we regard the second level as the 'experience', 
the' first is to be ,een as the expression and direction of that 
experience, and its translation into ,political terms. It is the 
close link between these two aspects of working class life which 
gave the Remscheid workers' their political strength and 'depth, and 
enabled them or their chosen representatives to play a dominant 
role locally and sometimes nationally. Although this study is pri-
marily concerned with the working class this should not be regarded 
as 'a group existing in a social, economic and political vacuum, 
thoroughly independent of all other classes of society. Indeed it· 
is the interaction between classes which ultimately leads to their 
demarcat ion, as it determi nes the collect he experi ence wh i ch in 
some circumstances sets one group against another. 1 
, 
.; , 
-' < ~~ 
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" A. Labour History 
1. Methodological Problems. 
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The following study owes much to the tradition of British Labour 
History which has been interested not merely in working class poli-
tical institutions, but also in culture as an expression as well as 
a strong determining factor of working class consciousness. A long 
line of historians. journalists and, social investigators2 have 
directed their attention to the working class in Britain, examining 
such varied aspects of working class life as diet, housing, educa-
tion, family-life, pastimes and work, trade union and varty life, 
and wider political activity, in an effort to understand their so-
cial, economic and political development as a class. Labour History 
,however has not been restricted to Britain and has indeed' been 
established in a number of other countries for a lony time. 3 One 
exception is Germany,4 where historiography has traditionally 
been dominated by conservative and nationalist schools which have 
been 'likened by their'critics to a medieval yuild, due to their 
highly organised character and jealously guarded, exclusiveness. 5 
These historians who mostly tended to identify with the state!:lave 
prid,e of place to questions of foreign policy, diplomacy and mili-
tary history. The role which they performed, that of helping to 
give their countrymen a national identity by instilliny in them 
pride in Prussian and German achievements. was retained right up to 
the 1960s. In the wake of the 'Fischer debate' during the 196Us, 
German historiography has undergone a transformation, with younger 
historians taking a closer look at internal politics, of the ~is­
marckian and Wilhelmine periods, in an effort to detect the roots 
of the Third Reich. They began to look to the social sciences for 
new concepts and methods and callle to believe that social history 
would help then} gain a better understanding of the internal struc-
ture and development of lmperi a 1 Germany. However the I new ortho-
doxy '6, as'they have been named, still continued to concern them-
selves with the con~anding heights of politics, an approaCh which 
J.." ; 
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• Richard Evans terms 'history from above'l. This approach tends to 
regard the workin~ class primarily as a passive instrument, influ": 
enced and manipulated by elites at the top of society. When the 
work i ng cl ass has been the subject of study, much of the work has 
been concerned with working class political organisations rather. 
than with working class culture and the everyday experience. 
British historiography on the other. hand has traditionally stress-
ed the importance of the grass _. roots of po 1 it i cs and the everyday 
life of ordinary people. As Evans rightly points out, history from 
below' neither means 'history without theory' nor 'history with t~e 
politics left out'.8 It is an approach which combines theory with 
empirical study and extends the d~finition of politics to includ~ 
areas of life· which German historio~raphy has trddtionally r~~"'rd~d 
as 'unpolitical'. 
A further point of consideration is that as the workiny class in 
modern industrial society has constitut~d such a large percentage 
of the population and may be regarded at least until the end of the 
Second World War as the largest single. class, it follows that its 
contribution to the cou~try's history has been so considerable that 
it warrants br rather demands, closer investigation. 
That the working class tends to be inarticulate and therebyreluc-
tant. to commi t i nterpretat ions of experi ence to paper, presents a 
challenge for the interested historian, but is no reason to ignore 
such a large section of society. The advent of Oral History consti-
tutes one response to the challeng~ of articulating the inarticu-
late. and a number of exciting projects hav~ uncover~d n~terial and 
pieced together working-class history which otherwise would have 
been lost for ever. 9 
furthermore such projects have undoubtedly succeeded in awakeni n9 
and extending the interest of working class p~ople in their own 
history, and have helped to bring about the realisation that the 
everyday actions of ordinary men and women have relevance to the 
who 1 e. i e. the; r everyday act ions i nfl uence, as well as bei n9 i n-
fluenced by. the course which that society takes. 
,,' i 
' .. , .. 
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Related considerations govern recent preoccupations with micro-
history. The in~estigation of a restricted locality creates inten-
sified. relat.ionships between the historian and his subject matter, 
between the historian and the local inhabitants or at least a sec-
tion of these, and between the inhabitants and their history. 
Single community studies have an important advantage over investi-
gations on a national scale in that they are more' likely to reveal 
detailed knowledge of regional peculiarities and their interaction 
wi th other areas. I t may be argued that mi croh i story presents a 
more detailed picture by focusing attention on a limited area, .with 
the result that eventually a clearer understanding of the whole may 
be gained, by means of comparison with other areas. 
There are however one or two pitfalls which need to b~ avoided by 
'microhistorians ' • The 1II0st important danger is a possible loss of 
perspective by focusing too closely on his subject cOllununity and 
ignoring or underestimating its interdependence with other areas. 
The unconscious attribution of autonomy to a single community leads 
to a distorted vision of reality and impairs the historian's work. 
For this reason it i~ imperative for the historian to be constantly 
aware of the relationship betw.een his area and the rest of the 
country. 
l~ recent years there have appeared a number of studies devoted to 
the worker's everyday experience both at work and at home, so that 
we may assume that the interest of some German historians may now 
be shifting to this sphere. Local and regional studies still appear 
to attract Anglo-American more than German historians, but this 
. . 
situation may also be changing. The most notable work for the pur-
pose of t~i s study is Erhard Lucas' compari son of two kinds of 
radicalism. expressed by the workers of Hamborn and Rern-
scheid. 10 Another recent local study by David Crew trdced the 
development of industrialisation in Bochum between 1860 and 1914 
and its effects on the workers. ll This study' also contains an 
analysis of workers ' protest in the form of miners ' strikes in the 
years 1889. 1905 and 1912. Other local and regional studies are 
those by Lawrence Schofer about Upper S il es i a from 1865 to 
- 5 -
1914,12 M.No'an's work on working class radical~sm in DUssel-
dorf 1890 to 1920,13 Tenfelde's history of the Ruhr mi-
ners,14 S.H,F: Hickey's examination of the Ruhr miners,15 
. 
Roland GUnther's examination of a coal miners' colony in the Ruhr 
bas~d on t nformat i on gathered from i ntervi ews ,16. Di eter Lange-
wi esche' s essay on the home and ~ falllily 1 ife of Vi enna workers17 
and William Sheridan Allen's book about the experience of a single 
town, Northeim, during the period i~nediately before and after the 
Nazi seizure of powerl8. The most notable recent studies de-
voted to workers' culture and everyday experience are: Jurgen 
Reulecke and Wolfhard Weber (edit.). Fabrik, Famil ie, Fe"ier-
abend. 19 which contains a number of essays on such varied 
topics as children's diet. the development of consumer coo~erative 
societies, lodgers in worklng class families. the club life of Ruhr 
miners, and workers' sport clubs; Lutz Niethamrner (edit.),' Wohnen 
im Wande1 20 j Niethammer and BrUggemeier's article on workers' 
dwellings in Imperial Germany21; Gerhard Ritter (edit.), 
Arbeiterkultur22, which deals more with workers' clubs and 
institutions than with home life; Si~gfried Reck's23 and Martin 
I 
Soder's24 examinations of the family, club and pub life of 
workers. 
Finally with regard to the local historiography of Remscheid, it is 
apparent that the fi e 1 d has tradt i ana lly been domi nated by an i n-
~terest in work processes and artefacts, with occasional portraits 
of outstanding local manufacturers and the odd idealised picture of 
artisans. The problem of social interaction between the various 
classes has been totally neglected'. This is above all true with re-
gard to the development of ~he working class and the working class 
movement. This fact necessarily raises the question as to whether 
thi s gross omi ss i on has been intent i ana 1, or whether it has been 
~ue to a disorientated lack of interest. Whatever the answer, the 
result at the local level is a widespread ignorance, particularly 
concerni n9 the communi ty' s development over the 1 ast one hundred 
years, and a loss of ,identity or a disturbed relationship with 
'00 
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their class orlglnS, above all amongst the workers themselves. 
During the period covered by this study and before, Remscheid was a 
I 
class society with a distinct divergence of interests. On the one 
hand there was a relatively small industrialist/manufacturer class 
supported by the state civil o service apparatus, and on the other 
hand the mass of wage-earners. At two intervals, between .1918 and 
1923 and from 1930 to 1933, Remscheid was the scene of open class 
conflict which was frequently marked by particularly violent 
clashes •. 
This diss·ertation will attempt to explain the development of ~1.ass 
conflict in Remscheid by applying a model devised by Kocka to ana-
lyse German society during the First World War. 25 
Essentially the model presents a three-phase development of class 
conflict based on the f"ilarxist definition of class membership in 
terms of the individual's relationship to the means of production. 
The phases do not necessarily have a strict chronological order and 
even tend to run concurrently although it is understood that be-
fore open conflict occurs, a broad consensus of dissatisfaction and 
a level of political) consciousness which explains the discrepancy 
between reality and what are felt to be justifiable aims, must al-
ready have been reached. 
The three phases of the development of conflict identified by Kocka 
are: 
1. The divergence of latent class interests (not necessarily con-
scious) according to one's position in society. 
Here the dividing line is drawn between those owning the means 
of production, and wage- and salary earners. Class denomination 
does not merely di ctate the product i on process, but a 1 so con-
sumption, status and opportunity in education, career and poli-
tical power etc. It follows therefore that the state constitutes 
an instrument in the service of the dominant economic class. 
2. Class hostility. 
At this level, divergent class interests deterllline individual 
hopes, desires, aims and attitu"odes, so that dependiny on the 
existence of certain pre-requisites these can develop into a 
• ~ .. •• • if,. , 
.. 
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collective identity of shared experience. The salient pre-
requisites for the development of a conscious corporate id~ntity 
. are traditional values. ideas and attitutes. The more these 
become institutionalised. the more they are effective. The· 
institutions in their turn reinforce the tradtions by a process 
of regeneration. The essential factor governing class hostility 
is for the wage- or salary earnerlt~e discrepancy between actual 
opportunity and the des i res and aims wh i ch he recogni ses as 
being legitimate. The discrepancy can either be a result of 
diminishing opportunity or increased expectancy. 
3. Class conflict. 
Class conflict follows a maturation process. which has been 
exploited by individuals dnd rejJr(!sentative institutions ut 
class interest ilnd when the state int~rvelles 011 belidlf of the 
ruling economic class to quell growiny discontent. The course of 
the maturation jJroc~ss is in no way autolllatic dnd is dejJendellt 
on a number of factors such as the avail abil ity of effect i ve 
leadership. an id~oloyy which justifies conflict and a func-
tioning cOllllllunications syste/ll between individuals and institu-
t ions. The 1 ack of these factors and the i ntens if i ca t i on of 
political suppression can lengthen the maturation process or 
even prevent th~ eruption of conflict. The point of erujJtion is 
always preceded by an extrellle polarisation of SOCiety. 
· " - , 
- .' -,. . ...~ 
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2. The Classes in Remscheid Society. 
The structure of Remscheid's industry, a predominance of small and 
medium-sized workshops and factories owned by local families and in 
which the owner normally worked side by side with his employees, 
and relatively few large factories elllploying more than tlUU, strong-
ly influenced the local bourgeoisie and the working class as did 
the type of industry, viz. work and machine tools, the manufacture 
of which required a high level of skill on the part of the wor-
kers. 
Ihe middle class of Remscheid during the Weimar period consisted of 
the owners and directors of the larger factories situated in the 
town, Similarly the owners and directors of the laryer and more 
successful export i ng houses - Remschei d' s dependence on overseas 
markets earned ft the title of 'Seestadt auf dem Serye' - a small 
number of senior civil servants and academics, several bank mana-
gers and their f~milies. Of these the manufacturing and exporting 
families fonned of long established group which proved quite resi-
t 
lient preserving and renewing its identity by consistent inter-
marriage until approximately the. end of the Weimar Republic. An 
account of this leading group around ItltlO tells of Sunday afternoon 
meetings in the "Hotel zum Weinbery". The observer of this weekly 
rftual perceived a hierarchical seating arrangement rouyhly struc-
tured according to annual tax payments. The pinnacle was formed by 
a Kommerzi enratst i sch and another tab I e seat ing twe I ve elderly 
gentlemen,' "die zwolf Apostel"26. The most influential families 
belonging to the town's leading group were inter alia: the Bakers, 
Mannesmanns, Hasencl evers, Arns" Hessenbruchs, von der Nahmer sJ 
Honsbergs, Peiselers, Hentzens, the Hardts of Lennep and perhaps 
somewhat later, the Zieglers. Below this almost impenetrable group 
were several aspiring families. acolytes of the respected society, 
conSisting of manufacturers and exporters, bank lIlanagers, higher 
civil servants and members of the professions, lawyers, doctors and 
- 9 
archHectS. There were no landowners in the sense of those who 
lived exclu~ively from land rents. 
The lower-middle class, - consisted ot 
two sub-categories, the traditional petty bourgeoisie and the new 
white-collar class. 2/ The traditional petty bouryeoisie con-
sisted of shopkeepers, independent artisans, publicans and small 
savers, the new white-collar class incorporated all the control and 
office work resulting from expanding industry and COllllllerce. Whilst 
the traditional petty bourgeoisie tends to decline during the 
period under examination, the white-collar class is increasjny. 
The local working class consisted of manual workers in industry, 
transport and maintenance, eg. counci I workers. At the beginning of 
the period under examination and particularly prior to this, lIIany 
workers were migratory seasonal workers coming from Hesse, I:.ast 
Prussia. Silesia and Vogtland/Erzgebirge, but also from Poland, 
Italy and Austria. During the war periods of course, there were 
also foreign workers residing in Remscheid who were not restricted 
in their movements as were prisoners of war. Nigratory workers were 
either housed in Ibarracks or else had lodgings in private families 
as Schlaf- or Kostganger (lodgers).28 The working class was 
also stratified according to status and earning potential. Ihe 
upper stratum consisted of master craftsmen - formerly independent 
artisans - employed in the larger factories as overlookers and 
controllers, or else merely skilled producers (their loss of inde-
pendent or semi-independent status was in many cases received as a 
welcome' liberation from the worr~es and responsibilities connected 
with their station), skilled metal workers/tool makers who had, 
served apprent i ceshi ps dnd perhaps also as journeymen,. and other 
sk ill ed workers. employed in other i ndustri es', for instance bri ck-
layers and masons. An intermediate position was occupied by semi-
skilled workers who were competent in their particular production 
process without having served the statutory apprenticeship. Hence 
they did not possess all the Skills required in their profession 
and did not hold the formal qualification. The lowest level was 
occupied by local unskilled workers in the factories and workshops. 
t" 
- 10 -
The'most subaltern category was that of the untrained seasonal wor-
kers employed as carriers on building sites, street cleaners, and 
refuse collectors etc. Another group of workers, the ra il way and 
postal workers, cannot adequately be integrated in the above struc-
ture, because of their different status. Technically workers with 
civil service status, this group occupied a position adjacent to 
the master craftsmen in the upper stratum of the working class, but 
with a tendency to transcend more frequent ly the d i v i de between 
lower-middle and working class. 29 
An analysiS of the membership/sociology of the working class move-
ment is concerned with that part of the working class which is 
actively en9a9~d in the dttellliJL to r~dlise the econolllic, jJolitical 
and social aims of th~ class. The movement incorporates working 
J 
class institutions, political parties, trade unions, sjJorts and 
other recreational clubs and organisations, newspapers and class-
conscious individuals. The working class 1II0velllent is not restricted 
to the reservoir of the working class, but also draws members from 
the bourgeoisie. It .consists of intellectuals, a cadre of leaders 
and functi~naries and members of all the various institutions. The 
functions of the intellectuals is to observe and receive im~ulses 
from SOCiety, and to interpret these in such a way as to give di-
rection to the movement. This can be achieved either directly, by 
writing books, pamphlets, newspaper articles etc, or else indirect-
ly by creating works of i;lrt and literature not merely for the work-
ing class, but also for the whole society. The cadre of leaders and 
functionaries makes up the movement's bureaucracy which above a 
certain level is professional. The functionaries organise and con-
duct the business of the movement and take decisions. The melllbers 
are engaged in implementing decisions taken by the leadership, re-
cruiting new members, agitating, representing the movement exter-
nally and defending it. 
The Relllscheid working class movement consisted above all of 
1. the Skilled, semi-skilled and unskilled workers employed in the 
large' steel-producing and steel-processi'ng factories 1 ike th~ 
t" 
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Bergische Stahlindustrie (BS1). Richard Lindenberg 8. Co. (later 
Deutsche Edelstahlwerke-DEW). Alexanderwerk. Luisenhutte, 
I 
Mannesmann Motoren- und Rbhrenwerke; 
2. the skilled, semi-skilled and unskilled workers employed in the 
many medium and small-sized tool-making factories scattered all 
over the town; 
3. skilled, semi-skilled and unskilled workers engaged in other 
industries also represented in Remscheid. of these the building 
workers were particularly prominent. as were printing workers -
if not quantitatively then certainly qualitatively. 
In Lennep and LUttringhausen skilled, semi-skilled and unskilled 
workers were also an integral part of the move"~nt, despite the 
fact that textile workers were not very well organised. However. 
even in Lennep, where the largest factory was the textile mill 
Kammgarn-Spinnerei. the local textile workers' role in the move-
ment as a whole was very much a subordinate one to that of metal 
and building workers; 
4. railway, postal, gas and electricity workers of all grades and 
skill, although for reasons already stated above, these workers 
did not tend to excel in the workers lIIovement; 
5. a number of white-collar employees (Angestellte). Marx predicted 
that the majority of these would side with the working class 
'movement in the class struggle as society, moved increasingly to-
wards polarisation. This clearly did not happen in Relllscheid 
during the period in question. Nevertheless the local mov~l~nt 
was supported by some white-collar employees. During economic 
crises, there appears to have been an increase in white-collar 
membership of -the movement, but it was by no means a massive 
shift of allegiance. 
A marked characteristic of the Remscheid workers' movement was the 
extremely tightly-knit cOlllmunity spirit which was particularly evi-
dent in the working class districts of, inter alia: Honsberg. Las-
pert, Neuenhaus, Bliedinghausen, RosenhUgel. 
0" 
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The idea of cO.nduct i ng a deta il ed invest i gat ion into the Remschei d 
workers' movement ensued from a short dissertation written in the 
I 
course ,of my studies at the University of East Anglia. The disser-
tation which was written in German during my 'year abroad', was an 
analysis of Reichstag election results in Remscheid and the rest of 
the country during the Weimar Republic. Much of the groundwork for 
that study could not be fully exploited in an essay of 'such re-
stricted size, and furthermore it could not attempt to answer 1I10St 
. . 
of the interesting questions during the initial research. I there-
fore returned to the town to extend n~ research for the purpose of 
. 
this dissertation. I have lived in Remscheid for the best part of 
13 years, and during that time have tried to immerse myself as much 
as possible in the community's customs, traditions and values, in 
an effort to gain a better understandiny of the historical develop-
ment of the town and its people during the last hundred years. 
Remscheid, a relatively young town not very well known to foreig-
ners unless they happen to be connected wi th either the mach i ne-
tool or ice-skates industries has tended to live socially and poli-
tically in the shad9w of its neighbours Solingen and Wupperta1. 
Remscheid had by the turn of the century long been established as 
the world's largest supplier of ice-skates, and by the end of the 
fi rst decade of thi s century had become the centre of Germany's 
machine-tool industry. The town had a 10ny radical socialist tradi-
tion which during the Weimar Republic manifested itself in repeated 
electoral victories for the KPD. This fact and the crushing defeat· 
inflicted on the Kappist Freikorps forces in March 192030 , an 
event conunemorated in avers i on of the Leuna- Lied "Bei Remschei ci 
sind viele Konununisten gefallen",31 earned Remscheid the title 
of 'Bergisch Moskau'. 32 
Despite its remarkable strength and achievements the local working 
class movement had, until the appearance of Erhard Lucas' book, 
received scant not ice, usually bei n9 ment i oned as an adj unct to the 
Solingen workers' movement. In reality, there can have been few 
local movements which made more important contributions' to the 
German workers' movement duri n9 the peri od covered by th is study 
t' , 
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than the 9ne in Remscheid. Un occasions its impact on the national 
level was considerable, and the movement either produced or ab-
sorbed a n~mber of outs tand i ng leaders whose i nfl uence was sub-
. 
stantial on the national scale. It therefore seemed appropriate to 
attempt to redress the ballance and undertake an examination of the 
Remscheid workers' movelllent. to try to explain the local radical 
socialist tradition and to trace its development through a stonl~ 
period of German history to its decline after a brief revival in 
the years following the end of the Second World War. 
3. Sources and Structure. 
The principal sources on which this dissertation is based are: 
official files, newspapers and interviews. In addition several 
other materials were consulted according to availability, these in-
eluded address books from Remschei d and LennejJ, Festschritten for 
important anni versari es. a regi ster of all manufacturi n~ compani es 
in Remscheid, Lennep and LUttringhausen, compiled in 1Y3!:l, and d 
record of war production and employment for 193Y-1945 for Relllscheid 
industry. Furthermore a number of documents and photographs, made 
I 
available by interviewees and other interested parties, were also 
used in the course of this study. 
Research was carried out in the Stadtarchiv Remscheid, the Stadt-
archiv Solingen, LandeshauptstaatsarchivDUsseldorf and the Berlin 
Document Centre. 
The dissertation is comprised of six chapters. Chapter I deals with 
the workers' movement duri ng the Fi rst Worl d War and traces the 
rise of class confl ict within Rernscheid society. Chapter Il is con-
cerned with the revolutionary period from 191tl to the defeat ot 
the workers' movement in 192:3. This chapter pays particular atten-
tion to the power struggle in the town after the end of the war. 
Chapter 111 gives a survey of the local workers' movement during the 
Weimar Republic. Chapter IV traces the development of the extreme 
right in Remscheid and contains a detailed analysis of NSDAP and SA 
membership prior to 1933. Chapter V is concerned with class con-
flict during the crisis period 1930 to 19:33 and chapter VI deals 
above all with the Gleichschaltung, the SA's campaign of terror anu 
working class resistance to the Nazis. 
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B. Historical Backyround. 
I 
1. Geographical Situation.' 
The town of Remschei d is situated in the northern part of the 
Bergische land, in the rectangle bounded on three sides, West, 
North and East, by the Wupper river as it flows towards the Rhine. 
It lies almost equidistant between Wupipertal in the North and 
Solingen to t~e West, approximate1y1~ kilometres from Wupperta1 
and ten 1<.110metres from Solingen. The original settlement was erec-
. 
ted on the Holscheidsberg and today still forms the nucleus of tile 
modern town. The area over which the town now sprawls, is criss-
crossed by a considerable number of deep valleys and dells etched 
by streams whi ch dra i n the formerly dense 1y wooded hi 11 s.1 he ~er­
gische hills which run from West to East reaching an altitude of 
40U metres lRemscheid 378 metres) are the highest between this 
point and, the coast. This phenomenon accounts for the notoriously 
high level of precipitation which makes Remscheid one of the wet-
'test parts of Wes1tern Europe. 33 
In earlier times it was the correlation of an abundant supply of 
iron ore, wood, and water power whi ch predeterrni ned the course uf 
local industry and with this the venue of the original settlelllent. 
One other factor - the lIIain trading route connecting Cologne with 
the Hansa-town of lUbeck on the Baltic traversed the region, run-
.ning through lennep and elevating this town to a pOSition of domi-
nance - was also important for the development of Remscheid's iron 
and tool industry. 34 Markets and fairs held at Lennep and other 
towns along the tradi ng route became important out I ets for Relll-' 
scheid products, which by the 14th century were also finding their 
way overseas. 35 The mining of iron ore eventually became un-
economic, so that the mi nera 1 thenceforth had to be imported from 
other areas. Local. craftsmen gradually' began to concentrate on 
iron-. and later steel-processing, rather than iron- and steel-
producing. 
From the late Middle Ages the most important articles produced in 
I" 
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and arou'nd Remscheid were agricultural illlplements, ego scythes and 
sickles and' weapons like swords, halberds and knives. 36 In the 
1Bt'h and 19th century the emphas i s changed gradually towards work 
tools, ego fi1es~ drilling tools, saws, pliers, etc., as well as 
fashionable articles for household use like waffle-irons and coffee 
grinders. 37 In Lennep, LUttringhausen and towns along the Wup-
per to the East of Remscheid (as in Barmen and Elberfeld) it was 
the textile industry which predominated, and began to flourish in 
the first quarter of the 18th century. 
In 1806 Remscheid and the Duchy of ~erg passed under French ad-
lOi ni strat i on and local industry suffered a sharp and 01 tter de-
cline, as a result of the Continental Blockade of Britain, and the 
erection of tariffs a 1 ony the Rhine by newly annexed territories 
which feared the economic power of the region. 3B However, 
French reforms swept away the feudal system and unshackled the eco-
nomy, thus aiding the development of local capitalism. The period 
of French administration also marked the beginning of tile ascendan-
.cy of Remscheid over Lennep. By the middle of the 19th century, the 
. product i DO of fil es and other work-tools had a 1 ready been trans-
ferred to factori es from the workshops of independent and sellli-
independent craftsmen. Some file-makers perSistently clung to their 
traditional way of 1 ife into the 20th century • but faced with the 
better organi sat i on and cheaper product i on of thei r cOlllpet itors, 
thei rs was· a cont i nuo~s 1y uphi 11 struggl e for survi Vd 1. On the 
other hand ribbon~making, centred in LUttringhausen and Ronsdorf, 
began to thrive mainly as a cottge industry. This form of organisa-
tion was retained successfully for the rest of the century into the 
the next. 39 
2. The Industrial Structure of Remscheid. 
As revealed in table I, Remscheid industry by the' second half of 
the· 19th century was unequ i voca l1y dom; nated by i ron- and 
steel-processing (tool-making), iron- and' steel-producing and 
'" 
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machi ne con'struct i on. These three branches together accounted for 
around 72 % ~f all the inqustrial establishments operating in the 
town' in 1913, and for 90 % of the total industrial workforce. Of 
the three main branches of the iron and steel industry, it was the 
iron- and steel-processing (tool-making) which was easily the most 
prominent in Remscheid with 573 of the iron and steel industry's 
total of 600 factories and workshops. However, in terms of workers, 
the eight establishments engaged in steel-producing as well as 
steel-processing in 1913, accounted for a quarter of the iron and 
steel industry's total. 
An idea of the structure of Remscheid's iron and steel industry can 
be obtained from table 2 which demonstrates the development of the 
industry between 1900 and 1928 in terms of size,and nUlllbers of wor-
kers employed in the various categories of establishments. The 
category wi th the yreatest number of estab 1 i shments was the work-
shop with between one and five workers, which with 565 made up 70 % 
of the industry's enterprises, employing however only 13 % of its 
workforce. At the other end of the scale were the four factories in 
the category empl oyi ng over 200 workers with a total of 3.126 or 
31 % of the industry's total workforce. The table shows a clear 
trend towards larger factories during the period between 1900 and 
1928, but also test ifi es to the res 11 i ence of the srna 11 workshops 
employing fewer than ten workers. 40 
The town's growth was a direct result of industrialisation. Whereas 
Remscheid had for centuries slumbered in the shadow of the walled 
market town of Lennep, it began its ascendancy with the introduc-
t i on of steam 1 ocomot i on both in the factori es and as a means of 
transport. The advent of steam created two necessary preconditions 
for industrial development in that it encouraged the concentration 
of production in larger units, thus regulating the organisation 
more efficiently. and it made the town more accessible by facili-
tat i ng. the supply of raw materi a 1 s from other areas, and the export 
of finished goods by railway. The construction of a rail link with 
Elberfeld was completed in 1868, and this factor more than any 
other was responsible for the acceleration of change in the for-
, .. 
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tunes of .the town. Railway engines facilitated the supply of raw 
materials required for Remscheid factories, because they were 
I 
be~ter suited to overcome the difficult terrain. Prior to this 
date, iron ore and coal had been transported by horse and cart at a 
notoriously slow pace, with irksome irregularity and at prohibitive 
costs. 41 The railway also doubtlessly aided local industry by 
conveyi n9 workers from .other more di stant areas to swell the ranks 
of those coming from the immediate hinterland to work in the fac-
tories. The rail network was extended in 18/6 with the construction 
of the .line from Lennep to Wermelskirchen and HUckeswayenj and a 
. 
link with,Cologne was established .five years later by the continu-
ation of this line via Opladen. A branch line frOll1 Kemscheid to 
Hasten ~as opened in 1884 ilnd the town's railwdY network was final-
ly comp'leted by the construction of the Kaiser-Wilhellll-13rucke span-
ning the deep Wupper valley at MLingsten for an extension of the 
line to Solingen, thus making the connection with OUsseldorf and 
Cologne. 
3. The Remscheid Working Class and its Institutions. 
Table 3 showing the demographic development of Relllscheid in the 
second half of the 1Yth century and the first decade of this, pin-
points the apogee of immigration during the years 189!'l to 1900, 
when around 50 % of the total increase in population was due to the' 
attraction of new workers from other areas. Table 4 shows that the 
substantial influx of labour also initiated a sizable increase in 
births in the ten years from 1895 to 1YU~. In contrast however to 
the last fi ve years of the 19th century. illulli yr~t ion dro\JjJed ab-
rupt ly. with the resul t that over 93 % of Kemschei d' s increase in 
population from 1900 to 1905 was attributable to a high birth rate, 
a fact which reflects the apparent readiness of newcolllers to have 
children once the uncertain transition from the declining standards 
of life in the country to the seeminyly illlproved prospects of urban 
existence had been effected.42 By ·recourse to tables relating 
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to the age st ructure and the rat i 0 of men to women. Lucas demon-
strates a relatively high percentage of married couples and r~la­
tively.few single men amongst the immigrants in Remscheid betw~en 
the ages of 25 and 40 years. 43 The pri nci pa 1 reservoi rs from 
which local industry drew its manpower were above all the Beryische 
Land and the areas mentioned above. The figures for religious de-
nomination supplied in table 3 suggest both a higher incid~nce of 
catholic immigration (confirmed by the known catchment areas). and 
as might be expected, a higher birth-rate amongst these people. The 
ratio of Protestants to Catholics fell from ca. 7:1 in 1890 to ca • 
. 
5:1 in 1905, with the latter more than doubling their number in the 
same peri od. Other Chri st i an denomi nat i ons w~re w~dk ly represented 
in Relllscheid, as were J~ws. Relllscheid also attracted r~latively few 
Po 1 es as most Po 1 ish i IIIlIIi grant s made for the coa 1 1111 nes of the 
l{uhr.44 
The 'rapid rise in Remscheid's population towards the end of the 
19th century led to an acute accollullodation problem which was to r~­
mai n a constant feature for the greater part of the peri od under 
ex~mination, despitelthe fact that ever more traditional Beryische 
slate-covered houses were bei n9 d~mo 1 i shed to make way for th~ 
grey and dreary appartment blocks which were being erected through-
oL!t Germany's industrial towns and cities at this time. The concen-
tration of large numbers of people in Mietskasernen was an example 
of the poor quality of life experienced by workers in industrial 
t~wns all over Germany in the 1 ast two decades of the 19th c~ntury. 
A further manifestat i on of thi s is the fall in the number of work-
ing class house owners and sitting tenants between 1890 and 1905 in 
Remscheid, and the increas~ in the number of 10dyers.45 The 
latter were usually single occupants of a room or more likely part. 
of a room, ie. a bed, in a private house. The rooms were only us~d 
at night to sleep in, as the Schlafganger (lodger) was generally at 
work for most of the day. Another variation of this relationship. 
cOllunon in Remscheid. was the Kostyang~r who in addition to his bed 
also receiv~d breakfast (consisting of bread and margarine, and 
coffee) and a warm meal in the evening (very often soup or perhaps 
· t'· 
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potato cakes or else jacket potatoes and quark or herrings). Before 
the advent of works canteens (introduced during the 1914/18 War), 
I . 
the Kostganger also took bread and soup to work in a container 
known locally as 'Elber'feld In Barlllen l46 • Duriny the first 
decade of this century the Kostganger in Remscheid paid a rent of 
somewhere in the region of 12 marks a month, a SUIII which was con-
s idered rather unreasonable dependi ng on the corMlonly poor board 
and lodgings offered. Schlaf- and 'Kostganger were fre4uently 
married men engaged in seasonal employment, or else men endeavour-
ing to establish themselves before sending for their families to 
, , . jOi n them. The majority, however t were probably young and si ngl e 
men who spent a cons 1 derab 1 e part of thei r 1 ives, between th~ age 
of 14 and the time when they married. in this type of acconunoda-
tion. Conditions in such houses varied, yet it was generally agreed 
that they tended to be unsatisfactory.47 The' houses were sllldll 
and families large, even without the presence of Schlaf- and Kost-
ganger; the latter were frequently confined to an attic roolll which 
they shared with others, a practice which was widely condemned as a 
regrettable but necefsary evil, owing to the chronic shortage of 
good housing. These conditions proved to be the source of much 
quarre 11 i ng and bi ckeri ng, between lodgers and landlord and be-
tween lodgers themselves. 
A si gni fi cant consequence of poor and inadequate hous i ng was the 
constant s~ream of criticism of the local authority's building pro-
grammes by the workers' political parties. The abject conditions in 
which many working-class families were compelled to live, provided 
ample p~opaganda material against a system which required manual 
labour, but was at best turgid, when it came to financing the con-
st'ruction of suitable dwellings. The failure to fJrovide the re-
quired number of flats and to renovate other buildings was a power-
ful weapon in the hands of socialist and communist politicians. 
Left to themselves, perhaps many workers would have borne thei r 
misery stoically, but the working-class movement, always ori the 
look-out for opportunities to attack, did not fail to exploit this 
serious lack. 
t" 
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"" Abuses :oi the unwritten contract between landlord and tenant wer~ 
conunonp 1 ace, with the former concerned about punctual payment. 
nciise and adherence to rules of the house, and the latter criticis-
ing the quality of food, the shabbiness of bedclothes, insufficient 
cleanliness and cramped condition"s. It is difficult to comment on 
whether lodgers recei ved fair treatment and value for money. Often 
the harassed landlady was not able to cope with her responsibili-
ties, and it was not unknown for" Single lodgers to be drawn into 
family quarrels and problems, being apprized of intimate details of 
family relationships and" difficulties in the process.4~ Insalu-
brious conditions and the lack of privacy were arguably the two 
most pros i1 i ent evi 1 s of th is kind of tenancy and • together with 
the eternal search for a cheaper arrangement, were undoubtedly the 
reasons for the rapi d turn-over of lodgers. The 5ch 1 af- and Kos t-
ganger's existence was not usually a happy one, even in clean and 
orderly houses, owing to the llIany restrictions. Often his life was 
downright miserable, brightened only by the knowledye that the 
season would pass and he would be able to return home again, or 
else his wife and children would soon be joining him. Young bache-
lors were most probably doomed to this arrangement until they took 
a wife and set up their own homes. The desire to escape, the dele-
terious accompaniments, the lack of privacy, the pilfering. biCker-
ing and danger of contagion were doubtless additional incentives 
fo~ marriage amongst young males cut off frollt their families in 
other parts of the Reich,. and compelled to suffer this type of 
accon~wdation.49 ' 
Young immigrant girls on the other hand. engaged in some industrial 
es tab 11 shments, poss i b ly enjoyed greater securi ty, from a materi a-
listic point of view, than their male counterparts, if they were 
allocated rooms or beds in a works' hostel like the one provided by 
the" Kammgarn-Spi nnerei Johann WUl fi ng und Sohn in Lennep. Such 
hostels, however, which had the explicit aim of preserving young 
people 'from" the e"vils of Kostgangertum50 and the latent profli-
gacy of" unprotected domicile, appear to have been exceptions in 
Remscheid around the turn of the century. Conceived with benign in-
'" 
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tention, 'such hostels were nevertheless -a mixed blessiny. Whilst 
they unmistakably offered security and the basis for an orderly 
routine existence, they also reflected the rigidly paternalistic 
attitude of the Wilhelmine bourgeoisie towards young workers. The 
register of house rules reads almost like those of penal institu-
tions. 51 
The Madchenheim provided by the WUlfing mill acco~nodated 126 young 
women around 1895, in rooms/dormitories containing between three 
and eight beds. The hostel's capacity was later extended to furnish 
places for a further 48 girls in eight rooms. The inmates.of this 
home were subject to constant supervision by hired staff charged 
not merely with the material well-being of their wards, but also 
and perhaps I/Iore illlportantly, with their lIIural welfare. The UllIlll-
present hand of authority 1Il0st 1 ikely contributed cOllsid~rdbly to 
ensuring a disciplined and pliant workforce and tended to obviat~ 
the problem of worker solidarity which was already prevalent in the 
Remscheid iron and steel industry. Indeed, the Deutscher Metall-
arbeiterverband (DMV) and its local antecedent, the Feilenhauer-
verein urged their members to eschew such aid and facll ities offer-
ed on behalf of the industrialists, for the precise reason that ac-
ceptance would render them more dependent and less flexible. 52 
In the local textile industry there was no equivalent attempt by 
the workers to frustrate the recondite motives of the employers. 
Instead, by accepting extra facilities provided by the elllployer, 
the Kammgarn employees allowed themselves to be bound ever more in-
extricably to the company by feelings of implicit moral obliga~iont 
fear of ejection from a company-owned flat or of being deprived of 
the use of the accompanying allotment, and a growing sense of iden-
tity with the company. 
Apart from the already mentioned hostel, works flats and allot-
ments, the Kanfngarn-Spi nnerei Johann WUlti n9 & Sohn provi ded a 
whole range of facilities which possibly helped.to enhance worker 
identity with' the firm. These facilities included: a grocery store 
operating on a non-profit basis,53 a library with a stock of 
552 volumes, a social club with a billiard table, wash-houses and 
... 
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baths on the workers' estate, baths on the works pr~mises, a school 
for young children. sewing, darning and mending classes, as well as 
I 
do~estic science and first· aid courses in the evenings, a compul-
sory sickness benefit scheme. a voluntary fi re servi ce and a host~ 1 
for young men. acconUllodating 43. Whereas it has been SU9!;1ested that 
the practice of Kostgangertum in some cases actually furthered 
working class solidarity,54 residence· in a works hostel was 
perhaps more likely to encourage petty rivalries and jealousies, 
servility in the face of authority and dishonesty as a cons~quence 
of the fear of harsh punishment. 
In the hope of alleviating the housing probl~n, a number of wealthy 
local industrialists formed a building SOCiety cal1~d th~ G~lIIein­
nutziger Bauverein. 55 to help workers to acyuire their own 
small flats or at least to provide these for rent. In a lIIodest 
building programme the building society erected houses containing 
smaller units 'which workers could afford. Its main activity centred 
on Honsberg which over the next quarter of a century WdS !;Iradually 
transformed from an old traditional settlement into a working-class 
estate comprisiftlY numerous . austere edifices, the likes of which 
were present in all the industrial centres of Germany during the 
last ten years of the 19th century and the first 25 years of this. 
The GemeinnUtziger Bauverein, wtlich also participated in joint ven-
tures with the local authorities, provided a model which was later 
imitated by other building societies in Remscheid and surroundin\;j 
towns~ 
Some of the 1 arger compani es llke the 135 I and Manneslllann IVlotoren-
und Rohrenwerke also owned houses containing flats which wer~ let 
to their emp10yees. 56 These however were relatively few in num-
ber and //Iade little impression on the calamitous shortage of suit-
able acconunodation, which proved to be:Cause of the departure of a 
number of workers and thei r famil i es for other towns offeri n9 both 
jobs and flats. 57 The shortage of accommodation was a constant 
feature of Remscheid's development throughout the period in ques-
tion. Indeed, it would be fair to suggest that the problem was not 
solved until well after the Second World War, although the effects 
" , 
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of the bombing raids were primarily responsible for the acute post-
war shortage. An accommodation census held in t'lay 1918 revealed a 
I . 
to~al of 13,718 occupied flats/dwellings for a total population of 
67,393. 58 The size of the dwell ings in the town ranged from one 
, 
room to houses of eleven rooms and more. Well over half the dwel-
1ings (7,710) contained between one and three rooms with the most 
popul ar category bei n9 that of two rooms and a kitchen. With an 
average of 4.9 persons per flat/dwelling and the knowledge that nu-
merous manufacturi n9 famll i es occupi ed 1 arge hou~es whil st over 
half of the occupied dwellings in Remscheid contained only three 
, . 
rooms and less, it is evident that there was widespread overcrow-
ding. 
The calamitous housing situation is, however, better illustrated by 
the results of an official survey made in 1911. 637 dwellings were 
inspected, and it was ascertained that excluding Kostganyer, there 
was an average of 2.0 people per bed. 59 
If interior living conditions of the workers were on the whole un-
sat i sfactory, the decentra 1 i sed nature of the town i ncorporat i n9 
many scattered hpmlets, ensured a much more tolerable environment 
than in most other industrial centres. Whilst areas like Honsberg, 
Kremenho 11, Laspert, Rosenhuge 1 and 131 i ed i nghausen were gradually 
tak i ng on the appearance of typi ca 1 contemporary working-cl ass co-
lonies (the indigenous slate-covered 13ergische Haus still persisted 
however, to di spel the danger of ~ompl ete 1y dreary uniformity).' 
they were nevertheless seperated by open fields and wooded slopes. 
A ten or fifteen-minute walk in almost any direction from the town 
centre would ensure a relatively secluded spot for those wishing to 
escapefrolll the noise and fumes of a busy industrial community. 
The working class estates, which were gradually taking shape around 
the turn of the century, developed a close-knit community spirit of 
a kind more usually associated with small villages than urban manu-
facturing centres. Areas like Honsberg provided at least a sem-
blance of semi-autonomy, a self-contained community of several hun-
. . 
dred people, still small enough to retain .a sense of familiarity 
t"" 
- 24 -
and identity, yet large enough to incorporate IlIultifarious facili-
ties supporiing an alternative system, which existed adjacent to, 
but also in opposition to, the ruling bourgeois culture. The harsh 
repression of Social Democracy, which attained new heights during 
the period of the Sozialistengesetze, played a significant part in 
moulding together a working class which created its" own social 
infra-structure based on class solidarity and discipline. The ex-
cluSion of Social Democrats from participation in many aspects of 
political life, which persisted long after the Anti-Socialist Laws 
had lapsed, served if anything to strengthen the workers· endeavour 
to overthrow the capitalist system. The solidarity therefore which 
was manifested inwardly in a cOllullunity like Honsbery, was balanced 
by suspicion and t!nmity displayed towards the outsidt!. This kind of 
sol idarity revealed itself whenever representat ives of authority 
ventured into terri tory wh i ch to all i ntt!nts and purposes was re-
garded by the residents as theirs. The intrusion of authority, be 
it in the form of police officers making enquiries, or bailiffs re-
claiming furniture or appliances in lieu of unpaid debts, or else 
landlords assisted by police in enforcingevictions~ was always 
1 ikely to generate hostile feel ings which, depending on the momen-
tary political situation, might erupt into riots. At times these 
required the dispatch of reinforcements to rescue beleaguered com-
pani ons bei n9 pelted with fl ower pots, refuse and other objects 
hurled from upstairs windows. As we shall see later, during the 
last phase of the Weimar Republic the police were lured into am-
bushes in Honsberg and more than once were warned to keep out" on 
pa in of death. The pattern of sk i rrni shes with authority earned 
Honsberg and other working-class districts a reputation of some 
notoriety, which in turn served to establish a grudging respect on 
the part of the police and local authorities and a sense of securi-
ty on the part of 'residents hostile to officialdom. 
Working-class districts like Honsberg were equipped with their own 
schools, shops and public houses."Life was noisy and intimate owiny 
above all to the many children and the close proximity of neigh-
I" 
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bourse Overcrowded houses and busy narrow str~ets, which served the 
I 
children instead of playgrounds, dominated the everyday scene. In 
. 
the sununer months in part i cu 1 ar much time was spent out of doors, 
standing on street corners or si tt i ng on doorsteps watchi ny the 
comi ngs and goi ngs. Before the appearance of the motor car, the 
only traffic passing through the narrow streets were hand-carts and 
bogies (Bollerwagen) and carts drawn by. horses. After 1893 tram 
cars teferred to as the 'Lektrische' ran through Remscheid, a 
nove lty seen only in one other town in the German Rei ch ~ri or to 
that date. 60 
Two institutions vied for the position of major cOllullunication 
centres in working-class districts. These were the public house ana 
the corner Shop,'Schmerwenkel'61. The latter were mostly small 
overcrowded shops, sometimes converted living rooms, which tended 
to stock almost everything from groceries to kitchen utensils and 
clothing. If the pub was the domain of the working man, the corner 
shop was equally that of his wife. Apart from the shop's ostensible 
function of retall outlet, it served just as importantly as an ex-
change for. local gossip and news, with the owner being one of the 
best .informed individuals in the whole area, at least as far as 
small-talk was concerned. 
The publ ic house was ,the centre of both organised and unor!;lanised 
social life in working-class districts, as it provided facilities 
for companionship, meetings, sporting activities, social !;lallles and 
the consumption of alCOholic beverages in warm and pleasantly fallli-
liar surroundings. For unorganised entertainment the public house 
offered the customer a place to exchange views with friends .and 
acquaintances. In many pubs newspapers were provided for the use of 
customers, and 1lI0st working-class public houses had Skat cards and 
dice for those wishing to use them. Skittle alleys were still a 
rarity in public houses, with only a'few of the larger establish-
. ments ~ei ng in a pos it i on to afford them. Board games like domi noes 
and chess. were also played in some pubs. 
1 f the pub 1 i c house was the centre of unorgani sed soci all ife. it 
became - more importantly for the working-class movement - the 
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meeting p,lace for the majority of social and'political clubs, par-
ticularly ~fter the lapse of the Anti-Socialist-Laws in 1890. 
During the twelve years when the Social Democratic Party was prohi-
bited, members had been compelled to seek other venues for their 
meet i ngs, frequently in pri vate fl ats and houses, or else they 
quite cOIMlonly founded ostensibly non-political clubs (Tarnvereine) 
in the hope of outwitting the authorities and thus avoiding obser-. 
vation. Towards the end of the 1880s a whole spate of such clubs 
. with dubious names and aillls was founded in Remscheid, although few 
of these managed to escape the notice of the police. Be~~een 1884 
and 190062 , for example, there was a total' of 50 recreational 
clubs, 25 of them dedicated to smoking and conversation. It is pro-
bable that many such clubs genuinely pursued their stated intention 
of providing a suitable meeting place where members could relax and 
enjoy a quiet smoke. A sizeable number however were secret Social 
Democratic organisations like the I/{aucherclub Einiykeit l at Sie-
pen, which was founded in 1889 and had 29 members. Llespite yreat 
caution this club was not able to evade the careful scrutiny of 
police spies. Th,e same fate befell the IRaucherclub Gute Hoffnunyl 
of Heidhof, which was founded in 1890 and had IS·members. The well- ~ 
informed police noted that the club1s membership .consisted almost 
exclusively of known Social Democrats. The Gesellschaft Tha1ia 
founded in 1886 existed ostensibly as a chess, domino and gallles 
cl ub, but as over ha 1f of its melllbers were Soci a 1 Delllocrats, it was 
infiltrated by police spies and very soon ceased its activities. 
Many clubs of this kind put in only transient appearances before 
falling victim to police vigilance. Probably the two laryest aud 
most important Tarnvereine (camouflaged organisations) in /{emscheid 
during this period were the Leservereine (reading circles) Hasten 
and Reinshagen. In 1886 these two clubs had together 10563 mern-. 
bers and virtually represented the aims of the party. organising 
and conduct i n9 elect ions in. the absence of the off1 cia 1 SPD and 
i nvit i ng speakers to i ~ 1 ega 1 po 1 it i ca 1 meetings. Such gatheri nys 
were occasionally held in the open air on the town boundary. In the 
event of an unexpected visitation by the police, the participants 
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would cross over the boundary out of reach of local police juris-
diction. 64 The SPD's presence was also maintained in the vari-
I 
ou~ Fachvereine (craftsmen's clubs) like the Metallarbeiterverein 
(metal workers' club) and the Feilenhauerverein . (file-makers' 
club), the latter were generally recognised as being the most mili-
tant workers in the area. It is also possible that sOlne of the many 
Brieftauben- and Tierzuchtvereine (pigeon fanciers and livestock 
breeding clubs) were merely facades for the local SPD, but there 
appears to be no conclusive evidence to support this supposition. 
However,. it is known that Social Democrats became members, <?f bour-
geois clubs and organisations in order to gain respectability by 
displaying their patriotislll. SOllle Socialists werl! even to be found 
in the ranks of the bel1iyerl!ntly .mti-socidlist KrleyerVl!rellle 
(ex-Servicemen's associations). At least three of these, the Mors-
bachet Landwehrverein, the Landwehrverein "Mit Gott fUr Koniy und 
Vaterland" and the Landwehrverein Deutscher Kaiser unwittingly pro-
vided at least a temporary refuge for some SPD members. It is quite 
1 ikely that some followers of the SPD pursued legitimate aims in 
. bourgeois clubs.tespecially if they had already been members prior 
to the: Anti- Socialist-Laws. It may also be assumed that they 
attempted to counter propaganda and opi ni ons host 11 e to the SPl) 
within their respective organisations. 
Despite their repression, the authorities were unable to destroy 
the local party group. which needed to be particularly inventive in 
order to remain one step ahead of the police. It is evident that 
even at the risk of losing their licences some publicans were wil-
ling to accommodate illegal Social Democratic meetings 'when neces-
sary. Such landlords were later rewarded by the continuous patron-
age of workers' clubs and organisations affiliated to the ,Social 
Democratic Party (SPD). From time to time the workers' political 
parties.{Social Democratic Party - SPO -. Independent Social Demo-
cratic Party - USPD-. and the Gerlllan COllllllunist Party- KPO -) cir-
culated their affiliated clubs and organisations with lists of 
approved public houses. 65 Landlords whose establishments were 
situated in predominantly working-class districts found themselves 
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placed in' a dilemma by the introduction of the Anti-Socialist Laws. 
On the one hand they faced ruin if convicted of knowingly harbour-
, ing a proscribed organisation, on the other they could not easily 
ignore the fact that the majority of their clientele were local 
working-class residents, many of whom supported, or sympathised 
with, the SPO, and expected some kind of collusion, at least to the 
point of feigning ignorance of the real identity of the organisa-
tion in question. 
The two decades follow}ng the lapse of the Anti-Socialist-Laws wit-
nessed an energet i c organi sat i on and development of club 1 i.fe wi th-
in the local working-class movement. The upsurge, which was encou-
raged by the fall of repressive legislation, coincided with the 
peak years of illuniyration. The Social DClllocratic party dlld its II10WY 
affil iated organisations, which had elllerged frolll the twelve-year 
ban unbroken, if not unscathed, were now able to operate legally, 
although the continued circulation of black lists66 between the 
authorities and employers still inhibited many working-class sympa-
thisers. A wide range of workers' clubs and societies were founded 
during these years, catering for allllost every conceivable taste. 
Apart from following the substantive aims of the respective organi-
sations, it was the intention of the working-class movement to 
create favourable conditions within the clubs and societies, in 
order to pronlote class consciousness. Several'Arbeitergesangvereine 
(workers' choral societies) were founded during the last decade of 
the 19th century and the first decade of the 20th. The lIIale-voice 
choir had long been established in the Bergische Land as a tradi-
tional form of cultural expression.The local working-class movement 
recognised the importance of organising workers' choirs and employ-
ing these as representatives ~t concerts, festivals, demonstrations 
and funerals. Most districts had their own choirs and these were 
all later united, under the umbrella organisation Arbeiter-Sanger-
Kartell Remscheid. Some choirs like the Arbeitergesangverein 
"Einigkeit" in Reinshagen, founded in 1895, had' an eminently rt!-
spectable number of active singers, in this case 50, as well as 6U 
passive members. 67 Some of the workers' choirs reflected in 
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their names the hopes of the working class for a better futllre, 
like the "Mqrgenrot" (red dawn) of GroBberghausen or the "Vorwarts" 
(oRward, ) of Bliedinghausen. A female choir which was also ~ member 
of the Oeutscher Arbeiter-Sangerbund was merely call ed "Zukunft 11 
(future). Other choirs stressed their class solidarity and their 
determination to resist oppression. Names lik~ "Freie Sanyer" (free 
singers), "Freie Liederhalle" (free hall of song), "Proletaria" and 
"Gesellschaft Fidelio" (the last-named was a mixed choir founded in 
1903) are -examples of these. There were however many choirs with 
neutral names like "Sangerchor" of Stachelhausen, "Niegedac~t", the 
"Allgemeiner Arbeiter Gesangverein" of Hasten, the "Liederkranz" of 
Krelllenho 11, and the "Fri schauf" of LasjJert.' SOllle of these Ctlul rs 
lIIuy huv!;! also cloItercd fur wOlllen ,.lIId child,'cll. A childr'clI's chuil' 
was, however, constituted on the initiative of SPD councillor Wil-
helm Koch, a few years before the war. Whilst the workers' choirs 
natura 11y devoted much at tent i on to the repertoi re of Kdlilpfl 1 eder 
and songs which described working and living conditions, they were 
by no means restricted to these, and also included operatic works 
in thei r concert progr"lIulles. 
The local working class lIIovement had other lIIusical societies and 
clubs besides' choirs. In 1910, a Zitherverein (zither club) was 
founded, and shortly afterwards a mandolin orchestra. The major 
problem for musical societies was the purchase of sufficient. nUIll-
bers of instruments. Before the 1914/18 War, the OMV (Oeutscher 
Metallarbeiterverband) introduced interest free loans to interested 
members to enable them to acquire their own instruments. A mOde'st 
amount was then paid weekly until the debt was settled. 68 The 
financing of working men's clubs and societies on the whole placed 
them in a disadvanto.geous position in comparison with their fre-
quently more prosperous bourgeois counterparts, which existed col-
laterally in the same districts. Bourgeois clubs were often in a 
position to offer superior facilities for their members, and it is 
clear that they were able to tempt some workers' into their ranks, 
but as the workers' movement ga i ned momentulll and also began to 
achieve success in t~ese fields, the drain of talent diloinished. 
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Before the war there were at least three local allldteur theatrical 
groups whi C;h were members of the Deutscher Arbeiter-Theaterbund 
(Germdn workers' theatrical SOCiety), these were: the "Freie 
Vol ksbUhne ll69 • the Arbeiter-Theaterverei n "Bruderkette" of 
Hasten70 and the IIFrohsinnll of Goldenberg. These presentea 
drama eveni ngs and occas i ona lly concert eveni ngs in conjunct ion 
with various choirs and lIIusical- societies. ,On such occasions the 
theatrical groups presented one-act plays and short sketches. 
for those workers interested in breedi ny 1 i vestock there were a 
number of prospects within the local working-class moveQleJlt, al-
though it is not,clear whether this field was dominated by the wor-
,king class in Relllscheid. Between 1881 and 1910 there was a total of 
, , 
20 new clubs founded for brt!t!diny and rdclny jJl~eol\~. In l!HU tile 
pigeon fanciers had a total of 225 melllbt!rs and 5.800 birds.71 
The popularity of this sport however did not transcend the war, 
whi ch brought about an abrupt end with the confi scat i on of all 
raCing pigeons on account of the security risk. 
The were also a number of Kaninchenzuchtvereine (rabbit breediny 
'clubs)72 with headquartt!rs in working-class districts of the 
town, and a Ziegenzuchtverein (goat breeding club)73 founded in 
1894, which after the war boasted a total melllbership of 600, in 
three separate sections. Although such clubs were intent on breed-i 
ing for aethetic reasons. it is likely that some of their animals : 
were designated for the cooking pot to supplement family rations. 
The number of workers keeping goats almost certainly increased 
during and after the war, when it became evident that these animals 
were a valuable asset consideriny the frequent milk shortages. The 
keeping of livestock was a lony-established tradition in the Ber-
. -' 
gische Land reaching back to the Middle Ages and beyond. when crop 
farming was more or less abandoned on account of the unpropitious 
climate. The breeding of poultry was widespread in the area. with 
hens. ducks and geese being an almost compulsory part of the scene 
around the Kotten (small water-powered mills) scattered amongst the 
valleys and dells. for workers living in working-class districts, 
the only opportunity for keepiny poultry was by rentiny an allot-
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ment either from the local authoritles, their employers or from 
private owners. Workers' Schrebergartenvereine (allotment clubs) do 
noi appear to have made much impact until after the war, during the 
course of which the values of small allotments as a source of extra 
rat ions was amply demonstrated. After 1918 there were all otlllt!nt 
clubs in: Blidinghausen, Struck, Neuenkamp, Hohenhagen, Laspert, 
Holte~feld, Vieringhausen and Schuttendefle. 74 For those for-
tunate enough to acquire an allotment, there were several important 
advantages. An allotment enabled the family to forti,fy and enrich 
its'diet by providing fresh vegetables, particularly ,/otatoes, 
carrots, Kohlrabi, turnips, cabbage and salSify, which yrow well in 
this area. Furthermore the family might also keep livestock, thus 
'avalling themselves;frlilk ,and eggs on a regular basis. The allotlllent 
supplied outdoor exercise and a place to celebrate special occa-
si ons or else meet fri ends on long summer eveni ngs. Above all dn 
allotment provided a refuge from the problems of work and family, a 
place to which one could retreat in order to escape the crowded and 
noisy atmosphere of the working- class estates. The yearning for 
the peace and tranquillity of the countryside and the encounter 
with unspoiled nature far away from the smoking chilllneys, was a 
powerful unifying force particularly amongst the youth of the pre-
war era. Various movements like the tlNaturfreunde u were still in 
their infancy75 by the turn of the century. Spontaneous and 
semi-organised groups from all social classes and backgrounds 
headed for the countryside on weekends and public holidays. In ReUl-
scheid working-class youth was organised in the Freie Arbeitt!r 
Jugend which was officially founded in 1909.76• Prior to this 
date local working-class youth most likely undertook hikes on an 
unorgani sed bas is, but nevertheless with the awareness that they 
did not belong to bourgeois youth groups. The working-class youth 
organisation was active in six main areas: education, music, hik-
ing, sports, trade union and party. Hiking excursions were designed 
to attract new members and infuse these with social ist values and 
tradition, if these were not already supplied in the home environ-
ment. A constant priority of all affiliated organisations to the 
• 
, 
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working-class movement was to prevent working-class youth from 
• joining bou~geois groups. The socialist youth organisation became a 
vital link in the chain of working-class organisations. and in Ren~ 
scheid boasted a ~onsiderable membership. It provided a convenient 
opportuni ty for meeting persons of the same age !;)roup and of the 
oppos i te sex in a soc i ety wh i ch was intent on separat i ng them. 
Count 1 ess marri ayes ensued from fri endsh i ps formed in the youth 
movement. 77 The Freie Arbeiter Jugend of Remscheid organised 
hikes to the Siebengebirge. the Eifel and Sauerland,78. and it 
was on the latter outing in 1913 that they met up with several mem-
bers of the "Naturfreunde" from Cologne. The contact was rt!peated 
at Mi.ingsten 1 ater that year J and it was deci ded to found a 1 OCd 1 
group of this organisdtion. The resonance was so strong that the 
fo 11 owi n9 year Remschei d was chosen as the venue of the annua 1 
regional meeting (Gautag). Despite police respression79 the 
meeting was an overwhelming success and the local movement was able 
to attract· new members. The "Naturfreunde" - .al though open to all 
comers - established a close link with. and became ont! of the sup-
porting pillars .of, the working class movement in Rernscheid, sur-
viving to the present day. and thus constituti,ng an important ele-
ment of continuity throughout and beyond the period covered by this 
study. The "Naturfreunde ll did not content themsel ves merely with 
hi,king, after ~he war they also organised folk dance lIlusic groups. 
a natural history soclety, as well as a photographic society and a 
sectidn catering for winter sports enthusiasts.80 The "Natur-
freunde ll also attracted cyclists of all ayes.81 Although the 
local terrain is not particularly conducive to cyclin!;): tile 
working-class movement constantly tried to accommodate bike enthu-
siasts. ,In Remscheid there were two workers' cycling clubs. both 
founded 1 n 1898. The Arbeiter-Radfahrer-Bund "$01 i daritat "82 
was the more durable, existing until the Nazi seizure of power in 
1933. The Arbeiter- Radfahrer-Verein· l'Ein1gkeit"83 did not sur-
vive long, most likely being absorbed either by the "S0 1idaritat" 
or the "Naturfreunde". 
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Gymnastics' and swimming were two sports which were later to capture 
the imagination of the workers. In the pre-war era, however, nei-
ther appears to have been well organised at the local level in Ren~ 
scheid. The network of working-class organisations also extended to 
more practical areas than those mentioned so far, and three of 
these ventures 1 aunched duri n9 the fi rst decade of the twent i eth 
century were destined to play a major integrating role in the deve-
lopment of the local movement. These were: the Konsumgenossenschaft 
(cooperative society) "Einigkeit", founded in 1902, the local SPD 
newspaper "Remscheider Arbeiter Zeitung"(later "Bergische. Volks-
stimme"),founded in 1904, and the Volkshaus founded in 1910.84 • 
The Konsumgenossenschaft's contribution to the local workers' move-
ment was considerable in ttJat it flot only supplied workers anu 
their families with groceries at e4uitable prices but also beCdllle 
an extraordinarily successful recruiting agency for the workers' 
cause by introducing individuals to the political ideals of the 
SPD. In this way the movement gained the support of some elelllents, 
who might otherwise have remained out of reach. On the other hand, 
the already politically aware would not consider making their lJur-
chase anywhere else other than at the Konsum (coop). The political 
aspects of shopping were grasped very early in Remsclleid.~5 The 
Konsum arranged the catering at all galas and other functions held 
by the workers' movement, and gained valuable experience in buying 
and processing in bulk. This experience, as we shall see in the 
next chapter, was to benefit all the inhabitants of Relllscheid on 
the outbreak of war in 1914, irrespective of their political con-
victions. 
Regarding the political and trade union development of the local 
workers' 'movement down, to 1914, one can already discern a radical 
tradition long before the turn of the century. As Lucas rightly in-
dicates, the radicalislll evident in Remscheid is that of the master 
craftsman. already declasse by mid-century. initially compelled to 
produce hi s goods on conuni ss ion. a lthough st ill as an independent 
artisan. but later being forced to renounce his independent status 
and seek employment in the factory. Remscheid workers first re-
belled in 1848 when they destroyed a factory at Burg on the WUJ.lper 
• 
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which was producing cheap cutlery and scissors of poor qual i-
ty.86 from I this time onwards the· struggle to retain indep~dent 
or' at least semi-independent status demanded the introduction of a 
longer working day for smaller master craftsmen, their journeymen 
and apprentices, in order to compensate for lower prices by in-
creased production. In such establishments a 16-hour day and six-
day week were no except ion. Lucas tells us that journeymen and 
apprentices were prepared to share this .burden only as long as 
there was still any hope of qualifying in their trade and founding 
their own businesses. Not only were employees in slllall establish-
ments required to work longer hours, but also their wages were less 
than those paid to factory workers. Furthermore the constant pre-
sence of the owner or lIIembers of his f alii 11 y exerted cons i derab 1 e 
pressure on these workers and afforded them 1 itt 1 e scope for tellliJO-
rary relief from their tasks, which in any case required a high 
degree of skill and concentration. As hope of attaining independellt 
status receded, so too did the numbers of journeYlllen and appren-
. tices seeking employment with small craftsmen. Faced with the 
fierce competition from the thriving factories, playued by an eter-
nal shortage of capit.al to finance the acquisition of machinery, 
and unable to attract workers into their establishments, many inde-
pendent craftsmen had not other course but to j oi n the i nfl ux of 
immigrants to the factories. 87 The years of unrewarded struyyle 
and the inevitable elimination under the prevailing circumstances 
were radicalising factors which affected a large section of skilled 
craftsmen-cum-factory'workers in the Relllscheid iron and steel· and 
tool industry. It is 1 ikely that the declasse master craftsmen and 
their families, resentful of a system which had deprived them of 
their traditional status and way of life, were particularly amen-
able to socialist ideas and began to organise and agitate for the 
overthrow of capitalism. 
The fil e-makers were the most radi ca 1 group of workers in and 
around Remscheid.88 The reason f6r their radicalism is to be 
found in thei r prolonged struggl e for independent status against 
. encroachi ng capital i sts, who, duri n9 the fi rst ha 1£ of the 19th 
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century operated a. putt i ng-out system whi ch amounted to severe ex-
ploitation.' The craftsmen were obliged to deliver the !:IOOdS them-
selves to buyers frequently living as far distant as the Sauerland. 
Such journeys were undertaken on foot, transporting the files on 
their shoulders in a "Liewermangken" (a basket carried over the 
shoulder on a stick) supported by a IDra9stock",89 and sume-
times taking two or three da~s. On account of their Skill, the ver-
satility of their excellent products and the fact that they were 
able to survive longest as owners of their own n~ans of production, 
. the fi l,e-makers came to embody the spi ri t of the honest i nd'ustri ous 
workers resisting, not unsuccessfully, the capitalist system. The 
admiration in which he was held locally, and his experience of 
fierce exploitatjon which induced him to organise at an early 
stage,90, elevated the file-maker to an elite-position in tile 
workers I inovement. A number of hi stori ans91 have sU9yested that 
metal workers were quite docile before the First World War in com-
parison with the coal miners of the Ruhr. Their findinys which lIIay 
be valid for that region92 should, however, be handled care-
fully, so. as io avoid misleading generalisation. tlarrington 
Moore93 and Peter N. Stearn94 appear to base their conclu-
sions on the situation in large steel-making plants in the Ruhr, 
where di sunity· seems to be quite pronounced owi ng to compartmenta-
lisation and specialisation, the wide range of pay differentials 
and the fear of dismissal which was norlllally accolllpanied by forfei-
ture of pension rights and tenancy of company-owned flats. David 
Crew points to the experience of large factories, but also suygests 
that solidarity, which is an important prere4uisite for a radical 
movement, was more 1 i ke ly to develop in slIIa 11 er workshops where 
workers were better integrated. Crew cites the case of file-makers 
in a small factory95 to illustrate this pOint. 
The 'situation in Remscheid. with its predwRinance of small factories 
and workshops was very different; hence incollling workers could be 
better integrated. The fact that the Remscheid workers I movement 
was older and therefore more firmly establ ished than its counter-
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parts in the Ruhr also accounts in part for the qualitative diffe-
rence in the radicalism of the workforces. A further significant 
I . 
di,fference however is to be found in the types of industry: in Rem-
scheid tool-making. This industry requires a highly skillea work-
force. Remscheid's tool makers and metal workers were no exception. 
They displayed a considerable degree of professional pride and 
interest96 and may be described as an 'occupational community' 
rather like Crew's coal miners of the Ruhr. 97 
Whatever the real situation in the Ruhr before the First World War 
regarding the militancy or docility of the 'metal workers. the 
. . 
. latter term can' in no way be employed to descri be the Rernschei d 
workers. Following the repeal of the Combination Act in 1869.98 
the Remscheid file-lIIilkers fouyht their first industrial dispute to 
establish a uniform wage. Three years later they succeeded in forc-
iny a wage increase by taking strike action. Yet a futtler dispute 
in the following year. 1873. was answered by a lock-out by the 
1 aryer factori es. whereupon the fi le-makers went on stri ke for a 
period of five months to force the outcome in their favour. In IB87 
the Feilenhauer-Innung (file-nwkers guild) was abandoned in favour 
of a more modern form. The Feilenhauer-Verein (file-makers club) 
was founded with a membership of 700 and aimed at the prinCiple of 
minimum prices to safeguard members and ensure the level of quali-
ty. The local employers also soon regarded this arrangement as ad-
vantageous and sanctioned its introduction. Furthermore. they 
agreed to employ or cOlllmission only members of the Feilenhauer-
Verein. a decision which precipitated an increase in membership. 
The run of success was halted in 1890. following the organisation 
of file manufacturers. when the file-makers again tried to gain a 
wage increase by strike action. The action was unsuccessful and two 
of the strike leaders. one of them was Max Kbnig. later Regierungs-
prasident in Arnsberg. were exiled from Remscheid. In the same year 
manufacturers from all branches of the iron. steel and tool-making 
industry convened to form the Bergischer Fabrikanten-Verein (manu-
facturers' association). under the chairmanship and vice-chairman-
ship of Reinhard Kotthaus and Moritz Bbker respectively. With 
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Arnol d Ma'nnesmann, Oscar Hessenbruch and Emil S~enllellldl\n - d 11 
representat ives of bi g bus i ness - also on the execut i ve cOllunit tee, 
it·is apparent that policy was determined more by the larger esta-
blishments, although small companies were also represented. 99 
The organisation of employers in the Fabrikantenverein lIIay be re-
garded as a counter-measure to that of the file- makers and marked 
a turning point in industrial relations in Remscheid when the ini-
tiative began to swing back gradually in favour of the manufac-
. turers. In 1903 the local employers extended their organisation, 
foundi ng the Arbeitgeberverband von Remschei d un'd Umyebuny e. V. 
(employers association),100 which had the specific ailll of 
representing the manufacturers in all questions relating to in-
dustrial disputes with tile workers. Melllber cOlllpanies were required 
to honour the agreement, that in tillles of strike they would refrdin 
from emp1 oyi ng stri kers from member fatori es. The elllp 1 oyers I asso-
ciation continued to make alllple use of black lists. In 19lU they 
introduced the Zwangsarbeitsnachwei s, a cOlllpul sory service record 
. for workers engaged by member compani es. The employee was supp 1 i ed 
with a work book which·was kept in the possession of his employer 
for the duration of his employment. On termination of employment, 
.the worker was handed the book containing his up-dated record to be 
, . 
presented to his next employer, who could then consult this before 
making his decision. Employment without a work-bOOk was not 
allowed, so that in the event of dismissal for reasons of trade 
union activity or party agitation, the worker was often left with 
no other choice but to leave Remscheid in search of a job. 
The first attempt by Remscheid workers to form a trade union was in 
1886101 ' when they founded a 1 oca 1 group of the Hi rsch-
Ounkerscher Gewerkverein which was not prohibitl:!d by thl:! Anti-
, Socialist Laws. 102 However this organisation was too con-
·ciliatory for local workers who in 1891 founded a local branch of 
the OMV with 89 members. Th is move 1 ed to the disband i ng of the 
Feilenhauerverein the following year. However, disaffected OMV-
members later (1896) refounded the local organisation in preference 
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to the DMV~ The quarrel with the DMV was one which remained unre-
solved throughout this trade union's lifetime. The relationship 
between the local branch and headquarters was rarely amicable. As 
_ we shall see in the next chapter,· tension, marked the relationship 
during the war years. In the immediate post-war period. the situa-
tion deteriorated considerably until it ultimately callle to a break, 
accompanied by ugly scenes and Ulutua 1 recrimi nat i on. Attempts to 
patch up the quarrel were never really successful and the interim 
truce was always fragile. 
The Feilenhauerverein finally ceased to exist in 1908 when ~embers 
decided to return to the DMV. In 1906/07 local rasp-makers laid 
down their tools in support of a wage clailll which they were able to 
force .through. The strike lasteo five dlld a halt munths and 111_ 
volved only 86 workers ellljJloyed in 32 _factories. lhe rasjJ-lIIdkers 
were partially successful in that the employers dyreed to lI\eet 
their minimum demand ,of a 7 1/2 % rise. 103 Up to the outbreak 
of war there was only one other st ri ke of note in I{elllschei d J the 
great file-makers' strike of 1910/11, when the local file-makers 
went on strike to secure a piece-work rate for machine-produced 
files, a minimum hourly rate of 60 pfennigs for machine operators 
work i ng on .0. day-l abour '~as is, a reduct i on in work i ng hours frolll 
, ten or twelve to nine and a half per day and the introduction of 
the half-day holiday on Saturdays. The strike lasted six and a half 
months and was supported at its peak by 1.142 workers in 31 fac-
tories. The employers answered the strike with a lock-out which 
affected around 500 workers and was eagerly supported by the pol_ice 
and law-courts. In all, 90 workers were charged with various 
offences against 9 153 of the Gewerbeordnung (trade regulations. 
act) wh i ch carri ed a pri son sentence of up to three months. The 
strike which earned the approval of the DMV was finally broken by 
the -introduction of black-legs from outside. During the six and a 
half months. particularly during th~e winter months, the strikers 
and their families suffered tremendous hardships and misery. Strike 
pay1which was 15 marks per week for unmarried workers and 24 marks 
for married men plus one mark per child,constituted only inadequate 
t"" 
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remunera~ion for lost earnings. In the face of great adversity the 
strikers showed remarkable courage and determi nat i on and thus 
gained the sympathy and admiration of fellow workers beyond the 
boundaries of Remscheid. The tactics used by the employers evoked a 
great deal of acrimony amongst the Remscheid working class, and did 
much to poison industrial relations locally for a considerable time 
to come •. The great Feilenhauerstreik which ended in defeat for the 
stri kers, became a mil estone of the 1 oca 1 workers' movement and was 
imbued with almost legendary qualities over the following decades 
and beyond. Instead of the calculated intimidatory ~ffect of the 
introduction of the work-book during the course of the strike, the 
emp 1 oyers observed the undes i rab 1 e swell i ng of 1 oca 1 Df't'lV-lIIelllber-
ship. Even u~or~anised workers perceived in the introduction of 
this fIIeasure a danger which could only be overCOllle by oryanist:!d 
res i stance. At the end of 1910 the 1 oca 1 branch of the uni on nUIII-
bered 4,199 members, roughly a fifth of the local workforce. The 
employers and the authorities won a temporary victory in 1910/11, 
but in so doing unwittingly strengthened the workers' resolve and 
helped to radicalise them further. 
The interest of Remscheid workers. for radical socialist ideas has d 
long tradition reaching back to 1863 and the founding of the All-
gemeiner Deutscher Arbeiterverein (ADAV). This party which already 
. had cons i derab 1 e support in Remsche id and Ronsdorf put up a cand i-
date for the election to the Constitutional Reichstay of the North 
German Federation in 1867,104 and was successful on the 
second round when Dr. Reincke attracted almost 75 % of all votes. 
~owever, this candidate vacated his seat in the fo11owin~ year, 
thus necessitating a by-election, whiCh was again won by th~ ADAV 
candidate fritsche. The forward march of Social Democracy continued 
through the 1870s and 1880s until by the end of the period of the 
Anti-S.ocialist Laws Remscheid was already regarded as a 'Brutstatte 
der Umsturzpartei'(a breeding ground for revolutionaries).105 
A local branch of the SPD was eventually founded in le91, and by 
1909 had 1,090 members, 106 and included a women's organisa-
tion which was formed in 1908. The SPO won every Reichstag election 
from 1895 onwards in Remsctieid and also enjoyed similar success in 
'" 
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Lennep, although here they were not as consistent. In local elec-
tions to the town council, the SPO gained its first breakthrough in 
1901, when despite the three-tier voting systeul, four of its candi-' 
dates became councillors. Despite their considerable supjJort· an-
chored in the working class, the four SPD councillors constantly 
found t~emselves' opposed by the entire council and mayor Nollau, 
who earned himself the title of 'Sozialistenfresser ' • The Social 
Democrats were for instance precluded from participation in council 
commissions. 
The SPD achi eved its hitherto greatest success in, Remscn,ei d, as 
indeed elsewhere, in the 1912 Reichstag election, when Wilhellll 
Dittmdnn was elected in the second 'vote, having narrowly failed to 
gain the required over-all majority in the first round. IU? 
Meanwhile theSPD faction on the town council had expanded consi-
derably and now comprised ten members: Wilhelru Koch, Eo tlenscheid, 
CorneliusGohr, Friedrich Voller, Paul Schlej)mann, Artur KanowSki, 
Rudolf Grimpe, Karl leverberg, August Markus and A. Hacken-
berg. 107 These men amongst others, such as: Julius Wetzel, 
Peter Stanul1, Christian Lenz, Emil Barthel, August Feld, Wilhellll 
Mengel, Ernst Leverberg, Peter Wipperfurth, Karl Lobach, Otto Bra0, 
Will i Grutz and A 1 bert GUllllllersbach, formed the core of the work i n9 
class movement's leading group in Relllscheid prior to the First 
Worl d War. Many of these llIen were master craftsmen (many of ttll:1I1 
file-makers) and veterans of the Anti-Socialist-Law period. SWI~ of 
them had been obliged to flee from Remscheid during those years and 
others had been jailed. Almost all had suffered in some way because 
of their political persuasion, both during and after the twelve-
year ban. Some of them were exceptionally well-read. Julius Wetzel, 
for e~ampleJ who was born in 1867 in East Prussia and came to Ren~ 
scheid in 1889109 , was an avid reader who Over the years 
collected together a su~stantial library which he made available to 
his fellow Socialists. Julius Wetzel's influence in SPU and later 
KPD circles in Remscheid was enormous. His hou,se was always open to 
young people from the Laspert area interested in discussing politi-
cal questions. l10 Wetzel married Anna Leverberg, daughter of 
, .. 
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another of Remscheid's most influential Socialis~ Karl Leverbery. 
The Wetze 1 s I had fi ve chll dren who all became members of the Freie 
Arbeiterjugend. These children used to bring their friends home 
regularly, so that there was a constant coming and going of work.iny 
class youths. Wetzel who had a gardening business, employed Wi 11 i 
GrUtz who also exercised influence on young visitors to the house • 
• Like Wetzel, he too was exceptionally well-read. The group of work-
ing class leaders was not based in any way on privilege, but at-
tained its position rather by ability, skill apd selfless dedica-
t i on to the cause. By way of marri age and fri endshi p the·l eadi ny 
group expanded, so that during the Weimar Republ ic Remscheid 
boasted a large party nucleus of talented, well-schooled and dedi-
cated leaders, whose existence in turn attracted othe~ gifted wor-
kers to th~ town. III 
A further important cons i derat ion concerni ng the soli darity ex-
pressed withi n the movement is that a 11 egi ance was frequent ly two-
fold. firstly to the movement/party and secondly/on account of the 
high level of inter-marriage between active families,to one's own 
kin.ll2 As in all leading groups, family background was d 
principal recolllmendation for a movement which was frequently sup-
pressed and therefore required above all loyalty and trustworthi-
ness. Inspite of this however, background was not enough - the 
movement needed and demanded devoted funct i onari es who were con-
scious of their class allegiance and the movement's aims, and the 
Remscheid workers' movement had a considerable amount of such ver-
satile cadre material throughout the period covered by this study. 
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TABLE 2 0 
The Development of Rerilscheid's Iron ana Steel Industry between 
1900 and 1928. 
Size according to year No. of Enterprises Total work force 
no. of workers 
.0 1900 ~b~ 1,312 
1 - 5 1905 5~4 l,2b6 
, 1909 41:m. 1,103 . 
1Y2B 42B 1,OBI 
1900 94 IlB 
6 - 10 1YO~ U4 ()~y 
1909 112 U2U 
192B 101 un 
1900 16 1,1!:>3 
11 - 20 190b' 16 1,1tiO 
1909 'cl 1 1,282 
. j 192B 11 1,040 
1900 45 1,464 
21 - 50 190!:> ~I 1,oeH 
1909 15 2,408 
192B 'cl I 2.~n!:> 
1900 23 1,662 
51 - 100 1905 33 2,266 
1909 29 2.099 
192B 3 'cl . 2,B39 
1900 2 342 
101 - 200 ' . 1905 / 948 
1909 11 1,596 
192B 13 11 /29 
1900 4 3,126 
" 
over 200 1905 4 3,014 
1909 6 4,U8/ 
, 192'cl B /,15/ 
Source: Wilhelm Enyelsand Paul Legers,Aus der Geschichte der 
Remscheider und Bergischen Werkzeuy- und Eisenindustrie, ~and 11, 
Remscheid 192B, p. 3B7. 
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TABLE 4 
Increase of Population in Relllscheid between 1895 and 1908. 
Years Li ve bi rths Difference Total no. Actual Increase in 
between of deaths popula- population 
births. and excluding tion due to 
deaths still-born increase ilfllfli yrat i on 
. 
. 
1895-1900 9,927 + 0,483 4.444 10,820 !:>,JJI 
1900-1905 10,440 + b,875 4.!:>1l 6,231 Jb~ 
19U!:>-lYUU o-.L124 + J,ooH ~.4~u b,4U~ 1, ~Jl> . 
Source: F.G. Ziegler, Die Tendenz d~r Entwickluny ZU/ll Grof3betrieb 
der Relflscheider Kleineisenindustrie, Berlin 1910. 
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INTRODUCTION 
NOT E S 
1 Cf., E. P. Thompson, The Making of the English Working Class, 
Harmondsworth 1963, p. 9 ff. 
2, Important landmarks and examples of this tradition are, amongst 
others: 
friedrich Engels, Conditions of the Working Class in England in 
, 1844, 1892. 
Henry Mayhew, London Labour and the London Poor, 1861/62, 
Charles Booth,' Life dnd Labour of the People in London, 
1902/04, 
Seebohm Rowntree, Poverty, 1901, 
B:atrice Webb. The Co-operative Movement in I3ritain, 1891, 
Sidney and Beatrice Webb, History of Trade Unionism, 1894, 
J.L. and B. Hammond, The Village Labourer, 1911, 
idem., The Town Labourer 1/60 to 1832, 1911, 
idem., The Skilled Labourer 1/60 to 1832. 1919, 
George Orwe'l. The Road to Wigan Pier, 193/, 
Other important works apJ)earing in more recent years are: 
G.D.H. Cole, British Working Class Politics 1832 to 1914. 1941, 
G.D.H. Cole and R. Postgate, The ConulIon People 1/46 to 194o. 
London 1949. 
Norman Dennis, fernando Henriques and Clifford Slaughter, Coal 
is our Life, London 1956, 
R 1 chard Hogyart. The Uses of Literacy, Harlllondsworth 19J/, 
LP. Thompson, The Making of the English Working Class, Ope 
cit. 
Brian Jackson, Working Class Community. Harlllondsworth 1968. 
Robert Roberts. The Classic Slum. Salford Life in the First 
Quarter of the Century, Harmondsworth 1971. 
3 Particularly the United States and France. 
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4 __ This is not to suggest that German historiography is devoid of 
labour Mstory. Empirical studies like that of Paul Gohre, 
'Lebensgeschichte eines modernen Industriearbeiters, the substan-
tial number of memoirs like Ludwig Tureks, Ein Prolet erzahlt, 
and descriptions of the everyday experience which are now bein~ 
rediscovered, testify to the contrary. However, such works did 
not constitute an accepted tradition in the sense of ~ritish 
Labour Hi story, and it may be argued that the lierlllan Workers' 
Movement tended to concern itself more with ideological ques-
tions and party organisation than examinations of life ).n work-
-ing class colonies and factories. 
5 Cf. Inunanuel Geiss, "Hestauration, Stagnation - produktive Kri-
se", in: idem., and Hainer Talllchind (edit.), AnSlchtell elner 
kUnftigen - Geschichtswissenschaft. Band I, Kritik, Theorie, 
Methode, MUnchen 1974, pp. 15-23; 
Manfred Asendorf, "Deutsche Fachhistorie und Sozialgeschichte", 
in: ibid., pp. 24-42; 
and Wilhelm Alff, Materialien zum Kontinuitatsproblem der deut-
schen Gesch i chte, Frankfurt a .fvl. 19/6; especi a 11y chapter en-
titled NInunanuel Geiss und das Kontinuitatsproblem - eine kriti-
sche Anlllerkung" • 
. 6 Cf. Richard John Evans (edit.), Society and Politics in Wilhel-
mine Germany. London 1978; 
see Introduction:"Wilhellll Il's Germany and the Historian", pp. 
11-39. 
7 Ibid., 
8 Ibid., 
9 Examples:-
George Ewart Evans, Ask the Fellows who Cut the Hay, 19bb; 
idem., The Days That We Have Seen, 191b; 
Honald Blythe, Akenfield: Portrait of an English Village, 1969; 
Ron Barnes, Coronation Cups and Jam Jars, 19/6; 
and A People's Biography of Hackney - Working Lives Vol. 1, 
1905-45, no date, 
Working Lives Vol. 2, 194~ - 19/0s, 1976. 
I·· 
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10 Erhard Lucas, Arbeiterradikalislllus. Zwei Formen von Radikalis-
mus in der deutschen Arbeiterbeweguny, Frankfurt a.M. 19/6. 
If David Crew, Bochum. Sozialgeschichte einer Industriestadt 186U 
- 1914, Frankfurt a.M., Berlin, Wien 1980. 
12 Lawrence Schofer, The Fonnation of a Modern Labour Force: Upper 
Silesia 1865 -·1914, London 1975. 
13 M. ·Nolan, Social Democracy and SOCiety. Working Class f<adi-
calism in OUsseldorf, 1890 to 192U, Cambridge 1981. 
14 Kl aus Tenfe lde, : Sozi a 1 geschi chte der ~ergarbeiterschaft an 
Rhein und Ruhr, Bonn, Bad Godesberg 1977. 
15 S.H.F. Hickey, "The Shaping of the German Labour Movement: 
Miners in the Ruhr", in: Richard J. Evans (edit.), OPe elt., 
pp. 215-240. 
16 Roland Giinther and. others, u[isenheim. Uie I:.rfahruny einer 
Arb~iterkolonie", in: Lutz Nietha~"er (edit.) Wohnen im Wdndel. 
Beitrage zur Geschichte des Alltagsin der burgerlicllell 
Gesel1schaft, Wuppertal 1979, pp. 188-211. 
1/ Dieter Langewiesche, "Politische Orientieruny und soziales Ver-
halten. Faudlienleben und Wohnverhaltnisse von -Arbeitern illl 
. 'roten' Wien der Ersten Republik", in: Lutz Niethan~er (edit.), 
OPe cit., pp. 171-188. 
18 William·Sheridan Allen, The Nazi Seizure of fower. The Experi-
ence of a single German Town 1930 - 1935, London 19b~. 
19 JUrgen Reuleeke ·and Wolfhard Weber (edit.), Fabrik, Falllilie, 
Feierabend. Beitrage zur Sozialgeschichte des Alltags illl 
Industriezeitalter, Wuppertal 1978. 
20 Lutz Niethanuner (edit.), OPe cit. 
21 Lutz Niethalllrner and Franz Bri.iggemeier, "Wie wohnten die Arbei-
ter im Kaiserreieh 1" in: Archiv fur Sozialgeschiehte Band XVI, 
1976~ 
22 Gerhard A. Ritter, (edit.), Arbeiterkultur, Konigstein/Ts.~ 
1979. 
23 Siegfried: Reek, Arbeiter nach· der Arbeit. Sozialhistorisehe 
Studie zu den Wandlungen des Arbeiteralltags, Lahn-Gie~en 
1977. 
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24 Martin Soder, Hausarbeit und Stamlltischsozialislllus. Arbeiter-
fami1ie t und A11tag illl deutschen Kaiserreich, Gie~en 1980. 
25' JUrgen Kocka, K1assengesellschaft 1111 Krieg. Deutsche Sozial-
geschichte 1914 - 1918, Gottingen 19/3, pp. 3-6. 
26 Cf. Gerhard A. Ritter and JUrgen Kocka (edit.), Oeutsche 
Sozialgeschichte. Dokumente und Skizzen, Band 11, MUnchen 19/4, 
p. 325 f., 
taken ~rom Bungeroth, "50 Jahre Mannesmannrbhren 1884 - 1934". 
27 For a differential examination of these two groups ~ee J~rgen 
Kocka, "The First World War and the 'Mitte1stand':. Gerlllan 
Artisans and White-Collar Workers", in: Journal of Cuntelllporary 
History. No. 8, 1973, pp. 101-123. 
28 Lodgers who rented a rOOIll, or part of a rOOIll, often ollly a IJed, 
usually in a private house or flat. If the arrallyelllent includeu 
meals, the lodgers were called Kostganger. 
Interesting studies in this phenomenon include: 
Niethammer and BrLiggellleier, "Wie wohnten die Arbeiter ..... , 
. op.ci t. 
Josef Etuner," "Wohnen ohne eigene Wohnuny. Zur sozialen Stellung 
von Unterrnietern und Bettgehern", in: Niethanuner (edit.), Woh-
nen 1m Wandel, Ope eit., 
idem. and BrUggellleier , "Sch1afganger, Schnapskasinos untl 
schwerindustrielle Kolonie. Aspekte der Arbeiterwohnull~sfraye 
illl Ruhryebiet vor delll ersten Weltkriey", in: Reulecke and Weber 
(e~it.) Fabrik •••• , Ope cit. 
29 For an interesting study of differing attitudes to the N~DAP, 
see H.A. Winkler, "Mittelstandsbeweyung oder Volkspartei ? Die 
soziale Basis der NSDAP", in W. Schieder(edit.), Veryleichende 
Sozia1geschichte faschistischer Bewegungen, Halllburg 1976. 
30 See Chapter 11. 
31 See Veroffentlichung der deutschen Akademie der Kunste zu Ber- ' 
1in, Lieder der Partei, Leipzig 1971, p. 49 f; 
and Wo1fgang Steinitz, Deutsche Vo1ks1ieder demokratischen 
Charakters aus sechs Jahrhunderten, West ~er1in 19/9, pp. 
424-429. 
. " 
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32 The;t6wn ~as also know~ by the epithet of 'Rotes ~emscheid' • 
33 See Erwin E. Stursbery, Remscheid und seine Gemeinden • 
. Geschichte, Wirtschaft, Kultu~, Remscheid 1969, p. 19. 
34 
35 
36 
37 
3B 
39 
40 
The annual ~nount of rainfall in and around Cologne is given as 
approximately 600 /lUll. In contrast the annual level of precipi-
" tation in the rectangle bounded by the Wupper exceeds 1200 lUll. 
Ibid., p. 36/37. 
Ibid., p. 56. 
Ibid., p. 82-85 
Ibid., p. 139. 
Ibid., p. 162. 
Ibid., p. 175. 
Hermann Ri nge 1 , Ueryische Wi rtsctldft zwi sctlen l/Yu und 1BbU. 
Probleme der Anpdssung und Eillylicderuny einer fruhilldustriel-
len Landschaft, Remscheid 1966, pp. 39-40. 
41 'Lucas, Ope ~i t., p. 31 f. 
42 Ibid., pp. 31-33. 
43 Ibid., pp. 46/47 and p. 53. 
There was a 'yearly average of 4,OUU lod~ers in Keruscheid in 
1,000 families between 1907 and 1911. 
44 For Polish imllligration in the Ruhr, see Christoph Klel3l11dnn, 
Polnische Beryarbeiter illl "Ruhryebiet 1870 - 194b. Soziale 
Integration und natiollJle Subkultur einer tvIinderhcit in der 
deutschen Industriegesellschaft, Gottingen 19/8, 
and idem ... "lur rec,htl ichen und" sozialen Laye der Polen inl 
Ruhrgebiet im Oritten Reich", in: Archiv fUr Sozialgeschichte. 
XVII, pp. 175-194. 
45 Lucas, OPe cit., p. 53. 
46 I nterv i ew wi th Ot to Rau. The 'El berfe 1 d 'n Barmen' was named 
after the twin towns which later, together with several smaller 
towns a ..nd vi11 ages merged to form the city of Wupperta 1. The 
container referred to here consisted of a cylindrical recep-
tacle to hold the soup or coffee and a lid which served as a 
bow1.orcup for drinking the contents, rather in the manner of 
the later vaccum flask, and is better known as a 'Henkelmann'. 
" . 
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47 Cf. Otto RLihle, Illustrierte Kultur- und Sittengeschichte des 
Proletaniats, Berlin 1930. 
48· Ibid. 
49 Information from Otto Rau who was obliged to spend a consider-
able period of time after his ar~ival in Remscheid as a lOdger 
in various houses. He complained of incessant quarrels over 
rent and the quality of board between lodgers and tenants. The 
turn-over in such houses was rapid, as lodgers constantly 
searched for more acceptable terms. 
> 
50 See Kubiak (no first name), Interessantes, Wissens.wertes, 
Erstaunliches, Kurioses aus 300 Jahren Geschichte der Firl1la 
Johann Wulfi ng und Sohn, 1973, brochure COllunelllora ti ny the 300ttl 
anni vt!rsary of the foundi ng uf tht! CUIII~dlly. 
51 Ibid. An example extracted frolll the house rules concerning tile 
daily routine, adequately reflects the paternalistic attitude 
of the owners to their workers:. 
'Fruh 5 1/4 Uhr gibt der Nachtwac~nann l1Iit der 
Glocke das Zeichen zum Aufstehen. Jede macht 
hierauf ihr Bett, wascht sich und geht zur Arbeit. 
OberflUssige Kleidunysstucke sind vow Schlafsaal 
zu entfernen und in den verschliessbareff Schranken 
aufzuhangen. nur das Handtuch findet am Kleiderhalter jedes Bettes seinen Platz. Vormittags 8 - 8 1/2 Uhr 
Ei nnehmen des Fruhstucks. Mittays 12 Uhr geHlei n-
schaftliches Mittagessen und Aufenthalt bis 1 Uhr 
i/O Speisesaal. Nachmittags 4 - 4 1/2 Uhr Einnehmen 
der Vesper und abends 7 1/4 Uhr gemeinschaftliches 
Abendessen und Aufenthalt im Speisesaal bis zum 
,Schlafengehen,welches im SOlluller UIII 10 Uhr, illl 
Winter um 9 1/2 Uhr erfolgt. Fruheres SChlafen-
gehen ist ohne ausdruckliche Erlaubnis der Vor-
steherin verboten ••• ' 
52 See Will Rinne, Moritz Bijker. Ein Bergischer Wirtschaftsfuhrer. 
Nach Tagebuchern, Reden und Aufsatzen. Berl in 1940, pp. 112-
117. 
A significant example of resistance by the workers' movelllent to 
the paternal ism of employers concerned an innovation of Moritz 
Bol<er's, namely a compulsory savings scheme whiCh \'JdS osten-
sibly designed to create a firm, if modest financial base to 
, .. 
- 52 -
enable workers to lTIarry and set up hOllle at the age of 2b years. 
The scheme which aroused interest alllongst other industrialists, 
, both in Germany and abroad, was imitated in manyestab1 ish-
ments. In Remscheid, however, the scheme provoked plenty of 
criticism on the part of the SPD and trade unions. These argued 
that if workers recei ved an adequate wage in the fi rst place, 
they could take their own steps to secure savings and pensions. 
Whilst the merits of this and similar schellles ought not to be 
overlooked, neither should the undesirable (frrnn the workers' 
point of view) ramifications stelllming from the preconceived 
.aims of the initiators, nalllely a greater dependence and reduced 
lIIob'il i ty of the workers.· These were factors wh ict! tended to 
render the workforce lIIore sUI·line. The better organised metal-
workers of Wilhelmine Gerlllany were lIIore successful in COlllbat-
ting such schemes than the textile workers. This particular 
arrangement was successfully adopted by the KallulIgarn IIli 11. 
53 Interview with Otto Rau. 
A number of smaller firms in Remscheid ran grocery stores at 
which workers were expected to make their purchase. Accordin~ 
to Rau, these shops tended to be expens i ve and therefore di d 
not attract suffi ci ent custom. I n order to overcollle the wor-
kers' reluctance, some employers issued threats of dislllissal if 
employees continued to buy provisions elsewhere. 
54 The theory tilat the practice of sub-letting to lodyersactually 
strengthened working class solidarity has been advanced by 
Niethallllller and tlriiggellleier in their joint essay, "Wie wohnten 
die Arbeiter irn Kaiserreich 1" (see note 21) and again in, 
"Sch 1 afganger, Schnapskas i nos ...... , (see note 28). Josef Ehlller 
on the other hand (see ibid.), does not find any evidence to 
support thi s theory, although he does make the reservat ion tllat 
the discrepancy may be attributable to the differing work and 
living structures,· in this case Vienna, and the Ruhr. In his 
conclusion Ehn~r paints to the high frequency of parallel work 
and dwelling relationships in the Ruhr, a phenolllenon which was 
much less COllllflon in 19th-century Vienna, as a possible explana-
tion for the discr~pancy between his findings and those of 
Niethammer and Bruggelileier •. 
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Heidi 'Rosenbaum in her book, Formen der Falllilie. Untersuchung 
zum Zusamnenhang von Familienverhaltnissen, Sozialstruktur und 
, sozialem Wandel . in der deutschen Gesellschaft des lY. Jahr-
hunderts, Frankfurt a.M. 1982, p. 428, stresses the disadvan-
tages of sub-letting, for example the restrictions placed on 
family members ensui ny from the 1 ack of space and beds, the 
severely reduced opportunities for finding privacy in a small 
flats, above all the extra pressure placed on the housewife, 
and the forfei ture of free time with the family. 
'Information gleaned from interviewees in Remscheid and frolll 
local newspapers .tends to stress the disadvantages, and arrives 
at the consensus that lodging was an evil for tenants and lod-
gers alike. Nevertheless, there is not enough local eviuellce tu 
refute the argulllent for solidarity, and the case for solidarity 
is plausible when tenants a~d lodgers were in any way relateu, 
when they ori 9i ni ated from the same area or when they worked 
side by side in the same factory. 
55 Lucas, Ope cit., p. 48; 
and Rinne, Ope cit., p. 124. 
A census of dwellings in Remscheid in 1887 indicated a desIJe-
rate accollllllodation problem. In 647 households consisting of 
1,610 rooms, there were 3,303 occupants - an average of fi ve 
persons per househo 1 din two and a ha 1 f rooms, or two persons 
per room. In a further 121 households there was an average of 
three to a room. The alarming revelations of this census led 
directly to the founding of the GellleinnUtziger Bauverein. 
56 Rinne, ibid., p. 126. 
Between 1897 and 1918 the Bergische Stahlindustrie erected 120 
flats for its ell\ployees in Honsberg, Loborn and SChiller-
stra(3e. The initiator of this building project, like that, of 
the GemeinnUtziger Bauverein was Moritz Boker. 
57 Lucas, Opt cit., p. 48. 
58 ef.Dr. Saenger (edit.), Zeitschrift des Preul3ischen Statis-
tischen Landesamtes fUr 1918/19, Berlin 1919, p. 85. 
59 Lucas, Opt cit., p. 295. 
60 Stursberg, OPe tit., p. 205. 
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61 Gerd Courts, Remscheid, so wie es war, Vol. 1, DUsseldorf 1974. 
62 StA Remscheid, VII M/ll, Gesellige Vereine 1884 - 1900. 
63· See file compiled by Fritz Sohnchen, Erinnerungen und Zeit-
politische Dokulllente zur Geschichte der Sozialdelllokratischen 
Partei in den Jahren 1880 - 1890 (Sozialisten-Gesetze). 
64 Hans-Gerd Selbach, 11100 Jahre Sozial istengesetz. ~etrachtung 
.seiner Bedeutung sowie Auswirkung in Remscheid", 2~ Teil, in: 
Die Heilllat spricht zu dir, Jahrgang 45, Nr. 11, November 1978. 
65 StA Remscheid, IV L/5, ATVS, Remscheid, Empfehlenswerte Ver-
kehrslokale. 
66 See, SPD Remscheid. 1. Mai 1976 (brochure), Relllsctleid 19/6. 
67 StA Remscheid, Akte VII H/11. 
68 Information frOll1 Otto RdU who hilllst!lf IIladt! Use of this SCllellll! 
to purchase a mandolin. 
69 See Remschei der Arbeiterzeitung (RAI), 1/3/12. 
70 RAZ, 11/3/12. 
71 StA Remscheid, Xl 0/50-69. 
72 StA Remscheid, XI 0/33-41. 
73 See Remschei der Zeitung (RZ), Ib/l/1904. 
and Bergische Volksstillune (BV), 9/5/19. 
,74 See,BV,24/12/19. 
75 The Naturfreunde were founded in 1895 in Vienna. 
Ib See BV, 9/3/29, 20 Jahre proletarische Jugendbeweguny in I{elll-
scheid. 
77 According to Milli Hilbert a high percentage of later party 
activists met their husbands and wives in the socialist youth 
movement. Survivors of the original local workers' youth move-
ment were still convening on a regular basis until the end of 
the 1970s. Their lIIeetings were opened and closed with ren-
derings of the songs they learned in their youth. See file 
Fritz Sbhnchen, OPe cit. 
78 See, 60 Jahre Touristenverein "Die' Naturfreunde", Ortsyruppe 
Remscheid, Remscheid 1973, p. 5. 
79 The march from MUngsten to Remscheid was prohibited by tile 
authorities. 
" , 
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80 60 Jahre Touristenverein ••• , ibid., p. 6. ' 
and interview with Hannah Quaas. 
81 Information from Gerd Friele. 
82· BV, 23/12/21, 23. Stiftungsfest. 
83 See StA Remscheid, VII M/22. 
84 For the developn~nt of these vital local institutions see later 
chapters. 
85 According to Fritz Knapper, no self-respecting worker would 
dream of taking his custom anywhere else. 
Interview with Fritz Knapper and 019a Jung. 
86 Lucas, OPe cit., p. 37. 
87 Lucas~ ibid.', p. 38. 
88 Fri tz Knapper, whose f atherwas a home-based f11 elllJker , recall s 
a wall-hanging decorating the falllily's living rOOlll, deplctillg 
the heads of Bebel, Wilhellll and Karl Liebknecht with tile 
inscription beneath: 'Nicht betteln, nicht bitten, nur lIIutly 
gestritten, nie kampft es sich schlecht fur freiheit und 
Recht. ' 
Smiths and grinders also tended to be radical 1 ike the fi 1e-
makers, for much the sallle reasons. See Lucas, 0IJ. cit., IJ. 36. 
89 Lucas, ibiq., p. 121. 
90 Lucas, ibid., p. 120~ 
91 Notably, Barrington-Noore, Jr., in: Injustice, the Social Base 
of Obedience and Revolt, London 1979, pp. 227-2/4, 
Peter N. Stearns in: Arbeiterleben. Industriearbeit und Alltag 
in Europa 1890 - 1914, Frankfurt a.M. 19HO, pp. 293-329, 
David Crew in: Bochulfl •••• , Ope cit., pp. 171-207. 
92 See Dick Geary, "Radicalism and the Worker: Metalworkers and 
Revolution 1914 - 1923", in: Richard J. Evans, Society and 
Politics in Wilhelmine Germany, OPe cit., pp. 267-283. 
The author rejects the claim that metalworkers were docile, in 
the light of their militancy during the First World War and 
afterwards. Whilst recognising the radicalising experience of 
the war, Geary quite rightly indicates that metalworkers had 
begun to sti r long before the outbreak of war, and that the 
peri od 1905-1914 was IIlarked by an upsurge of lIIil itancy in the 
metallurgical industry. The author cites the twin bastions of 
Skilled craft, Relilscheid and Solinyen, as examples of radical 
metalworker tradition. 
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93 Barrington-Moore, Ope cit. 
94 Peter N. Stearns, Ope cit., p. 293-329. 
t 
9~ David Crew, Ope cit., p. 201. 
96 Lucas, Ope cit., pp. 42-45. 
97 'Crew, OPe cit., p. 198. 
98 Lucas, Ope cit., p.120. 
99 StA Rernscheid, XB/46, Gesamtverband der deutschen Werkzeug-
industrie, fruher Bergischer Fabrikantenverein. 
100 Lucas, Ope cit., p. 122. 
101 Ibid., p. 123. 
102 Ibid., p. 125. 
103 Ibid. 
104 Selbach, Ope cit. 
105 Ibid., quote from a report from the Oberburgerlllei ster of Relll-
scheid and the Landrat in Lennep. 
106 Lucas, OPe cit.,p. 131. 
107 See Karl-Heinz Trachte, Die politischen Strukturen und Aus-
eindandersetzuflgen zu Beginn der Weimarer Republ ik, EXdlllens-
arbeit fur di e Erste Staatsprufung fur das Lehralllt an Grund-
und Hauptschulen, Relllscheid 1969. 
1st vote 12/1/12 Stadtkreis 
Eickhoff, Liberal 
Stuhrlllann, Christsozial 
Dittrnann, SPD 
Chociszewski, Polenpartei 
gi.iltige Stirnrnen 
ungi.iltige Stinullen 
abgegebene Stirnmen 
2nd vote (Stichwahl) 25/1/12 
Relflscheid 
5,946 
1,801 
8,536 
70 
16,353 
43 
16,396 
Eickhoff 7,275 
Dittmann 8,946 
108 Fritz Sbhnchen, OPe cit. 
DUsseldorf 
Wahlbezirk 1 
15,992 
14,788 
27,120 
1,155 
59,OJ!> 
219 
58,294 
25,963 
28,760. 
109 Information from Milli'Hilbert, daughter of Julius Wetzel • 
. Wetzel's library containing works of Marx, Engels, ~ebel anu 
many socialist thinkers was confiscated by the Nazis in 1933. 
110 Information from Erich Thieler. 
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111 According to Mi11i Hi1bert the KPO had over 500 officials in 
·Remscheid during the Weimar Republic. 
112 The web of family ties amongst Remscheid workers links n~st of 
the socialist and conllllunist activists of the Weimar period. 
Marriage amongst leading worker famll ies did not. unl ike those 
of many bourgeois elites •. take place with the function of 
rnalntaining e1 ite status. Here there was no el ite status as 
such, but rather a party/trade union bureaucratic grou~ which 
had no guarantee of preserving its own position wittlin the 
movement. Marriage ensued naturally out of n~tual attFaction, 
convictions and shared interest in the fortunes of their 
class. The children of these families received a political 
education, initially in ttle hUllIC and then later in various 
sect ions of thc movelllent, so that the chanc~s of IIleet i fly 
accordant marriaye partners here were exceptionally high, 
considering the lack of opportunity to meet young people frold 
other backgrounds and other areas. 
There are se.vera1 examples of such marriage between activist 
families or at least between children of activist families and 
the children of other socialist families which did lIot ~lay 
any leading role in the 1II0velllent. 
A few examples to illustrate the point: 
Jul ius Wetzel married Anna Leverberg and had four daughters 
and one son. Three of the daughters married party activists. 
Lieschen married Albert Issel who was later destined to play a 
major role in the local KPO group. Lotte Wetzel married Ferdi-
nand Thieler who later becallle chairman of the Arbeiterschwillllll-
verein. Gretchen married Fritz Sbhnch~n who was on the staff 
, 
of the Bergische Vo1ksstinlllle. Mil1i married Leo Hilbert who 
was treasurer of the BV. She also played cl Significant role 
within the movelllent~ She was employed in the local KPD office 
from 1923 to 1929 when she was elected to the town counci 1. 
Frilz Wetzel was likewise a leading activist in the KPU in the 
20s. 
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Another exarnp 1 e of the pre-war 1 ead i ng group is the falllily of 
Peter Stalllll who had two daughters and a son, who were all ac-
tive in the movement. One of" the daughters, Aline, married 
Eugen Rongen who came from a Luttringhausen social ist falllily. 
Both Aline and her husband were KPD councillors. Aline's 
brother, Robert Stall!ffi was an i IIIportant 1 ink in the KPD net-
work. After several years as leading functionary of the KJVD 
Remscheid he became secretary of the KPD district apparatus 
for Barmen-El berfe 1 d. Later he became po 1 it i ca 1 secretary for 
the Bezirksleitung Nordwest in Dusseldorf, and afterwr.ds held 
the" equivalent post in Niedersachsen and then Berlin-Branden-
burg. 
Three dauyhters .of Lrllst Leverbery, brother ut Karl, ulso 
married the sons of activist falllilies, these were: Ernst 
Klein, Heinrich Schafer and J. Weps. August Feld's daughter 
Jda married a son from the Kattwinkel family. 
Otto Rau who played a substantial role in the Arbeiter Sama-
riter Bund IIIdrried Klara Krauskopf who hailed frail! an activist 
family frol1liRadevorlm~dld. One of Klara's brothers, Hermann,; 
also played an active role in the KPD and DMV. 
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C H APT E R I 
The Remscheid Workers' Movement, 1914 to October 1918 
1. Social and Political Survey of the Workers' Situation in the 
German Reich in the Years prior to 1914. 
The growth of membership and increased trade union activity as well 
as factory 1 eyi slat i on had u~ldoubtedly helped to bri ny the i IIdu~-
tri a 1 workers of Gerllldny sOllle soc i a 1 and ecunollli c i IIIprovelllents 
during the last decade of the 19th and the first decade of the 20tl1 
. centur~. These were principally concerned with increased earninys, 
the length of shifts and the fight against industrial accidents. In 
the peri od between 1890 and 1913 earni ngs increased in real terllls 
but diminished projJortionately and finally stagnated by 1913.1 
The German worker of 1913 was then financially better off than his 
father had been twenty years earlier., 
Political pressure led to an extension of factory legislation which 
resulted in shorter working hours and a reduction in industrial 
accidents. The construction of larger factories and the benefits of 
modern technology resulted. in in~roved working conditions in gene-
ral. The reduction in working hours afforded the worker a S~ight 
increase in leisure-time, and the real growth of earnings provided 
him with a little more money to spend on entertainment. Sickness 
benefits and various saving schemes ensured at least minimal assis-
tance for those participating. 
Paradoxically the same period witnessed a growiny impoverish-
ment. 2 This was manifested by a trend to equalisation resultiny 
from downward mobility which initiated an increased growth in the 
number of unskilled factory workers. Further manifestations of the 
equalising trend were dimishing wage differentials between skilled 
> 
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and unskilled workers and the concentration of the workforce in 
larger factory units and working class colonies of large tenement 
blocks. Despite· the modest improvements secured by· the workers, 
life still remained hard and unrewarding for the majority. Families 
with many children were particularly vulnerable. 3 Accidents and 
illness and the resulting loss of income brought severe restric-
tions of diet, clothing and heating etc. which in turn ·exacer'bated 
the state of health. In such families infectious illnesses would 
pass from one child to another owing to cramped, insalubrious con-
ditions. Long periods of illness suffered by the main brea{iwinner 
were particularly ruinous and could even lead to the separation of 
families, with the children being taken into care. 
If there were social and econolllic illlprovements. nO'lIIatter how 
modest. the workiny class and its institutions were still very lIIuch 
underpri vil eged. Despi te the mounting support for the SPI) and the 
free trade unions. the working class was still not able to trans-
late this growing strength into real political power and relllained 
at least formally without 'political influence at government level. 
As the strength of the SPD and the free trade unions increased. so 
too did the militant anti-Socialism of mass movements like the All-
deutscher Verband,4 the Reichsverband yegen die $ozialdemokratie 
. and the Deutscher Flottenverein. These organisations, which were 
above all supported by industrialists. land-owners, civil servants 
and professional people. commanded impressive financial resources 
and could conduct lengthy campaigns in an attempt to arrest the 
growth of Social Democracy.5 Social, iJemocrats were portrayed ,as 
traitors of the national cause, as 'vaterlandslose Gesellen'. 
Despite impressive successes by the Social Democrats. such as the 
landslide victory in the Reichstag elections of 1912 which made the 
SPD the largest faction in parliament, the bourgeois and argrarian 
forces were able to overcome their own differences and combine to 
block SPD-proposed legislation whenever this threatened to disrupt 
the existing power structure. In this way the ruling elites were 
able to parry the assault on the obnoxious Prussian three-tier 
voting system. 
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The police, public prosecutors and law-courts applied anti-socia-
list legisl~tion like the Combination Act and the law applying to 
clubs and societies n~re stringently in an effort to arrest further 
democratisation. The authorities employed a varied ranye of tactics 
in order 'to limit or prevent workers' lIIeetings, often prohibiting 
these at the last possible moment on technical grounds, if all else 
failed. It was on the industrial front where the workers felt the 
suppress i on of thei r movement most. Under the pressure of the 
spread of trade unionism through the Reich, the employers also 
began to organise in order to combat this. The employers still 
, ,.
generally adhered to the 'Herr-im-Hause' approach to industridl 
relations and refused to recoynise the free trade unions whilst dt 
the sallle time tryin~ to l!lIcourJ~e the sjJrcJd of 'yclluw ul\ioll~t.G 
The 'yellow unions'. which were nUlllerically never strong, received 
generous financial backiny from employers' organisations. but 
nevertheless failed to make a serious impact on the working class 
and did not effectively split the workers as the elllployers had 
hoped. 
In the class conflict. which intensified in the years leading UjJ to 
1914, the balance of power swuny back towards the employers. The 
incidence and length of industrial conflict reached a climax 
between 1906 and 1911 with the number of lock-outs increasing in 
ab~olute terms and relatively to the number of strikes. 7 
Another weapon used by the employers to combat free trade unions 
was the compiling of black-lists which were circulated alllonyst mem-
bers of the employers' organisations. The keeping of black-lists 
was particularly effective the higher the degree of collusion 
between the employers and the author it i es. A worker who had the 
'misfortune to be listed, often had no other alternative but to 
leave for another area, when he realised that no local establish-
'rnent would employ him. 'The introduction of work-books for employees 
was an even more effecti ve weapon against trade unions than the 
b 1 aCk-l i sts. The work-books subjected the worker to more careful 
scrutinity) in that each new employer could check with his predeces-
sor the reasons for the terlllination of emploYlllent. Dislllissal for 
trade uni on activity woul d usually be reason enouyh not to 9i ve 
him employment. 
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In times of strike, when all otht!r methods failed, the employers 
were able to resort to the employment of black-legs, norlllally 
brought in from another area,so that they would be unlikely to sYIII-
pathise with their striking colleagut!s. Strike-brt!akers could count 
.on poli~e protection and were sOllletimes ·granted the reward denied 
to their antecedents. 
However, by 1914, despite these setbacks, workers stll1 had SOllle 
reasons for modest optimism. Socially and economically they had 
made some headway and despite the blocking tactics of the bourgeois 
parties, it seemed only a matter of time before some of their lIIore 
important political demands would have to be met. At the outbreak 
of war it was evident to sOllle that the working-class movelilent stoou 
to gain at best very little frolll.the venture, dnd tlidt the redl 
advantages of a victorious conclusion to hostilities would be held 
by the existing monarchical order.8 A short sucessful war, it was 
believed by some conservatives, would reJuvinate liermdn society dnu 
unite the people behind the existiny system. Gerlllan industry would 
profit by extendi ng its i nfl uence over new terri tori es and markets 
and German farlllers would realise the drealllS of rich fertile settle-
ments in the East. In this atmosphere the workers' organisations 
would-be in danger of falling into discredit with the masses. 
furthermore the military victory would be bought at the expense of 
working-class lives lost on the battlefield. 
2.Remscheid at the Outbreak of War. 
In the middle of the July crisiS, the SPl) oryan, the Relllscheider 
Arbeiter ·Zeitung (RAZJappealed to the local workers to den~nstrate 
their unwillingness to fight. The appeal which appeared under the 
heading "Nieder mit dem Krieg", said, 
'Arbeiter. BUrger,Manner und frauen. 
Die Kriegsbestie grinst seit Samstag die Vtilker 
Europas aus ihren hohlen Augen an. Eine Panik hat 
sich bereits in dem Wirtschaftsleben bemerkbar 
gemacht. leichtfertig will der wahnsinniye Imperia-
lisrnus die europaische Kultur niedertralllpeln. Hier-
, . 
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geyen gilt es, Front zu machen. Hier darf 
keiner, dem der Volkerfriede lieb ist, keiner, 
der den Krieg mit allen seinen Greueln und 
Elend verabscheut, fehlen. Arbeiterschaft v6n 
Remscheid, zeiye, daB Du nicht gewillt bist, 
Deine Knochen fur die wahnsinniyen Kriegshetzer 
zu Markte zu tragen. Erscheine zum Protest geyen 
den Krieg, gegen den Verwuster aller Kultur, am 
Donnerstag Abend in der Versa~nluny. Die Konzert-
halle Ge~mania mu!) uberfullt werden. Krieg delll 
Kriegel' .. 
This . unequivocal statement of the local working-class moYelllent's 
pos it i on was answered equally unequi voca 11y by Relllschei d' S workers 
as they followed the call and appeared in thei r hundreds to 
demonstrate their desire for j.leace. We are to1<.110 thdt 1I0t 
since the years 1910 and 1911 "<.Id RClIlschei<.1 witllt!sseJ SUl:1t 1l.1ur~e 
gathering of people in its streets. The concert hall Genlhlllia WJS 
completely packed so that hundreds were left standing outside ill 
I 
the street. The speaker, grulllbach frolll Pari s, was loudly aJ.lIJ 1 auded 
as he proclaimed that .International Social Democracy would be the 
saviour·of the peace. In contrast to the workers' demonstration for 
peace, the Relllschei der General Anzei yer (RGA) reported the 
reception of the news of mobilisation in the following way on the 
3rd August: 
'Die gluhende Begeisterung, mit der die 
kaiserliche Sotschaft der Mobillllachuny in 
unserer Stadt am Samstagnachmittag aufgerion~ 
men wurde, kam im weiteren Verlauf der Abend-
und Nachtstunden ill einer Weise zwn Ausdruck, 
die nur mit der denkwi.irdiyen Erhebung und dem 
ruhmreichen Befreiungswerk vor 100 Jahren zu 
vergleichen ist.' 11 
\ 
Reports in. the Arbeiterzeitung duri ng the next few days refer to 
groups of middle-class youths parading through the streets, taun-
ting workers and SPD members and singing patriotic songs.l2 
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It is therefore highly unl ikely that the euphoric mood and enthu-
siasm repor,ted in the Generalanzeiger was shared by lIIany workers. 
Th·is dichotomy of attitudes alllply illustrates a polarisation which 
manifests itself continually throughout the period under investiga-
tion. Remscheid society is split into two cultures with usually 
little or no intercourse between the two unless solely for business 
reasons. 
A further initial reaction to the outbreak of war was the lIlass 
hysteria unleashed by warnings to be on the look-out for 'enemy 
agents'. Both the Remscheider Arbeiter Zeitung and the l{ellTscheider 
Generalanzeiger published reports of ugly scenes on I{elllscheid's 
streets, where innocent peo~le who had the misfortune either to be 
or to look foreign were attacked and dragged off to the police 
station, in some cases dfter hdvin~ first rect!ived <.l be~till\;l. l)ulll 
newspap.ers condemned this behaviour by Remscheid citizens but ill 
quite different terms. Whereas the Generalanzeiyer eXjJressed the 
need for vigilance, relating the case of two I{ussians allegt!dly 
caught attempting to poison a reservoir in Chemnitz, almost apolo-
getically condemning the action of over-zealous citizens, pleaded 
for caution as a case of mistaken identity could have serious con-
sequences in the form of a charge of .con'-lIitting bodily harm, yet 
'andererseits aber auch tatkraftig einyeschritten, wenn sich wirk-
1ich mal lichtscheues Gesindel verdachtig macht' 13, the Relll-
sCheider Arbeiter Zeitung expressed its disgust in cOlllpletely unam-
biguous terms: 
'Es gibt Wesen beiderlei Geschlechts, bei 
deren Treiben man tatsachlich in Zweifel geraten 
mul3, ob man sie ZUII1 Menschengeschlecht rechnen darf. 
Wie lrrsinnige stUrzen sie durch Strassen, gedanken-
und planlos, lachend und gro1end, da~ einelll die Scham-
rote ins Gesicht steigt.' 14 
Qui te cl early the Remschei der General anzei yer, the organ of the 
local bourgeoisie, was seized by the same kind of war hysteria 
which it purported to condemn. The Refllscheider Arbeiterzeitun~J on 
the other hand, despite the SPO's change in policy over the yrdn-
,. , 
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ting of war credits, could not hide its disappointlllent that Wdr 
had not been averted. 
On ·the 3rd August, it appealed for calm and reminded its readership 
that under the Emergency Laws governing a state of siege, the paper 
woul d 'soon be subjected to stri ct censorshi p.15 It fo 11 owed 
this article with an explicit statelllent on the 29th August: 
'Wie unsere Leser bereits wissen, untersteht 
die Presse scharfer.Zensur. Meldungen des Wolf-Buros 
dUrfen nur in unverandertem Wortlaut gebracht wer-
den. Ober die Zulassigkeit alles anderen Textes ent-· 
scheidet die Zensurbehorde. Wir vertrauen auf die 
geistige und politische Schulung unserer Leser, daB 
sie in dieser leit alles das, was sie in jahrelanyer 
Aufklarungsarbeit Uber die wirtschaftlichen uno 50-
zialen Ursachen der tlistorischen t:reiynisse yelernt 
haben1 jctzt dUCti L1uf die GcgenWdt't JIIZUWellOCII w i $- ' sen.' 6 . 
This statement together with the other articles written duriny thl;! 
first weeks of war, reveal the sceptislll of the local workers' lIIove-
ment towards the Burgfrieden pol icy and i~dicate the 1 i~ ihood of 
future opposition to it. 
What then were the considerations whiCh induced the spn and trade 
union leaders to consent to a war which until days before its out-
, . 
break they had condelllned as a capitalist war, which would in no way 
benefit the workers? The SPD along with other European Socialist 
parties had repeatedly declared its intention of using all its 
influence to pr~vent the workers frolll taking part in the nt!xt 
war. l7 H' O1~jo~ reason was that the SPl.) and the trade union 
. . . . 
leadership glimpsed a. chance of having sOlile of their more radical 
demands like the abolition of the Prussian three-tier voting systelll 
and the re~ognition of trade unions together with the introductiun 
of the ei ght-hour work i ng day granted in return for thei r 1 oya 1 
". support of the Gerlllan war' effort. The Remschei der Arbei terzei tun';} 
also joined the debate with an article on the 10th August in which 
it stated categori Ga 11y that the grant i ng of Wdr cred its was i n-
tended in the interest of the Gennan working class and of the 
ruling power elite. It went on to say: 
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'Die Abstinvnung am 4. Auyust lIluB weit hinein-
wirken in die innere wie die auBere Politik des 
Re~ches. Sie will nicht sagen, dass die Arbeiter-
klasse auf ihre Forderungen verzichtet, sie sagt 
vielmehr, daB diese Forderunyen zu yeeiyneter Zeit 
mit den geeigneten Mitteln und mit noch ganz ande-
rer Wucht erhoben werden sollen als bisher. 18 
Support for the German war effort was just ified by SPD and trade 
union leaders by the aryuments that French and English workers had 
enthusiastically followed the call to arllls and that German workers 
were defendi ng Western Eurol-lean cul ture agai nst Eastern barbari Sill 
and autocracy. With regard to the latter argulllent, the Relllscheider 
Arbei terzei tung stressed that Gerlllan workers were fi gilt i ng for 
their freedom against the /{ussii.111 TSdr. 19 
The euphoria of Relllscheid citizens subsided 4uitt:! soun dftt:!r tht! 
. departure of the troops, but broke out aga in whenever German suc-
cesses at the front were announced. The newspapers were constantly 
full. of optimistic reports which tended to present t:!vents at the 
front, as a kind of game which was totally divorced frolll life in 
Remscheid. There ~were reports of /{elllscheid troops in action and 
from time to time lists of local citizens who had bt:!en awarded 
medals for bravery. Until the end of the year the civilian popula-
tion was still quite confident of the ultimate victory even if the 
troops would now no longer be home for Christmas, as had been pro-
mised during the late sumner. Civilians, of course, had no idea of 
what conditions were really like at the front until tht:!y began \;Ira-
dually to be confronted by the horrors of war in the form of ever-
increas~ng obituaries which started to appear in Remscheid newspa-
pers a~ early as October 1914. 20 Troops coming home on leave 
also contributed to the enlightenment of local people as did the 
increasing number of casualties admitted to the local lIIilitary 
hospital. 
" , 
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3.The Effects of the War on Remscheid's Industry. 
Remscheid on the eve of the First World War was rapidly approachiny 
the 80,000 population mark. The town had long been established as 
the centre of the German Werkzeuy- und Kleineisenindustrie and de-
pended to a great extent on overseas markets for its manufactureo 
; 
goods. For this reason it is hardly surprising that the outbreak of 
war had serious repercussions on its industry. The inunediate ban on 
exports caused a sharp rise in the unemployment figures as men were 
laid off through lack of orders. This rise of unemployment.occurred 
despite the call up of three and a half thousand "~n during the 
first days of hostilities. 21 The fairly rapid trdrtsition to a 
war-based econolllY, however, chanyed this situation within the SPdCt! 
of six months. The conversion of the town's laryer fdctories to tile 
production of munitions was effected during the first months of WJr 
and necessitated the reclalllation of lIlany skilled workers who IldO 
received their iall-up papers during the first week of Auyust. 
The war transformed the system of production from a competitive to 
a cartel base. The creation of central bureaus like the Waffen- und 
( 
Munit ionsbeschaffungsamt - WUM~A (Offi ce for the Procurement of 
Weapons and Munition) with regional sub-offices which influenced 
production enormously by the introduction of norms and standards in 
the manufacture of war materials. rescued or at least granted a re-
prieve for lIIany small factories and workshops, which prior to the 
war faced bankruptcy, because of thei r i nabil ity to compete effec-
tively. The war and the controlled production of weapons and war 
materials,which required a maximum use of all existing resources, 
meant that even the slllal,ler firlll~ had an important part to play in 
the production process. Small factories and workshops ~ven had an 
advantage over large estab 1 i shments, in that they were often able 
to effect the change to war production with a minimum of time and 
expence. Furthermore, for the duration of the war they did not 
worry about finding new orders, as these were more or less guaran-
teed. Although the large factories like the Bergische Stahl-
Industri e and the Manneslllann Munit i onsfabri k recei ved the majori ty 
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of orders'directly from the military, they were nevertheless ob-
liged to s'ubcontract,at least until they had completed their tran-
sition •. 
The 'war had a beneficial effect o~ Relllscheid's industry as a whole, 
as it played a key role 1'n the national war effort, not only as a 
top-priority supplier of arms and precis'ion tools to the military, 
but also as an important supplier to support industries. The 
" , 
machine-tool industry quickly began to pick up again after the ini-
tial confusion by the onset of war. Remscheid tools were needed by 
the military ,for repairing and servicing vehicles and ae,~oplanes 
and were also required by t~e industries producing these 
vehicles. 22 The war also helped those Rernscheid firllls. specia-
lising in the manufacture of d~ricu1turdl tools dnd IIldcllillery. III 
the course of the war Gerlllilll ayriculture, severely dellu~o of IIhHI-
. . A 
power. had to become highly mechanised in order to maintain effi-
ciency. in view of the great responsibility it carried and conside-
ri ng the effect i veness of the i:)ri t i sh naval blockade. Such fi rills 
also received a boost following the German occupation of the 
Ukraine.23 'with the result that they could not keep up with 
o,rders. owing to the chronic shortage of labour which was by tllen 
already apparent. 
I 
By March 1915 the local unemployment situation had been dramatical-
ly reversed. so that there were now many more jobs vacant than men 
to fill theine This situation became increasingly more acute during 
the course of the war and after 1916 attained crisis prolJor-
tions 24 as thearlllY sustained horrendous losses in campaigns 
at the front. and was fO,rced to utilise all available sources of 
manpower. regardless of whether these were considered to be essen-
t i alto the war effort on the home front. After 1916 it became dif-
ficult for employers to secure the release of their skilled workers 
or postpone their call-up. although the practice did still continue 
through to the end of the war. 
'" " 
- 68 -
The war Gaused a number of si gni fi cant changes in the product ion 
process, although most of these did not survive th~ duration of 
I 
ho~tilities. Probably the most important change and one whicll 
proved to be of a permanent nature was the i nfl ux of wOlllen into 
areas of production, which had hitherto been considered unsuitable 
or else had been seen as the natural preserve of men. Quite apart 
from the munitions factories where women quickly found elllploy:-
ment. 25 they were also recru Hed in i ncreas i ng numbers in 
steelrol1ing mills and iron foundries. It was also during the war 
that women first began to appear in the uniforms of tram and rail-
way conductors. By the end of the war. transport depend·ed to a 
major extent on the employment of women. 
A further result of the shortage of manpower in the product i on 
industries 'was the employment of youths 26 and of j.lensiullers 
who were recalled from retirement, particularly those who were 
" sk ill ed:. Another measure to combat the shortage of manpower was tne 
policy of employing skilled foreign workers. 27 1{~lIlscheid in-
dustrial ists' recruited mainly from Belgium, which was under German 
occupat ion. Sk 11} ed forei gn workers were pa id top rates t enjoyed 
freedom of lIIovement and were granted regular periods of leave. Pri-
soners of war, on the other hand, enjoyed no such privileges. For 
German industry they constituted a cheap source of labour to be ex-
ploited fully.28 They held a status similar to that of slaves, 
working hard for the lowest rate of pay, but dishabilitated by re-
strictions of movement an"d contact with the local inhabitants. Tile 
official policy of prohibiting contact between prisoners and the 
German civilian population was primarily deSigned to maintain the 
image of the enemy disseminated in the newspapers, and to control 
the information passing to local civilians. Constant supervision of 
prisoners and their continual state of isolation were usually suf-
fi ci ent ly effective measures to achi eve these aims and perj.letuate 
the hostile gulf separating these from the rest of the popula-
t{on?9 Treatment of prisoners appears to have been strict yet 
correct ~ wi th no evidence of excesses towards them as' was cOlllmon 
during the Second World War. The rations which prisoners received 
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were only marg i na lly worse than those of thei r fe 11 ow Gerlllan wor-
kers, so that the fonner did not noticeably suffer more hunyer than 
the latter. 3D However, prisoners were not able to supplement 
these rations in times of shortage as others were, viz. by foraying, 
or by purchase on the black market. The acqu is it i on of supp 1 elllen-
tary foodstuffs was prevented not only by the res tri ct i on of move-
ment, but also by the fact that prisoners did not receive their pay 
in the form of money, but rather in the form of tokens whi ch were 
convertible only in the camp or the factory where they were housed. 
This was a precautionary measure' to frustrate escapellttempts. 
Whil st thi s and the other measures undoubtedly impa i red the chances 
of escape, they did' not succeed in preventing it. 31 The reyu-
larity of escape attempt's would even indicate organised <1isru~tion, 
as the chances of completely evadiny recapture would have been ex-
tremely slim, and therefore would have ruled out allY real possibi-
lity of getting home. Fugitives had to content thelllselves with the 
disruption they were causing the local police. filemoranda were occa-
sionally circulated calling for vigilance on the part of civilians, 
accolllpanyi ng guards and ovt::rl ookers, as there was reason to suspect 
sabotage either of cornfields, followiny fires attributed to fuyi-
tive prisoners, or of machinery and manufactured suppl ies by pows 
in the factories. However, it is not known whether these warnings 
justifiably resulted from events in RelJlscheid or whether they were 
based on experience elsewhere. 
In Remscheid. POWs were acconullodated in approximately ten different 
work call1ps.32 The large number of inmates would illlply a con-
stant lack of privacy which may also have been accountable for SOllle 
attempted escapes. Regarding recreational activities. apart from 
obligatory physical exercise, consisting mainly of 'gymnastiCS, 
occas i ana lly a game of football. the auttJorit ies arranged Sunday 
visits to a local 'cinema for well-behaved prisoners to see special 
propaganda films. 33 These were designed to 'show Germany as the 
paragon of cultural development and to make prisoners aware of the 
fact that the social and welfare institutions operating in their 
own countries were inferior, and that they had been misled by men-
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dacious information into' forming attitudes. which were hostile to-
wards Germany. It was also hoped that enlightened POWs would later 
I 
re,turn home and force the introduction of similar conditions in 
,their own countries, which would by then be much llIore amenable to 
German culture. 
Despite the close supervision of, and considerable restriction on 
POWs. there were occasional.demonstrations of individual sympathy 
and kindness by some class-conscious workers. On the whole, how-
ever, contact remained minimal, and the workers were also constant-
ly occupied with their, own problems, with the result that t.he offi-
cial policy of isolation of POWs was in the main successful. 
The war siyn1ficantly chan~ed the role of women frolll that of IIlother 
and housewife to breadwi nner. If Relllschtd d wOlllen hdd taken up elll-
ployment before the war. it was usually as either shopgirls ur 
housemaids in the homes of local manufacturers ,anu higher civil 
servants. EmploYlllent as a housemaid was commonly regarded as hlU-
. tually beneficial to both, employer and elllployee, as the latter had 
an opportunity to acquire basic household Skills prior to marriage. 
Althoug~ this, traditional emploYlllent continued through the war, 
young girls either left this form of work to answer the call to en-
gage in activities more relevant to the war effort, or else went 
directly from school into the factories. This fact prumpted the 
wife of an industrialist to curse the war on the grounds that there 
were no longer any good housemaidS available. 34 
The changiny role of women was accompanied by a number of problems. 
Firstly. married wOlllen were now burdened with extra responsibility 
and accompanying worries. They now had to go out to earn the fandly 
livelihood as well as keep the home runni,ng. The burdens increased 
as the war progressed, so that they did not usually have IIluch 
opportunity for recreation and relaxation. 
A particular problem was that of child care. The working mother had 
to find some kind of, arran~ement for the care of her chi ldren 
whilst she was out at work. Unless a grandmother or other suitable 
relative was near at hand, the choice would perhaps fall to a 
neighbour. Whatever the solution, however. the mother-child rela-
tionship was bound to suffer. 
I 
p. 
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Young, unmarried girls who went straiyht into the factories frolll 
, . 
school. did, not 'acquire tuition in the basic household skills of 
sewing, cooking, baby-care and hygiene. For this reason several 
organisations attempted to solve this problem by introducing eve-
ning courses. One such organisation was the Remscheider Frauenbund 
(women's, league) which enjoyed the support of local firms. J5 
The Remscheider Verein fUr das Gemeinwohl (society for general wel-
fare) was also alerted to the problem. 36 
The changing role of women from a primarily domestic life to occu-
pying a key position in the production and service sectors,.in such 
a short space of time. inevitably had a powerful effect on felllale 
consciousness. Over ,and above the responsibility on the dOlllestic 
front. women in the role of 'Solddten der Produktions-
schlacht'37 were burdened with 'the responsibilities of ~ruvi­
ding enough munitions and ensuring the smooth running of the coun-
try's transport facilities for the duration of the war. WOlllen 
proved that they were just as able as men to cope with heavy res-
ponsibilities regarding family welfare; they showed that they were 
able to carry out employment in almost any area of production or 
service, and this at a time when industry was considerably under-
manned and the authori ties were anx i ous to increase output, when 
rations were usually woefully inadequate and the work tempo was 
extremely hectic. By their experience in the production process 
more and more women became aware of the discrepancy between thei r 
essential value to the national cause. and their disproportionate 
remuneration. 38 Furthermore, they were now more inclined to 
question discrimination, and began to take more interest in trade 
union affairs in order to seek more satisfactory solutions to their 
problems. In addition. some women. particularly youny. unmarried 
ones, began to translate their enforced emanCipation in the produc-
tion process into a bid to effect a chanye in their general social 
status. They began to attack long-standing social habits and taboos 
by visiting places of entertainment unaccompanied. or else .. for 
example - by smokiny in public places. The change in femdle con-
sciousness was later also reflected in increased partiCipation by 
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women in sports' clubs after the war, and a trend to n~re 'daring' 
clothing and make-up fashions. When hostilities ceased in 1918, 
many women working in factories were probably glad to be relieved 
of their burdens of war work by soldiers returning home from the 
front. 39 Nevertheless, many young women, particularly those who 
'were still unmarried could not return to a role which they had 
never known. Having led a relatively independent existence for the 
duration of the war, ,they found themselves equipped and ready to 
compete with men on the labour lIIarket afterwards. Des~ite exhorta-
tions from the authorities and the trade unions to stand ~wn and 
make way for returning soldiers, many elected to keep their jobs or 
seek alternative employment, thus aggravating the emploYlllent pro-
blem. 40 
For another fairly large section of WOlllen, nalllely ,the war-widows, 
the enforced emancipation of war was more pennanent. Many of these 
could now look forward to a life with little chance of findiny a 
new partner considering the unfavourable ratio of women to men in 
Gerlllany,41 and had no choice, but to continue the newer role of 
breadwinner and mother. 
4. Growing Economic Deprivation and Social Tension. 
The war, far from being the means of social integration on which 
the authorities had pinned their hopes, clearly emphasised the deep 
fi ssures in German soci ety. After the fai 1 ure to force an early 
military victory, the pressures weighing on the civilian popula-
tion, and in particular on the urban industrial class, began to in-
crease at an alarming rate. Against a background of rising prices, 
falling wages in real terms owing to the effects of inflation, an 
unequal and inconsistent distribution of food and an ever-increas-
ing intensification of production, morale began to sag. Owing to 
the foresight of several men~ers of the town council, in particular 
some Soci a 1 Democrats, and the offer cif the Konsumgenossenschaft 
'Einigkeit' to make its expertise available to the local authori-
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class was 'of utmost importance. Here again it was two Social Delllo-
crats, counc; ill ors Wil he 1111 Koch and Ot to Degen, who managed to lo-
cate and purchase sufficient quantities in the Priegnitz area and 
have these transported to Remscheid. 47 A further ilil!Jortant mea-' 
sure in the early part of the war was the i ntroduct i on of the 
Stadtischer Lebensmittelmarkt which operated on the basis of custo-
mer lists with ration books. For this purpose the town was divided 
into seven districts with about 250 distribution !JOints in the fonn 
of gcircer's shops.48 Later in the war, in an effort to make the 
di stri but i on of foodstuffs fairer" the lebensmitte llllarkt operated 
. . 
on a four-tier price basis. Prices were fixed each week and 
published in the newspapers. The four different prices were calcu-
lated on the basis of taxdble incolllc. 49 
A similar system was introduced for the sale of fish in 191!:l arid 
worked quite well for a till~. However, owing to the increasing re-
strictions of war placed on fishing in northern waters, the 
supplies of fish reaching Remscheid dwindled and later in the war 
more or less disappeared. Another innovation introduced by the 10-
ca 1 town counc il duri ng the war years was the town' s SChutlbesoh-
lungsanstalt (shoe repair centre), which employed around lUO wor-
kers, the majority of whom were prisoners of war. This institution, 
occasionally working with smuggled leather, was concerned mainly 
with the repairing of footwear but did also produce new shoes. One 
of its notable achieveme'nts was the repairing of the shoes of all 
Remscheid's junior school pupils. 50 The Vaterlandische Frauen-
verein also repaired shoes. 
During the course of the war, the town of Remscheid set up d number 
of VolkskUchen (soup kitchens), primarily for the feediny of fami-
lies whose mother was employed full-time and could therefore not 
provide a warm meal. Furthermore, the town provided five kitchens 
offering food for special diets for patients under90in9 medical 
treatment. 51 
With regard to the question of rent, the town of Relllscheid under-
took to p~y the rent of soldiers' families up to the amount of 30 
marks per month. Local industrialist and counCillor, Moritz Bdker, 
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gave the counci 1 250,000 Jnarks in trust, the i nter~s t of wlli ch WdS 
to be used'~o subsidise rents of large families existiny on less 
than 3,000 1I1arks· a year. 52 The town council also organised the 
purchase of a town dairy situated in the Sauerland to allevidte 
milk shortages. A herd of dairy cattle was bought to jJrovide lJIilk, 
primarily for young children and hospital patients. Despite these 
measures, however, inadequate rat ions of llIi 1 k was the no rill for IIIdny 
local families. 53 
These measures coul d only postpone or at best all evi ate the very 
severe problems of food supply and distribution which deve)ojJed in 
the course of time. Industrial centres like Remscheid were totally 
dependent on agricultural areas for their food supply, despite the 
fact that everythi ng was done to cult i vate unused 1 and withi n the 
town boundari es. 54 Local i nhabitants wer~ encourayed to grow as 
much food as possible on their allotments in order to supplelllent 
rations. The newspaper published gardening tips to imjJrove har-
vests, yet although self-help certainly alleviated, it could not 
hope to solve the problellls of food supply. 
Whereas lIIuch thouyht had been given to the military conduct of war 
in Wilhelmine Germany, not very much attention had been paid to the 
organisation of the home front. Military theory was. completely 
shackled by the idea of a short, successful campaign lasting at the 
most only a few months. Uecause of this fact, Germany was only pre-
pared for a brief exchange when war did occur. As we have already 
seen, a system of rationing was introduced at the outbreak of 
hostilities, but this was pret!lIIpted by panic buying and hording, 
which led to initial shortages and a startling rise in prices. The 
authori ties needed several weeks before they were able to bri JIg a 
halt to these misdemeanours. In order to control and direct food 
supply po 1 icy. a system of quotas was introduced whereby farmers 
were obliged to sell a certain proportion of their crops to provin-
cial agencies. which then directed these purchases to waiting mar-
kets. This measure, which was adopted in order to prevent shortages 
and heavy price rises. at times actually promoted such evils. In 
the case of Remscheid it seems that as long as the authorities were 
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allowed to purchase on the open market, supplies were usually regu-
lar and prices were relatively equitable. 55 The major effect of 
I 
the quota system was a flourishing black market as farmers made 
higher profits on their surplus produce. The quota, which was fixed 
on a certain percentage of produce irrespective of the size of the 
harvest, met with much criticism, particularly from the socialist 
press. Trade unions pleaded constantly for a change of policy, 
arguing that black market transactions could be stopped ilTlilediate-
ly, if the government agencies were to buy all stocks of produce, 
·except those actually required by the farlllerfor his own personal 
. needs. 56 The Bergische Volksstirnme, in an article entit"led "lur 
Kartoffelversorgung", on 14th Noven~er 1917, bitterly attaCked the 
quota system on potatoes when, owing to shortages of other vital 
foodstuffs, i ndustri a 1 workers were more dependent on thi s basic 
vegetable than ever before. Nevertheless, farlllers were still only 
required to supply 60 hundredweights per acre despite an excellent 
harvest. The article warned that the farmer was literally induced 
to sell his surplus on the black market, with ,the result that this 
caused higher pl~ices, further shortages and a further decline in 
morale amongst the industrial working-class population. At this 
stage, the. weekly potato ration stood at seven pounds per person. 
One of the root causes of shortages in food and fue) was the badly 
coordinated transport policy which relied heavily on dn overbur-
dened and underinanned ra il way system. Firs t ly, owi ny to the i n-
. volvement of German troops in military action over a very wide 
area, supply lines primarily served by the railways were extended 
far beyond the boundaries in which these had ever operated in peace 
tinle. This meant that a sizeable amount of rolliny stock had to be I 
earmarked for troop movements to and from the front and betw~en 
different fronts. Further stock was needed to supply the troops at 
the front with proviSions and equipment. Furtherlllore, domestic. or-
ganisation and planning was subject to sudden disruption owing to 
the interference of m11 itary schedules. These often changed at 
short notice according to the location of the battles. 57 The 
~ problem was further agyravated by the fact that the railway network 
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was not sufficiently equipped to bear the increased volume of 
freight. Bef.ore the war, lIluch of the country's coal, iron ore and; 
to'a certain extent, imported food was delivered and distributed by 
way of rivers and canals. However, during the war with the need to 
speed up transportation, much of this traffic was transferred to 
the ra il ways. 
Undermanning on the railways was yet another problem which mani-
fested itself particularly with regard to repairs and ~Iaintenance. 
As the railways became more and more overburdened, the frequency of 
breakdowns owing to engine fai lure or of the telllporary closure of 
tracks owing to signal f~ilure etc. increased. Organisational mis-
takes led to waggon loads of fresh veyetables being left to stand 
in .. sidinys during hot wCdther, with the result. thdL whell they t i-
nally reached their destinatioll, they were cOllljJlctely ullfit fur 
human consumption. The outcome of such problems was that of tell 
ration quotas for the industrial centres existed lIIerely on pajJer. 
Rolling stock could not be sufficiently replenished because of the 
higher priority placed on the manufdcture of munitiolls and lIIilitary 
equipment. Later! in the ~Jdr following the coal crisis, a higher 
pri ori ty was gi ven to the manufacture of tracks, 1 OCOlIlOt i ves and 
railway trucks and to the exemption from military service of lIIore 
labour to ensure speedier repairs and maintenance. These measures 
mitigated the problems but did not solve them. 
Remscheid, as an industrial centre, was particularly dependent on 
the,efficiency of the transportation system, for allllost all of its 
food had to be brought in frolll other areas. Although the bulk of 
the town's supplies came from surrounding country areas lik.e the 
Oberbery i sche L and and Sauer 1 and, nevertheless IIldllY COIIMIIOd it i es 
. came from areas situated much further afield. RemsclJeid was parti-
cularly vulnerable because the surrounding terrain precluded or at 
least made other methods of delivery difficult, so that a smooth-
running railway systelll was essential. 
for people living in industrial centres like Relllscheid, opportuni-
ties for supplementing rations were fairly limited. Those who were 
fortunate enouyh to rent an all otlllent and had enough spare t irne 
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to work it J were able to help thelllse 1 ves to sOHle extent, a 1 though 
the amounts,they could grow were limited by the smallness of their 
gardens. A further., restri ct i on ensued from: the a llllost perlilanent 
shortage of fertilizers. Nevertheless, newspapers helped hobby gar-
deners to attain better results by featuring regular gardening re-
ports and alternative tips. Remscheid's raw climate, however, 'ten-
ded to preclude notable successes and linlited the variety of crops. 
From time to time the authorities appealed to allotment tenants to 
plant particular crops to help alleviate a nationwide shortage. On 
one such occas i on the newspapers appea 1 ed . for sunfl ower~, wh i ch 
were needed for oil. 58 
Another way of supplelllenting rations WdS to IIIdke ford~ill~ trijJs 
into the surrounding coulltrysi<.Jc to gdtlH;;r nuts dllU ucrrics. [uell 
year .. duri ng the sUlllmer months, thousands of Relllsctleid c i t i zens 
streamed into the Oberbergi sche Land in search cf· wi 1 d fru its. 
Whenever possible, special trains were mdde available. 59 The 
search for extra vitamins in the countryside was accompanied by the 
publ ication of country recipes in the local newspapers. Herbal 
soups, various' jams and cordials were, reintroduced to Remscheid 
palates by the exigencies of war, and doubtlessly benefited a part 
.of the ~orkilig class population suffering from vitamin deficiency. 
This form of foraging expedition was tolerated by the authorities 
because it was expedient. Another practice, however, was dis-
couraged, namely begging from farmers. Despite possible jJunistllllent, 
whole. families would wander from farm to farm in search of milk, 
eggs, butter and left-over vegetables. 60 Some town dwellers 
took' articles with them to exchange for food, whilst others offered 
money. If these strategi es failed, sOllle resorted to theft. 61 In 
order to deter this practice of. begging and foraging, gendarmes on 
horseback used to tour the countrysioe,stopping groups of women and 
children and confiscating their provisions. Baggage checks at rail-
way stations were another method employed by the authorities to 
discourage sorties into the countryside for food. 62 
When the authorities finally became alerted to the black market 
problem, which was favoured and prollloted by foraging trips, they 
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tried to enlist the aid of railway personnel in order to rule out 
the use of railways for illicit excursions. Furious Landrate from 
the Oberbergi sche Land p 1 i ed the ra il way authori tie s wit h com-
plaints about the lack of vigilance of railway personnel and even 
of collusion between these and forayers. Complaints from GUllllllers-
bach, Waldbrtil, and Landkreis MUlheim induced the police president 
of Elberfeld to address a letter to the local railway authority 
headquarters. 63 The letter suggested the following IlIeasures to 
prevent miscreants from using the railways. Heavy bags and luygage, 
which were too large to fit into the luggage rack, were to be 
handed in as accompanying baggage to travel in the goods van and 
were therefore subject to inspection. Railway employees were also 
exhorted to help the police with bagyd~e checks, IJdrticuldrly dt 
Bergisch Born, WipperfLirth, Marienheide and Oierinyhdusen, as these 
were favourite destinations of racketeers. It is not clear whether 
the practice of foraging by railway was completely sUjJpressed by 
these measures for the rema i naer of the war. It is 1 i ke ly that the 
authorities only temporarily succeeded in making any impact on the 
activities of those looking for extra food and a chance to make 
large profits. However, less than six months after the .end of the 
war,. the Landrat of GUllllllcrsbach was again complaining to the rail-
way authorities in Elberfe1d of the increased activity of forayers 
'from the industrial towns. The Landrat reported that hotel owners 
from Barmen were paying the usurious price of BO marks per hundred-
wei ght of potatoes, wi tt! the result that farlllers were 91 adly se 11-
iny off all their stocks, even seed potatoes earmarkt!d for next 
year's crop. In his opinion, the 1I1ain culprits were not the needy 
and indigent, but above all racketeers exploiting a precarious 
s ituat i on~ 64 
As the war progressed and money gradually lost in value owi ng to 
inflation caused by the government's policy of financing the war by 
printin'g more banknotes, a practice becallle COUllllon which was indubi-
tably harmful to the rationing policy. T~is practice was the provi-
sion of bonuses by larger factories in the form of foodstuffs. Al-
though this practice was reyarded by the authorities as unaccept-
I" 
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ab 1 e, most 1 arge compan i es incorporated it in the i r pay po 1 i-
cy.?5 Company agents toured country areas purchasing ostensibly 
surplus stocks of food from farmers and transporting them back to 
the factories. This form of transaction was especially opprobrious 
beca~se it encouraged th~ farmers to fiil up their official quotas 
with produce of poorer quality or else to attempt to swindle the· 
government agencies by giving short-weights etc. Industrial buyers 
were able to pay higher prices than 1II0St individuals and were often 
able to supply valuable,fertilizers which could either be kept or 
reso 1 d to other farmers at a handsome profi t. Some unsc'rupu 1 ous 
agents afterwards proceeded to swindle workers of their company out 
'of their extra provisions by reselling at a profit to another 
buyer. Such practices occurred regularly throughout the war years, 
mainly ~o the detriment of the urban working class, which was de-
pendent on others for the delivery of food. 
There were also a number of ill ega 1 methods of supp 1 efllent i ny ra-
tions which, as the war dragged on, were adopted by increasingly 
.large numbers. Tauschhandel (the exchange of goodS) was an indict-
. , 
ab 1 e' offence whi ch became wi despread. I t was above a 11 the more 
well-ta-do sections of the population who indulged in this fon~ of 
transaction. The rich had assets which could either be exchanged 
, for food or else be converted into cash for purchases on the black 
market. Workers were less able to partiCipate in this barter sys-
tem, as they did not as a rule have very much of value to offer. 
furthermore, the exchange system'was a time-consuming affair which 
required sufficient spare tillle. 66 Other malpractices which 
supplied the black market were the illeyal butchery of animals, in-
dulged in by some farmers, a ruse invariably worked by supplying 
the authorities with inaccurate data, and the feeding of potatoes, 
maize and other cereal crop to livestock in order to aChieve higher 
,weights~ The latter malpractice could only be effectively combatted 
by granting high price rises for these staple foods, with the re-
sult that the workers suffered once more as this was jJassed on to 
them in the form of higher bread and potato prices • 
. , 
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As we have seen, the local authorities, in particular, had' been 
anxious to i~troduce a fair system of rationing and were initially 
quite successful apart frorll the f1 rst few weeks when panic buyi ny 
led to high prices and unnecessary shortayes. In order to be better 
able to control prices locally, ·the Lebenslllittelausschuj) set up a 
tribunal, the price control board, to fix prices and \Ilake inquiries 
into cases of complaint regarding prices, weights and measures. The 
tribunal was given the power to ~and over offenders to the police 
and the local courts for trial. Reports on proceedings ajJpeared 
regul arly in the newspapers and these called for more assistance 
from the civilian population to help track down offenders. A fdvou-
rite pract i ce alllong di shonest shopke'ejJers was the wateri ng-down of 
milk or other liquids or clse lIIixing additives to other toods. ~ucll 
offences were severely puni shed, eS/-lec i ally towards the end of the 
war. 67 
The introduction of the quota system, however, with its many accolll-
panying evils, some of which we have already seen, facilitated and 
encouraged the setting up of a fl.ourishing black market •. Frequent 
price rises, introduced in the hOjJe of placating irate farmers, 
actually induced the latter to withhold supplies until the new 
prices came into force, so that there were artificially caust:!d 
shortages in times of relative plenty. The higher price on turnips 
was reason enough for fanners to switch to this crop in preference 
t~ potatoes in a year when the potato harvest was by no means 
poor. 68 The authorities, owing to undennanning, were sorely 
pressed to detect offenders against the official prices policy •. For 
these reasons the chances of llIak i n9 ri ch profits and rema i ni ng un-
. punished were fairly high. Even detection normally only lIIeant a 
fine which could quickly be made good again by further rackets. 
As we saw earlier in this chapter, Remscheid workers were not 
en thus i ast i c about the war. Undoubtedly there were those who wert~ 
seized by the patriotic urge to do their duty and volunteer in the 
hope that they would return home victorious within a few weeks or 
months, but the rnaj ori ty rellld i fled scept i ca 1 and res i gned thelllsel ves 
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to the coming uncertainty. It is hardly surpnslng then that as 
soon as the ,effects of the blockade and th~ many shortages b~gan to 
be·felt. there was widespread dissatisfaction and resentlllent which, 
however, was not allowed to be dissipated by precipitat~ and un-
coordinated action, but was instead skilfully channelled into a 
revolutionary movement. The process of attrition suffered by the 
" German working class was unquestionably more severe in tOWIIS ill the 
Ruhrgebi et than i n Renl~chei d69 where the lIIajority of workers 
was engaged in war production, earning high wages. Despite this 
fact, however, Remscheid workers were subjected to frequeQt shor-
tay~s of foodstuffs and fuel and suffered miserably in the harsh 
winters. The last three winters of the war were lIIarked by a chronic 
shortage of IIIdnjJower (..t lJt;rlllunclIl CUllditilJll ill i<cllIschcid lltruu~lluuL 
the 'war), fuel crises, shortage of potatoes, brcdd Jlld lIIeat, which 
also led to cuts in rations, although it was believ~d that tht:!se 
foods were in plentiful supply. In spite of dwindling rations the 
work rate was constantly accelerated to mak~ up for ttJ~ shortage of 
manpower. Shifts were lenythened and legislation protecting women 
and.youths from lony working hours was suspended. An obvious con-
se~uence of longer shifts and an accelerated work temjJo, given the 
deteriorating standard of nutrition, was a higher inciden'ce uf 
industrial accidents, due to fatigue and loss of concentration. 
, 
Workers were driven to exhaustion without the hope of respite. A 
further result of the hectic tempo was the temptation to produce 
inaccurate work which, i~ the case of munitions. could and did have 
fata 1 consequences. Piece-workers in part i cu 1 ar resorted to stlort-
cuts in the assembly process, which in turn led to dud amunition or 
even sometimes to unsafe fuses. Sometimes whole sections of workers 
were initiated in this kind of practice in order to lIJeet reyuired 
schedules. One such affair was discovered early in 1918 at the 
Mannesmann munit ions factory JO Handgrenades whi ch had' beer) i n-
accurate ly turned were then beaten 1 nto shape with a haJluner. 
Furthermore, cartons of grenades which had been rejected by the 
official controllers were given a forged stamp of approval and duly 
delivered to the front. 
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Undernouri'shlllent gradually lowered the res i stance to - ill ness 
amongst th~ workers and their families. 71 Children and old 
people were particularly vulnerable. Each winter the twin evils of 
tuberculosis and pneumonia took their toll. Influenza epidemics hit 
Remscheid except i ana l1y hard duri ng the 1 ast two wi nters of the 
war. Between 1st October and the end of Uecen~er 1918, 398 people 
died from this ill nes s. 72 Work i ng women had to contend not only 
with the requirements of thei r jobs but also with the per~etua 1 
worry of providing enough food for their families. They were also 
continually worried about their husbands serving at the front. 
These worri es were constantly rei nforced by the steady stream of 
mil t'tary obituaries in the local newspapers, and the horror stories 
related bY troolJs on leave.73 
Almost as bad as delJrivation itself WdS the know1ed~e that others 
we're not having to make the sallle sdcrifices. The flaunting of 
wealth in the face of hunger and poverty had a disastrous effect on 
'the morale of the workers and played a significant role in the 
pOisoning of relations between the classes towards the end of the 
war. As the war progressed it bec~l~ apparent to the workers that 
; t was they who were 1 aden wi th ob 1 i gat ions wh i1 st others seellled to' 
be enjoying the olJPortunities of making fortunes. From time to 
time, the authorities made a~peals to the rich not to provoke the 
workers by ostentatiously brandishing their wealth. 
5. The Economic Situation and Political Activities of the Relllscheid 
Bourgeoisie. 
In accordance with the predictions of socialist theory, the war 
paradox; ca lly breathed new 1 i fe into the capital i st system. Withi n 
months t formerly a 11 i ng factori es and workshops had been revi ved 
and were again working to full capacity. In this respect Relllscheio 
was no exception. Several struggling and nearly moribund establish-
ments were reprieved and then saved by the transition to war eco-
nomy. In general, it was the laryer factories like the Bergische 
Stahl Industrie, Manneslllannwerke, Alexanderwerk and Richard Linden-
t" 
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berg etc.,which profited most frolll the war, but also lIIiddle and 
small-sized firms were able to participate in sub-conctracting and 
I 
sp~cialisation. 
The i ntroduct i on of central purchas i ng bureaus for the 11111 itary en-
sured a steady flow of contracts which were then redistributed lo-
cally. This system had the advantage of making local industry inde-
pendent of uncertain foreign markets and the vicissitudes of pro-
duction and trade cycles. Furthenl~re, the trade union support of 
the Burgfri eden and thei r undertak i n!;j not to sUIJPort stri kes, 
augured well for the smooth running of production and the, Qenerat-
ing of increased profits. If Germany could win the ~ar and con4uer 
new markets, industry would be able to expand prodi~ouS1Yl as it hold 
following the victory of 1871. In such a situation Kelllscheid. with 
its already well-developed world-wide network of contacts, consi-
, derable trading expertise and manufacture of special tools for d 
world becoming increasingly mechanised, would grow yet ftfther in 
. A 
stature and prosper enonnously. Juxtaposed to these important pre-
conditions for the untrammelled prosperity of employers,were tile 
J 
'presence of a hi~hly skilled and traditiollallyrnilitant workforce 
and a shortage of skilled manpower which in the course of the war 
increased to chronic proportions. 
The Remscheid tool industry appears to have paid its Skilled wor-
kers high wages and compared favourably with bigger towns like Ber-
lin, Oi.isseldorf, Essen, Ouisburg, etc.74 Furthermore, a lower 
cost of 1 i vi ng and an undoubtedly better qual i ty of 1 i fe in the 
smaller Bergische town lIIade it infinitely more attractive. On the 
other hand, in order to earn top rates of paYlllent. Relllscileid wor-
kers had to produce on a piece-work basis which meant a higher in-
tensity. At the flat rate Remscheid occupied a fairly low-to-middle 
position for most skilled jobs, although added bonuses tended to 
close the gap somewhat.75 Ouri ~9, the war however, when sk ill ed 
labour was in short supply, local industry was compelled to offer 
wages in excess of the official rates, and, as we have already 
seen, bonuses in the form of provisions. Differentials between 
. 
skilled, semi-skilled and unSkilled workers also began to illcrease 
again during the war. after a period of stagnation. 
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The shorta'ge of manpower, particularly skilled workers, during the 
war years was primari ly compensated by 1 anger shi fts for all wor-
ker-s. On the whole it was the larger factories enyayed in war pro-
duction which were IlIOSt successful in reclaiming ski.lled workers 
from their call-up duty. As the war progressed, however, and the 
military sustained heavier losses, even large factories like the 
BSI and Mannesmann found it increasingly difficult to hold on tu 
those Skilled workers who had been released from military duty. 
Another method by which industrialists hoped to cOlllpensate for the 
shortage of manpower was by an increased work tellllJO, i ne.vi tab ly 
leading to a rise in the number of industrial accidents" as an 
undernouri shed, underlllc.tnned and exhausted work force s trugg 1 eu to 
keep pdce with rcyuircllll!lIts. 76 ,1\ further result 01' till;! fllst~r 
work rate was the higher incidellce of faulty \Jrulluct5 dnu thl! 
greater frequency of breakdowns as the delllands on old IlIdCh i nery 
were extremely rigorous. 
The high wages payed to German and foreign workers were to a cer-
tain extent neutralised by the increased exploitation of prisoners 
of war who were paid at the lowest rate, sO/lle of them for doin~ 
highly skilled work. Skilled forei~n workers were attrac ted to 
Remscheid by high rates of pay, and by the end of the war accounteo 
, for a substantial section of local skilled labour. 77 
High wages paid to skilled workers were also in part offset by the 
influx of women into local industry. Like POWs they were also ex-
ploited unashamedly, working long shifts for extrelllely low rates of 
pay.78 
A further consequence of the manpower Shortage was the prolllulgation 
,of the Vaterlandische Hilfsdienstyesetz (Auxiliary Law) in Decelllber 
1916. As it was generally recognised that the well-ta-dO often 
needed to be coerced into doing their patriotic duty,79 the 
authorities insisted on the drafting of all males between 17 and 60 
years who were not serving in the armed forces into relevant areas 
of war production. SOllle wealthy people were able to profit from 
persona I contacts to ha ve ttlelllse 1 ves either exelOpted or else to 
secure easy desk jobs. On the other hand, Illany were drafted into 
" . 
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war production who had hitherto never worked in a factory. Very 
often such ~eople were subjected to derision because of their phy-
si'cal stature ·or because they lacked the necessary strength to do 
the job properly. Nevertheless the law did succeed in mobilising 
hitherto u~tapped resources of manpower, which from then on helped 
to share the burden borne by the workers. 80 As oppos it i on to 
the war became more and more vociferous the mil itary authorities 
, ' , 
began to insist on the call-up of political activists who had been 
reclaimed from niilitary service by their employers. This threat of 
reporting political troublemakers was used quite frequer'ltly and 
very probably contri buted cons i derab ly to 5ubdui ng oppos i t i on to 
the war and the status quo for so long. The fate of Wilhelm Ditt-
mann was proof enough to local workers that the threats of release 
to the mil itary authorit i es were genu i ne. Ul 
At this point it would seem expedient to consider the prices of 
staple foods which forllled the basis of the traditional diet of th~ 
local ~orking class and of combustible fuels in order to demons-
trate the loss of purchasing pO\'Jer experi enced by the ~wrkers 
during the course of the war. Considering the failure to locate a 
more complete list of items from which an accurate index could be 
calculated; we must suffice with a rough estimate, whi~11 is arrived 
at by the correlation of basic wage rates and the prices of the 
most important food and fuel items. It must be remembered that the 
prices indicated in table 5 are those officially fixed by the Relll-
scheid Prices Control Board as equitable to both producers and con-
sunu~rs. The information supplied in the table does not reflect 
black market pri ces wh i ch were, of course, much higher and would 
have const ituted an i nqex much nearer to reality had they been 
available instead. All the items listed in table 5 were rationed 
and sold in exchange for the indicated officially fixed amount and 
the appropriate coupon. Rations fluctuated according to the availa-
bility of individual items. Potatoes, for example, were rationed at 
10 lbs (5,000 grams) per' head per week, but after the first 12 
nlonths of war were reduced to seven pounds per person per week, and 
at one point slipped to three pou'nds plus extra turnips.82 The 
t' , 
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fact that'other vital foodstuffs were also in short supply or else 
completely unavailable poignantly illustrates the inadequacy of 
these rations, and gives a clear indication of the catastrophic 
standard of nutrition in both quantitative and qualitative tenns of 
those who had no means of supplementing their diet in other ways. 
Fuel rations also fluctua~ed considerably. Uuring the coal crisis, 
which unfortunately coincided with the miseries of the 'turnip win-
ter·, coal was rationed at a maximum of two buckets per household 
per week. Furthermore, those households which already had coal in 
their cellars were precluded from further purchase althol.lyh it is 
not clear how the authorities meant to enforce this rule. The lIIise-
ry caused by the coal crisis and the coal decree was eXdcerbdted by 
the 'knowledge thdt IIluch of the co(.d which WJS aVdiLll.lle WdS eJr'-
marked for' industrial use. The penalties for sellin\:j inJustrial 
coal to private households were particularly stiff: six months im-
'prisonlllent or ,10,000 llIa~ks fine. e3 The Rheinisch-Westfal i sclle 
Elektrizitatswerk (RWE) also experienced difficulties in supplyin\:j 
electricity so that it becdllle necessary to prohibit the lightin\:j of 
shopwindows.ln February certain schools were closed down because of 
the shortage of heatin!;!, fuel. 84 The plunderiny of coal trucks 
in the ra i1 way goods yards beca/lle a peril ou's game for work i ng-cl ass 
children during the winter lIIonths.tjb The effects of the coal 
crisis, which was caused primarily by the lack of lIIiners, the shor-
tage of rolling stock and an increased demand from industry, per-
sisted for most of the following year, so that an official coal re-
port, written in Remscheid in September, stated that 19,OOU house-
holds de'pended on coal suppl ies, and that a hundredweight per fami-
ly per week would amount to 16 coal trucks per day and that the 
current supply stood at 11.86 It was further calculated that 
something in the region of five to six thousand fanlilies were regu-
larly receiving coal bonuses from their employers. In the same 
month (September 1917) the petroleum ration was reduced from eight 
litres to five and a half per month.8] From this it should I 
therefore be clear that the listing of priced itellls in table!> I 
indicates only the availability but not necessarily the correspond- I , 
, 
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ing fixed' rations. Frolll this it follows that official rations very 
frequently ~nly existed on paper. The blank sqares in table 5 indi-
cate the unavailabil ity of the correslJonding items. Other fOOd-
stuffs not listed" ego fruit and fish, were only seldom available 
although frequently obtainable on the black market. 
If one now considers the case of a highly Skilled male worker over 
the age of 24 years employed in the Relllscheid metal industry and 
earning the basic hourly rate as indicated in table 6 and assuming 
that this rate constitutes his net pay, one can roughly gauge his 
standard of 1 i vi ng durl ng the Cours~ of the war. 
Table 7 shows the purchasing power of cl Skilled metalworker over 
the age of 24 years» a melllber of the cream of the RClllscheiu work-
t·orce~ !he table reveals d consiuerdule loss of J.lurCllasill~ J.luHer 
during the el!;lhteen months separatin!;l the two shoppin!J days 24/~/lb 
and 25/11/17. It is also essential to recall that durin~ this 
period supplies were erratic and in general tendiny to shortages ill 
the most important items. On 25/2/18 the sallle worker was now earll-
ing 1 mark 20 per hour so that in theory; at least, the ratio of 
. his wage to official prices had altered in his favour. However, the 
'actual picture was far different. Although this worker's wages had 
risen considerably, suppl ies had become much worse and the most irll-
portant items were only regularly available on the black market at 
prices which the individual in question 1II0St certainly could not 
afford. If one considers that this worker was married and had three 
or four dependent children and a wife who did not work, then his 
fortunes already appear gloomier, despite the various bonuses in 
extra rations which he lIlay or may not have received. Although his 
net wage increased each year, it failed to keep paCe with official 
prices until the end of 1917, and only in the final year of the war 
did his take-home pay leap above that of official prices. The fact 
that money had lost considerably in value owing to quickening in-
flation and that therefore the black market prices were a truer in-
dicator than those fixed officially by the prices control board, 
reveals a picture of misery and hardship suffered not only by this 
individual but particularly by other cateyories of workers elllployed 
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in the highly paying Remscheid metal industry. If we consider the 
plight of an unskilled female worker employed by the Alexanderwerk 
in' November and December 191788 the true extent of 1111 sery and 
hardship becomes clear, particularly if we assume that she is 
married or widowed and has two depenqent children.89 
date 
25/11/17 
hourly rate 
30 pfennigs 
time worked 
32 llIins. 
1 hr. 18 lIIins. 
1 hr. 40 lOins. 
7 hrs.30 mins. 
6 hrs.40 lOins. 
41 lIlins. 
lY lIIins. 
to buy 
1 1 b.carrots 
1 eg~ 
1 litre milk 
1 cwt. coal 
1 lb. margerille 
1 1 b. war breali 
1 lb. potatoes. 
It has already been established in this chapter that the bulk of 
local establishments became involved in war production and were 
very soon working'at HldxinlulII capacity. The exploitation of felllale 
labour, prisoners of war and youths also considerably reduced over-
heads on production, so that it was clear that a yreat deal of 
wealth was being generated in Relllscheid's iron and stt:!el industry. 
The treasurers I annual reports of Relllscheid I s 1 aryest f1 rIllS show an 
embarrassingly consistent increase in profits. The Alexanderwerk 
for instance announced an increased turnover for the year lY15/16 
from 5.973.276 marks to 7.087.689 marks and an increast:! in profits 
from 1.703.522 to 1.922.688 marks. 90 The turnover of the 
Alexanderwerk continued to increase so that shareholders received 
handsome dividends throughout the whole of the war period. 91 In 
November 1917 shareholders of Richard Lindenbery were consulted on 
the question of increasing share capital frolll three to four million 
marks by issuing new shares. The move was agreed and 1.200.000 
marks were earmarked for thi s undertaking from the 1916/17 pro-
fits. 92 It was presumably soaring profits which induced Richard 
Lindenberg to purchase a villa in Alsace, an investment which re-
" , 
- 90 -
mained inflationproof .. In January 1918 the Mannesmdnn-Rbhrenwerke 
increased its share capital by 14 million marks to a total of 86 
million and this was only one of two Mannesnhlnn factories based in 
Remscheid. 93 The Bergische Stahl-Industrie's turn-over in-
creased in the followiny way: 
1913/14 
'1914/15 
1915/16 
1916/17 
1917/18 
1918/19 
14.117.878 marks 
17.379.238 
32.099.394 marks 
marks 
40.205.935 marks 
67.350.376 marks 
44.293.944 marks. 94 
A table jJublishe<.l by tile Ueryische Vulksstilllllle ill 1911 revealed lhe 
amount of wealth in Relllscheid at the be9il\nin~ of the Wolr. Of the 
ten different towns and areas surveyed, Remscheid had tile hiyllest 
proportionate incollle. 95 
The newspaper article featuring table 8 suygested that Relllscheid 
had already usurped the title of 'land of unlimited opportunity' 
from America. This picture is confirmed by an article appearing in 
1919, which announced that according to the Prussian tax conmission 
Remscheid occupied first place in respect of payment of war taxes, 
,which meant in fact that Remschei d had proport ionate ly made the 
largest ,profits during the war. 96 In 1918,' of the approximate 
76,000 i:nhabitants, 21,400 were subject to incollle tax. Of these, 
16,200 earned below 3,000 tv'larks p.a. and 5,200 earned, more than 
3,000 Marks p.a. Of these, 1U6 were taxed on an income of more than 
100,000 Marks p.a. These figures help to show that Relllscheid became 
a veritable gold-mine, particularly for the industrialists and 
manufacturers during the war years. The mayor in his annual report 
for 1918/19 was able to point to an increase of eleven million 
marks in the local savings bank's deposits which leapt from 38 to 
49 million marks despite the economic depression which set in with 
1011 itary collapse.97 
So far, the profits examined were those which were officially pre-
sented for taxation and may be regarded as legally earned and de-
" , 
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clared income. However, this was not the cOlllplete picture as a tax 
fraud scandql of gigantic proportions revealed during the course of 
the last year of war. 98 At the centre of the scandal was the 
ge,ya 1 ' director of the t'lannesmann, Wa ffen-.und Mun it i onswerke, 
Adels. who had been awarded the cOIIUllendqtiollilL., I1ledal (Verdienst-
kreuz) for meritoriousservice to the war ~ffort" Adels had since 1914 
consistently failed to declare considerable portions of his income. 
For the year 1916 he declared an income of 11,700 IIlarks although ( 
inquiries subsequently revealed an actualincollle of-22,700 marks. 
For the year 1917 Adels declared 49,150 although his reat income 
was in fact 412,590nlarks. Together with an accomplice he sllluggled 
a sum of 520,000 Swiss Francs out of the country dnd delJosited this 
in a Zurich bank. Wtlt~n the scanddl Cdllle to li~ht tile dCCOlIllJlice 
cOJlunitted suicide. The factory manager, director Karl E~g99, 
was also implicated in the scandal,as was one of the factory's lIIain 
suppl iers. The sentences were extrelllely lenient when cOlIllJured to 
those meted out to opponents of the war and those found dLstribut-
ing anti-war leaflets. Director Adels was fined a SUIII of 1,b52 
marks or sentenced to one year and six weeks impri sonlllent. 'of vlh i ch 
five months spent in custody whilst inquiries were being made, were 
deducted from the total. The publ ic prosecutor's aIJpeal for the 
suspension of civil rights for a period of five years was not 
granted, which effectively meant that director Adels was permitted 
to continue wearing his' JIIedal for exemplary service to the war 
effort. lOO T~e case considered above serves to illustrate the 
opportunities for making large profits both legally and illegally 
in Relllscheid during the war. It appears to have been an exception 
as far as the amounts involved are concerned. The effects of this 
scandal and the announcement of legal profit's were' exceedingly 
damaging to the morale of war-weary workers struggl ing to secure 
even the most basic needs of their families. 
The exterit to which the local middle and upper-middle classes in-
dulged in the pursuit of pleasure during the war years remains 
essentially speculative. Owing to stringent censorship reports on 
the recreation of the well-ta-dO were forbidden and therefore this 
" , 
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aspect was relegated to the status of gossip. Secret military re-
ports, how~ver, confirmed many of the rumours which circulated 
during the war years. The selfish hedonism of the idle rich had its 
worst excesses in the spas of the South and the seaside resorts of 
the North. 10l It is doubtful whether members of the Hernscheia 
elite engaged in such pursuits as they were traditionally fairly 
modest and reserved as well as discrete with, reyard to recrea-
tion. 102 A traditional domain of the wives of local manufac-
turers was charity and welfare and it lIIay be assumed that they 
regarded their 'work' as pleasurable. On the other hand, th.e ladies 
of wealthier manufacturers insisted on the emploYlllent of housemaids 
in order to be re 1 easedfrulIl the burdens of housework for lIIore 
satisfyiny pdstillles. The Wdr, huw~vcr, did not ultl!r thc'ir Uelll..tIlU 
for housemaids although the sUPllly was no longer as plentiful as ill 
previous years. Despite this fact there were still oPllortunities 
for young girls to acquire the techniques which were necessary for 
employment in the better houses. An advertisement in the BV testi-
fies to the persistent demand for assiduous housemaids with 
polished manners - the knowledge and lIIanners could be acquired by 
attending Jenny Schulllacher's "Tischdeck- und Servierkurs" (table 
setting and waitress course) costing 15 marks, three days a week, 
at the illustrious Hotel ZUlU Weinbery.103 
Other forms of. work wh i ch bouryeoi s 1 adi es engaged in were the 
various collections for the war effo.rt as, for exalllple, the collec-
tion for submarines which, on three days in June, raised 30,509 
marks. Theco/lunittee which forllled to or!;lanise this venture callle 
exclusively from Relllscheid's upper-middle class. Of the final total 
only 8,980 marks were collected on the streets, the larger amounts 
came from industry, eg. 20,000 marks from the BSI, 1,UOO marks frolll 
Walter Hentzen & Co., which requested no publicity, and several 
other establishlilents. 104 Hindenbury collections prOduced a 
similar response and the willing cooperation of the local upper-
middle class. As we have alredy established, the manufacturing, 
,higher ,civil servant and professional middle class had set their 
siyhts on a successful conclusion to the war, which held the 
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prospect -of new markets and sources of raw materials. This together 
with the fa,ct that they did not suffer hardship and misery as did 
the working class and parts of the lower-middle class, ensured 
their support for the Ourchhaltepolitik demanded by the nationa-
list-chauvinist Vaterlandspartei. 
The year 1917 revealed more clearly the polarisation of. German 
society than any other previously. The rigours of tilt:! 'turnip-
winter'. the increasinyly vociferous and militant opposition to the 
war which resulted from the recognition of diveryiny inter~sts and 
which finally destroyed the illusion of the Burgfrieden. the entry 
of the United States into the war on the side of ttle Western 
Allies, and the rt!volution in Russid on the one IIdIKI, tilt! dec1siofl 
to unleaSh all-out subllldrine warfare, the annexationist delllallds of 
. the Alldeutschen {Pan Gerlllan League),and the victory on the eastern 
front on the other hand, were all facts which played a role in the 
organisation of pro-nationalist forces in a supra-party /lIovement to 
disseminate chauvanist propaganda and attelllPt to encoura~e a findl 
rniyhty effort which would finish the war before the AJllericans had 
time seriously to influence the course of events. 
The ·1 oca 1 branch of the V aterl andspartei was forllled in November 
1917,105 and a few days 1 ater lJub 1 i shed a fu ll-page manifesto 
and membership-list in the RGA.I06 The governing committee of 
seven was under the chairmanship of industrialist, Alfred Klin~eln­
berg, owner of a floiJrishing middle-sized firm engaged in war pro-
duction, and his deputy Peter Hollender, headmaster. The remaining 
cOffuni ttee members were two more i ndustri a lists/manufacturers, an 
infl~ential businessman representiny the interests of export, a 
foreman (Werkmeister) and a warehouseman, Wilhellll Schroeder, who 
after the war became a leading member of the Oeutsch-Nationale 
Vol kspartei (ONVP). 
The Activities Committee, which was the main decision-makiny body, 
consisted of five of Remscheid's most influential industrialists 
and the wives of two others, Or. Alfred Ziegler, the owner of the 
· . 
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Remscheider General Anzeiger (RGA), KOllllllerzienrat (councillor of 
commerce). Hermann Hasenclever, several senior teachers, st!nior 
civil servants. two representatives from the church, a few lawyers 
and wealthier shop and warehouse owners and one bricklayer. Apart 
from these the local party had a further 275 ordinary members, con-
sisting of at least 73 industrialists/manufacturers, at least 51 
independent businessmen (Kaufmanner), 41 senior civil servants, six 
pastors/priests. five doctors. 17 Prokuristen and engineers (senior 
staff ~n industry). six lower civil servants, three bank directors, 
two architects, two chemists, one 1 ieutenant of the arlllY reserve, 
one pub landlord, 21 Werkmeister or master craftsmen (probably in-
dependent) and lower-middle class white-collar workers and 14 who 
could be positively identified as workers, and the rt!st were at in-
determinate social origin. This cOlllposition lIIedns thJt dt least 229 
of the total of 275 definitely did not belong to the wurkiny class. 
This, as we shall see in the following chapters, was rou\:lllly the 
dividing line of class interests in the polarisation of Relllscheid 
society throuyhout the Weilllar Re\Jublic, less riyidly duriny the 
Nazi period and again after the demise of the Third Reich. The 
interests aligned on both sides constitute important elements of 
continuity throughout almost the whole. period under examination in 
this study. More importantly, its appearance as a loosely-oryanised 
bourgeois coalition accentuated the (Jolarisation in Relllscht!id 
society. which had been briefly obfuscated by tht! Burgfrieden, and 
which was to remain in evidence throughout the whole of the period 
with which this study is concerned. 
In its statement of pal icy the Vaterlandspartei professed the in-
tention of collecting together all the various patriotic yroups and 
individuals in a supra-party structure in order to lend conVincing 
support to the government and strengthen the resolve of the people 
to hold out and win the war. The manifesto explicitly eschewed com-
petition with existing parties and promised to disband as soon as 
peace was signed. The essence of the manifesto was an a(Jpeal to 
postpone all social grievances and quarrels until hostilities had 
ceased. 
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Then. in a more direct address to local inhabitants. the local 
branch reminded Relllscheid citizens of their obligation to a system 
which had granted them social benefits that were beyond co"~arison 
in the enen~ states. It assured readers that since the inception of 
unrestri cted sublllari ne warfare. Eng1 and was faced wi th a race 
against time which it could not win. Furthermore. Russia WdS in d 
state of collapse as was Italy, and the French had lost their will 
to fight. The appeal closed with a reminder of the implications of 
victory: 
'Oenkt an die Ausfuhr Eurer Erzeugnisse. Manner 
der Industrie: Arbeiterund Fabrikanten. Ude seht 
Ihr die grol3en Gebaude der Ausfuhrfirlllen. die ruhlo-
1 ich den deutsclH!JI N':.lIl1en in die fernsteJl lei le der 
Erde getragen, Euch Arbeitern lohnenden Verdienst 
gegeben haben. Uie starke Heschaftigung der Kustunys-
betriebe bleibt nicht. Dann lllu(3 der Auslandslllarkt 
wieder offenstehen, UIIl den Oberschuss der Erzeuguny 
an Waren aller Art Uber den Inlandsbedarf nach de", 
Auslande ~bzusetzen. Geht's nach dem Willen Enylands 
und seiner Trabanten, dann bleiben uns die Auslands-
markte dauernd verschlossen. Was das bedeutet, diJrfte jedem.Arbeiter, Fabrikanten und Handelsherrn klar seine 
Nur ein siegreicher Friede bUrgt uns fUr eine Betati-
gung auf gleichberechtigter Grundlage im Wettbewerb 
mit dem Auslande. 107 ' 
The Vaterlandspartei held meetings regularly, and orgnised patrio-
tic evenings in order to raise funds for the war effort. Locally 
its impact was fairly limited. For obvious reasons it attracted 
support flfm the established middle class, but was not able to make 
Significant inroads into the working class or the 'new' and lower-
middle class for that matter. 
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6. The Development of Class Conflict in Remscheid during the War. 
The following is an attempt to explain the development of class 
confl ict in Relllscheid during the last three years of war by means 
( . 
of the Kocka model as explained in the introduction. 1U8 The 
analysis will be continued in Chapter Il for the period 1918 to 
1923. 
The essential fact to keep in mind when applying a model like this 
to a Single cOllllllunity is that cOll1ll1unity·s lack of autonolllY and its 
subordination toa wider econolllic and political region ~in this 
case the land), and then the whole country. 
Owing to the given situation in Relllsche'id society109, thert~ 
already existed a distinct diver~ellce of class interests bl.:!fore the 
outbreak of war. On the one hand there was a re 1 at i ve ly Sllla 11 
industrialist/manufacturer class, supported by the state civil ser-
vi ce apparatus, and 011 the other the mass of waye-earners. 1 tie 
. ) 
allegiance of salary-earners is more problematic, as the delllarca-
tion line runs through this cate~ory.110 
In class terms the lo~-Jer-lIliddle class or the ·new· middle class, 
consisting of those employed in industry, ie. in offices,. typin~ 
pool s etc., tended not ·to identify with the workers, and thei r 
vocational organisations were anxious to emphasise the difference 
separat i ng the two classes although economi ca lly they were on the 
whole just as dependent as the proletariat. During the.course of 
the war the new middle class suffered the same' kind of illlp'overish-
.ment as the proletariat1ll 
During the course of the war there was a further divergence of 
class interests locally, as owing to the boom-like conditions in 
war production the industrialist/manufacturer class were making 
vast profits to the detriment of the hea lth of workers and thei r 
famil ies. The workers did not profit fro/ll the war, on the contrary 
they suffered accelerated impoverishment. 
Class hostility had been a regutlar feature in Remscheid society 
over the preceding two or three decades but it intensified qualita-
tively and quantitatively during the war years, particularly from 
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1916 onwards. As the divergence of class interests bt!Callle lIIort! 
·acute, so d~d class hostility. Firstly, even at the politically un-
organised level it became clear to Remscheid lIIetal workers that 
they were vital to the war production progralTUlIe and hence for the 
prosecution of war per se. However, instead of benefiting frolll 
their key po~ition they were called upon to make even greatt!r 
sacrifices, ego to work longer hours, to speed up tilt! proQuction 
process, to tolerate frequent ration shortages, to make do with in-
adequate supplies of fuel and to go without, or content themselves 
with minimal opportunities of entertainment, etc. Wage increases 
did not keep pace with price rises so that the workers and the 
majority of industrialist white-collar workers were actually econo-
mically worse off thdn-they had been before the war. intlation anll 
a flourishing black market rendered WUYt! increases cOllljJletely in-
effective, so that by the time the workers did receive a real ilil-
provelllent in paid recollljJense for their labour, they wt!rt! not able 
to acquire even the most basic foodstuffs as these were often only 
obtainable at black market prices. Despite ration shorta~es, the 
workers were further demoralised by the exhortations to hold out 
and make further sacrifi ces. On the other hand, they were aware of 
the profi ts bei ng made by thei r employers and they a 1 so not iced 
that malnutrition did not occur in the ranks of the industrialists/ 
manufacturers and seni or ci vil servants. rvlany workers became con-
scious that manufacturers and senior civil servants were able to 
pay black market prices or at least exchan\;je goods for foodstuffs 
and clothing. 
Undoubtedly class hostility was intensified by the spread of 
rumours around the factory and proletarian districts, as it was by 
party agitation on the part of the socialist youth;, the USPU and 
Spartakists. 
-As already noted, it was apparent from the very outbreak of host i-
lities that the majority. of Remscheid's organised workers were 
against the war. Opposition to official Burgfrieden ~olicy dt!ve-
loped rapidly in the local branches of the.SPD and I)~~IV. At the 
national DMV conference in 1915, for instance, the Remscheid brdnch 
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tabled a 'motion condelllniny the Metallarbtdter-Zeitunys's pro-Bury-
frieden st'ance. 1l2 Again at the' 1917 conference . held in 
Cologne,. the Rernscheid branch of the DMV condemned the national 
committee's war policy in general, and strongly rebuked those trade 
union'leaders belonging to their organisation who had assisted in 
the formulation of the Vaterlandische Hilfsdienst law,which severe-
'ly resiricted the mobility of the workers. 113 In March 191H 
Remscheid officials of the union toyether with colleagues from 
DUsseldorf and Solingen reproached the DMV national cOllunittee for 
its publication of an appeal warning members of the daflgers of 
civil war and 'Russian conditions', and asking them to ignore revo-
lutionary leaflets and agitators. In April, the Kemscheid branch 
again attacke.d the Metallarbeiter-Leitun9 position on social anu 
political questions. 1l4 trolll this it is' clear. that at least 
the majority of local OIv1V officials were opposed to their trade 
union's official policy of supporting the war. It is also extrelllely 
likely that the DMV's local officials were supported in their oppo-
sition' .to' DMV policy, although - as elsewhere' - IlIelllbership hdd 
slumpu between 1914 ana 1918 from around three and a half thou-
sand to 900. 115 Furthermore, local functionaries like Hein-
rich Schliestedt, Cornelius Gohr, etc. constantly advisea the wor-
kers ,how to exploit the employment. Situation to their adVdn-
tage. 116 Likewise opposition within the. local SPO branch was 
articulated more and '[lore vociferously with the protraction of the 
war. The Reichstag deputy for Lennep. Wilhelm Dittmann, 
-.earned the criticism of the local cadre 
members for tailing to vote against the war credits. He rectifiea 
. this in March 1915. 117 Again on 21/12/15. Dittlllann ,. voted 
against the credits and his action was warmly approved of bY.local 
.functionarieswho appealed to the .SPD group in the Reichstag to 
abandon Buryfrieden in ,favour of ~ocialist policies. 11B . Other 
prominent· local party leaders 1 ike Otto BraS, willl GrLitz, Rudolf 
BUhler,.also made their disapproval of official party policy known • 
. The· first two played very prominent roles in the organisation of 
the USPD which was formed in April 1917 at a congress in Gotha. 
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Whilst Dittmann became one of the new pdrty's reco~nised leaaers. 
GrUtz was Ivoted onto the Beirat (steeriny comlllittee)1l9 and 
BraB was party chairr,lan of the Lower Khinelandl20 • The socia-
list youths were also active in protesting against the war by dis-
seminating oppositional material in the factories and at the front. 
The illegal "Jugendinternationale" and "Spartakusbriefe" were dis-
tributed and read in Rems~heid. and local delegates participatea in 
the international youth conferences in 1916,1911 dnd 1918. 121 
The RAZ/BV became less cautious, particularly after the winter at 
1916/17, and played an important part in interpreting events and 
enliyhtening the workers. 
With so much opposition present in the tovm, not merely to the Wdr 
but to the capitalist system, it is likely that IlIost workers were 
aware of the opposition's arguments and IIIdny were able to identify 
with these by relating them to their own experience. Local party 
and trade union representatives were highly respected fiyures WhOli1 
the workers felt they could trust and the argUlllents they usea were 
liberally interspersed with examples taken from their illullediate 
surroundings. It is clear that in such dire circulllstances lIIany Illore 
workers were prepared to consider the aryulllents of radical Socia-
lists than had been the case before the war. 
The highly skilled metal workers of Relllscheid who constituted the 
'aristocracy of labour' became increasingly aware of the discrepan-
cy between their actual declining economic position and the rewards 
which they considered their vital contribution to the country's 
war effort should have brought therll. The consciousness of this 
argument plus the close proximity of a virulent opposition and the 
knowl edge that thei r employers were reapi ng ri ch profits and not 
suffering any noticeable hardships,were the salient prerequisites 
for open conflict. 122 This phase of class hostility becallle all 
almost permanent feature in Remscheid during the period 1916 to 
1950 with the exception of the period of the Third Reich. 123 
Open conflict in Rernscheid followed a relatively long period of 
maturation.· As protest became more overt, suppression on the part 
of the authorities became harsher. House searches and general 
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harassment by the police took on a 1110 re regular pattern. 124 
The authori~ies, in collusion with the elllployers, becallle more wi 11-
ing to denounce agitators, so that thes~ wer~ then conscripted. 
Leafleteers were sentenced to terms of impri sonment and/or after-
. . 
wards were drafted to the front. Despite these measures the police 
were unsuccessful in quelling the considerable discontent. As al-
ready noted, there was an extremely able opposition which skilfully 
chane1led the workers' dissatisfaction. The local radical Socia-
lists pointed out the injustices of the capitalist system and pro-
pagated the seizure of power by the workers in order to terminate 
the war and construct a socialist society. Noreover, the opposition 
had an excellently functioning system of cOllllllunications, not merely 
in Relllschtdd where by nuw all the \~orkt!rs' illstitutiulls wt!rt! t!X-
elusively in the hands of the USPD, but alsu betweell tile 1{L!lIlsclidJ 
workers' institutions and those in other industrial towns. Ottu 
Bral3 and Willi Grutz also maintained lines of cOllllllunicatlon Hith 
.the USpp throughout the Reich, and Bra£) had links with the revolu-
tionary' workers' cells in the Berlin munitions factories. 125 
· In January 1918, at the beyinning of allother harsh winter, the con-
· ductresses on the Relllscheid trams came out on strikt! and were join-
ed soon after by the male drivers. In the press th~ dispute was 
portrayed as a purely economi c affa i r wi th the conductrt!sses and 
their colleagues delllanding lUore pay.126 The strike, however, 
reflected widesiJread discontt!nt /lot lIIerely alllonyst the strikers but 
also amongst the whole working population. There was cuncern that 
as the country entered the fifth winter of war, the end was nowhere 
in sight, and in addition the recent appeals of the Vaterlandspar-
tei gave the impression that sOllle wtlO wt!re profiting frolll the war 
did .not really desire its conclusion. The Russian Revolution had 
shown that the workers were capable .of bringing a sudden end to 
hostilities and seizing power. The previous sununer had witnessed a 
successful strike by the ribbon workers of Ronsdorf and l~ttriny-
· hausen and ,towns alony the Wup~er.127 The ~eriod i~l~diate1y 
before Christmas had been accon~anied by the ubiquitous shortages, 
on this occasion potatoes128,salt129,ana suyar13~ 
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Just before Chri stmas the workers of the BSI131 and A 1 exander-
werk132 demanded a reduction of workiny hours, illljJrolled 
rations and a 'pay increase. Workers also dl:!llIdnded chdn~es in thl:! 
rule which compelled thelll to relllain at their place of work duriny 
break-downs and which accorded thelll payment only after a waitiny 
period of four hours. The workersclaillled that failure on the part 
of management to comply with these'demands would be arlswered by a 
strike. The mood of the working population had changed over the 
previous twelve months from one of dejection and resignation to one 
of belliyerance. The transport workers' strike ended after fuur ur 
five days, but the settlement did little to allay ttll:! rising dis-
content. In July the total Relllscheid workforce Cdllle out on strike 
delllandiny extra pay to cOlllbat price rises and the effe<.:ts of infla-
tion,and a reductiorl of shifts from 0~-60 hours to 02 In.13J 
The strike lasted from 2nd July to 25th July and ended favourably 
for the workers. 
From the sunmer onwards demands for an end to the war were rejJeated 
ly heard in Remscheid. The failure of the July offensivl:! had de-
mora li sed the m11 itary authorities and lllrge sect ions of the bour-
geoisie became resigned to defeat. As Remscheid workers were jJlan-
ning to seize control locally, the sailors revolted in Kiel and 
triggered off the revolution. 134 
The war had clearly radicalised the workiny class of kelllscheid, 
parti cul arly from 1916 onwards. The ever-i ncreas i ng Sllare of the 
war burden which fell to the manual and clerical workers, the (Jillli-
ni sh i n'g relllunerat i on in rea 1 terms and the monumentd 1 dec 1 i ne in 
the quality of life which accompanied this, combined to promote 
widespread dissatisfaction amonyst these sections of SOCiety. The 
manual workers in particular began to understand the vital nature 
of their role in the war eff~rt and did not fail to perceive the 
glaring discrepancy between performance and reward. Woefully inade-
quate and irregular rations. the increased production tempo plus 
the longer hours of work demanded of them over prolonged. seemingly 
endl ess peri ods of time, sdjJped the workers' strength 'and hei ghtened 
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their desire for peace. On the other hand the re~eated calls for 
the workers ,to redouble thei r efforts anCl hold on unt il a mil i tary 
victory could be aChieved, the growiny chorus of vehement relllons-
trat ions by the All deutschen, the V aterl andspartei and otller ri yht-
. wing groups against those who wanted an end to the war without 
military gains, the conspicuous dealings of a flourishiny black 
market patronised above all by the rich, war-profiteering and 
corruption, all combined to. infuriate the war-weary working class. 
The presence of an act i ve workers' 1Il0vement which by way of its 
various institutions was amply able to expose the inequality of 
sufferi ny and reveal the many fila 1 pract ices of profi teers, was' an 
essential factor in the transformation of workers' resiynation into 
positive revolutiondY'y iH;Lion. Hll! sUlJlJression of criLlcislIl, Llle 
authorities' diJjJarent edyerness to lIlete out of~ell oispro~ortionute­
ly harsh punishment to those engayed in appositional activity Jno 
the growiny desperation of dn anti4uated ruling order' totterillg 011 
the pOint of collapse, were th~ factors which elevated existiny 
class hostility to the level of open conflict which broke out at 
the end of 1918. The period betm!en 1918 and 1923, as will be seen 
in the following chapter, was characterised by intense class hosti-
lity punctuated by situ?tions of open conflict, but ~Jhich ended ill 
,a serious setback for the Remscheid workers' movelllent, bringiny the 
revolutionary period to a close. 
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et ' I ," I I I I I , I able ~n Rernschel l 
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c;. ---4--- -. I I \,! ' . I I r. ~ ... :, : I c 3 Usually a rnixt u ; 
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I . ,2,tC i: ,tC ;'jtol l/l.L'/ I I j , I I 
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_. ! ,... "7' - t I 
-:.-
- 104 -
TABLE 6 Hourly rate of pay in I<elllsctleid industry frolll 1914 to 
1922, workers over 24 years of age. 
Year sk ill ed semi-skilled unsk ill ed 
31/07/14 0,45 0,40 0,35 
01/01/15 0,59 0,45 0,40 
01/01/16 0,73 0,60 O,~O 
01/01/17 0,80 0,70 0.50 
01/01/18 1,20 0,92 0,60 
01/01/19 1,50 1,38 1,20 . 
17/03/19 2.40 2.20 2.00 
01/09/19 3,4U 3,2U 2,80 
01/11/19 3,6U 3,3U ~,yt> 
15/01/20 4,00 3,40 :> , 1L) 
24/03/20 5,20 4,t>5 4,20 
03/06/20 5,90 5,05 4, /0 
13/01/21 6,30 5,65 0,30 
.24/02/21 6,55 5,95 ~,eu 
08/09/21 7,55 6,80 6,!:>5 
03/11/21 9,50 8,65 8,30 
. 15/12/21 12,00 11 ,UO 1U,5U 
15/02/22 13,90 12,70 12,00 
16/03/22 15,50 14,10 13 ,55 
06/U4/22 18,3U 16,60 16,U5 
04/05/22 21,25 19,40 113,130 
Source: see note 75. 
" , 
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TABLE 7 'Purchasing power of a skilled worker in l{elllscheid1 
1916 to 1918. 
Date hourly rate 
24/05/16 0,73 marks 
25 / 11 / 1 7 0 , BO ilia r k s 
25/02/18 1,20 marks 
1 
time worked2 to buy 
1 hr. 1 lb3 beans 
20 llIins. 
23 mins. 
3 1/4 hrs. 
2 hrs. 
2 3/4 hrs. 
W mins. 
b lltins. 
1 egg 
1 litre milk 
1 1 b cheese 
1 cwt coal 
1 lb margerine 
1 lb Wdr bread 
1 1 b potatoes 
12 lIIi ns. 1 1 b carrots 
30 IIlins. 
36 lIlins. 
2 hrs.5U lIIins. 
2 1/2 hrs. 
17 lIlins. 
1 eyy 
1 1 itre milk 
1 cwt coal 
1 lb. margerine 
1 1 b war bread 
6 1/2 lIlins. 1 'Ib potatoes 
9 mins. 1 lb carrots 
24 IlIins. 1 eyg 
27 lIlins. 1 litre lIlilk 
hr. 22 1/2 lIIins. 
1 hr. 40 wins. 
10 lIlins. 
4 1/2 1111 ns. 
2 hrs.40 lIIins. 
19 1/2 hrs. 
14 hrs. 
1 
1 
1 
1 
cwt coal 
lb maryerine 
1 b war bredd 
Ib potatoes 
1 lb dairy butter 
rent of 22,5~ lIIarks4 
1 lb butter5 
1 Skilled worker over age of 24 years 
2 approximate time worked 
3 1 lb = 500 gms 
4 two-room fl at with kitchen - the /IIost abundant forlll of dCCOlHllloda 
tion in Relllscheid at that time., 
5 black market price in Remscheid. 
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TABLE 8 Comparison of total strength of various income brackets 
for the year 1914. 
Town area a b c .:\ e f 
- - -
'. -
-
-Remscheid 76.57'1 32.000 5.150 23.4CO 2.140 740 
Lennep (Kreis) 86.717 3'1.000 13.060 21.680 1.520 440 
So1ingen ~stadt) 51.570 21.000 2.6'"{0 15.~00 1.660 480 
So1ingen Land) 169.396 70.000 17.710 47.810 ).150 b40 
Neusa ~stadt) 41.15G 16.000 ·3.410 10.BSO . 1.200 320 
Neua8 Land) . 35.146 1:3.000 5.470 ',.030 380 80 
Grevenbrotth 51.469 20.000 9.320 9.640 760 180 
Moenchengladbach 
(Stad t) 68.518 30.000 9.960 16.680 2.070 780 
ilhelldt 45.672 19.000 5.510 11.550 1.200 440 
Moenchen~1adbach . (Land) 127.290 50.000 22.200 26.050 1.250 300 
a) total population 
b) subject to income tax 
c) income below 900 marks p.a. 
d) between 900 and 3,000 marks p.a. 
e) between 3,000 and 6,500 marks p.a. 
f) between 6,500 and 8,500 marks p.a. 
g) income above 9.500 marks p.a. 
,,' 
~ 
SlC 
3QC 
29C 
49C 
19( 
4( 
10( 
5l< 
:su( 
20. 
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CHAPTER I' 
NOT E S 
1 Kocka, Klassengesellschaft •••• , Ope cit., p. B 
2 Ibid., 
3 Ibid., p. 9: 
'Insbesondere wenn ruehrere Kinder zu ernahren 
waren, konnte die Arbeiterfalllil ie auf die I~lit­
arbeit der Frau nicht verzichten; solche Doppel-
belastung hatte haufig bedruckende Konse4uenzell 
fur Familien1eben ulld Kindererziehung. Bei Unfall 
und Krankheit drohte weiterhin Not.' 
4 Kurt Hirsch, Die heilllat10se Rechte. Die KOllservJtivcn ulld FrJllz 
Josef Straul3, j'lunchen 1979. 
The All deutsche Verballd was founded i 1\ 18do, till! I{ei chsverbdlld 
gegen die Sozia1delllokratie in 1904 and the Deutscher Fluttell-
verein in 1898. All three interest yroups were anti-socialist 
and anti-delllocratic. 
5 S'ee Geoff E1ey, "The Wilhelllline Right. How it chanyeu", in: 
Richard J. Evans (edit.), Society and politics in Willlelllline 
Germany, op cit., pp. 112-136. 
6 Yellow unions were essentially patriotic and favourable to the 
status quo. Consequently they were strony1y encouraged by 
ernp'l oy ers. 
7 Kocka, Klassengesel1schaft •••• , Ope cit., p. 11. 
B Lucas, Ope cit., p. 125, for an account of the filernakers' 
strike. 
9 Remscheider Arbei ter Zeituny (RAZ), 30/7/14, Ni eoer lIIit dem 
Kriege. 
la RAZ, 31/1/14, Kri eg dem Kri eye'! Fur den Vo 1 kerfri eden! 
11 Remscheider General Anzeiger (RGA), 3/8/14, Hurra llermania. 
12 RAZ, 31/7/14, Nieder mit dem Kriege, 
and 3/8/14, Oer Kriey 1St da. 
- 108 -
13 RGA, 4/8/14, 
14 RAZ, 4/8/14, Spione in Relllscheid. 
15· RAZ, 3/8/14, Der Krieg ist da. 
16 RAZ, 29/8/14, Die Zensur. 
-17 For accounts of the Second International's intention of pre-
vent i ng a war by persuadi ng the workers not to fi yht I see 
George'Lichtheilll , A Short History of Socia1islll, Glasgow 1910, 
pp. 239,-254; 
and Peter Gay, The Di1enuna of Oelllocratic Socialislll. Eduard 
Bernstein's Challenge to Marx, New York 1970, p. 271 f •• 
18 RAZ , 10/8/14, Dafur kampfen wi r. 
19 Ibid., 
20 The RGA attelllpted to dispel the feJrs dnd IIlutterinys of discolI-
tent of the local popul.:.ttioll with <.In <.Irticle Ober'LricbclIl! 
Besorgnis on 18/11/14. The article described life in the 
trenches as comradely and relatively cOlllfortable with warm duCj-
. . 
outs lined with hay and moss provided for the troops. Mothers 
and wi ves were assured that thei r menfolk spent on ly short 
periods in cOlllbat, bein!;l fre4uently withdrdwn to rest aredS 
where they could recuperate. 
21 RAZ , 8/9/14. 
22 As well as producing hdnd~grenades, rifle barrels and steel for 
guns, the BSI also produced cOlllponents for 1 OCOIllOt i ves, IlIotor 
vehicles and aeroplanes. 
See Wilhelrn Rinne,' D'ie 13ergische Stahlindustrie 18b4 - 1939, 
Band 11, OPe cit., Ch. 8 (unpublished history in two volumes). 
'23 Lucas, OPe cit., p. 138. 
24 The Remscheid Kleineisenindustrie was particularly hit by the 
shortage of qual ified toollllakers caused by conscription. A 
report entitled Aus der Rernscheider Kleineisenindustrie appear-
ing in the RGA on 27/3/16 indicated some of the problems facing 
1 oca 1 i ndus try. Because of the shortages of manpower lIIany COIII-
panies could only supply half thtdr orders. Supply could not 
keep pace with demand. Other companies were experiencing long 
delays in deliveries of materials owing to the shortage of 
" 
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steel and foundry workers. The rejJort also jJointed out that 
attempt's to quickly train unskilled worke'rs in the production 
. of tool s were 1 arye ly unsuccessful, as there was no effect i ve 
substitute for years of patient practice. 
See StA Remscheid, W 11/4, Krieyswirtschaftliche r-'dl)nal"lI~1I der 
Stadt Relllscheid, Novelllber 1915 - Auyust 1916. 
25 Rinne, Ope cit. 
On 20/8/17 the BSI had 163 female ~~orkers elll1J10yed in its 
Remschei d factory and this number had ri sen to 226 by June 
1918. The total workforce of the. BSI rose from 2,501 in 1914 to 
3,646 in 1918, and for figures of women 
factories, see Lucas, Ope cit., p. 140. 
J..ill.. 
metal workers over 16 years 0,3U9 
female workers over 16 years, 
16 to 21 years 162 
over 21 years 49 
young people 14 to 16 years, 
lIIales 499 
females 70 
26 Rinne, OPe cit. 
employed ill i<elllsclleid 
1917 
.tllii 
1,41~ I,Y~l 
1,436 1,U9u 
1,424 1,59U 
929 o~3 
371 310. 
On 20/8/17 the BS I had 207 youths working in its Kemschei d 
factory. 
27 Ibid. 
In 1915 the 13S1 employed 187 Belgians, 88 Poles, 29 Itd1iCln~ 
and 21 other foreigners. This total had risen to 863 by June 
1918. 
28 Ibid. 
The BSI had 142 prisoners of war in its books in June 1918. 
29 Erich Thieler relates an experience which occurred when d 
column of marching school children passed a group of Frenc~1 
POWs who were being escorted from the railway station. Erich 
was beaten by the schoolteacher for waving to enelllY prisoners. 
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30 StA I{~mscheid, W VIII/3, Kriegsgefangene illl allgellleinen. 
A memorandulTI from the CVlinistry of War listed inter dlia the 
I 
following weekly rations for POWs: 
bread 1610 YflIS plus supplementary allowance for 
strenuous work 
Wurst 
meat 
potatoes 
salted fish/sea 
blubber/whale n~at 
herrings 
margerine 
cheese 
sugar 
low fat milk 
lIIarlllalade/jam 
fresh vegetables 
150 gills 
350 grns 
2800 gills 
400 gms 
150 gms 
70 gills 
75 grns 
133 gms 
250 gills 
75 YIIIS 
1 (jOO gms etc. 
The above rations wen;! subject to dvailability 011\.1 sUllletillles 
existed only on Pd~er. 
31 StA Remscheid, W VIII/3, ibid. 
It is not known whether any POWs ac tua lly lIIi.lllayed to evade .'I;!-
capture and fi na lly escaped, but the large nUll\ber ot warrants 
in the file indicate frequent attempts to break out. In such 
cases local inhabitants were warned by the authorities to con-
tact the police in the event of suspicion. On one occasion two 
Remscheid workers recei ved a reward of 5 marks and 3 lIIarks 
respectively, for information leadiny to the recapture of three 
French POWs who had escaped frolll the 1:$5 I Arei t skollulIanao 
(l7/11/15). 
32 StA Remscheid, W lIa/52, I3rotversoryung der Anstalten und 
Kriegsgefangenen-Arbeitskruwnandos. 
In 1916 POWs were accolllmodated in the following work camps in 
Remscheid: 
09/04/16 
03/16 
08/04/16 
16/08/16 
16/08/16 
16/08/16 
16/08/16 
16/08/16 
16/08/16 
Arbeitslayer August Dohrlllanll 
Arbei tskollllnando Sal elllstraBe 
Arbeitsko~nando Bliedinghausen 
Arbeitskolllmando BSI 
GebrUder i)usch 
Alexanderwerk 
Stadtverwaltung 
Schone Aussicht 
H. Dohrlllann 
75 POWs 
18 POWs 
55 POWs 
115 PUWs 
54 PUWs 
155 POWs 
19 POWs 
95 POWs 
93 POWs 
, . 
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33 StA R'emscheid, W VIII/3, Ope cit-, 
see memorandum circulated by lIIilitary authorities. 
34· Lucas, Ope cit., p. 140. ' 
35 Bergische Volksstimllle (BV), Novelllber 1917. 
36 RAZ, 22/5/16: 
'Die Zahl der Flickschulen hat sich nicht vt!r-
) mehrt; diese Schulen konnten ihre Aufgaben nicht 
ganz vollfUhren, weil es an Material und auch an 
Leiterinnen und Helferinn~n fehlte. Mit Bedau~rn 
wird festgestellt, daB es s1ch gezeigt hat, datl 
gar manche Kriegersfrau mit Nadel, lwirn und Schere 
nicht umgehen kann, die einfachsten Flickarbeiten 
nicht ausfUhren kann ••• • 
37 Silvia Kontos, Die Partei kalllpft wie ein Hann: FrJuenpolitik 
der KPD in der Weillldrer Republik, Frankfurt a.I"I., 19/9, p. 21. 
38 Lucas, OPe cit., p. l39. 
Women were paid cons i derab 1y 1 ess t~an fIIen for the saute ~wrk. 
39 Kontos, OPe cit., pp.28-29. 
40 See StA Relllscheid, W 11/9, Wirtschaftlictle Defllobillllachun~, jJ. 
128. 
The unemp 1 oYlllent and vacancy f1 yures for Relllscllei din January 
1919: 
male vacancies 
female vacancies 
unemployed men 
unemployed woltlen 
41 Kontos, Ope cit., p. 29. 
33 
·0 
1,065 
426. 
In 1913 for every 1,0UO lIIen between the ayes of 18 dnd 45 in 
Germany there were 1,005 women. By 1919, hO~iever, this surjJlus 
of women had risen to 1,000 : 1,180. 
42 BV, 12/2/19, Wie hat s.ich die I{emscheider Konullunalverwaltuny 
seit Kriegsbeginn aut krieyswirtschaft1ichem Gebiet betatigt ? 
43 Lucas, Ope cit., p. 144. 
44 av, 12/2/19: 
45 Lucas, Ope cit., jJ. 144. 
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46 BV, 12/2/19, OPe cit. 
• ••• und zu welchen Preisen ! Proletarier staunen. 
iJl, das Liter zu 1 Mark 70 Pf., Schinken, das Pfulld 
zu 1 Mark 50 Pf., und Salallliwurst, das Pfund zu 
1 Mark 80 Pf. lm Vorbeigehen wurden noch einige 
Waggons echte Reisstarke, das Pfund zu 50 Pf. mit-
genonunen. • 
47 Ibid. 
At thi s time there was still no shortage of potatoes and the 
price of 4 marks per hundredweight was regarded as fairly 
reasonable. 
48 Ibid. 
49 Ibid.: 
Ifs zahlen den Grundpreis abzUylich eines Rdbattes 
von 25 % all e Burger lIIit ei nem steuerpfl i cllt i yen 
Einkolluilen unter 3.000 Mdrk. Es kOllllllen hierbei in 
Frage 56.000 bis 57.000 Personen. Den Grundpreis 
ohne Rabatt und oh ne Aufschlag bezahlen alle Ihirger 
mit einem steuerpflichtigen Einkommen von 3.001 bis 
6.000 Mark. Es kO/luilen in Frage ca. 13.700 Personen. 
Den Grundpreis zuzUylich 25 % Aufschlag zahlen alle 
Burger wit einelll steuerpflichtigen Einkollllllen von 
6.001 bis 10.500 Mark. Es konnen in Frage ca. 1.&00 
Personen. Den Grundpreis zuzUylich eines Aufschlayes 
von 50 % zahlen a11e BUrger lIlit einem steuerpflichtigen 
Einkollullen von Uber 10.500 Mark. Es kommen in Frage ca. 
3.250 Personen.· 
From the report it is not clear when this progressive.price 
system was introduced and to which years the indicated incollle 
brackets pertain. 
50 Lucas, OPe ~it., pp. 144-145; 
and StA Relllscheid, W 11/6, Krieyswirtschaftl iche tvla!3nahlllen der 
Stadt Remscheid 191//18. 
.- -
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Owing- to the shortage of leather the shoe repair centre experi-
mented with other materials in the production of footwear. The 
t ' 
COllunon alternative - a thin wooden sole ~Iith reinforced pa~er 
uppers - was unsuitable for the wet Remscheid clinlate, with the 
result that this lIIodel had to be discarded. Instead elllployees 
designed and developed a sturdier shoe of wood and waste 
leather which retailed at a lower price than the standard war-
shoe available on the market. Furthermore !Joor families were 
granted a price reduction. 
51 Balthasar Becker, Krieyswirkungen im'Ber~ischen Land,. DUssel-
dorf 1918, p. 40. 
Meal tickets were sold in weekly blocks of 6 costiny 2 Illarks 10 
pfenniys for adults Jnd 1 IIIJrk 5 !Jfellniys for cllildrell. S~eciJl 
diet meal tickets were also sold in blocks of six, costing 3 
marks 60 pfennigs for full port ions and 1 lIIark 8U pfenniys for 
halves. 
52 Ibid., p. 63. 
53 BV, 12/2/19, Ope cit.: 
'Doch ist dieses nur ein Tropfen auf den heiben 
Stein. Uerjeniye, der Gelegenheit nimlllt, seine 
Schritte in die Proletarieryeyend zu lenken, kann -
sehen, wie sehr unsere heranwachsende Juyend an 
Unterern~hruny leidet.' 
In contrast to the Socialists' inter!Jretation of the /IIilk 
supply situation in ,Remscheid during the Hdr is deputy-mayor 
Georg zur Hellen's somewhat complacent ,report written on 
15/8/18, although in fairness it lI\ust besaid that it was pre-
dominantly concerned with supplies of milk in the second quar-
ter of that year, a period which witnessed a transient improve-
ment. We are told that all children under the age of 14 years, 
all invalids and all those over 70 years had received their 
full rations of milk. A comparison with other industrial towns 
in the Niederrhein area for July 1918 reveals quite a favour-
able balance for Remscheid. , 
See StA Remscheid, W Ila/10, Milchversorgung. 
" , 
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54 See StA Relnscheid, W IIa/42, Kleinyarten und Privdtyrundstucke. 
waste l'and owned by local factories was let out to the to\Yrl 
. council, in the majority of cases gratuitously for the use of 
allotments' and the large-scale planting' of ~otatoes. lhe 
Gemeinnutziger Bauverein ego put its square land at the dis-
posal of the local authorities for the duratioll of tile war, 
seeing all building activity had ceased. In 1nH the local 
authorities were granted the use of a total of 103/4 acres of 
land by private owners. The council was also using 13 acres of 
its own 1 and for allotments and was manayi ny a further 18 1/4 
acres on behalf of others. 
55 See ~V. 12/2/19, Ope cit. 
56 For trade uniun criticislII ot tile ottici,,1 food jJulicy, see Ur. 
C. Melchior and colleagues (edlL.), Wirtschafts- und SOZidl-
yeschichte des weltkrieyes, Stuttgart, Uerlin und Leipzig 192H, 
pp. 89-109. 
57 Gerald D. Fe1dlllan, Army, Industry and Labour in Gerllldny 1914 -
1918, Princeton 1966, p. 255. 
Feldlllan argues that there was a lack of cooperation bt:tween the 
military and industrialists on the one side, and the railway 
authorities on the other. 
58 BV, 14/4/16, Bekanntmachung ! Dringend notwendiy ! 
59 BV. 4/7/17, Waldbeerenernte, Volkerwanderuny. 
The article reports thousands of JIlen, women and children Comb-
ing the forests for berries. Two special trains were organised 
to carry passengers into ttle Oberberg i sche. 
60 Interview with Olga Juny. 
Her parents rented roollls in d farhlhouse and she frequently wit-
nessed chil dren and adults from the towns beygi ny for lIIil k. 
61 'E.R. Greulich, " ••• und nicht auf den Knien", Ber1in-Ost 1964. 
p. 91 f 
The author relates the epiSOde when gendarmes on horseback cut 
open sacks of potatoes and. vegetab 1 es wh i ch the women and 
children had either bought or begged from fanners. 
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62 Interview with Fritz Knapper. 
He relates an incident at 8ergisch Born railway station where 
. he alighted from a train and had to argue adamantly to prevent 
a policeman from confiscating some butter which he had 
acquired. 
63 See StA Remscheid, W 11/16 I, Preistreibereien, Schleichhandel, 
Wucheramt, letter of 7/11/17. 
64 See StA Rernscheid, W 11/16 11, letter from Landrat in GUllllllers-
bach of 11/3/19. 
65 See StA Remscheid, W 11/16 I, Ope cit., 
letter penned by the mayor of Re~~cheid dnd circuldted to all 
local companies ttireatenin\;j action by the auttlOrities to stallllJ 
out this COIIIIIOII prdctice; 
and ibid., reply frolll Gebr. I\rns on 1/3/18 imlicdtirl!;l tlleir 
belief that the reason why the recent wave of strike in tile 
West German industrial region had not been severer, was 
precisely because local finlls had been able to feed their wor-
kers extra rations. This opinion was reinforced four days later 
by a letter addressed to police inspector Christian, by one of 
Relllscheid's 1II0St powerful and respected industrialists, Noritz 
Baker, on behalf of the Beryische Stalll Industrie. He says: 
'Wir mussen in vollelll Mal3e anerkennen, daf3 unsere 
Arbeiterschaft trotz der starken ~eei nfl ussuny durch 
die radikale Partei - der unabhangige Sozialist Ditt-
lIIann ist bekanntlich der Abgeordnete des hiesigeJl 
Kreises - ihr letztes bei der Arbeit heryibt, UIII die 
Heeresverwaltun\;j zu befriedi!:len. Diese Stillullung ist 
indes nur zu erhalten, wenn van Seiten der Arbeit-
yeber dew Verlallgen nach einer Unterstutzuny bei der 
Ernahrung Rechnullg getragen werden kann ••• • Ibid. 
With such illustrious figures as Baker defyiny the official 
decrees it is highly unlikely that the local authorities con-
sidered takiny serious steps to prevent companies frrnn purchas-
ing stocks of extra rations for their workers and to punish 
offenders. 
" 
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66 Prostitution for e,xtra rations or exchangeable,yoods was almost 
certainly practised, particularly given the close proximity of 
soldiers. An increase in prostitution locally was noted by the 
authorities although no figures could be found. 
See HStA DLisse 1 dorf, Reg. DOss. 8148, Kri eys-Gesundheitsberi ctlt 
fur den Regierungsbezirk DUsseldorf 1914 - 1918. 
67 See Lenneper Kreisblatt (LK), 7/2/18, eg.: 
'Mit 1.000 Mark Geldstrafe 5011 die Enefrau des 
Landwirtes R. aus dem Kreise Lennep dafUr b~ben, 
daB sie die Milch, die sie abzuliefern hatte, in 
ganz erheblicher Weise mit Wasser "streckte". 
Wahrscheinlich .wollte sie mit der Milch, die sit! 
si ch dadurch erslJJrte, untt:!r der /l,wd ei 11 besseres 
Geschaft lIIachen. Oa die f'llilch nur alleine fur Woch-
nerinnen, Kinder und Krdllke bestillllllt bC, IIIUjjtt: ihr 
Treiben dls besonders verwerfliclI und strdfwurdig 
bezeichnet werden ••• I 
A short selection of offences published in local neWslJdperS 
reveals a varied spectrulII of illeyal prdctices stretctlilllj frolll 
the failure to display prices correctly to the iIlore seriuus 
acts of usury, illegal butchery, slllugyliny, giving incorrect 
weights, the illegal distillation of spirits, racketeerillg and 
black lIIarketeeriny. Here are a few examples: 
1. Grocer Frau B. received a warning ill October In7 for 
selling carrots at 20 to 25 pfennigs per 50U granls, at a 
tillle when the official price was 9 IJferllli\:js. 
2. Milkman B. was given a warning for alleyedly sel1illY greater 
quantities of milk to favoured fdlililies than these were 
entitled to • . 
3. Shoemaker Johann F. had his licence witlldrawn and his shop 
closed perlil~lIlently for overctlarginy and receiviny stolen 
goods. /-le had lIl?de and sold shoe-soles ,frolll stolen fan-uelt 
leather at a IJrlce of 14 IHarks 50 pfenll1gs each. Uct. 1917. 
4. The wife of butcher Robert K. was fi lied lUU lIIarks and Ilt:r 
sholJ was closed for a period of olle IlIonttl, as sile hdu 
knowingly overcharged for bacon. May 1917 • 
. 5. Frau Heinrich W. of HonsDery was fined 15U marks for cllary-
ing exorbitant prices and sellillY soap wittlour ration cards. 
The authorit i es were tipped off by an anonYlllous It tl:!r that 
Frdu W. WdS charging B lIIarks for half a \Joulld (250 yrallls) of 
butter anll five to si" Iildn,:) for a piece of SOdIJ. f"lay Ino. 
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Nos. i, 2 and 3 in: StA Remscheid, W 11/6, Krieywirtschaftliche 
Ma/3nahmen der Stadt Remscheid 1917 - 1918 • 
. Nos. 4 and 5 in: StA Remscheid, W 11/7, Handelsuntersagungen illl 
allgemeinen. 
6. Grocer Robert K. of L indenhofstra/3e had his 1 icence per-
Inanently withdrawn on 9/5/16 for charging exorbitant prices. 
He had been selling an egg-substitute called "Frauenstolz" 
at the price of two packets for 25 pfennigs. An inspection 
showed that a, fair price would be no lIIore than 2 1/2 
pfennigs per packet. Similarly, a salad-ail-substitute 
called "Herto1" was sold by K. at 2 marks 10 pfenniys per 
litre whent the fair price was not more than 20 pfennigs. 
See StA Remscheid, W II/1B, HOchstpreise. • 
7. A dealer named Ponullerenke was hauled before the local prices 
control board for what was described as one of the worst 
cases of Kettenhandel. P. had acquired four hundredweight of 
peas for ~BOlllarks ,and sol~ them at the extremely high ~rice 
of 1 mark 35 pfennlYs per 500 grams. The peas had first been 
purchased by a dealer in Graudenz for 40 marks per hundred-
weight, and he sold them to a dealer in Leipziy for 95 marks 
per hundredweight, who in turn sold them to POIIMllerenke. 
15/9/16. 
See StA Remschei d, W II/I0, Tat i gkeit der Prei sprufunys-
stelle. 
The most frequent offenders ap(Jear to have been milklll~n, 
butchers and grocers. In 1918 the local authorities tightened 
up considerably with regard to milk. A large number of local 
mi~k producers were ordered to hand over their surplus milk to 
designated distribution centres or face charges carrying a 
maximum penalty of 10,000 marks. This was one more example of 
the authorities taking action far too late to make much 
difference to the war effort. 
See StA Remscheid, W 11/10. Milchversoryuny. 
Butchers often appeared before the prices control board for 
illegal butchery and overcharging. Grocers were frequently 
charged with usury. giving short weights and mixing additives. 
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68 BV, 12/2/19, Ope cit.: 
:Ohne den Landwirt in Bausch und Bogen zu 
verurteilen, wird der Proletarier nie vergessen 
. konnen, auch nie begreifen konnen, wo im Jahre 
1916 all die SteckrUben herkamen. Das Gros der 
Agrarier hat sich da in seiner wahren patrioti-
schen Gestalt gezeigt.Die SteckrUben mit ihren 
ungesunden Begleiterscheinungen fUr das Volk. 
Es brachte mehr Profit ••• • 
69 Lucas, OPe cit., pp. 140-144. 
70 HStA DUsseldorf, Ger. Rep. 5/1187. 
71 For pernicious effects on health owing to employment ·of women 
see RAZ, 2/6/1916, Der Jahresbericht der All~ellleinen Orts-
krankenkasse Rernscheid. 
72 BV', 28/2/19, Bericht des Oberburgerllleisters Ur. Hartmdnn uber 
die Verwaltung und den Stand der Gemeindeangelegenheiten illl 
Jahre 1918. 
On the ohter hand Remscheid was spared the worst of the dysen-
tery epidemic which hit Sol ingen, Barmen and Elberfeld during 
the years 1916 to 1918 inclusive. 
See HStA Uusseldorf, Reg. Duss. 8148, Kriegs-Gesundheitsbericht 
fur den Regierunysbezirk DUsseldorf 1914-1918. 
73 War losses, soldier~ killed and injured. Relllscheid lost over 
2,000 dead; Lennep lost 350 killed, 210 wounded, 46 invalids 
(more than 50 % incapacitated). 
74 See Statistisches Jahrbuch fur das Deutsche Reich 1920, Berlin 
. 1920, p. 132. 
75 StA Rernscheid, X J 14, Arbeitgeberverbande in Remscheid ulld 
Umgebung/Arbeitgeberverband der Ei sen- und Meta 11 i ndustri e van 
Remscheid und Umyebung e.V., 
also see note qualifying wage table: 
'Unter Facharbeiter (skilled worker) verstand man 
zwischen 31/7/14 und 16/3/19 nur die best en Arbeiter, 
z.B. Ofenarbeiter, Schleifer usw.' 
· , .. 
- 119 -
16 Erich Thieler tells of a fatal accident he witnessed in the BSI 
rolling mill and which was attributed to tiredness and lack of 
I 
concentration due to hunger on the part of the victim. In this 
case the young apprentice failed to yras() a molten steel rod 
emerging from the rollers with his tongs, and was impaled be-
fore anyone could react. 
11 See Rinne. Ope cit, chapter~. 
On 30/6/1~ there were e63 foreign workers {excluding POWs) in a 
total workforce of 3,646 at the BSI. 
18 'For women's rates of pay see BV, 4/12/1/, Eine Versallllllluny der 
• 
Arbeiter des Alexanderwerks. 
In this factory women were paid 30, 30 or 4U pfenniys per hour 
according to their degree of skill. On the bdSis of a ten-hour 
day this gave them a weekly waye of between 13 and 24 marks. 
19 Feldman. Ope cit., p. :304. 
80 Rinne, Ope cit. 
62~ of the BSI's 3,646-strong workforce on jU/b/le were people 
mobilised by the Auxiliary Law. 
81 JUrgen Reulccke, "Der Erste W~ltkrieg und die Arbeiterbeweguny 
im rheinisch-westfalischen lndustriegebiet", in: idem (edit.), 
Arbeiterbewegung an Rhein und Ruhr, Wuppertal 19/4, p. 22b. 
Wilhelm Dittmann was the Reichstag deputy for Lenn~p as wel I as 
editor of the So I i ngen-based Beryi sclle Arbeiterst illlme. 
~2 On 23/12/16, in the notorious 'turnip-winter' the local prices 
control board fixed the weekly ration of potatoes at 3 lbs {x 
bOO grams) per head plus extra turnips. lurnips were in plenti-
ful supply, because th~y fetched a higher price whereas pota-
toes had been officially pegged back to ~ pfellniys per 000 
grams. 
See StA Remscheid, W 11/5, Kriegswirtschaftliche JVlal3nahmen 
September 1916 - April 1917, p. 43. 
~3 See StA Remscheid, W lIlo, ibid.,p. 41. 
~4 l~id •• p. 03. 
~o Greuling, Ope cit., p.72 f. 
Also interview with Erich Thieler. 
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8b StA Remscheid, W 11/6, Kriegswirtschaftliche MaBnalunen der 
Stadt Relllscheid 191//113, taken from I{GA LL/9/l/. 
81. Ibid., 22/9/1/. 
88 See note 78. 
89 In this case she would be entitled to benefits but these were 
woefully inadequate. 
90 StA Remscheid, W Il/o, Ope cit., p. 22. 
91 See also Lenneper Kreisblatt, 1/2/113. 
92 BV, "L8/11/l/, Stahlwerk Richard Lindenberg; 
and BV, 213/9/17, 3 Millionen tvlark Aktienkapital - 3.180.UOO 
Mark Gewinn. Richard Lindenberg AG. 
The Mannesllldnn-Werke made a clear profit ,in the jJrev'ious yeo..lr 
of 24,/48,011 marks clnd over the )Jrevious thrce yt.!..trs LUyt.!tller 
49,136 m ill i on /lid rk s • 
Also see BV, 12/12/1/, Welll das Gluck hold ist, wird lIutsbe-
sitzer. 
93 RGA, 2//12/1/. 
94 Rinne, Ope cit. 
'90 See BV, 12/1/1/, Die drlllen una reichen Leute in den Kreisen 
Rernscheid, Lennep, Sol ingen Stadt und Land, Neul3 Stadt und 
Land, Grevenbroich, Monchengladbach Stadt·und Land und I{heydt. 
96 See SV, Remscheid, die Stadt mit den yrbBten Kriegsyewinnen. 
91 (lV, 2'd/2/19, Aus unserem Wahlkreis. Bericht des Oberburyer-· 
meisters Dr. Hartllldnn uber die Verwaltuny und den Stand der 
Gellleindeangeleyenheiten ill1 Jahre 19113: 
' ••• Diese Zunahllle ist die grbl3te, die seit Bestehen 
der Sparkasse in einelll Jahr erzielt warden 1st. 
Diese ist einlllal aut die Gewinne und Lohne wahrend 
der Kriegszeit zuruckzufUhren, ZUlU andt:!ren aucll 
darauf, daB das Geld vor allem bei den Gewerbe-
treibenden flussig war ••• • 
913 HStA DUsseldorf, Ger. Rep. 5/840, OPe cit. 
99 See BV, 20/8/18, Noch ein SteuerhinterziehunysprozeB, 
and HStA Dusseldorf, Ger. I{ep. 0/'d40, Ope cit. 
, .. 
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100 See BV. 17/8/18. 
101 Kocka: Klassenyesellschaft •••• OPe cit., pp.32-33. 
102 The relatively strong local support of slilall Christian sects 
extolling puritanical virtues is a major factor determining 
the traditionally modest life-style of Remscheid's manufac-
turers. 
103 BV, 10/11/17: 
'fUr jUngere und altere Damen,' frauen und Tochter, 
we1che eigenen Haushalt fUhren, oder als Hausdamen, 
StUtze oder besseres Hausmadchen sich ausbilden"wollen, 
beginnt Dienstag, 13. Noven~er im Saale des Hotel zum 
Weinberg, Elberfelder Str. 25, unter bewahrter Leitung 
ein Tischdeck- und Servierkurs verbunden lIIit Anstands-
lehre. 
Lehrstoff: Feines Tafeldecken, Tafelschmuck, Servieren, 
Servietten brechen (theoretisch und praktisch), S~eisen­
fo1ge, Anrichten und Ausschn~cken der Speisen. 
Honorar 15 Mark. Wochentlich drei Unterrichtstage ••• 
Die Unterri chtsl eHuny: Jenny Schumacher. 
104 StA Remscheid, IV/14, U-Boot-Spende. 
105 BV., 17/11/17, Auch Relllscheid hat jetzt seine "Vaterlands-
partei". 
106 RGA, 9/12/17, Aufruf der Deutschen Vaterlandspartei. 
107 Ibid. 
108 Kocka, Klassenyesellschaft ••• , OPe cit., pp.1-b. 
109 See introductory chapter of this dissertation. 
Briefly. in the course of the industrial revolution a class of 
capitalist entrepreneurs had formed and were concentrating the 
ownersh i p of the means of product i on in thei r hands to the 
disadvantage' of small craftsmen. The latter wt!re yradually 
squeezed out of the market so that they and thei r son.s jOi ned 
the stream of immigrants from the country areas looking for 
work in the factories of the entrepreneurs. However, not all 
the local craftsmen were driven out. By various methods and 
owing to the high degree of skill and know-how required in the 
product i on of tools, a number of small independent and sellli-
independent establishments wt!re able to survive into the 20th 
century and through to the present day. 
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110 A comparison of wage and salary tables for local industry 
actually reveals a faster growth of income for a skilled male 
worker over 24 years than for a 2B-year old commercial/indus-
trial employee, with ~he former actually overtaking the latter 
by the end of 1917. The sk ill ed worker however st ill had to 
work longer hours and did not enjoy the same privileges as the 
clerk elsewhere. Eg. even before the war the industrial white-
collar worker was entitled to much longer paid holidays (usu-
ally two, sometimes three weeks) than the factory worker 
(three to six days). 
111 See Ludwig Preller, Sozialpolitik in der Weimarer Republik, 
DUsseldorf 1978, p. 150. 
For white-collar workers during the war see JUryen Kocka, "rhe 
First World War and the ·Mittelstand· ••• ", Ope cit. 
112 Lucas, OPe cit., p. 146. 
113 Ibid., p. 147. 
114 Ibid. 
115 See, Buchdruckerei des deutschen Meta 11 arbeiterverbandes (no 
au:thor), Remscheid. Ein Kapitel komlllunistischer Gewerkschafts-
arbeit im Deutschen Metallarbeiterverband, Stuttyart 1924. 
116 Lucas, OPe cit., p. 147. 
117 Ibid., p. 149; 
and JUrgen Reulecke, Der Erste Weltkrieg ••• , Ope cit., p. 117. 
118 Ibid., p. 224. 
119 Lucas, OPe cit., p. 151. 
120 Ibid., p. 124. 
121 See BV, 9/3/29, 20 Jahre proletarische Jugendbewegung in R~n-
scheid. 
122 The fact that Remscheid's metal workers who were amongst the 
highest paid in Germany developed such a radical tradition and 
were frequently in the forefront, albeit in an orderly fashion 
behind their leaders, in situations of conflict would at least 
seem to question Lenin's theory of a workers' aristocracy 
which was handed out lIIorsels of the profits of imperialist ex-
ploitation and thus constituted a privileged group which kept 
itself apart from the n~sses of the poor, and not only reject-
ed revolution but actively supported capitalism. 
( 
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123 In nearby Barmen confl ict broke out in February 1917 when a 
crowd of around 10,000 people demonstrated in front of the 
town hall and smashed windows after their demands for more 
food had been ignored. Subsequently, the crowd plundered seve-
ral grocery shops including SPD-owned cooperatives and vanda-
. lised a residential area. Soldiers were drafted in to quell 
the riots. 
See Hans-Ulrich Knies, "Arbeiterbeweyung und Revolution in 
Wuppertal. Entwicklung und Tatigkeit der Arbeiter- und Solda-
tenrate in Elberfeld und Barmen", in: Reinhard RUrup ledit.), 
Arbeiter- und Soldatenrate im rheinisch-westfalischen' Indus-
triegebiet. Studien zur Geschichte der Revolution 191B/19, 
Wuppertal 1975, p. 8B; 
and Reulecke, Der Erste Weltkriey ••• , Ope cit., p. 228. 
124 ~V, 2/11/1B, Das neue Deutschland und die Remscheider Polizei; 
and ~V, 4/11/18, Nochmals die Verhaftung des Genossen Courts. 
125 Lucas, Ope cit., p. 152. 
126 See Lenneper Kreisblatt lLK), 9/1/18. 
127 BV, 20/7/17, Erfolyreiche Lohnbewegung der Seidenbandwirker. 
128 BV, 14/11/17, Zur Kartoffelverso~yung; 
and BV, 16/11/17, Wo bleiben die Kartoffeln ? 
129 BV, 12/17, shortage of salt. 
130 BV, 31/10/17, lwei Milliorien Zentner Zucker auf Lager. 
131 BV, 27/11/17, Massenversalllmlung in der BSI. 
132 BV, 4/12/17, Versanunl ung Al exanderwerk. 
133 Lucas, op.-cit., p. 147. 
134 Ibid., p. 152. 
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C H APT E R 11 
The Struggle for Power in Remscheid 191H to 1923 
1. Remscheid during the 1918/19 Revolution. 
Th~ transfer of executive power from the local authorities to the 
Remschei d workers' and sol diers' council was effected smoothly and 
peacefully on the 9th November. l The policy-making committee 
(Vol1zugsausschu[3) consisted of five members: Heinrich Schliestedt, 
Otto Brajj, Willi Grutz, Paul Schlejjlllann and Otto Sctllllidt. rh~ wor-
kers' and soldiers' council had 45 members consistiny of IIIJinly 
Independent Socialists and about ten Spartakists. Unlike the 
Wuppertal towns of Elberfeld and Barmen the NSPD (Majority Social 
Democrats) had no i nfl uence on the counci 1, so that from the very 
beginning the latter worked exclusively for the introduction of the 
dictatorship of the proletariat, bdsed on the council system. The 
local council suspended ~he police inspector and took on responsi-
bility for the maintenance of law and order. Auxiliary police wear-
ing white armbands were chosen by the council to assist the regular 
police on patrol. The auxiliaries had full power and were armed. 
The workers' and so 1 d i ers' coune 11 forrlled a number of sub-eolluni t-
tees to handle administrative affairs. One of the coollittees - for 
propaganda, under the 1 eadershi p of Will i Grutz - was correctly 
regarded as vital to the success of the revolution.It was seen as a 
necessary link between the workers' and soldiers' council and the 
local inhabitants, explaining policies and countering anti-revolu-
tionar,)' propaganda circulated by the industrialists and military. 
Remsch~id quickly acquired the 'reputation of a 'bastion of bolShe-
vism', owing to the united and radical actions of its workers and 
their leaders. Soldiers prior to demobil isation were told by their 
comnanders that 1 aw and order had comp 1 ete ly broken down and that 
they would be attacked, beaten and robbed by anarchist gangs. False 
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rumours of murder. rape and robbery were spread by local industria-
lists and manufacturers in the hope of incensing the returning sol-
diers. so that these would eliminate the workers' and soldiers' 
council. 2 When troops did enter the town they found a completely 
peaceful scene with the law meticulously observed by a disciplined 
. and resolute workers' and soldiers' council. They also noted that 
the executive apparently enjoyed the full support of the local 
workforce. In Lennep. however. the local workers' and soldiers' 
council was disbanded by occupying troops. and leading members were 
imprisoned. The red flag flying above the town hall was r,eplaced by 
the old colours: black. white and red. Braf3. $chliestedt and a 
small group of arllled workers and soldiers attempting to intercede, 
were disarlllcd alld also illlpri50llcu. The news of this incident. UII-
leashed a wave of anger amongst Remscheid workers dnd a strong Jnd 
heavily armed detachment hurried to Lennep with the intention of 
fighting. if needs be, in order to free their leaders and restore 
control. In the face of such determined opposition the troops sur-
rendered without a fight. The occupation of Remscheid andLennep by 
the /TIil itary was greeted by a general stri ke ~ si yna 11 ed by the 
sounding of factory sirens. It was decided that the employers would 
be compelled to pay lost wages for their complicity in the counter-
revolutionary plan. 
Bra13 and Grutz sei zed every opportunity to inform revo 1 ut i ondry 
councils and important conferences of the existence of detai led 
plans to overthrow the revolution and restore the old order. At the 
congress of revolutionary councils in Berlin on 17th December. Brai~ 
revea 1 ed the ex is tence of counter- revo 1 ut i onary plans and delllanded 
the removal of all those military personnel responsible. The speech 
contained strictures on the peoples' deputies' sluggish reaction to 
the overwhelming proof that the revolution was in peril. 3 ~ra13. 
who rejected cooperation with the MSPD and warned Dittmann that the 
revolutionary counCilS, in the West would oppose any collusion 
between USPD and MSPD in the format i on of a temporary government, 
agitated incessantly throughout the Ni ederrhei n for the Sov iet 
system and against the parl iamentary system which the MSPD· pre-
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ferred. In this policy he found the complete sYlllpathy of the wor-
kers of Re~schei d and Soli nyen. 4 At the Barmen conference on 20th 
November Willi GrLitz introduced a resolution condemning the 
attempts by the MSPD to usurp control and exploit its position to 
force through the parl i alllentary system. He went on to state the 
aims of the revolution a~ understood by himself-and his Remscheid 
colleagues: 
IDas Ziel der Revolution ist die Sozialisierung der 
Gesellschaft, die OberfLihrung der Produktionslllittel 
aus den Handen weniger in den Besitz der Gesamtheit • 
zu erwi rken. I 
He went on to warn of the dangers of counter-revolution: 
IDie Arbeiter- und Soldatenrate ha ben die Pflicht, 
- auf di ese gro13e Gefahr auflllerksam zu iliac hen und di e 
Volksll~ssen ZUIII rUcksichtslosen Kalllpf gegen diese 
Geyenrevolution aufzurufen ••• Den geyenrevolutionaren 
Plan, die kapitalistische Gesellschaftsordnuny vor 
der Sicherstellung der Ziele der Revolution durch 
eine (verfassunysgebende) Nationalversallunlung zu 
retten, lehnen die Arbeiter- und Soldatenrate d~s 
Bezirks Nil;derrhein auf das bestinunteste ab ••• '5 
Events elsewhere eventually overtook the Remschei d workers' 1 ea-
ders, who reluctantly agreed to propose candidates for the election 
of the asselllb ly to draw up the new const itut ion. The newly- formed 
KPD on the other hand decided not to partiCipate in the election. 
Apart from this and one or two minor disagreelllents the two parties 
were still very close, and were able to present a fairly united 
front against the counter-revolution. 6 BraS, GrLitz and comrades 
were careful to paint out the dangers of splitting the'revolution-
ary movement and stressed the will on both sides to cooperate. 
Later events were to prove that the Remscheid workers did not 
desert thei r 1 eaders, on the contrary, they repeatedly demonstrated 
their approbation. 
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By the end of January the Df'iIV' s 1 oca 1 branch under Sch 1 i es tedt and 
Freitag had' a membership of 9,1667 (926 women. and 441 youths), a 
fact which reflected the confidence which local workers had in 
their leaders. Over the next twelve months this figure was to in-
crease further to a total of nearly 19,0008• Li kewi se the USPO 
received an avalanche of applications for membership during the 
first half of 1919.9 This pattern was repeated in all the major. 
working-class institutions and clubs. The socialist youth movement 
was reorganised in the Arbeiter-JugendausschuB, on which there were 
three representatives from the USPD, three from the TU cartel, one 
from the Frei er Turn- und Sportbund, one swimmer, one Naturfreund, 
one cyc 1 i st, one Sarnariter (workers' alllbu 1 ance corps) and one 
representative from the workers' teetotallers' club. The youth 
organisation was also flooded with applications from individuals 
and new clubs. IO The Spartakist uprising in Berlin was not 
supported by action in Remscheid. The news of the murder of Karl 
Liebknecht and Rosa Luxelllburg, however, again brouyht forth d 
mighty demonstration by the united forces of the USPD and KPD. A 
one-day~ protest strike completely paralysed production and trans-
port. A procession of demonstrators which marched from the Volks-
haus to the 'Spiesser-Republik Hasten'll carried banners de-
manding, 'Down with the Scheidemann yovernment'. Remscheid workers 
demonstrated their loyalty to their leaders on 6th June when 
government troops occupied the town and arrested all the prominent 
fi gures. As soon a~ news of the occupation and arrests becallle 
known, local metalworkers laid down their tools and began to con-
gregate outside the Volkshaus. They were soon joined by the prin-
ters with the result that no papers were pub 1 i shed, and by the 
ra 11 way workers who brought 1 oca 1 ra 11 transport to a standstill. 
The hatred felt by the workers for the troops and factory owners 
was manifested by outbreaks of violence,' particularly against 
industrialists and manufacturers,12 but also against governlllent 
troopsl3. Remscheid workers were joined in the strike by 
colleagues in Lennep, Radevormwald, and other towns of the region. 
An article appearing in the BV held the Scheidemann government 
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responsible for this act and reported thdt a deputation sent to 
Werl to i nqui re into the reasons behi nd the arrests returned wi tll 
fe~ble e~planations which it found unacceptable. 14 A spokesllhln 
for the mil itary occupat i on forces shed 1 i ght on the matter by 
pointing out that government orders had been repeatedly ignored in 
Remscheid and that there was concern that local. Spartakists were 
about to proclaim a Soviet republic. as well-known national leaders 
like Eichhorn. Hammer, Liittgen and ~Ierges had been spending con-
siderable time in the town during the preceding weeks.l 5 The 
spokesman went on to disclaim any knowledge of the pending pay dis-
pute in the Remscheid metal industry and suggested that the tillling . 
of the occupation was a lIIere coincidence. A meeting of the workers 
voted to continue the strik.e. On the 11th June and the following 
day, the Reichsk.ollunissar, Severing, hurried to a lIIeeting in the 
town hall. He spoke of the need to restore order and prollll sed that 
the prisoners would be released soon. The reception for the Reichs-
kommissar was particularly hostile.16 Those local functionaries 
present at the meeting promised to persuade the workers to return 
to the factories, but the following morning the strikers were 
joined by their colleagues in both Manneslllann factories, who iJro-
posed a general protest stri ke for the funera 1 of Rosa Luxelllburg I 
whose body had only recently been rt!covered from the Teltow canal. 
In view of the explosive situation the trade union conveners depre-
cated further strike action and succt!eded in persuading their work-
mates to return to work. Soldiers began to withdraw f~om tile town 
on the 18th, but the ernergt!ncy powers remained in effect. ll The 
workers expressed their solidarity with their imprisoned leaders by 
regular collections for their falflilies. 18 
The overwhelming support which the USPD received can best be gauged 
by its performance in the series of elections which took place 
during the first three months of 1919. Elections for the National 
Assembly were the first to be held after the revolution19 , by 
which uni versa 1 suffrage was introduced. The recently-formed KPl.l 
declined to partiCipate and called instead for the establishn~nt of 
the council systelll. The turn-out. in Relllscheid was higher than Rt:!ich 
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average with 86 % of the el igible voters gOing to the polls l in 
Lennep 89.ij %).~O Six parties nominated candidates for the 
election, two of which - the OVP (Oeutsche Volskpartei) and ONVP 
(Deutsch-Nationale Volkspartei) - formed an alliance. The USPD ran 
out winners, and the votes were cast as follows: 
USPD 
SPD 
DOP (Deutsche Uemokratische Partei) 
. DVP/DNVP 
Zentrum 
16,~~H (41.~ %) 
5,63~ {u.!:} %) 
10 , 1 t>4 ll4. I %) 
4,612. (11.4 %) 
3,Ot>O ( I.t> %)21 
In 22 of the 29 voting wards in Remscheid the USPD recetved the 
most votes winning more than 50 % in eight wards, al I of which were 
situated in working-class districts. The party's best results were 
aChieved in the following wards: 
Ward 13 
Ward 16 
Ward 14 
Ward 5 
Ward 24 
Honsberg I 
K relllenho 11 
Honsber\;j 11 
Struck 
Laspert 11 
14 % 
66 % 
62.t> % 
61 % 
60 %. 
The SPO on the pther hand aChieved its best result in ward 19 •. 
Giildenwerth/Reinshagen, 26 %. This area on the west side of the 
town contained numerous small family businesses elllployingfewer 
than ten workers, and this result might indicate that workers 
employed in small factories where the style of management was still 
persistently patriarchal were more amenable to the less radical SPO 
than the USPD. Whatever the case, GUldenwerth/Reinshdgen cannot be 
regarded as a predominantly workin\;j-class district like Honsbery, 
Krernenholl, Laspert, Struck, Papenberg and Rosenhugel. Ihe SPO's 
next best result (19 %) was gained in ward 3, Fichtellhohe which was 
also not a working-class district. This area was populated by a 
strong,minority of lower civil servants, dwelling in houses owned 
by the 'Bealllten-Bauverein in Spichern-, Worth- ana Sedanstral.)e. lhe 
USPD, however, gained "lore than twice the number of votes pal led by 
the SPI.) in this ward, b~b (approx. 42 %). In the E.lberfelaer 
StraBe/WaldstraBe area, ward 22, the SPD gained 17 % of the votes. 
.. 
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This district incorporated VillenstraBe, one of Remscheid's most 
exclusive a~d fashionable residential streets. lhis area, as can be 
seen from appendi x 1 (ward 31 for 1929) revea I s a stronger than 
average contingent of lower-middle class white-collar workers, 
clerks and shop assitants. In lY~Y the roughly corres~ondiny voting 
'ward 31 was inhabited by approx. 36.0 % workers not including 
widows that belonged to this category. This area, too, therefore, 
cannot be regarded as a working-class district. In ward 23, Laspert 
I, which does rate as a working-class district, the SPD gained 16 % 
of the votes compared with 46 % won by the USPU. A similar situa-
tion occurred in ward 6, RosenhUgel/Burger Stra~e, which also 
counts as a working-class district. Here the spn gained It> % COIII"'; 
pared with the USPU's 4U %. 111 wJrd 13, lIonslll;!r~ 1, ttle Sill) ullly 
managed 9 %, scoring even less than the UDP. 
"The above results, therefore, show overwhelming sup~ort in Relll-
" scheid - and particularly in the working-class districts - for the 
USPO and its cOlllmitment to the counci 1 system. By the same token 
they reveal much I ess sym~athy for the spn 1 oca Ily. 
Of the bourgeois parties, the uDP was by far the stronyest, winning 
the remaining seven wards, three of them quite handsomely. This 
party did particularly well in wards: 12, Alleestra~e/town centre; 
20, Polizei-PrasidiulII/Lindenstral)e - a residential area housin~ 
predominantly professional people, l3ealilte, (civil servants), busi-
nessmen and clerks; and in ward 21, Scheiderstra(3e/Schutzenstrdbe 
which was an area' housing many lower-middle class white-collar 
workers and shop assistants, as well as professional people and 
Beamte. 
The picture in Lennep is a little different, in that here in the 
Kreisstadt (district administrative capital), inhabited by a rela-
tively large percentage of Beamte,22 the OOP' manayed to poll d 
handful of votes more than the USPO. The lentrUlu's result with 
15.6 % (more than double its share in Relllscheid) reveals a stronger 
contingent of Catholics in Lennep. 
LUttringhausen presents a very different picture with the OOP just 
beating the OVP/DNVP alliance into second place. LUttringhausen, 
, " 
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situated on the north-eastern side of Remscheid and bordering on 
I ' Ronsdorf and Wuppertal,and an open country area to the East, was a 
di spersed community wi th small workshops and factori es, some of 
which were engaged in the textile industry. This town 'was situated 
off the main thoroughfare of the Bergische Land, so that its con-
tact with cosmopolitan ihflu~nces was quite negligible. LUttring~ 
hausen, unlike Lennep, was almost exclusively protestant and had a 
higher percentage of inhabitants employed in agriculture than' 
either Remscheid or Lennep" 
On 26/1/19 on a lower turn-out (78.2 %) the USPD was ~y~i~ wi~ner, 
this time in the Landtay election'.23 Of the 37,482 votes 'palled 
it received 14,638, this time winning 20 of the 29 wards~ Its 
'closest rival, the UUP, won all the other wards receiviny a totdl 
of 9,378 votes. This result demonstrates the readiness of UDr su~­
porters to turn out for Landtag elections and also reveals a gred-
ter reluctance on the part of some workers, who 'possibly regarded 
this type of election as be~ng less impo~tant. 
Council elections, which were held six weeks after the USPD's illl-
, ' 
pressive'victory in the elections for the National Asselllbly, re-
vealed a different tactical approach by the bourgeois parties. 
Enervated by theoverwhelrning support amongst local working 'people 
for the radical policies of theUSPD and KPD, and fearing the con-
sequences of a repeat victory at the lIIunicipal level, they embarked 
on a four-party all i ance between the DOP, OVP, ONVP and Zentrulll, 
which was organised by these parties together with the Remscheid 
civic associations (BUrgervereine).24 With this alliance" the 
bourgeois parties were to set a pattern for the whole of the Weilllar 
period, because they quickly recognised that there was no other way 
of preventing a socialist-communist lIliljority on the town council. 
Despite the all iance, however, ,the bourgeois parties failed to 
achieve their aim in this poll. The KPD made its first appearance 
in the local election and took 4.1 % in a fairly high 72.8 % turn-
out. 25 The BUrgerblock gained 40.5 %. the USPO' 38.5 % 'and the 
SPD 16.9 % of the votes so that the distribution of seats on the 
council was as follows: 
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Burgerblock 22 seats = 13,830 votes 
USPD 21 seats = 13,0/3 votes 
SPD 9 seats = !:>,IIO votes 
KPD 2 seats = 1,4U8 votes. 
This result meant that the balance ,of power on the town council for 
the period 1919 to 1924 was exercised by the SPD. On 28/1/~1 the 
USPD and KPD coalition dissolved to form the VKPD' (Vereiniyt~ 
Komrnunistische Partei Deutschlands), which now had 22 seats in the 
Remscheid town hall, as two USPD councillors, Rudolf Bi.ibler and 
'Gustav Eckhardt, decl ined to Join the KPD, and for the tillle beiny 
continued to represent the by nuw tiny USPD. Ihey later Joined the 
SPU. Louis Uarrll, whu had been elected to repr'esellt tile ~I-'U, 
changed in mid-term to the KPD.26 
Throuyhout the next twelve months the situdtion inkemscheid asci \-
lated between- intense hostility and open conflict. lhe leaders of 
the 1 oca 1 workers correctly assessed events in the Rei ch and 00-
served the creepi n9 encroachment of the counter- revo I ut i on in the 
West. BraB and Gri.itz saw their warfling ~yainst cooperation with the 
SPD' confirmed, but were not powerful enough to recreate in oUler 
revolutionary councils the kind of united front that was present in 
Remscheid and Solingen. In optiny to put up candidates for the 
Nat i ona 1 Const itut i ona 1 Assemb Iy they acted to try to prevent the 
other parties, particularly the SPD, DOP and LentrulII, from cum-
pletely dominating the proceedings. At the same time they realised 
that the pro-revolutionary forces had lost the initiative and would 
have to await the next favourable opportunity to seize power 
again. 
At this point it would seem appropriate to consider to what extent 
the local leaders actually prevented the revolution from spreading 
out from Remscheid and Solingen to connect with the more spon-
taneous, less disciplined workers in some of the Ruhr towns.~1 
On the one hand it is evident that the Remscheid leaders were a"~ng 
the most active of German revolutionaries, not only at home but 
also in the Ruhr' and Rhine areas, helping to organise councils, 
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agitating, speaking at conferences both in the Niederrhein area and 
Berlin. In 'addition, they had a representative, Heinrich Schlie-
stedt, on the COllllllission elected to draw up proposals for the 
nationalisation of the coal industry. The Relllscheidleaders also 
took great care to explain their actions to the workers, but this 
usually happened afterwards. Thus the workers were constantly pre-
sented with a fait-accompli, and were not actively involved in the 
'formulation of revolutionary action. Time and time again local wor-
kers demonstrated their readiness to aid the progress of .the revo-
lution, either by facing up to governlllenttroolJs, as in Lennep, or 
else by strike action, as' in February 1919 when Remscheid metal-
workers called a strike in solidarity with the striking Ruhr 
miners. Again during the occuJJation of I{emscheid in June, they 
showed their detenllination to resist armed troops. Iheir resistance 
met with the disapJJroval of their leaders and they were persuaded 
to return to work, rather than ri sk bloodshed, in what was by now 
regarded as a lost cause. The question as to why such revolutionary 
enthusiasm was not given free rein at an e.arlier stage would cer-
tainly appear valid. 
In defence of the local leadership it must be said that they were 
well placed to judge the actual situation, and were aware of events 
in the rest of Germany which took d different course from those in 
the' West. The fact that Remscheid and Sol ingen fell within the 
neutra I zone i nhi bited arllled interference on the part of the 
government, but at the same tillle there was no reason to susjJect 
that the Allies would tolerate the existence of a Soviet RelJublic 
in the West. In addition, the problem of food supplies alone would 
have doomed unilateral action in the Bergische Lema aud the Ruhr to 
failure. The blockade was still in operation and with foodstocks 
badly depleted, both areas were more dependent on the surrounding 
hi nterl and than ever before. Furtherlllore, although the workers of 
Remscheid and Solingen presented a united frout, this was far frolll 
being the case in the Ruhr, Wuppertal and Hayen, where the SPU gra-
dually gained control of the revolutionary councils and worked to 
dowse the flame. Had Relllscheid and Solingen been in any way autono-
mous regions, the chances of success might have been gredter. 
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2. The Kapp-Putsch in Remscheid. 
The opportunity for the Remscheid workers' leaders to a!;jdin seize 
the initiative presented itself quite soon. There were several 
attempts by government troops in the autumn of 1919 and the spriny 
of the. following year to bring local workers under control 2e 
The provocative behaviour of the troops and their display of the 
old colours of the empire brought the workers to seething point. 
The occupation of Relllscheid by troops of the Freikorps Uitzow29 
and the supporting action of the citi~ens' guard lBiir!;jerwehr) under 
the leadership of Dr. Ewald Weisemann, and consisting laryely of 
the sons of local industrial ists/lllanufacturers and. civi I ser-
vants30 again intensified class hostility in tile tOWIl. WhclI 
workers' leaders and the workers' newspaper tried to protest, 
Liitzow arrested the forlller and banned the latter. The appeal by the 
government to strike was answered by loyalty in Relllscheid, although 
the workers were fully aware that their action was not to bailout 
an administration, which they considered had betrayed the revolu-
tion, but rather to bring the revolution to a successful conclusion. 
The Freikorps troops proceeded to seal off the centre of the town 
around the town hall and the post office by erectiny barriers of 
barbed wirt~. with the warniny that anyone passing the barriers 
would be shot. On the eveniny of the 11th March a large, an~ry 
crowd of workers protested at the. barriers, and the troops - feel-
ing themselves threatelled - fired into the midst killing one ana 
.seriou~ly injuring a second worker. This incident triggered off UIl-
equivocal action and again overstepped the threshhuld from class 
hostllity to class conflict. Local workers brought out their wea-
pons and went onto the offens 1 ve. a llllost as soon as the fi rst 
shells rained in on the town hall from the canons of the 'Red Army' 
which were positioned on the heights above Lennep, L~ttringhausen 
and at Hohenhagen. The heavy figthiny in Remscheid involved women 
and youths as well as the men. Youths were mainly engayed in cou-
rier duties and delivering supplies. 31 When it became clear 
that the government troops,by now consisting of LUtzow's detachlllent , 
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the Zeitfreiwill igen (citizens' lIIil itia) of Remscheid, the remain-
'der of "Gill,hausen's troops falling back from E1berfe1d, together 
with the decimated Freikorps Hacketau and a group of security 
police, in all roughly 1,700 men, could not hold the town, they 
began to retreat towards the occupied zone, the border of which 
separated Remscheid and Solingen at Mungsten. It was on this re-
treat that the government troops suffered thei r heaviest 1 asses, 
being caught in the crossfire of a machine-gun company. The survi-
vors, something over 1,000 men, surrendered to the !3ritish troops 
in Solingen. 32 
Needless to say it was again the local leaders of the USPD who or-
ganised and directed the assault on the Freikorps troops.3:> The 
dramatist and poet, Fricurich Wolf, who WdS ClIIlJloycd by tile 10C<.11 
medical centre playcd an illlportant role in dircctiny the workers' 
assault on the Freikorps troops. Losses on the workers' side were 
lower than those of the government troops. From Relllscheid there 
were 21 killed, including three women and two yout~s,34 the 
latter being killed by an exploding shell which had been miSdirec-
ted into Honsberg. Twelve ~JOrkers frolll other towns also died in the 
fighting. 
This action which again freed Remscheid and the southern part of 
the Ruhr of government troops was once more to prove to have been 
in vain, as the initiative slipped away from the workers, and was 
finally lost with the signing of the Uie1efeld treaty.35 The 
government covlS {l~trl~kJh,.~c.t:"rClt,Q.l0f Relllscheid and the area south of be.c.,",~e.. h1~ 1.1£4~ o,,,,,.I.tllrll'~~3"lll, 
the Ruh~l\and relied on ~he dlscipline of the workers and t~e re-
spect for their leaders to bring about a peaceful conclusion. The 
workers complied with these wishes, but criticism of BraB, one of 
the signatories of the Bielefeld treaty, and claims of betrayal 
became i nc reas i n 9 ly aud i b 1 e, pa rt i cu 1 a r ly among younger cOlllmun is t 
workers. from now on the allegiance of the Remscheid workers began 
to move towards the communist party, which propagated an uncompro-
mising policy of class conflict to bring the revolution to a suc-
cessful end. 
Government troops in the form of security pal ice under Oberst 
Graf-' van Pominski finally occuiJied Remscheid on 27th May. The 
threatened general strike did not lIIaterialise.36 
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3. The Emergence of the KPU in Remscheid. 
The KPD wh i ch was offi ci a lly founded at the end of December 19H> 
had its first regional branch, outside Berlin in Remscheid. 31 
The Remschei d branch' s. i naugura 1 meet i ny was convened by Sparta-
kists, who had constantly. criticised the USPD policy of sharing 
government responsibility with the SPD in the provisional council 
of deputies. The founding me"~ers of the local bra~ch of th~ new 
party were inter alia: Christoph Herzog, Albert lssel, Paul Schro-
der. Karl PUtz, Emil Voss. Fritz Schiffler. Otto tlraun, .Wilhellll 
Courts, ,EmU Merten, August Kallweit and Frl. Gretel wetzel, and 
were mostly members of the Kemscheid workers' and soldiers' coun-
cil. They are known to hdve bet!1l pdrticularly censoriou!) uf Wilhellll 
Dittmann, clairniny ~hdt he dnd /Jddse would aChieve JbSolutely 
nothing. 38 As already noted, the founders of the local brdnch 
of the KPD also disagreed with the USPD decision to put up candi-
dates for the election to the National ,Assernbly.39 On the other 
hand, local leaders, conscious of the dangers of splitting the wor-
kers' movement, were anxious to adduce, pOints of agreelllent between 
the two representat i ve, part i es of the workers in Rernschei d. 40 
The unification which Relllscheid workers ,felt sure would take place 
occurred in the autullln of 1920when the USPD split and by far the 
majority of the Independents opted for the KPD,41 which now be-
came the largest workers' party in the town, whilst the USPD dege-
. ' . 
nerated into near oblivion. The VKPD had between 5,000 and 5,200 
signed-up membe'rs by July 1921. 42 ' Silllilarly. the unification 
between the left-wing of the USPO and the KPD clarified the posi~ 
t i on regard i ng the youth movement, with the merger of the KOlllllluni s-
tischer Jugendverband (KJV) and the Sozialistische Proletarier-
jugend (SPJ). Eventually this union again split into the much 
stronger KJVO and the Sozialistische Arbeiterjugend (SAJ), which 
beca/lle attached to the left wing' of the. SPD.43 The chairman of 
the SAJ was Kurt BraS who did not follow his father into the VKPO. 
Over the next three years the VKPD set about organising its members 
in a revolutionary party, in preparation for seizing power at the 
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earliest opportunity. Comlllunist activity now concentrated on the 
trade unions and the working-class housing estates. The local VKPD 
branch true to its Spartakist oriyins, now set about activating its 
members, stressing the need for tot a 1 devot i on. to the cause, draw-
ing them into an omni present system, which was oryani sed from 
party committees down to the family via factory councils, street 
cells44 , newspaper, sports clubs, youth and children's groups, 
cooperative society and lIIany others. This rigid organisation deman-
ded by the VKPD taxed even the di sci p li ned Remschei d workers and 
many, part i cul arly 01 der ones, veterans of the former SPD d'rgani sa-
. tions, ·began to complain about the inflexibility of the party. 
A measure of the party's inflexibility was its intolerance of indi-
vidualistic expression within its own ranks, and the appdrent ala-
cri ty with whi ch it expelled dissenters. Unfortulldtely, by its 
authoritarian style, the party managed to stifle useful debate dllU 
criticism. Some of the local party's most talented leaders were to 
fall victim to the absurdly conUllon practice of expulsion. The pur-
gative method of quelling dissent was to become even more fre4uent 
in the latter years of the Weimar Republic, so that by the time the 
Nazis came to power a sizeable number of leading functionaries of 
the KPO had at SOllle stage been ejected from the party. Furthermore, 
the BV's con~~ntaries on expul~ions were often couched in hostile 
language, the harshness of which seemed to bear little relation to 
the extent of the quarrel. 45 • 
The older Remscheid workers were .. used to the SPU/USPD style of 
leadership which had tended to act on their behalf rather than 
demand t~eir constant participation, only calling upon their aid at 
elections or when a show of force seemed necessary. It is also 
possible that the new leadership in the VKPD did not display enouyh 
tolerance and patience with their melllbers, and too often resorted 
to constraint by reprilllanding and cajol ing46, Bra13 and Gri.itz who 
both joined the VKPD, gradually began to lose influence in the new 
party although for the time being they were still active. 41 
Following the failure of the importunate March offensive and the 
subsequent inner-party bi cker; ng, lIIany members turned thei r backs 
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on the VKPD although ,the Relllschei d branch appears not to have 
suffered as' much as others. 48 A lthouyh not many members in the 
town resorted to resignation from the party, they revealed their 
disaffection with the party's methods in other ways,for instance -
unusual for Remscheid - poor turn-outs for meetinys, sluggish pay-
ment and collection of subscription etc. and general criticism of 
party policy.49 
The unusually harsh censorship of leadership and policy forced the 
party to concentrate more on achieving a united front wi,thin the 
workers' movement - a policy which plunged the authorit-ies and 
bourgeois parties into deep despai~.50 A leaflet campaign was 
enthusiastically supported, and pointed to the need for united ac-
tion against the Oryesch and citizens' vigilante s4uads, and argued 
the case for the forJllation of proletarian protection s4uads. The 
first successful united action was the setting up of a cOllullittee 
consisting of members of all three socialist parties to consider 
the problems of unemployment and inflationary prices. The nUlllber of 
unemployed in Relllscheid currently stood at 750 plus a further 400 
who had been sacked for their part in the March offenSive, and who 
received no benefits whatsoever and therefore had to be supported 
by the party and the trade union. 51 The VKPU, seeing the revo-
lutionary potential of unemployed workers, also began to reorganise 
these by forming a cOlllmittee of unemployed KPO members to discuss 
their problems and plan action campaigns and demonstrations against 
the employers and 1 oca 1 authori ties •. 
The year 1921 offered further opportunities for united action in 
Remscheid, and again manifested the extent of polarisation. The 
fi rst occasion was in the sunuller when under the 1 eadershi p of Wil-
helm Schuy the bourgeois parties agreed to form an anti-socialist 
coalition on the town council. They advertised the unity of bour-
. ' 
geois groups by organising a gala day (BUrgerfest) with an impres-
sive procession of right-wing and centre organisations, consisting 
of the right-wing political parties and the OOP, Jungdeutscher 
Orden, Oeutsch-Vol k i scher Schutz- und Trutzbund, Verei n der Wa 1-
decker, non-socialist employees' trade unions, guilds, protestallt 
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and catho 1'1 c youth groups, mi 1 itary veterans' and ex-Serv i celllen 's 
association~ and non-socialist sports- and recreational clubs. The 
festival was ostensibly called to demonstrate support for the Repu-
blic. The involvement of groups like the DNVP, Deutsch-Vblkischer 
Schutz- und Trutzbund, the Alldeutscher Verband and Kriegervereine 
testify to Schuy's ignorance of his allies' aims and intentions. 
The procession and gala appear to have mobilised between 20,000 and 
24,000 people, and the march past lasted 73 minutes. 52 The yala 
took two months to organise and was bitterly criticised in the BV 
which called on all socialist pa~ties to boycott the ev.ent and 
organise their own festival on the same day. This tactic had been 
successfully elllployed by the old spn oryanisation towards the end 
of the 19th century dnd duriny the first decade of thlS. The tradi-
tional Relllscheid gala week always witnessed j.ldrdl1el Volksfeste, ill 
order that the workers and thei r fami 1 i es would avoi d contact wi th 
their employers and their organisations at recreational events. On 
the 31st July two processions passed through Remscheid, the bour-
geois coalition towards Kuppelstein and the socialist/trade union 
march to the reservoir. The route taken by the former was abundant-
ly lined with black, white and red flags. The Volkshaus, Konsum and 
. workers,' houses displayed red flags. The event was such that the 
town was literally split into two opposing camps. The workers were 
so angered by the rival ev~nt that names of shopkeepers takiny part 
in the procession were noted with the intention of introducing d 
boycott. 53 The BV in its familiarly belligerent style described 
the events as a 'klare Scheidung der Geister': 
'Auf der einen Seite'das Krauter- und Spiel3biiryertulII, 
auf der anderen Seite das mdchtvoll und vernehllll ich 
seine Rechte heischende Proletariat. Hier alte, dart 
neue Zeit. Hier nationalistischer Kriegsrummel der 
Kriegsgewinnler und Plusmacher, dart Kampfentschlossen-
heit fUr die Erringuny des Weltfriedens durch die Macht-
ergreifung des internationalen Proletariats. '54 
The f~jl .. ((. to.) for."1 
parties 
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a united front, consisting of the three socialist 
i." . 1921. revea'ted a weakness 
wh~ch became a permanent feature of political affairs in Relllscheid 
throuyhout the Weimar Republic. This was a reversal of the roles at 
the Reich level. with the local SPD holding a decidedly subordinate 
position. in comparison with firstly the USPO and afterwards the 
KPD. The relationship was unmistakably marked on the one side by a 
desire to delineate interests and preserve a separate identity, and 
on the other side by bitter enmi~y towards the saUlll party, deri-
sori ly referred to by 1 oca 1 Comrlluni sts as the • Relllscheid~r Acht-
familien-Partei .55, which in their eyes was intent on prevent-
i n~ unity in the Relllsehei d workers' 1II0velllt:mt. nle 1 oed I sro I edder:;i 
constantly found ttwmselves ch<.lryed with the U/lenVidbh:! task of 
, 
defending the actions and rulings of governments, whose hostility 
to the workers' cause wo:. abundant ly delflonstrated. I hei r to ler.illce 
of unpopular government coalitions for the. sake of preserving an 
illusory democratic republic which was consistently being under-
mined and subverted by judiciary, military, civil service and 
industrialists, earned thelll the title of traitors of the workers' 
movement, and sometimes even exasperated their most loyal rdnk and 
fll e members. I n add it i on to the des i re by 1 oca 1 SPO I eaders to 
maintain a separate identity there was undoubtedly a strong element 
of personal enmity and petty jealousy between the local leaders of 
both sides. These factors therefore were time and again de~isive irl 
the failure to forlll a united workers' front in Relllscheid, through-
'out the Weimar years, despite a strong desire at the grass roots 
level. In the early summer of 1921 the three social ist parties 
exploring various channels for Joint action, set up a conmittee to-
gether with the AUGB lA 11 yemei ner Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund), and 
the local board of factory counci Is for the mobilisation of the un-
employed. This council of unemployed workers lArbeitslosenrat) was 
chaired by KPD-melllber Seidelt>O, and was intended to conduct the 
interests of the local unemp'loyed workers. It very quickly becamt! 
domi nated by KPO members, so that the SPU felt itse I f to have been 
outmanoeuvred. 
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The assassination of Matthias Erzberger at the end of August sig-
nalled anotHer opportunity for joint cooperation between the three 
different socialist parties. This time the initiative WdS tak!:!n by 
the SPD and USPD. which together approached the KPD and the chris-
tian trade unions with the aim of presenting a broad workers' front 
in protest to this and the series of political murders perpetrated 
by right-wing extremists. Whilst the KPD readily accepted. the 
christian trade unions declined, so that the action was a predollli-
nantly socialist affair. The delllonstration which took place on the 
2nd September on the Rathausp 1 atz (town hall square) was· at tended 
by about 4.00057 • The crowd was addressed by representat i yes of 
the three parties. Sauerbrey and Olk from Elberfeld and L!:!itner 
from Essen. All three speakers recalled the sacrifices dnd tile 
mistakes made by the workers' movement since 191U: 
'Ludendorff, Kapp, pp. wollten im Mdrz 192U die Monarchie 
wieder aufrichten, aber wir standen gewappnet da und hatten 
die Macht haben konnen, wenn wir nicht so viele Fehler ge-
macht hatten ••• Wie oft warer,wir schon versanulleltl Wie oft 
haben wir Resolutionen abgefabt! Es hat alles nichts ye-
nutzt. Nehlllt die Herausforderuny der Rechtsparteien an, 
dann werden die 20,000 Bedrucker auseinandergejayt. Denkt 
an Marz 192U, an das Bielefelder Abkommen, an die acht 
Punkte. nicht ein Punkt ist erfullt warden. Man versprach 
uns Bildung van Einwohnerwehren, bestehend aus Proletariern. 
Sie wurden wieder aufgelost. Wir verlangten Auflosuny salllt-
licher verfassunysuntreu gewesener militarischer formatio-
nen. Nichts ist geschehen.' 
The assembled protesters endorsed a four-point resolution demand-
ing the illvnediate disarming of all right-wing parahlilitary groups 
lik~ Orgesch. Stahlhelm. Rossbach, etc •• the removal of all recon-
dite monarchists from the R~ichswehr. civil service and judiciary, 
and the elect i on of arrn!A'po 1 ice offi cers and judges. 58 and the 
abrogation of the state of emergency in Bavaria. East Prussia, 
Halle and Merseburg, together with the release of all political 
prison~rs. IJespite the recurrent calls for the establishment of cl 
united front. the three part i es were not able to reach agreement. 
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The local 'SPD leadership tound its~lf on the one side subjected to 
pressure for unification by its ordinary rank and file, and on the 
other side severely reprimanded by the Freie Presse ot I:.Iberfeld 
for ac~ding to the wishes of the former on the instance of the pro-
{I 
test demonstration following th~ murder ,of Erzberyer.~Y Yet 
another attempt to create a coalition of the three workers' parties 
occurre~ in October immediately following the USPD decision to 
merge with the KPD. This time the three parties bO discussed the 
formation of a working conullittee because 
'der festgeschlossenen Front des gesamten l)urgertullls • 
eine festgefUgte einheitliche Kampfstellung des Prole-
tariats entgegengesetzt werden lIlusse.,bl 
The already extant working COlllllllttee ot KPU, SPl) and USPU tac-
tions on the town 'counci I, which had been cre<.lLed Lu cuulILer Llle 
apparently unproblematic coalition of bourye'ois jJarties, was tu try 
to present a united front on every possible occasion, in order to 
gain the maximum benefit for th~ workers. The working cOlllmittee, 
however, failed its very first test, when the SPl) refused to parti-
Cipate in a planned delllonstration against inflated 'jJrices ,and for 
wage increases. 62 The ultimate demise of the transient working 
committee was signalled by the proposal to erect a monument to th~ 
workers who died during the Kapp-Putsch in Remscheid. Ihe bourgeois 
councillors boycotted the council meeting so that it was inquorate 
_ a circumstance aided by the absence of several SrD members. Ihe 
SPD fact i on later proposed the erect i on ,of the monument in the 
cemetery, instead of in the Stadtpark as had originally been in-
tended. I he KPD fact i on was angered by the SPD 's wi 11 i ngness to 
compromise so readily. The final cOlllment was left to the BV: 
'Es muB oft ausgesprochen werden, daB mit solchen leuten 
ein Zusalllrnenarbeiten irn Sinne der organisierten Arbeiter-
schaft unmoglich sei. Die kommunistische Fraktion hat es 
schon oft versutht, eine geschlossene Front 101 Stadtrat 
herzustellen, aber immer scheiterte ihr BemUhen an diesen 
politischen Weichtieren. Die Rechtssozialisten hatten nun-
mehr das Recht, sichArbeitervertreter zu nennen, endgUltig 
verscherzt. ,63 
- 143 -
At this stage the question must be raised as to Just how seriously 
the KPD des. red a un ited front i n 1~2!,· and on what terllls. Accord-
ing to police reports and newspaper articles, the KPLl yenuinely 
desired a united front with the USPD and SPO, but not as a parlia-
mentary coalition in the form of an inter-factional working conunit-
tee, but rather as a joint force prepared to seize power and esta-
blish a dictatorship of the proletariat. b4 
4. Conflict with the Trade Union Movement. 
The revolution brought the workers important gains in the econolllic 
and social as well as the political sphere. Along with the dellland 
for universal suffraye went the ,introduction of the eight-hour ddy, 
recognition by the employers of the trade unions as tile representa-
tives of labour and their right to negotiate wage deals on behdlt 
of ,their members. lhese points were all hurriedly conceded by re-
presentat i ves of the emp I oyers' organi sat ions and the Zentra 1-
arbeitsgellleinschatt - ZAG lcentral working cOlllmittee) which had 
been forllled soon after the outbreak of revolution.b~ Whi 1st the 
agreement undoubtedly benefited the workers soc i a Ily and economi-
cally' and was therefore celebrated as a victory in spa and trade 
union circles, it was neverthelessurullistakably an implicit accep-
tance of the capitalist syst~n, and was to have far-reaching conse-
quences with regard to the question of a united front in the wor-
kers' movement. The agreement also made provision for factory coun-
cils to assist and represent the workforce in disputes 'with the 
management or owner. Proponents of the council system advocated th~ 
transformat i on of factory council s into organs of workers' execu-
tive power. In this way workers.would be able to control produc-
tion, and industry would be nationalised. The debate about the form 
and powers of factory counci Is ran parallel to that concerned with 
the system of government viz. parliamentarianism or workers' coun-
cils.Whilst the SPD and the right wing of the USPLl together with 
the trade union leaders concentrated on le!;jalising the existence 
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and function of factory councils, the left wing of the USPD dnd the 
. Communists 'began to organise independent revolutionary factory 
councils at the national level. 
The Remscheid branch of the DMV in opposition to union headquarters 
was one of the radical union bodies which supported the decision 
taken at Halle in July 1919. After months of stormy debate the fac-
tory counci 1 1 aw was passed at the be~i nni ng of 192U, bb however 
in a form which ensured the continued existence of capitali~" and 
which severely limited the rights'of the workers. Rather than an 
organ of workers' executive power, the factory council was aSSigned 
the function of representative, a bri dge between management and 
workforce. The prolllulgation of' the factory council law effectively 
signalled the end of the debate councils vs. parliamentarianisl".' 
The five years between 1920 and 1924 witnessed a struggle for con-
trol of the unions in Remscheid, which developed parallel to, and 
as part of, the struggle for political leadership of the local 
working-class movement. The unions, of which the OMV was the most 
important, were dominated first by the USPO and after 1920 by the 
KPD~ Dissension ensued mainly from the question of what type at 
organisation the trade union should be. Whilst the Communists were 
intent on using the unions as a political weapon in the class con-
flict, the SPD minority wanted to limit its function to the econo-
mic and social sphere. 67 The truculent mood of the KPO-Ied Ot<lV 
local coumittee under Karl PUtz, Christian Herzoy~ Adulf Benscheid 
and Willi GrUtz, its readiness to take strike action as part of d 
wider KPD strategy, alienated lllany Ulelllbers with the result that 
some joined other unions in protest. btl The loss of ,"embership 
corresponded to a fall in KPO membership and reflected a temporary 
disaffection with the party's trade union strategy. This assessment 
was further born out by the results of the election of delegates to 
the DMV general meeting at Jena. The communist list, headed by Karl 
Putz, Alois Kreven and Otto BraB, received - by Remscheid standards 
- a fairly low I~ %, whilst the SPO/USPD list led by Rudolt POllllller, 
Josua Heirnbrock and Oskar Koch I recei ved a respectable 24 %.69 
The position was redressed somewhat in January 1Y~2 when at the 
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annua 1 general meet i n9 of the 1 oca 01 branch an a ll-collullun i s t genera I 
conmittee was elected. 70 0 Attending members were also informed 
that local membership was again on the increase. 
The struggle for control of the DMV continued unabated with a shift 
in emphasiS. to a quarrel between the communist-led local branch 
1 eadershi p and DMV headquarters in Stuttgart whi ch took up the 
cause of the minority SPD faction. During 1922 Karl PUtz became a 
casualty of the dispute. The KPD exacted swift retribution for his 
o failure to uphold party policy towards the DMV and expelled him 
from the party. His expulsion was rapidly followed by his- removal 
from office in the trade union, despite his enjoyiny continued 
support of DMV headquarters. PUtz' relllova I was sanct i oned by the 
local general meeting so that headquarters was unable to intervene 
on his behalf. On the other side, district secretary Wdlter Freytd';j 
suspended Otto Weber. Alois Kieven and Adolf Benscheid, pending the 
outcome of an inquiry into their conductin!:) of trade union busi-
ness.ll Against this background I the conununist general cOllullittee 
was returned to office minus those suspended officers. These were 
rep I aced by other party members, and the fi rst secretary was now 
Ernst Crone. 
The extent of support for the local branch leadership was consider-
able, as the flood of resolutions taken by town district cOllunittees 
testify.72 The election Of reopresentatives, which preceded the 
annual general meeting, also brought a resounding victory for the 
KPD. In Laspert, which was considered the main SPD stronghold, the 
Communists ran out winners by 200 votes to 2!:>. The victory was 
followed by the election of COlluTlunist district conunittees in Hons-
berg, Stachelhausen. Laspert. RosenhLigel. Hasten (formerly SPD), 
and Scheid. Considering the tenacity of opposition from the Rem-
scheid branch, DMV headquarters decided tore-assert their authori-
ty by making an example of the three suspended Cornmunists. When 
Weber. Kieven and Benscheid ignored the rec~runendation of the arbi-
ters, namely a one-year ban fromsp~akin9 at DMV-meetings. with a 
public warning for Weber, the central cOllunittee decided to expel 
them all.73 This act released a burst of ·protest from district 
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corrunittees and factory work forces in Remscheid74 , expressin!;) 
solidarity with their elected officials. 
Against a background of bellicose nationalist sentiment kindlea by 
the french occupation of the Ruhr75 and the coincidental as-
sault by employers ondocal factory councils, the majority of local 
workers once again sought a plausible explanation for the latest 
course of events from the KPO. Whilst the social democratic ~ruup 
of trade uni oni sts around Gustav Haddenbrock. po I i Ct! chi t!f Pau I 
frUngel. Wilhelm Kliemt, Lorenz Ridders and Wilhelm Allendorf elec-
ted to aid the coalition of christian and Hirsch-Ounkerscne trade 
unions, employers and civil service/local authorities in the fi-
nancing of the /{uhr Aid Proyrallullt!, the KPU-Ied 10Cdl ordlleh eOllullit-
tee of the UMV ddulJtt!O d starlet! trom, dml olJlJust!u tu, bott! tilt.: 111-
vaders and the ndt i ond I defence lIIovelllt.:nt wi th the si oyan "Sell I d~t 
Poincare an der /{uhr und Cuno an der Spret!! .. 76 Ihe local SPu 
I eadershi p angered I oca I work~rs who were tht!lilse I Vt!S a I ready ex-
periencing serious financial problellls, by their sUJJPort for thl;! 
Ruhr Aid Programme which required eVery worker to forego ont! hour"s 
wage per week to help finance passive resistance against the 
French. The occupation of the Ruhr WdS answered by the ringing of 
church bells which proclaimed the beginning of a half-hour strike 
ca 11 ed by the SPU and emp I oyers' associ at ions. Where factory work-
forces did participate in ~he protest, the KPO-Ied counei Is wert! 
able to turn the occasion to their advantage by holding meetings to 
explain the party's point of view~1/ Many workforces, however, 
ignored the call to strike completely, so that in the end the pro-
test had a decidedly bourgeois flavour with nlarches held by choral 
soci~ties, fire-service, ex-Servicemen's associations and other 
right-wing organisations.1 tl Furthermore, the majority of /{em-
, scheid :factory workforce refused to partiCipate in the Ruhr Aid 
ProgralTUne which the BV had condemned as fraud: 
'Wiederum versucht man, den ausgebeuteten Schichten der 
Bevolkerung, der Arbeiterschaft. den Anyestellten, kleinen 
Bauern. d~n sogenannten kleinen Mittelstand begreiflich zu 
machen. daB das "Schicksal" sie mit dem Gro~unternehlllertulII 
verbinde. Und doch zeigt dieses Gro~unternehmertwn schon 
jetzt. wie es dieses "Schicksal" auffaBt. Deutsche·und 
f~anzosi s~he Ver~r~ter d i eses Grof3unternehmertuIIlS haben 
slch berelts geelnlgt, "kauflllannisch miteinander ZU ver-
ke~re~". d.h. auch un~er .den jetzigen Verha.ltnissen ein-
t r.tq 11 rill' r.f><:rll d 1" 1!11 t i' 1 n \fltjf't' '11 11101('111>11.' JIj 
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The same article went on to attack the SPD for its support of the 
national defence movement, however, completely iynoriny the fact 
that the SPD regarded the alliance as a defence of the Republic: 
'Die Sozialdemokraten haben sich mit ihrer "Streik"-Parole 
dem Gespott aller Arbeiter ausyesetzt. Trotz loder weyen) 
ihrer "Schicksalsyemeinschaft" mit dern UnternehlllertulII 
konnten sie die Arbeiterschaft nicht davon abhalten, den 
Weisungen des Remscheider Ortskartells wie der KOllununis-
tischen Partei zu folyen. Die Arbeiterschaft hat ausdem 
Krieg und seinen Folgen gelernt, die Sozialdemokratie nicht. 
Ihr EinfluB verschwindet trotz der radikalen Verbramung 
ihrer Politik. Der gestrige Tag hat das auch in Relllscheid 
bewiesen.' • 
The KPD, with its consistent stand ayainst both the employers dlld 
the French, appears to have impressed the I Dca I workers, so thJt 
thes.e rallied around the local DMV committe, with the result that 
the small group of SrD trade unionists became increasingly i501J-
ted. The dismissal of Schulz at the BSI was interpreted by the wor-
kers as chicanery on the part of the firm's director Ur. Steinbery, 
a young ex-cavalry officer, who had taken up the post at the BSI 
promising 'to severe the red thread running through the fac-
tory,80. Throughout the preceding months the factory coullci I, 
under the chairmanship of Otto Frohlich, had won a nUlllber of Skir-
mishes with the BSI manayement,81 so that the suspicion arose 
that Steinberg wanted to relilove a particularly troublesome eounei I. 
The dismissal of Schulz was' answered by a strike in the smeltiny 
works.82 In a eompromi se worked out by the arbitrdt ion eOlllmit-
tee, led by deputy mayor Zur Hellen, Frohlieh and Schulz were re-
moved· from their eounei 1 posts, but reinstated in their jobs.~n 
The removal ot" Frohl ieh and Sehu Iz was followd a tew weeks later by 
the instant dismissal ot- EUli I Page), another cOllllllunist memoer of 
the factory council. 84 This and similar moves in other taeto-
ries suggested the possibllitY of a systelllatic assault by the local 
employers' association on the convlIunist-led factory councils.8~ 
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Instead of supportin!:! their cOIIMllunist colleagues in the Df"IV, the 
SPD and USPD trade unionists seized every opportunity to attack. 
their policies and methods. This criticislll'was interprett!d by the 
workers as a tac it endorsement. of the emp layers' as sau I t on the 
communi st-l ed factory council s, which many regarded as thei r chosen 
representatives. In a number of factories in Remscheid, includiny 
. . 
the Mannesmann Rohrenwerke, Gottlieb Peiseler and F.W. Arnz, the 
management attempted to persuade the workers tQ work an hour over-
time to help finance the welfare system, as public money was bein!;! 
re-routed to support resistance in the Ruhr. The Mannesmann Arbei-
terrat refused the extra hour's work because the free trade unions 
had not agreed to this measure, and the responsibility for welfare, 
it argued, was the town ~oullcil's and the yovernlllt!/Il'S, not tile 
workers' whose earllinys had alreddy been reduced to a third of the 
peace-t ime rate. The lIIanayelllent of the IVlanneslllann Ruhrenwerke ac-
cused the Arbeiterrat of having overstepped its powers and applied 
. for the remova I of the cha i rlllan of the workers' counc i I • ~b I he 
rejection of the extra hour was enthusiastically supported by both ; 
organised and unorganiseo wO~kers, so that here again the KPU was 
able to capitalise on the situation,whilst the SPD found itself 
outmanoeuvred by both sides. 
By its repeated warni ngs of fasci st act ivity the KPD a I so provt!d 
itself alert to the dangers. facing the working class. In the atmos-
phere of intense nationalislll, which accompanied the French occupa-
tion of the town, it was the KPD which initiated the defence of 
working-class. districts. a~Jainst the attacks of. groups of young 
right-wing extremists, furious at the unwillingness of the workers' 
to assist their resistance against the invaders. The KPD called for 
the formation. of proletarian defence groups to patrol the streets 
of the town as the attacks by right-wing bands increased. Ihe de- , 
mand for action was taken up by the conlllittee of factory counci Is 
which passed the following resolution: 
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'Unter den 1 ugneri schen Sch 1 agworten "Notyelllei nscha tt" 
und "SchicksalsgelIleinschaft" versucht die besitzende 
Klasse die klaffenden Gegensatze zu ubertunchen, die 
zwischen ihr und der von ihr ausgebeuteten Arbeiter-
klasse bestehen. Sie will wiederum die wachsende tlll-
po rung eindallunen, die die Arbeiterschaft angesichts 
der illUller rucksichtsloser betriebenen Ausbeutuny er-
greift. Gleichzeitig versucht die Bourgeoisie, diese 
gegen sich gerichtete Emporung der Arbeiterschaft durch 
Entfachung nationalistischer Leidenschaften von sich 
abzulenken, um auf diese Weise ihre Herrschaft nochlllals 
zu sichern ••• ,87 
The resolution ended with a condemnation of the SPO, cflristian 
and "Hirsch-Dunkersche unions because of their alliance with the 
emp 1 oyers: 
'Die Remscheider Betriebsrate fordern deshalb die Arbeiter-
schaft auf, jede Gellleinscliaft IIllt den deutschen KdjJltdlisten 
we"lcher Art sie immer sein lIIogen, entschieden abzuletmen 
und alle deren Verschleierungsversuche lIIit der Ansaye 
scharfsten Klassenkalllpfes zu beantworten.' 
The 'AO~B Ortskartel1 under KPD-Ieadership voted unanimouslyHH 
to support the dellland for" arllled proletarian guardS to assist the 
pal ice against excesses by right-wing extremists. The local SPU 
leadership, however, found itself isolated once more, as it leant 
its support to the local police chief and SPD melllber Paul Frunge)'S 
outlawing of such proletarian groups, a decision whiCh was later 
sancti oned by the Prussian Mi ni ster of the Interi or, SPO member 
Severing. 
Throughout the year 1923 the KPD was able to consolidate its hold 
on the local DMV organisation as it conSistently challljJioned the 
workers' cause against the onslauyht from the employers, the police 
authorities, right-wing extremists and the French. Ihe SPI) chal-
1 enge co 11 apsed completely, as the resu It of the elect i orl of de I e-
gates to the"annual general meeting of the DMV in Kassel reveal. In 
Remscheid the KPD list received 2,999 votes or 94.~ % of the total 
votes, with the remainder falling to the SPD.89 Despite re-
peated et"forts by DMV headquarters to pri se the cOlllllluni st-I ed I oca I 
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committee out of its position, the local workers continued to su~­
port their elected representatives. The dispute finally led to a 
spl1t when the local DMV cwrullittee was expelled by h~ad4uarters for 
its refusal to submit. The majority (all but a small yroup of 
around 180) complied with the local cOlllmittee and forllled the UrvlV 
opposition with the following aims: 
1) the reunification of all metalworkers, 
2) the improvement of wages and working conditions, 
3) return to the eight-hour working day, • 
4) the destruction of capitalism, and 
0) the introduction of a cOllllllunist/socialist system of production 
under the dictatorship of th~ proletariat. 9U 
5. Working Class Resistance in the Crisis of l~lj. 
The des i re for a united ,workers' front was voiced throughout th~ 
years 1923 and 1924, as the counter-revo 1 ut i on I aunched another 
attack on the achievelllents of the wurk~rs' movement. 
The occupati on of the town by the French and the broad front ot 
bourgeois resistance incorporating the elllployers, the local autho-
rities including the police, shopkeepers and artisan organisations 
as well as christian and Hirsch-Dunkersche trade unions and the 
SPI). presented the ext r~lIIe ri ght wi n9 with an opportun ity to ope-
rate "~re openly than had been possible during the months followiny 
the murder of Rathenau in, the SUIIMIler of 19l1.Yl Ihe right-winy 
extremi sts now lined up I oca lly under such nallles as: l3und der 
schaffenden Stande •. Roelllryke Berge, Sctterenk 1 ub, and duri ng tne 
course of the year, Nationalsozialistische Arbeiterpartei Ueutsch-
lands (NSDAP). The groups were largely an outgrowth of the banned 
Deutsch-Volkischer Schutz- und lrutzbund and were also assisted by 
. the more radical elements of the nurnerica Ily strong Jungdeutscher 
Orden. There was 1lI0st probably a certain amount 'of overlap either 
overtly or covertly between the,militant right-wing groups and the 
Jungdo. 92 The militant groups engaged in anti-French resistance 
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and smuggling, as well as punishing all fraternisation with the 
enenw and attacking workers for their refusal to support the natio-
I 
na~ist campaign. Many members of the extremist groups were the sons 
of Remscheid manufacturers93 • and judying by thei r propa~anda, 
which appeared in the forlll of leaflets, posters and stickers,94 
it seems that one of their hiyhest priorities was to, settle ac-
counts with the Communists. This was most probably the motive be-
hind the fire which was deliberately started in one of the Volks-
sti~ne buildinys on the night of 12th March, although no prriof was 
found to link the incident with any particular group .• 9~ Ihe 
fire completely yutted the bui1din~ althouyh it was not the one 
containing the printiny works. The BV appeared the following day as 
usual with a cOllullentary su~yesting the cOlllplicity between the lUCid 
bouryeoi s press. certa in manufacturers who fi fldllceu such Jct ions. 
and right-wing etttremists who carried them out.% 
In February and March there were a number of attacks on workers in 
Remschei dYl and Lennep, and these prompted the ca 11 fur the 
formation of arllled Proletarian Hundreds to patrol the streets. Ihe 
ADGB local cartel accepted the leadership of the Proletarian Hun-
dreds and appealed to the police to grant them the status of auxi-
liaries. The AOGB announcement of the formation of the Proletarian 
Hundreds also accused the police of sympathising with the extre-
mists and turning a blind eye to their antics. The aillls of the Hun-
dreds were to protect workers and their institutions, like trade 
union buildings and offices, the. Volkshaus and the BV printing 
works, as well as their political and trade union rlleetings, from 
attacks by right-wing extremists, and to ensure publ ic safety both 
. on the 'streets and in factories. Furthermore they aimea at protect-
ing the Republic from attacks by reactionaries. Ihe Proletarian 
Hundreds were organi sed in groups of i ndi vi dua 1 s and factory wor-
kers and consisted of Social Democrats and unorganised wor~ers as 
well as COlllmunists. 9tl Despite continued attacks YY the Prus-
sian Minister of the Interior proclain~d a ban on the Proletarian 
Hundreds because they were interpreted as an instrument for the KPU 
to seize power. lOO 
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In the light of the evidence. Severing's reason for th~ ban on the 
Pro I etari an I Hundreds was not comp I ete Iy convi nci ng. Wlli 1st the 
' . 
KPU's avowed intention was to overthrow the Republic and replace it 
by a dictatorship of the proletariat. it was not yet in a position 
to dO so in the spring of InJ. 1n Remscheid, which was under 
french occupation, the Proletarian Hundreds were essentially de-
fence formations although it is likely that their continued exis-
. 
tence might have led to their transformation into assault troops 
'~ter in the year. The ban definitely facilitated the operations of 
the right-wing extremists although it by no means elllascul~ted' the 
workers' movement. 
In August. a clash between Iflelllbers of the right-winy extremist 
group Roelllryke I)erye dnd COlllllluni s ts at Kreckersweg near l.Jabri ny-
hausen 1 ed to the shoot i IIY of i.l Werlllel sk i rc tw 11 KPU lIIelllber. WJ Iter 
lUnJJ,Je. Many of the part i ci fJants on both sides were from Relllschei d. 
The right-wing group, disguised as hikers, had been observed reyu-
larly holding military manoeuvres in the area. On this occasion the 
Communists, reinforced by a contingent from Relllscheid, surrounded 
the right-wing group in cl barn. During the ensuing skirlllish which 
took. p J ace in darkness, LUlllpe was shot dead. tiy the t iltle the po I i Ct:: 
arrived, al I the weapons had been disposed of with the exception of 
a pistol found inside tt)e building. At the time the incident was 
never sat i sfactori /y clarified, and the cl ailils of the bourgeoi s 
press and certain policelllen that the COllullunists had shot LUlllpe 
themselves would appear to imply cOlllplicity between the pOlice'and 
the beleaguered right-willgers. lU1 
I he i nci dent provoked an, outcry ayai nst the ri yht-wi og extremi sts 
and the police, and lumpe's tun~ral drew thousands of llIourners frolll 
the surrounding area. Ihe funeral proceSSion, which brouyht local 
industry to a tewporary standsti 11, was turned into an illlpressive 
show of 'strength by the workers' movement wi tl1 support trom workers 
of all political persuasions. Ihe bourgeois press and the authori-
ties for their part demanded more rigol~ous control of COlluuunists by 
the police. During the course of the investiyation, 2l COllununists 
were charged with di s turb i n~ tl1e peace, and 15 recei ved tota I sen-
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tences of IbO months prison and 39 months penitentiary. Ihere were 
no charges tirought against the other side. 1Ul 
The controversy surrounding the incident stemmed from the tact that 
the Communists indisputably ambushed what the bourgeois press spu-
riously claimed was a group of hikers. The Communists for their 
part had repeatedly warned the police about this group's partici~a­
tion in military manoeuvres in the Oabringhausen area. Ihe police 
ignored these warnings and after the event denied any knowled~e of 
them. When police arrived to free the captiv~sJ they found no wea-
pons as these had obviously been disposed of under cover Of dark-
ness. One bourgeois newspaper~ the Lenneper Kreisblatt, on 3U/b/~4 
published a contradictory article clailllin~ that the unarllled youths 
of the Roemryke Berge were surrounded by COllllllunists and a shoot-out 
(Feuergefecht) took place, during which LUlllpe was shot dead by tile 
Communists! The police also arrived at this conclusion, possibly on 
accou,nt of fi ndi ny the members of the Roelflryke ~erge unarmed. I he 
CO/Iununists. for their part. insisted that Lumpe was hit in the 
chest by one of the first shots fired from the barn. Un the other 
hand, as the incident occurred in darkness. a stray bul let trom a 
cOlllnunist pistol might just be a feasible explanation althouyh the 
pas it i on of the body and the ho 1 e made by the proj ect i 1 e wou J et 
surely have shed light on the matter. Local workers were particu~ 
larly incensed by the apparent lack of sus~icion by the police of 
the Roelllryke Berge and their' allies. Ihe incident was clarified 
somewhat ten years J ater after the Nazi 'sei zure of power. when 
several newspaper articles corroborated KPO claims that the Roelll':' 
ryke ~erge had indeed been engaged in manoeuvres and had been 
arllled. 
The workers' movement also engaged in resistance against the Frencll 
occupat ion, but was carefu'l to difterent i ate between imperi a lists 
and 'Arbeiter im Watfenrock' .lU3 Ihe KJVO led by' Artur Becker 
, I 
was particularly active printing and distributing leaflets, news-
~heets and posting stickers. Emil Kortmann relates an incident when 
a young Communi st ,arri ved at the works' gate with d wad of I eat lets 
to be distributed inside. The way was barred by patrolling french 
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soldiers and GerJllan police. The leaflets were. however. smuy~led 
inside the ,factory in a soup container {Henkellllann).lU4 Ihis 
method was so successful. that it became standard iJractice and 
helped to reduce the number of arrests. Ihe KJVD also attempted to 
enl ighten French and Belgian soldiers as to the reasons behind 
thei r occupation of the Ruhr. Contact was made with a number of 
soldiers who agreed to smuggle leaflets and copies of the Junge 
Garde into the barracks. On another occasion a group of youny Com-
munists aided by French sympathisers entered the projection room of 
the French cinema and wrote slogans ayainst French and lierllli!n capi-
talists on the bottom of the reel so that when it was directed onto 
the screen it caused uproar amongst the audience. 
The subversion Wi.lS so successful that 1I1..1"y ~rcnctl soldiers ..Ictu..Illy 
refused to break up workers' delllonstrations and remove COllullunist 
posters. Some troops were even sent back to France for ui sobeyi ny 
orders. lOt> 
The assault by the counter-revolution also met with stern resis-
tance in local factories. The attemiJt to dismiss pertinacious and 
troublesollle factory cOUrlci I members was answered by sol idarity 
strikes which at least prevented theirterrnination of employment. 
if not their removal from office. Also. during a period of.extreme 
hardship for the workers. the majority refused to join the national 
defence movement and support the Ruhr Aid Proyraollne which was 
ostensibly to provide for the old and poor. A report in the I:3V from 
Remscheid's most signiticant plants reveals a determined stand by 
the workers who argued that they were being compelled to finance a 
programme opposed to thei r own i nteres ts wh i I st the elllp loyers were 
benefiting from government aid and inflation. lOb At the 
Glockenstahlwerl< Lindenberg the workers refused to partiCipate in 
both the overtime plan and the collection,altough several christfan 
and Hirsch-Dunker unionists contributed to the latter. At the 
Alexanderwerk only around /0 Christian and Hirsch-I)unker members 
agreed to overtime out of a tota I worktorce of over YOO. At the 
Mannesmann Motorenwerk, LuisenhUtte, Ernst-August-Werk in Hasten, 
Vereinigtel:3eckersche Werke, t-irma MLihlhoff and Albert Herlllanns the 
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workers refused to cooperate outright. In the BSI resistance to the 
plan was only partly successful owing to pressure from the manage-
,"ent and the christian/Hirsch-Dunker factory council which had been 
conmissarially charged with that office,following the ,suspension of 
frtihlich, Schulz and Pagel, and the resiynation of other men~ers in 
protest. Despite this fact, the majority of workers declined to 
work overtime and support the collection. At a work's Illeetiny of 
the Mannesmann Rbhrenwerke a' resolution was lJassed claiming that 
the whole question of occupation was a swindle as the real dispute 
was to see who would control french ore and Gennan coal, Stjnnes or 
Loucheur. The resolution predicted hardship for the workers due to 
the resultant devaluation of the lIIark. lU7 
lhe authoritarian attitude of local ellllJloyers dllO tilt.: pollce, dill! 
the vanishing purchasing JJower of the mark, which by the cnd of MdY 
stood at oU,UUU to the dollar, combined to provoke strike action by 
the workers. The strike initially broke out at ~riedrich August 
MUhlhoff and the Mannesmann Rbhrenwerke, and these were jOined the 
following day by the BSI.lUtl By the ltlth May these tactories 
had the support of over 40 others, including all the town's larye 
iron and steel factories. lUY Uwing' to the onset· ot hyper-
inflation, which severely reduced their earnings, the workers de-
manded a 10' % pay ri se back-dated to the loth» and fu II pay for tile 
days on strike" as. well as an inflation subsidy of ItlU thousand 
marks. 1 he workers presented a tota Ily united front trom Communi sts 
to Chri st i ans. At a. lIIass stri ke meet i n9 on the Jahn sportst le Id, 
the workers were addressed by August Benner and August Lipken, botll 
communi st factory counc i I melllbers frolll Mannesmann. I hey warned 
against individual negotiations, encouraged solidarity and adv~sed 
their fellow workers to avoid alcohol at all costs. Ihe employers 
had al ready increased their after trom l~ :t to 21 III % and owing 
to the,wide range of support the workers were confident of success. 
Report i ny of the stri ke in the RGA provoked an angry response trom 
the workers, and norllla Ily reserved' Hi rsch-Dunker representat i ve 
Schnitz I er advi sed subscri bers to cance I thei r orders for thi s 
paper forthwith. Ihe BV seconded the attack on its arch r1val with 
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the caustic remark: 
'Oer RGA ist der geschworene Feind der Arbeiterklasse 
und wird sein Gift stets gegen sie v~rspritzen. lr leDt 
" eben davon und kann es leider tun intolge des lnditteren-
tismus weiter Schichten der Arbeiterschaft.,IIU 
Un the same day the arbitration cOllulIittee under the chairmanship 
of SPD member Schobe 1 set the hour Iy rate for group In at l.4UU 
marks from the loth to 30th May and at 3.UOO thereafter.lhe dollar 
stood at b7,OOO marks. With this ruling local employers claimed to 
be paying the highest wages in the Ruhr. lU A meeting ?f tac-
tory councils rejected the ruling but agreed to consult their Ill~m­
bers. Dr. Legers. the legal advisor of the employers' association, 
at thi s stage r~buked the UI"IV headquarters tor not que I I i fig the KPU 
opposition within the trade union in Remscheid. it is likely that 
faced with stubborn and united opposition, Legers,was searching for 
a moderate ally to help him deteat the strike lIIovement~ In order to 
compe I the OMV to take act i on he ma i nta i ned "that all trade uni on 
policy in I{emscheid was decided by the Bergische Volksstinlll~ illld 
not by Stuttgart. lll Ihe subsequ~nt vote in the factories re-
vealed an overwhelming majority in tavour of continuation. 11j 
Of 11.799 votes pal led~ 10,5/1 rejected the arbitration conmittee's 
recollunendations. "(he employer's intransigence114 failed to 
imjJress the workers, who were by now receiving financial sUPIJort 
"from fellow workers in other factori es and towns in lieu of st ri ke 
pay which had been retused by UMV headquarters.l1~ ~urther­
more, the first contribution of flour tram the Soviet Union - which 
had been sent to Remschei d workers as a gift of so I i darity - had 
just arrived in the town. llb ~inally, on 7th June the elllploy-
ers gave way and ~greed to pay an hourly rate of 3,YUU lI~rks (Class 
61) and an immediate inflation subsidy of lOU.UUU marks. 1l7 
The gains made by the successful conclusion at the strike were soon 
swallowed by rampant int"lation. On the 1st August th!:! dollar was 
worth 1.1 million marks and the price of a three and a half pound 
loat at bread was Ib.OOO marks whilst a litre ot.milk delivered to 
the house cost 17,OUU, marks. 11H lhe continuing downward 
plunge of the mark can be seen from table Y. 
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By the beginning of August Remscheid's workers were demandin!:l a 
further incr;ease to keep pace with inflation. Ihe tactics of the 
ernp,loyers was to prolong negotiations, on the one hand in order to 
maximise their profits and on the other to constrict their adversa-
ri es. !)ome J oca 1 elllp I oyers also began to provoke the workers by 
purposely paying too 1 Ht le. On the 7th Septelllber, workers at the 
BSI were handed pay packets by Dr. Steinberg containing sums with 
as little as half a million marks. Ihe same occurred at the 
Glockenstahlwerk, and when the workers complained, both Steinbery 
and Eilender called in the Schupo.llY Despite warnings by 
assistants, Steinbery insisted on handing over the grossly inade-
quate pay packets. Ihe conflict was tinally resolved when other 
senior directors at tile cUIIIIJany instructed hilll to PJy out the tull 
entitlement - between ten and twenty lIIillion lIIarks. A tew d.:tys 
later, Dr. Scheid at the Alexanderwerk retused to pay the workers 
demandi ny thei r wages for that day (I uesaay) and to I d thelll tlley 
would be paid on the Friday. By now prices were bein!:l increased 
twice daily so that the workers were particularly hard pressed to 
feed their t-amlies and meet other obligations. When part of the 
worktorce demonstrated in front of the offices, the director cal led 
a detachment of Schupos to disperse them.l~U I he director 
-, gave the workers an ultimatulll to return to work iuuuediately or else 
they wou I d be locked out. The SPU counei I under chairman Hermann 
Mei swi nkt! I tri ed to i nter:-pose with an appea I to camp Iy wi th tile 
ultimatum to avoid a lock-out. After an angry exchange, the majori-
ty of workers walked out. 
Similar disputes arose at Klingelnberg Sbhne and Kotthaus & Uusch 
over pay. If! the latter case, Kotthaus junior informed the workers 
that he was complying with instructions from the local employers' 
association and that he was. not prepared to work out the rapidly 
changing exchange rates and wage tables all day long. He ended the 
negotiations with the cOllment that _ it was time the workers lIIade 
sacrifices for once. lll 
fhe sacrifices already made by the workers and their tamilies, al-
beit involuntarily, were considerable. Ihe deterioratiny state ot 
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health of'large sections of the local population bears testimony to 
this fact. 1 A report published in May lY~Jlll linked the 
worsening state of health to the political and economic situation. 
The generally poor state of health was becoming noticeable by the 
pale and shabby appearance of passenyers on trams and buses. In-
creaSing numbers of townsfolk looked thin, weary and hungry. A dif-
ferent survey held around this time ascertained that 3l '.t of Hem-
schei d chi I dren were undernouri shed.l~J It was a I so di s-
covered that the development of children's lungs wastrequently re-
tarded and in many cases did not correspond to the individual's 
age. There were a I so many cases of ske I eta I structura I weakness 
particularly in the spinal column due to undernourishment.l~4 
,Tuberculosis was still regarded locally as the most dangerous dl-
sease, particularly because of the danger of contagion in crdlllped 
living quarters. Despite the perceptible progress already made in 
Relllscheid . in the tiyht to control this ~poor man's diseas~l~~, 
it still accounted for around IOU deaths per year. 
Ihe accuracy of the Itl mortality rate was however questioned by the 
author of the health reJJort of lY23 hilllself. He'postulated a higher 
death rate due to the fact that only .the in~ediate cause of death, 
for instance heart attack, was reflected in the monthly demographic 
tables and not the frequently real cause, nalllely Ill. An annual rt:!-
port made by the local health authority put the number ot patients 
treated for tuberculosis in Remscheid in lYl3 at,l,J02, about l/b!:l 
of the total population. Out of these, ~32 were children under 14 
years. The report painted out that Y30 of these patients did not 
have a bed at their own and were forced to share with at least one 
other family member. 12b The health report of- InJ also noted 
an alarming rise in the incidence of rickets. Ihe Vaterlandischer 
Frauenverein - aware of this problem - opened a treatment clinic in 
lY22 which catered for 25 patients. 121 
A, further,reflection of the grave political and economic situation 
was the fal ling birth-rate. 12B 'The lY2J; health report, using 
differert figures to those shown in table IJ, ,observed that intant 
mortality stood at Y.!:l % in Relllscheid l12!:l babies). Ihere was also 
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an a I armi ng number of premature bi rths wh i ch poi nted to a corres-
ponding numtier ot attempted abortions. A further report written two 
months later mentioned a disturbing upswing in the number 
tions amongst 16 and 11 year-old girls. 1lY Venereal 
were apparent lyon the increase in Remschei din 
which would indicate an increase in prostitution. 1Jl 
ot abor-
diseases 
l~~J iJU , 
I hi s was 
doubtlessly resorted to by some young women trying to escape trolll 
poverty. The French occupation obviously ensured an enthusiastic 
, 
clientele, which could pay either with· inflation-proof foreign 
currency or provisions which could be sold profitably on t~~ black 
market. The health report also pointed to the spread at parasitic 
skin diseases which were attributed to the increase in. the price ot 
soap and poor bathin~ faci lities Ul in proletarian hOIJles. 
Misery and suffering were, ot course, nothiny new in jJroletar1an 
districts, but during the course ot lnJ a large section at the 
traditional middle class was becoliliny acquainted with poverty, as 
inflation voraciously consumed penSions and savings. In many ways 
.this section ot the population was less able to cope with the S1-
tuat i on than were the workers. Whereas many work i ng-c I ass t allli lies 
were constantly aware at the diminutive margin separating their; 
usual state from complete destitution, and the perpetual struggle 
against poverty had traditionally encouraged forms at collt!ctive 
action and strengthened working-class solidarity, the older mldale 
class, with its conservative valu~s acquired in - by cOlllparison _ 
an econollll ca Ily less vo I at i I e era, was sudden Iy engu I fed by the 
etfects of the collapse of the German mark. Ihe traditional middle 
class ethically orientated towards individualism and a well-guarded 
private sphere, had no social device tor cushioning the blows, so 
that many were left isolated and bewi Idered. According tu the re-
port some of' the worst cases of hardship were revealed in tamilies 
too ashamed openly to admit their poverty.lJJ Many old people 
who had hitherto never known want, tried to hide their need by 
staying at home in unheated rooms, badly nourished and alone. ~or 
some people the obloquy of applying to the weltare was unbearable 
and they chose to commit suicide or succumb to disease d\:lyravated 
by hunger andcold. 134 
., 
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It was of'course in homes striken by illness or where a widow was 
left with s'everal chi Idren to care for, wht!re the worst hardshijJ 
occurrt!d. The filt! of the Deutsche· Notgelllt!inschaft13!) testi-
fies to tht! widespread misery in Rernscheid during lY23. 
The building sector also reflectd the hardship and the sacrifices 
made by the workers. As already stated, the shortage of suitable 
accomlllodat i on was a perlllanent feature in ReHlschei d ttlrouyhout the 
whole of the period covered by this study. After the war the local 
authorities. together with the Gemeinniitziye Aktiengesellschaft, 
embarked on a building progranulle which aimed above all to' provide 
small flats wnich workers could afford to rent. There were several 
different sites, amongst these: Iionsbery, Neuenhaus, UUjJpel- and 
fichtenstraBe. Uwing to the growing expense of bui Idillg IIIdterials, 
the authorities be\;jilll to experiment with clay ~ialls but this jJrac-
t ice had to be abandoned bt!cause of the unsuitabil ity of c I ay in 
such an inclement cl illlate. 136 Whi 1st the illunedidte post-war 
years witnessed a proliferation of self-help settlelnent groups wor-
king according to the ideas of Adolf Oamaschke, creatiny whole 
estates like the one dt ~bkerhbhe,1~7 the privatt! building 
sector remained almost non-existent with only 16 houst!s and 32 
flats befor~ 1922. SOllle of the larger companies, like the BSI, also 
erected houses for their workers but these were few in nun~er. Ihe 
1923 health report, however, t!stablished that. the accolJlmodation 
proble~ ~as still catastropnic,138 despite the erection of 
226 new flats in that year. Ihe report claimed that Relllscheid was 
Short of roughly three and a half thousand flats and that on 1/1/22 
5,098 citizens of the to~m were looking tor accollllllodation. Ouring 
the course of 1922 hea Hh inspectors had noted that 344 occupi ecJ 
flats were in near dilapidated state, 745 flats wt!re too small for 
the families occupying them, 121. flats were damp. while IH3 cases 
of inadequate sleepiny arrangements, due to a lack of space, were 
regarded as a moral hazard. The report added that owi n9 to the 
economic situation the health inspectors had found it necessary to 
relax their standards in order to prevent undue alarm. Ihe 
lodgings' situation for SchlafYdnger was thou!:)ht to be extremely 
grave. 
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Resistance in the factories did not, however, merely consist of 
strike, action) although this was the ultimate weajJon. During the 
October crisis the KPO and IW called for the setting up of factory 
news sheets to en~ighten unorganised workers and discuss industrial 
problems. In quick succession newssheets appeared in the Mannes-
mann Rohrenwerke. the BSI and the Glockeflstahlwerke. 139 
With ,the collapse of passive resistance towards the end of Se pt ell 1-
ber and inflation advancing at a rate hitherto unknown in the 
world, the industrialists now began to demand the introduction of 
the ten-hour working day to help meet the reparations bill. The 
abolition of the eight-hour day, one of the last amllllost jJrizeJ 
gains of the rt!volution, which coincided with the oVt!rtllrow of Llle 
~egal SPD/KPU Ldnd-~overrull~nt in Saxony dnd Ihurin~id, Si~l\dllt.!J 
the triulIljJh of tht! counter-revolution in Germdny. in /{t!llIsclll:!id llle 
board of factory counei Is appealed to' the workers to defend tilt.! 
eight-hour day. This was dnswered by the following resolutioll 
passed by the, workforce ,of the Mannesmann Motorenwerke: 
'Die alii 8. Okt. im Volkshaus tagende Betriebsvollver-
sdmllll ung der ~lallneSllldnn Motorenwerke erhebt schdrfsten 
Einspruch gegen das immer mehr auf eine Provokation hin-
zielende Unternehmertulll und gegen die versuchte Beseitiguny 
des Achtstundentages. Zur Verteidiyung wird die Arbeiter-
schaft alle Kampfmittel anwenden. Um die uns noeh geblie-
benenRechte genugend zu schutzen, ist der ~ellleinsame 
Kdmpf dller Arbeiter notwendig. Wir verlangen deshalb von 
den Gewerkschaften und den proletarischen Parteien, sofort 
zusallUllenzutreten' zwecks Bi Idung eines Aktionsausschus-
sese ·140 , 
A few days later cl works lIIeeting at the BSI passed a resolution 
which condemned the attempt by the employers and authorities to 
make the workers bear the costs o'f passive resistance in the /{uhr. 
The workers of the BS I were aware of the connect i on between the 
question of the eight-hour day and the balance of power,and were 
prepared to fi ght for thei r ri yhts. They demanded an end to the 
state of,emergency and the formation of workers'lIlilitia to !Jr~vent 
separatist-secessionists. Ihe resolution called on all workers to 
join the united front against the capitalist offensive. 141 
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It was ag~inst this background that open class conflict brok~ out 
for the second time within four years in Ren~cheid. It occurred as 
the result of the frequent resort to violent suppression on the 
part of the police. By 1923 there was clearly a feeling of deep-
seated rancour towards the 1 oca 1 workers' movement amongst 1 arye 
sections of the police force. This was further intensified, during 
the course of the French occupat ion, when the po lice found theHI-
selves playing a subordinate role and were thernselves subjected to 
harassment from the one side142 and constant abuse from the 
other. The i nabi 1 ity to stri ke at the invader generated all' accumu-
lation of aggression which was released in the direction of what 
the bourgeoisie regarded as a treacherous working-class mOVl:!lIlent. 
It is also evident that a bond was forged during the course ot the 
year between some members of the 'I oca 1 po lice torce and ri ght-wi n~ 
extremists, engaged in resistance activity against the 
French. 143 
In accordance with the state of ernergency the police now bannl:!d al I 
large gatherings, and the BV offices were searched on several occa-
sions. A meeting of unemployed for which nobody accepted responsi-
bility was dispersed by a police charge. On the Markt a gatherin~ 
of people was attacked ~y police using truncheons and sabres. In 
this latter incident a worker, Wilhelm Emlllerich, was hit by a sabr~ 
blow and died later in hospital. During this period the local 
police used particularly harsh measures. Their lack of self-control 
and their readiness to make use of their weapons was hitherto un-
precedented in Remscheid. 144 On the 24th Novelllber durin~ a 
workers' demonstration at the BSI, director Steinberg cal led in a 
troop of po lice who opened fi re k i 11 i ng a number of wor-
kers. 145 The mood of the workers was by now extrellle ly be 11 i-
gerent. The situation was particularly tense. The police most pro-
bab ly ant i ci pated an armed upri s i n9 as in Hamburg, but there is no i 
concrete evidence of the existence of such plans in Relllscheid. the ; 
lo~al SPD leadership rejected the KPU's, appeal for a united front 
with the aim of establishiny a workers' governmeut. 146 As 
factories had been working at reduced capacity and there had been a 
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large nun~er of redundancies there was a great deal of hunger and 
misery in evidence everywhere in the town. Dr. Legers of the em-
pl oyers' assoc; at; on refused to re-employ those who were redundant 
because local firms were allegedly experiencing difficulty selling 
their products. The employers took the opportunity to implement a 
policy of rationalisation by investment in modern machinery. On the 
4th December 1 oca 1 food shops were broken ; nto and plundered by 
hungry workers who were now receiving no unemployment benefit owing 
to the call apse of welfare. The management of the Mannesmann Rbh-
renwerke, who had completely crosed the factory making all their 
workers redundant. now sent a ci rcu 1 ar to all thei r marri ed workers 
with the exception of those over bU: 
'Wir sind in der Lage, unseren 8etrieb in beschranktelll 
MaJ3e versuchswei se mi t der Vorkri egsabeitszeit und Vor-
kriegsarbeitsweise wiederaufzunehmen. Falls Sie bei uns 
wieder eingestellt werden wollen, konnen Sie sich mit 
Ihren Papieren bei Ihrem Herrn BetriebsfUhrer bis Freitay, 
d. 14/12/23 abends 6 Uhr melden, wo Sie alles Weitere 
erfahren werden~'141 . 
At this point Remscheid workers demanded strike action despite 
the approach of Chri stlllas. The spn had been puni shed recent Jy for 
its equivocal handling of the situation. At the council elections 
in the Alexanderwerk, the only spn bastion in Remscheid, the srn 
trade unions were o~sted in favour of Conmwnists, so that the new 
council now had seven KPD members, three christian and Hirsch-Dun-
.. 
kersche (It~e.r"\&l"ion.s ) 'and only two SPD llIelllbers. 148 lhis 
setback for the SPD was repeated at the election of DMV representa-
t ives in Laspert where the complete KPD 1 i st was chosen .14Y 
This loss of confidence amongst their already negligible reservoir 
of supporters probably compelled the local SPU leadership to sup-
port the strike, although some of their comments and actions would 
. sUYges~ res i gnat i on and a lack of cornmi tment. 
On 9/1/24, following the workers' rejection of d wage reduction and 
the introduction of the ten-hour working day, the manayement of the 
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BSI dislnissed the whole workforce and locked the gates. Ihis action 
was emulate<:1 by other local em~loyers.l~O There. now developed 
a general strike, as transport workers joined their col leagues from 
the factories. The employers' use of strike breakers, a tried and 
. tested method in Remscheid, poisoned the atmosphere further. On the 
13th J~nuary a young policeman was shot dead. lb1 This dCt 
provoked immediate retaliation by the police, who now appeared 
ready to punish any resistance by the use of weapons. On thel7th 
January an illegal meeting on the s~ortsfield in Hqnsberg, which 
was attended by several hundred unemployed and strikers, was broken 
up by a large detachment of police. The police officers arllled with 
rifles escorted the strikers along the narrow street (Honsberger 
Stral3e) towards the town centre. When one of the workers tried to 
enter hi s home he was pursued by po lice, dragged' out ot the house 
and beaten up, as WdS a young visitor of the family. This act was 
accompani ed by boos' and wh i st 1 es, and other sk i rllli shes broke out. 
At this point a policeman fired into d group of workers, hitting cl 
. young man in "the leg. 152 
Violence flared yet again when early one "wrniny a strong group of 
policemen, alnwst certainly acting on a tip-off, raided the 
working-class estate of Neuenhaus. l53 Orl this occasion, too, 
the police made ample use of the"ir truncheons even beating women 
who offered resistance. The police discovered it sJllall drillS cache in 
one of the" houses. It was later understood that the arms, which 
originated from the Kapp-Putsch, had been hidden by bricklayers 
working on the house. 1b4 The BV reproached the workers of 
Neuenhaus for 1 eavi ng the resistance to the women, who the' paper 
reported as ask i ng: • Si nd unsere Manner Nenunen, daB" si e si ch so 
etwas gefallen lassen?' 
With the strike front already beginning to crumble in Ousseldorf 
and other towns and DMV, headquarters ready to di sconti nue thei r 
support for the strike in the Ruhr, a group of Rell~cheid anarcho-
syndicalists hurled a bomb through the window of fvIannesmann Rbhren-
werk director Albert's house. Although the house was considerably 
damaged, none of the occupants were injured.l~b The incident 
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" may well have been a final desperate act to revital ise the sayging 
strike fron~ as some workers were already drifting back to the 
RHhrenwerke. The strike ended in defeat for the workers, and the 
employers introduced the ten-hour day in Remscheid as in the whole 
of the Ruhr. 
The year 1923 represented a resound i ny defeat for the wo r.l<ers • 
movement although this fact was not immediately grasped. 'Despite 
the existence of concrete plans to seize power in the Reich, the 
KPD leadership, under Brandler, failed to act decisively, judying 
the moment to be unpropitious. 156 In Remscheid the~PU had 
managed over the preceding three years to occujJY all the illlportant 
positions within the local workers' IIloVellltmt and it had succeeded 
in organiSing a f\lctory-bdsed workers' lIIilitia IIldinly under its Uwll 
leadership.l57 However, it is not known whether JrlY concerted 
plans existed duriny In3 to seize power in Relllscheid by force of 
arms. The aim of the KPD also in Relllscheid. was to conclude the 
revolution by seizing power and establishing a workers' dictator-
ship. Uespite its near monopoly of power within the local workers' 
movement the KPD, however, was not dbl e to lIIobil i se I drye yroups of 
factory workers who remained under the influence of Christian and 
yellow trade unions or were unorganised. The SPD trade unionists, 
as we have already seen, shrank to an insiynificant group of less 
than 200. Considering the failure to reach and activate a large 
section of workers and the absence of adequate quantities ot 
arms158 , together with the prest:!nce of a strony cant i ngent of 
po 1 ice housed in the new barracks in Rernschei d, and the ~ rench 
occupation, an armed cOllullunist-led uprising like the one in Hamburg 
was extremely unlikeJydespite obvious sympathy for this policy 
amongst local KPD members. 
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6. The Increasing Radicalisation of the I<emscheid Working Class as 
Reflected in the Elections 1920 to 1924. 
The development of the KPD from a small fringe party to the strong-
est political organisation in Remscheid can be seen most lucidly by 
a brief study of the election results during this period. After-
wards. a more accurate reflection of electoral behaviour is re-
vealed by the correlation of, Reichstag election results and a de-
tailed study of the social structure of,the town's 40 voting wards 
after, 1920. 159 
The Reichstag election on 6th June 1920160 took place in the 
wake of the Kapp-Putsch and the occupat i on of the I<utlr by the 
Reichswehr and Freikorps troops followill!:) the 13ielt!fcld treaty. lilt:! 
situation in Remscheid, as,we have already seen, was extrelllcly vo-
latile. The emeqLing polarisation of I<elllscheid society is reflecteu 
in the election results. The turn-out for this election was 93 I~ 
{Reich"average /9.4 %).1 61 This tiJlle voting was in :JO wards 
of which the USPD won 23, gaining a total of 17,O~9 votes = 40.1 %. 
, The OVP's defection from the forlller alliance with the ONVP and its 
more tolerant attitude to the Republic, and locally its leading 
role in the alliance ayainst the Socialist parties, attracted an 
avalanche of votes away frolll the putatively cOlllprolllising 
OOp162. so that it now, usurped the role of leadiny bouryeois 
party with 10,501 votes = ~4.7 %, winning the relllaining Seven 
wards. Despite thi s I urch to the ri ght by so OIany of, its former 
supporters. the ODP held up quite well with b,bl1 votes = 13 %. lhe 
ZentrulII received 2,740 votes = 6.4 %, the KPD l,:nO votes = b.4 %, 
the DNVP 2,286 = 5.4' % and the SPD 1,997 = 4.7 %. The Polen party 
gained a mere 124 votes (O,J %). 
Again the USPO's best results were in the predominantly working-, 
class districts of Honsberg.Laspert. Krelnenholl. StrUCk, Blieding-
hausen (location of the Mannesmann works), Pdpenbery/RosenhUyel and 
Neuenhof/WUstenhagen. In ward 13, Honsberg I. the USPU gained b2.b% 
= 7bl votes. In the other Honsberg ward, 14, the USPU won 61.4% or 
799 votes. In ward 25. Laspert 11, the USPU's share was OY.~' % 
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or 711. In Kremenholl/Kippdorf, ward 16, it had ':l7 % or 741 votes. 
The Indepen4ent Socialists received ':lb.~ % or 848 votes in ward 0, 
Intzestraf)e/Struck; 50.3 % or 6b4 votes in Papenberg/Rosenhi.igel and 
50 % (bOO votes) in Neuenhof/WUstenhagen. 
Compared with the election to the National Assembly the Radical 
Socialist vote was boosted this time by the participation of the 
KPD which achieved its best result in ward 5, Intzestrar~e/Struck, 
14.2 % = 213 votes. The KPD also attracted higher than averaye 
votes in wards: 13 Honsberg I, 9.1 % (lU!:!). lo, Krelllenholl, 7.0 % 
(99); 24, Laspert I, 7.9 % (103). 2':l, Laspert lIt J.Y % (.YO). and 
11, Osterbusch, 7.8 % (110). The SPD challenge co11Jpsed dralllati-
cal1y in this election and this party slithered to seventll pOSition 
in Remscheid. It is noticedble that the SPo, lost ~round ill ttlL' 
working-class districts in particular, and this fact can only re-
flect strong dissatisfaction with that party's policies amongst 
local workers. This time the SPD achieved its best result in ward 
21, HindenburgstraBe, 1O.':l % (108), which was a respectable area 
populated by civil servants, profeSSional people like doctors, 
teachers, chemi sts and architects and I ower-mi ddl e c I ass wh He-
co 11 ar workers, cl erks, shop-assistants, shopkeepers and i ndepen-
dent artisans (Handwerker). The SPD's next best result was ayain in 
ward 19, GUldenwerth/Rei nshagen, but thi s t illle the share of the 
vote had fallen from 26 % to only 8.':l % (128 votes). The same was 
true of ward 3, Fichtenhbhe, where the SPD share fell from 19 % to 
a mere I % (105 votes). In ward 23, Elberfelder Stra~e/waldstra~e, 
it ·attracted only 6.1 % (99 votes) compared with 17 % in 1YlY. In 
the working-class districts the SPD scored badly. Three exalllp1es 
suffice to illustrate the workers' rejection of the SPU's policies. 
In ward 5, Intzestraf)e/Struck, the SPD managed only 2.2 % (34 
votes), in ward 13, Honsberg I, 3.3 % (40 votes) and in ward 2':l, 
Laspert 11, 3.5 % (42 votes). 
The DVP's usurpation of the leadership role of the bouryeoisie frolll 
the DDP can be clearly seen by the fact that the forlller overhauled 
the latter in 29 out of 30 wards, failing only in Hastenlll, ward 
30. Furthermore, fi ve of the wards won by the OOP in 1919 were 
0" 
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taken by the DVP. these were: wardS 1U. Blumenstrafje/Pdlmstralj~i 
12, Alleestra!3e/town' centre; 1~. Bruderstra!3e/Schi.itt~lldelle; ~U. 
Pollzeiprasidium/LindenstraBe; and 21. HindenburgstraBe whicl) was a 
rearranged voting ward corresponding to ward 21. Scheiderstral,)e/ 
SchUtzenstra!3e in 1Yl9. lhe remain'ing two wards won by the DVP this 
time were wards 1. Markt/town centre; and 23. Elberfelder StraBe/ 
WaldstraBe. The DVP's best results were aChieved in wards: 12. 
AlleestraBe/town centre. 4~.1 % (584 votes); 21. HindenburgstraBe. 
36.8 % (590 votes); and 23, Elberfelder StraBe/Waldstra!3e, 33.9 % 
(b43 votes). The corresponding figures for the USPO's performance 
in these wards will serve as a yui~e: ward 12. 21.6 % (303); ward 
21, 18 % (288) and ward 23; 25.b % (411). 
The OUP's best r~sult WJsill ward jUt tiJsLen Ill. where it jJushcu 
the OVP into third jJlace (ward jU ,was wun uy the USPU). 111 this 
ward the ODP gained 25.5 % (383 votes). lhe Delllucratic Party also 
did quite well in wards 28. Stockderstrabe/Hasten I, 2U.8 % (313); 
21, Hindenburgstra!3e. 20.~ % (328) and 20. Polizeiprasidium/Linaen-
stra!3e, 18.5 % (296). 
The results in R~lIIscheid reflect lIIutatis mutandis the tr~nd in the 
country as a whole, with the exception that here the DNVP did not 
achieve the succesS which it had in the Reich.lhe vote in Rem-
scheid may also be seell as a rejection of the Weimar Republic, as 
indeed was the election result in the Reich. In Remscheid, however, 
the rejection was of the parliamentary and in favour of the council 
system propagated by the USPO and KPU: 
'Die Reichstagswahl van 1920 steht SOlllit am !:Seginn der 
permanenten Krise des Weilllarer Staates, in dem van nun an 
das normale Wechselspiel zwischen einer arbeitsfahigen 
Regierung und einer konstruktiven OjJposition nicht n~hr 
zustande krnrunen konnte, weil die grbBte staatstragende 
Partei sich versayte und zudem die Starke der au6ersten 
Linken. dann aber auch vor allem die wachsende radikale 
Rechte ... jede positive Majoritatsbildung unmoylich lIIach-
ten. 16J . . 
In Lennep the USPD (2,115 votes) and the KPD (344 votes) together 
polled 2,459 votes. which was a significant increase over the 
USPD's share in 1919 (1,84b votes). 
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The oth~r' parties scored: 
OVP l,b91 votes 
Zentrum 1,060' votes (191Y = 1,120) 
OOP 994 votes (1919 = 1,8(0) 
DNVP 8Y4 votes 
SPO 300 votes (1919 = 1,241) 
Polenpartei 76 votes. 
The Reichstag election of 4/b/24, which took place in the wake ot 
the Cuno government's self-induced'inflation, the collapse.of pas-
sive resistance against the French and the deft:!at of the radical 
working-class movement by the combined forces of the counter-revo-
lution, the introduction of the nine- and ten-hour workin~ ddy, ,md 
in Remscheid the qUdrrel between lhe locdl UMV brdJlch dJld IU;!i.ldlju.Jr-
terse A completely rearranged electoral structure, consist1n~ of 4U 
wards of approximately 1,000 voters each, was in ojJt!ration. Whilst 
in most wards the core relllained after 1920, they nevertheless Cdn-
not be regarded as identical with the voting wards for the elec-
tions in 1919 ami 1920. Henceforth, the inforUlatioll re9drdill~ so-
cial composition presented in appendix 1applies164 up to and 
including March 1933. In the May election of 1924,1b parties and 
interest groups put up candidates in Relllscheid. This time the turn-
out'was 10 % less than in 1920, standing nevertheless 
spectab 1 e B3.1 %.16!> The Rei ch 'avera~e was 
The overall result for Remscheid was as follows: 
at a very re-
77.4 %.106. 
KPO 
SPD 
OOP 
ONVP 
Hau!3er Bund 
Freiwirtschaftspartei 
Christlich-soziale 
13,209 
2,980 
3,730 
4,740 
!>3 
63 
Volksge"~inschaft 100 
OVP 11,237 
Polenpartei 61 
Volkisch-sozialer Block 626 
USPO 2/3 
Zentrum 2,Bb1 
Republikanische Partei 36 
Rheinische Wirtschaftspartei 
des Mittelstandes ,669 
Nationale Freiheitspartei 23 
votes = 32.4 % 
votes = 7.3 % {l920:,1,99/= 4,/%) 
votes = 9.2 % (1920: 5,b21= 13 %) 
votes = ll.7 % (1920: 2,286= 0,4%) 
votes = 0.1 % 
votes = 0.1 % 
votes = 0.2 % 
votes = 21.B % (192U: 10,b01=24.1%) 
votes = 0.1 % . 
votes = I.!> % 
votes = 0.8 % 
votes = 7.0 % (192U: 2,740= 0.4 ~) 
votes:: 0.1 %' 
votes = 1.6 % 
votes:: 0.1 %. 
- 170 -
The first, point to notice from the election results is that the 
KPD. owing ~o the unifica~ion with'the majority of the USPU, is now 
the sole representa t i ve of the rad i ca 1 workers' movelllent in kt!lIl-
scheid. The remainder of the USPO now has more in common with the 
SPO although. for the time being, it continues to exist indepen-
dently. albe~t as a completely insignificant group. 
A glance at the above table also reveals the loss of around five 
and a half thousand votes for the radical left which would corres-
pond roughly with the reduced turn-out of 10 % (disrt!garding the 
new voters) = 4.990 plus the extra l,UOU votes picked UIJ. by the 
SPO. ThIs would possibly indicate a certain loss of sympathy by 
some workers with the radical left lKPO). lhe reason for this IlIdY 
havt! been the dispute in the DMV. Nevertheless, the KIlU won ~j of 
the 40 wards in Relllscheid. the relllilinin~ 17 illl fall in!.) to tile UW. 
The KPO's popularity is onCe again reflected in the rt!sults 
achieved in the working-class districts, although only in two wards 
did this party attain percentages considerably above ave-
rage. 167 In ward 19, Honsbery Ill. the KPD polled tl07 =b3.4%, 
. and in ward I, lutzestr,1/)e/Struck, tl4!;1 votes = 58.2 %. Ihe party's 
success in other wards was more modest: in 18, Honsbery lI, 41!> = 
52.5 %t 5. Neuenhaus, 403 = 4/.9 %; Honsberg I, 437 = 47.5 %i 14, 
Oste·rbusch. 457 = 46.1 It 6, Neuenhof, tlO!) = 45.9 Xi 34, Struck, 
475 = 43,2 %; and 32, Laspert I, 4~U = 42.4 I. Although the SPD was 
undoubtedly able to illlprove its position slightly in these areas, 
only in one of these ~ards did it aChieve 9 % (ward 17, Honsbery 1, 
HY votes = 9 X). Its best results were achieved in wards: 33, 
Laspert II. 143 votes = 13 li ,~tl, Hindenburgstrar.~e, 128 votes = 
10.6 %t 3!>. Heidhof, 100 votes = Y.I li 23, SchUttendelle. 9ti votes 
= 9.8 %; and 3H, Hasten II/Stockderstral3e, 102 votes = 9.3 I. A 
91 ance at appendix 1 reveals that of these wards only Laspert Il 
. I 
and SChuttendelle can be described as working-class districts. and 
even th~se rated as better working-class areas than, say laspert 1 
or Honsbery. containing a higher middle-class element. The party's 
modest success in Hindenburystral3e and Heidhof would suggest eitht:!r 
the spots appeal to lower-middle class white-collar workers/clerks 
and junior Bearute or else to soule workers dwell ing in this mi 1 ieu. 
, ... 
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The DVP was again the champion of the middle classes and the local 
establishment, even picking up a few extra votes from disaffected 
former OOP voters whose switch reflected quite lucidly the general 
swi ng by the bourgeoi si e to the ri ght. It must be remembered that 
particularly lower-middle class pensioners and slllall savers had 
suffered badly duri ng the previ ous years and were apt to b I allle 
their misfortune on the consequences of the Versaille Peace lreaty 
and the Weimar Republic which they identified with sublllisssion to 
the arch-enelT\Y france which, incidentally, was still in occupation 
locally. By their upbringing, cultural milieu, education "and in-
cli~ation these people were generally out of reach of Marxist ar-
.guments; and their contact with the proletariat was usually tran-
sient, perfunctory and superficial. Their move to the right was a 
continuation of the process of polarisation which could be observed 
during the war and particularly following the Kapp-Putsch. 
The OVP's best perforrlldnces were in wards: 27, PolizeiprasidiulII/ 
lindenstra(.)e, unmistakably a pleasant and prosperous lIIiddle-class 
residential area with tree-lined streets and detached houses with 
large gardens, where it achieved 41.3 % (4Y6 votes); 16, Allee-
straBe/town centre, 40.3 % (~24 votes); llberfelderstra(.)e/Wald-
stra(3e, 37.1 % (446 votes); 28, Hindenburgstra/3e, 30.1 % (434); 
Bruderstra(.)e/Amtsgericht, another pleasant residential area, 36 % 
(432 votes); 30, Schi.itzenstra/3e, a lower-middle class area po~u­
lated by white-collar workers, shop assistants, civil servants, 
professional people and independent businesslllen, 3~.j % (424); and 
13, Blwnenstra(3e/Palmstrabe, an area situated in the centre of town 
around the catholic church. This area was a Cheerful residential 
area inhabited by middle-class families with a strong catholic ele-
ment.l 68 In ward 13 the DVP won 34.8 % (418 votes). 
A further manifestation of the swing to the right is the prodigious 
leap in the votes in favour of the ONVP, from 2,~Bb (0.4 %) to 
4,740 (11.1 %). The party's spectacular performance locally, as 
indeed throughout the Reich, is to a great extent directly attribu-
table to the intensely chauvinist atmosphere (which was more acute-
ly in evidence in occupied border areas like Remscheid than else-
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where), in which this. election took place. This election, however, 
marked the'DNVP's apogee in Remscheid. From the mid-20s, it fell 
Yi~tim to the splintering of the bourgeois Yote, although it did 
. prove more resilient than the DVP,the party of the local establish-
ment. The DNVP's most remarkable success was in ward 4U, Hasten IV, 
19.1 ~ (166 votes), roughly corresponding to ward 30, Hasten III in 
.1920 in which the DDP beat the DVP into third place and in which 
the DNVP only managed HI votes. This area (Hasten) was the location 
of numerous small family bus inesses liIanufacturi ng and export i ng 
tools. The tentative comparison also illustrates the swing to the 
right, some of the reasons for which have already been ad-
duced. 169 The UNVP's ~ther noidble successes were. in wdrds: 
31. ElberfelderstraBe/WaldstraBe, Ib.~ l (lYU votes); ~/, Polizei-
prasidium/Lindenstra!)e, Ib.~ % (190 votes); ~Y, Wi Ihellllstrdl.~e, 10.1 
~ (150 votes) - this-ward also rated as a fashionable lIIiddle-class 
area inhabited by executives, civil servants, professional people 
and independent businessmen as well as a large contingent of lower-
middl e cl ass white-coll ar workers; 28; Hi ndenburgstra/3e, 14. Y % 
(1/9 votes); and 10, Burger Stra/3e, 14.U % (163 votes), which en-
compassed the town's 1II0St exclusive residential area. The ~uryer 
Stra/3e/Ehringhausen area was the neighbourhood housing the town's 
most important industrialists, senior executives and civil ser-
vants. Amongst this ward's residents were the Mannesmann family and 
Director HlI,ge.r of the ~Sl. 
The other interestillg feature in this election is the candiddture 
of the Volkisch-Sozialer ~lock which was a loose confederation of 
extreme right-wing anti-semitic groups with one of their strong-
holds in nearby Elberfeld. In Reruscheid, the supporters of the 
Volkisch-Sozialer Block in this election are the forlller lIIelllbers of 
the Deutsch-VHlkischer Schutz- und Trutzbund which was prOhibited 
in 1922 and had a lo~al membership of around 60U.1/0 After 
the ban on this organisation several members forllled right-winy 
groups 1 i ke the Roelllryke Berge and Scherenk I ub, others joi ned the 
NSDAP. the Orgesch and Organi sat ion Consul. Aftl:!r the ban on the 
NSDAP many continued their Itlelllbership unoffiCially in local call1ou-
f . 
I' , 
t 
\ 
f, 
" , 
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flaged organisations like the Bund der Schaffenden Stande and 13und 
der Gerechter). It is known that these activists were mostly young, 
very many of them coming from shopkeeper, white-collar employee, 
sma 11 manufacturer and artisan famil i es. Many of them were in the 
process of becoming declasseworkers owing to the inability of 
their parents to support their sons in the ailing fallliliy busi-
nesses. Volkische ideas were also propagated by a large group of 
youths at the Ernst-Mortiz-Arndt-Gymnasium, which drew the majority 
of its scholars from wealthy hOllles. The majority of the supporters 
of the Volkischer Block were new voters born after 1900. 
for cOlllparison purposes, the results in Lennep and Luttrinyhausen 
were as follows: 
DDP 
HclUf)er Bund 
SPD 
DNVP 
Freiwirtschaftsbund 
Christlich soziale Volksgen~inschaft 
KPD 
DVP 
,Polenpartei 
V~lkisch~sozialer Block 
USPD 
Zentrum 
Republikanische Partei 
Rheinischer Wirtschaftsbund 
NationaleFreiheitspartei 
Lennep 
614 
4tl7 
1,3U6 
17 
42 
1,IY6 
1,22Y 
43 
9tl 
53 
I,U61 
tl 
321 
18 
Luttrln~hausen 
4/J 
Il~ 
1,/43 
2tll 
14 
l,lU!:> 
-;9/ 
3 
1!H 
34 
942 
2 
238 
11 
In Lennep results reflect a similar trend to Rernscheid although 
there the DNVP presents the main bourgeo is cha 11 enge to the wor-
kers' movement. The strong showing of the DNVP in Lennep and 
LUttringhausen reveals the monarchist sympathies of clergy, senior 
civil servants. small town academi cs and farmers as well as i ndus-
trialist families. In Luttringhdusen, the UNVP is by far the most 
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popular party, thus underlining the conunents already I/Iade re~ardiny 
the DNVP' s, supporters .171 I n add it i on to th is the ONVP 's 
greater appeal in Luttrinyhausen than in Lennep would corroborate 
the claim that this party was ,primarily protestant.17~ Ihe 
relatively high number of votes polled by the Volkisch-Sozialer 
Block in Luttringhausen (191) already indicates the alllenability of 
small-town protestants to anti-semitic propaganda. This point finds 
b 
confirmation in later elections, when results reveal the estalish-
1\ 
ment of an early NSDAP stronghold here. 
The town council election on 4/5/24 was held on the same day as the 
Rei chstag el ect i on and was therefore assured of a hi yh turn-out 
.(11 % higher than 2/3/19). It was.a resounding victory for the 
bourgeois parties, desj.>ite the KPO's cOllfirlllJtioll dS ttll.! IJr~I.!Sl 
individual faction, owiny to the already long-establistled bouryeois 
party alliance. The BUrgerblock was able to overturn a SOCidlist-
cOIliIlunist majority of ten seats to a IIldjority of six in its favour. 
The results for Relllscheid were as fol lows: 
Burgerblock Alliance 
DDP 
DNVP 
DVP 
Zentrum 
Kriegs- und Sozialrentner 
KPD 
SPD. 
votes 
23,030 
4,b63 
3,3btl 
10,/92 
3 020 , . 
1,272 
13,140 
3,126 
seats 
1924 1919 
24 
10 
22 
23 
with USPI), 
9. 
This election set a precedent for the remainder of the Weilllar 
period, bringing to an end the years of socialist-communist pre-
. dominance on the town council. The left-wing parties would never 
'again hold a majority in the town hall. 
One of the first acts of the new council .was the symbolic restora-
tion of the old monarchist tradition to accolllpany the actual 
" , 
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triumph of the counter-revol ut ion.A number of street nallles1/J 
assoc i ated wi th the monarchy had been changed by the COllllllun is t-
social ist council following the murder of Erzberger and Rathenau by 
right-wing extremists of the Or9anisation Consul. The UDP's and 
Zentrum's complicity in this and similar slJurious ventures such as 
the official order to decorate the town with the old monarchist 
colours black, white and red,174 which remained in force up 
to the Nazi seizure of power, was an olllinous indication of the real 
affinity of these local parties with the pre-war anti-democratic 
and above all anti-socialist tradition. 
The defeat of the workers' movement also brought an end to a jJeriod 
of cooperation, no matter how tenuous, between the KPU, USPU and 
Spni n Kelllscheid. Ouri ny the course of the yelir ln4 the term 
Sozialfaschisten for Sodu} Ul!lIIocruts III .. HJe its ujJl·H,~ .. ,lt'ulll:e ill ltlL' 
pages of the Volksstilllllle iJlld was henceforth incorjJordted in the 
local co~nunist vernacular. 
In Lennep and Luttringhausen the bourgeois party alliance was un-
assailable. In Lennep the bourgeois parties won 10 seats, the KPU 
6, the spn 1 and Kriegsbesch~digte 1. The result in Luttringhausen 
was similar, with the bourgeois parties gaining 11 seats, the KPO 4 
and the SPD 3. 
The stormy years between 19H~ and 1923 in Kemscheid /IIark a lJeriod 
of intense class hostility in whiCh the polarisation of local 
society continued to gain lIIomt!ntum. Jhe first part of the periOd 
until March/Apri I 1920 was dominated by the outbreak and consol ida-
tion of the revolution, c~lminating in what was possibly the last 
real istic opportunity for the workers to seize power and determine 
the course of the revo 1 ut i on. Conversely, the second part of the 
period reached its climax with the defeat of the workers' movelllent 
in the crisis of 1923 and its aftermath, the muniCipal elections 
which s~aled the triumph of the bourgeoisie. Both crises, ie. the 
Kapp-Putsch and the collapse of resistance in the Ruhr and the re-
introduction of the ten-hour working day wt!re decisive moments pre-
ceded by overt class conflict. On the first occaSion, the Relllscheid 
I 
1 
~ , 
" 
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workers' movement achieved its immediate purpose, but the town re-
mained a fairly isolated enclave for lack of coordinated action in 
ot .. er parts of the country. On the second occasion the local wor-
kers' movement was unable to present the solid ana resolute unity 
needed to resolve the conflict in its favour. The reason for the 
defeat at the local level was the gradual disinteyration of the 
tentative alliance of the three workers' parties, the free trade 
unions ~nd occasionally, the christian and yellow unions. Ihe 
break-up of the alliance was due to ideological differences which 
proved to be insurmountable during the crucial year of 1~23. Ihe 
KPO, which emerged to take over the leadership of the local wor-
kers' movement, aimed at a dictatorship of the proletariat whi 1st 
the SPOt which lacked effective influence in Relllscht;id, adVUl:dLed d 
policy of defence whilst the christian und yellow uniolls rellldillel.l 
true to their policy of cooj.leration with the elllj.lloyers. We shall 
see that these three positions hardened in the followiny years thus 
preventing further effective cooperation of lastiny duration. 
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TABLE 9: Exchange Kate Mark Dollar on the ~erJin Stock 
Exchange1l5 
JO/0!l/23 1 Dollar = 61 ,000 f~arks 
01/0B/23 1 Dollar = 1.1 lIIi 11 i on Marks 
09/08/23 1 Dollar = 6 million Marks 
31/08/23 1 Doll ar = 11 mill i on fYla rk s 
06/09/23 1 Doll ar = 21 1/2 million Marks 
12/09/23 1 Dollar = YU mi 11 i on I~arks 
20/09/23 1 Dollar = 242 mi 11 ion Marks 
06/10/23 1 Dollar = 6Ul 1/2 mill ion Marks 
20/10/23 ' 1 Dollar = 12,080.000.000 Marks 
Ub/ll/23 1 Dollar = 4l1.UbU.UUU,UUU Marks 
TABLE 10 List of Local Retail Prices. 
1 
04/08/23 
07/U8/23 
17/08/23 
31/08/23 
08/09/23 
2 
04/09/2;J . 
07/09/23 
Source: 1 = 13V, 
2 = RGA. 
Graubrot, three and a half pounds = 
litre 11111 k = 
Graubrot, three and a half pounds = 
potatoes, one pound = 
Graubrot, three and d ha 1f pounds = 
lignite bricketts, 1 cwt = 
1 1 it re mil k 
1 1 itre milk 
= 
= 
Ib,OOU Marks 
3,80U fvldrks 
112,OOU Marks 
60,UOO fvlarks 
b20,OUO Narks 
4,30U,OOU Narks 
43U,UOU Marks 
600 ,OUO I~drks 
11/09/23 1 litre mil k 
14/09/23 1 litre milk 
= 1.700,000 Marks 
= 2.500,000 Marks 
10/09/23 Kostganger (lodger with breakfast). 
attic room with bedding. rent per 
month176 = 4,850,000 Marks 
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. TABLE 11: Deaths in Rernscheid due to TB. 
Year 
1913 
19l:!> 
1916 
1911 
1918 
1921 
1922 
1923 
1924 
192~ 
1926 
1932 
1933 
1934 
1938 
1942 
1944 
1~4~ 
Deaths 
i 92 
98 
99 
169 
146 
125 
103 
105 
107 
14 
74 
69 
61 
53 
6~ 
bb 
58 
88 
Source: 
Years 1913-1918: HStA Uusseldorf, 
Reg. UUss. 8148 
Years 1921/1922: HStA Uusseldorf, 
Rey. Duss. 38945 
Years 1923-1926: HStA Uusseldorf, 
Reg. Uuss. 53952 
Years 1932-1945: HStA Dusseldorf, 
Rey. Ouss. 54332 I. 
TABLE 12: Population Figures Lennep, 1914 to 1921. 1 
Year Total Marriages Births incl. Deaths incl. 
population still-born still-born 
Ueatl1S due 
to 
infants infants2 war cduses3 
1914 13,893 100 2b4 1~5 4 
1915 13,851 33 196 259 14 
1916 13,501 31 122 336 98 
1911 13,581 60 96 411 58 
1918 12,9/5 56 120 429 13 
1919 13,218 133 162 248 8 
1920 13,290 W6 251 240 Y 
1921 13.386 150 221 201 
No. of cOlllbattants from Lennep: 2,400 
No. of soldiers killed 350 
1 taken from Statistisches Amt Remscheid. Band I Nr. 10 
2 total 3 part of 2. 
TABLE 13: Population figures for nemscheid 1913-1932. 1 
Year Total Y.u3rriages B i r t h s D eat h s 
PopuLi t ion live births still-born total in 'Remsc~',eid in the war total Figures compiled from Band I Nr. 10, 
male female infants Statistisches Amt Remscheid, 
1913 77 ,002 614 904 895 74 1,873 825 825 StA Remscheid IH/68, Bevolkerungs-bewegung in Rernstheid 1913-24-,-
1914 78,447 824 780 71 1,675 816 326 1,142 StA Remschetd, IIA/41a, Einwohnerzahl 
1915 77 ,013 663 562 47 1,272 753 586 1,339 der Stadt Remscheid aus Bergischem Abendblat~ Nr. 162 and 13/7/32. 
1916 77 ,416 458 445 . 31 934 756 416 1,172 HStA Dlisseldorf, Reg. Dliss. 53952. 
-
1917 77,391 382 362 35 . 77.9 791 298 1,089 
1918 76,766 442 423 36 901 995 336 1,331 Notes. 
1919 75,632 939 608 595 32. 1,235 990 132 1,122 1 Figures for Remscheid withouiLenn( 
1920 75,332 1,076 809 737 55 1,601 1 , 125 . 1,125 and Llittringhausen 2 with Lennep and Llittringhausen 
1921 75,875 881 789 716 57 1,562 803 803 
1922 77 ,052 925 642 675 61 1,378 928 928 Total no. of war deaths 2,094. 
1923 77,634 853 650 592 44 1,286 734 734 
1924 77,906 . 595 559 588 45 1,192 760 760 
1925 76,989 678 621 569 40 1,190 750 750 
1926 77,098 584 575 560 47 1 , 182 734 734 
1927 77,774 689 527 516 36 1,079 749 749 
1928 78,772 757 586 546 37 1,171 776 776 
1929 79,098 591 526 39 1,156 844 844 
1930 932 554 555 8592 
1931 848 511 442 8482 
1932 893 426 407 
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CHAPTER I I 
NOT E S 
1 for detailed account of the ceremonial inauyuration of the wor-
kers' and soldiers' transition to power, see lucas, Ope cit. 
pp. 193-19!:>. 
2 Ibid., p. 198; 
and BY, 28/11/18. 
3 See EnthUllunyen Uber gegenrevolutionare Umtriebe - Rede des 
Vors itzenden des Arbeiter- und So 1 datenrates I<elllschei d. Otto 
BraS,' auf dem Ratekongrei3 aln 1//12/1918 (extract), in: Gerhard 
A. Ritter and Susanne Miller, Die deutsche Revolution 19lU-1919 
- Dokurnente, Hamburg 19/!>, pp. 148-1b3. 
4 Lucas, OPe cit., pp. 202-203. 
b Ibid., p. 204. 
6 See BY, 9/1/19, Eine Versalllllllung in der Konzerthalle; 
and BY, 31/1/19, Eine bedeutsallle Pa~teimityliederversalllmluny. 
7 BY,' 8/2/19, l"1eta 11 arbeiterversallulll ung. 
S Buchdruckerei des Deutschen Metallarbeiterverbandes, Re~lscheid. 
Ei n Kapitel kommuni st i scher Gese 11 schaftsarbeit ••• , OPe cit., 
p. 2. 
9 BY, 21///19, Ober 1.000 neue Mitglieder fur die USPD; 
BY, 13/8/19, In einer einzigen Abteilung der BSI 3!:> A/lIlleldun~en 
fur die USPO; 
BY, 5/7/19, '1111 Bezirk Rosenhuyel wurden bei einer Ayitations-
tour 55 neue Mitylieder fUr die USPD und 36 n~ue Abonnenten fur 
die BV gewonnen'; 
10 BY. 11/8/19, Der grof3e Arbeiter-Jugendausschu(3. 
11 BV, 21/1/19. Zu einer wuchtigenMassendernonstration 
The article refers to Hasten as the 'SpieBer-Republik' because 
. this district was inhabited by many 10ng-estaDlished slIIall 
manufacturers who demonstrated thei r support for the monarchy 
by hanging the old colours from their windows. Hasten and 
lUttringhausen were the two districts of Remscheid where Anti-
Socialism was most intense •. 
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12· LUttri nghauser T agl i cher Anzei ger (L TA), 6/6/1 Y, Bel agerunys-
zustand Uber i{elllscheid. 
I 
Fac~ory owner Heinrich Hentzen, brother of the Lennep Landrat 
w'as attacked and beaten up by strikers. Another yroup of in-
sensed workers broke into the factory of A 1 bert Urbahn & Co. 
and manhandled the owner's three sons. Another factory owner 
who received a beating during this tiloe was Huyo Usenbery. 
See HStA OUsseldorf, Ger. Rep. ~/tl41. 
13 RGA, 17///1Y, Angriffe auf Regierungssoldaten. 
14 BV, 11/6/19, Remscheid unter Belagerun9szustand 
15 LTA, 11/6/19 
16 LTA, 13/6/19 
11 LTA, 19/6/19 
18 BV, 17/1/19, Gesalllmelte Gelder fiJr die in Sctlutzhaft betind-
lichen Genossen. 
19 StA Remscheid, I B/21, Sonderakte betreffend Wahlen zur ver-
fassunyyebenden deutschen Ndt i ona lversalllllll uny VOIII 19/1/19 
20 The Reich average was 83 %. See Lucas, OPe cit., p. 133.' 
, 21 The corresponJing figures 
DDP 1,tl60 
USPO l,tl4b 
SPU 1,~41 
Zentrum 1,120 
OVP/DNVP l,llb 
and for Luttrinyhausen: 
DDP 1,6// 
DVP/UNVP 1,649 
SPD 1,393 
USPU 
Zentrum 
1,041 
925. 
for L~nnep are: 
25.9 % 
25.7 % 
17.3 % 
15.6 % 
15.5 X, 
22 Lennep is the most important railway junction in Remscheid, 
serving Cologne,' DUsseldorf, Wuppertal and the Uberberyischer 
Kreis. For this reason there has traditionally been a larye 
number of railway personnel with Beamten status resident in 
this town. 
23 av, 2//1/19, Landtagswahlergebnisse. 
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24 StA Remscheid, VII M/15, Akten der BUryervereiniyun~ Remscheid-
Slid 1928-1933. 
See letter from chairman Hermann Pflanz dated 4/9/29 eXJ-llaininy 
the election strategy of the bouryeois parties ano the civic 
association during the Weimar Republic. 
25 BV, 3/3/19, KOlJullunalwahl. 
26 StA Remscheid, 11 A/85, 28/1/21, Vereinigte KOllullunistische 
Parte; Deutschlands. 
The full list of KPD town-councillors was now, Ewald Benscheid, 
Walter Bornefeld, Ernst Brautigam, 'Louis Bar~n, Nartha Bott-
cher, Eugen Ebel, Heinrich Fisctler, Cornelius Gohr," Rudolf 
Geldsetzer, Hugo Heier, Albert Issel, ,Wilhelm Kot.:h, Artur Kdr-
nowski, Ida Kattwinkel. Ernst Leithoff, Christian Lenz. Carl 
Leverberg, Gustav MiHler, Paul Schle[)mann, Paul Sctlroder, Hans 
Sunzel and Jakob Wolf. 
27 Lucas, Ope cit., pp. 228-234. 
Briefly. Lucas argues that there were two sdlient reasons for 
the failure of the Novelllber, revolution. Firstly, there was not 
'enough spontaneous action of the kind whiCh occurred in Ham-
born. and secondly the highly disciplint!d radicalism of tht! 
Remscheid workers and the subject i Vt! sjJontaneous radi ca 1 i Sill of 
, , 
Hamborn workers fa 11 ed to cOIIIJ-ll elJlent each other. Lucas cri t i-
cises the Rernscheid leadt!rs for prt!venting the revolutionary 
fervour of the workers from beiny carried over into other areas 
and translated into energetic belligerent action, which would 
have'ensured constant momentulII. 
28 See BV. 20/9/19, Neue run i tari sche Ubergriffej 
LTA. 29/1/2':); 
'L TA, 11/2/20. 
29 For an account of events and the battle of Remscheid see: 
Georg Eliasber~t Der Ruhrkriey van 1920, Bonn, Bad Godesberg 
1974, pp. 89-91; 
Hans Peter Heise (Bund deutscher Pfadfinder, edit.), General-
streik fUr Freiheit und Demokratie, Marz 1YlU, pp. 31-33; 
also Ewald Weisemann (Zeitfreiwilligenkorps Remscheid e.V., 
edit.), Die Remscheider Marzkampfe illl Jahre 1920, Relllscheid 
1934. 
PAGE(S) MISSING IN 
ORIGINAL 
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40 BV. 3.1/1/19. E i ne bedeutsallle Parteillli t9 1 i ederversamllll uny. 
Willi GrUtz was of the opinion that the two parties would soon 
I 
be reunited. The report went on to say: 
'Mit allem Nachdruck hob Schroder auch hervor, da~ 
man in Remscheid gegenuber der USPO keinerlei Vor-
wUrfe erheben kbnne. sondern feststellen "~sse, da~ 
in Relllscheid ganz yute Arbeit geleistet worden sei. 
Die ko~nunistische Partei bestehe aber fur ganz 
Deutschland und da konne man ortlich keine Ausnahme 
machen, sondern mUsse auch hier eine Ortsgruppe des 
Spartakusbundes bilden, von den Genossen, die sich 
dazu bekennen. Er hoffe jedoch, dab recht bald wieder 
eine einheitliche und geschlossene Organisation aller 
ehrlichen revolutionaren Kreise geschaffen werd~.' 
The USPD's position was stated in an article in the Volkstri-
bUne on 19/1/n, entitled. Unilbhilnljl<Jl! Sozialdelllukrdtie: 
'Die KOIIMllunisten belieben es illUller so darzustellell, 
als ob sie links von uns standen. Wir aber behaupten, 
daB links von uns nichts lIIehr steht. Auch aer Name 
ist es nicht, der uns trennt. Denn das KOllullunistische 
Manifest ist eSt das die Begrunder der Arbeiterbeweyuny 
uns geschaffen und dasauch wir anerkennen ••• • 
41 HStA DUsseJdorf. Reg. DUss., 15445, 22/12/20, Staatl iChe 
Sicherheitspolizei, Lagenbericht. 
42 HStA DUsseldorf, Rey. DUss •• Ib446, 12/7/21. WochenDericht uber 
Nachrichtendienst. 
43 BV. 0/2/29, Aus den Kalllpfjahren des kOllllllunistischen JUljendver-
bandes Ortsgruppe Re/llscheid. 
44 BV. 2/1/21, Der Zehnerfuhrer. 
. 
The street cell called Zehneryruppe was the last link ill the. 
chain which stretched from the local party branch headquarters' 
to district headquarters (almost always housed in pubs) down to 
the street level. The Zeh~ergruppe ~as responsible for doorstep: 
contact, distributing leaflets. canvassiny. recruitin~ new welll-; 
bers as well as sticking posters and reporting on the activi-! 
ties of oppositional groups. 
45 BV. 10/2/23, Aussch 1 ur3 aus der Partei. comment on the eXlJu 1 si on 
of Resch; 
also RGA. 15/11/22. reporting on an article aoout kesch in the 
BV. 
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46 BV, 2/7/21, Hinein in die kOllllllunistischen Kinderyruppen. 
The tone of this article lJenned by a 14-year old official of 
the children's group was offensively adlllonitory, 'to say tilt:! 
least: 
'Was die kOllullunistische Kindergruppe wirklich ist, 
schei nen bi sher noch weni ye KOllulluni sten zu wi ssen, 
sonst wurden uns nicht illuner bei unserer Ay i tat ion 
ungefahr folgende Satze begegnen: Ich will es mir 
noeh einmal uberleyen. - Ieh mul3 erst mit meinern 
Mann dariiber spreehen - ••• Wenn ei n Konulluni st es . 
sich noehmal Uberleyen will, sein Kind in die kOHl-
munistische Kinderyruppe zu schicken, dann kann er 
richtigen Herzens sagen: Jetzt habe ich unserelll 
Pastor einen guten Dienst getan, fur den er mir dank-
bar sein wird ••• • . 
Also BV, 4///21, Genosse, du bist Lehnergruppenf~hrer. 
This article explaining the duties of street-cell leaders was 
written in an exceedingly jJdterndlistic tone and lIlay have given 
ri se to resentment amongst melllbers. 
41 Lucas, OPe cit., p. 124. 
Otto Bral3, who in Uecelllber beCl.1ll1e secretary in the VKPD nat i 0-
nal headquarters, was evidently too much of an inaividualist 
for the party's strict code of discipl ine. He very quickly 
found himself at odds with the party line dnd after resigning 
his, post, was later expelled for his· criticism of the IJarty 
lea~ership's handling of the March uprising in 1921. 
48 HStA DUsseldorf, Reg. DUss. 15446, Wochenbericht uber den 
Nachrichtendienst, Relllscheid 21/9/21. 
Dusseldorf, which had 10,000 melllbers befort:! ttie attelllIJted in-
surrection, had only 3,500 afterwards. fvlelllbership in Solinyen 
slumped from 12,000 to 4,000. and in Relllscheid district from 
1l.bOO to 8,000. The Relllscheid branch, however, held up best of 
all. at 5.000. 
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49 HStA ·Diisseldorf, Reg. DLiss., 1!>446, Wochenbericht l.iber den 
. Nachrichtendienst, Re"~cheid 14/10/21: 
'Es wird jetzt bekannt, daB die Neuorganisation 
nach Zehnerschaften und die Aufstellung einer 
Kampftruppe bereits in den Aktionsmonatell Juli 
und August auf den starksten Widerstand eines 
groBen Teils der Parteimitglieder gesto~en ist.' 
The report goes on to say that party headquarters, alerted to 
the problem in Relllscheid, quickly dislJatched COlllrade Leuthner 
from Essen ~o manage the tri cky s ituat i on. However, hi s pre-
sence failed to placate angry members. He was given .a storlllY 
reception at a meeting on 22nd Septelllber. Local parly chairlllan, 
Schroder, also incurred the wrath of his IIlelllbers dnll was 
accused of i ncolllpetence in the halldling ot jJ~rty lJo I h:y. Ihere 
was also widespread anger over the indiscreet behaviour of cer-
tain other leaders in their private lives. There also appeared 
to be a strong yearning for united action with the other socia-
list parties. The report indicated the decredsillY IIlelllberstlijJ 
but doubted that this would result in a defection to the other 
socialist parties: 
'Oieser Zerfall darf -aber nicht optimistisch stimmen, 
da nach hiesiger Ansicht der augellblickliche Zerset-
zungsprozeB nur eine vorl.ibergehende Erscheinung ist, 
bedinyt besonders durch die gegenw~rtiye Wirtschafts-
lage. Sobald in dieser Hinsicht ein UlIIschwuny eintritt, 
ist lIIit Sicherheit anzunehmen, daB der Karnpfcharakter 
der Partei wieder zum Vorschein kOllunen wird.' 
50 HStA Diisseldorf, Reg. Duss., 1!>446, Lagenbericht, Remscheitl 
13/6/21. 
51 Ibid. 
52 HStA Diisseldorf, Reg. DLiss., 15446, Wochenbericht Liber Nach-
richtenwesen, Remscheid, 5/8/21. 
53 I bi d. 
54 Bv, 1/8/21, Rernscheid illl Zeichen von DelllOnstrationen. Klare i 
~ 
Scheidung der Geister. 
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55 BII, 26/1/23, Katzenjammer der /{elllscheider Gewerkschaftssabo-
teure. 
The name I Relllschei der Acht-F dlllil i en-Partei ' ,refers a 1 most cer-
tainly to the cliquish nature of the local spn branch. SOllle of 
the families holding important functions in the party were the: 
Haddenbrocks, Blanks, Winniarskis, Fleischmanns, lserlohs and 
Gesenbergs. The lack of resonance for the SPU locally can be 
seen from membership figures published at the Party's Area Con-
ference held at Elberfeld in 1919. According to the report, spn 
membershi pin the Lennep/Remschei d/Mettlllann di stri ct ~tood at 
only 1,273, less than a quarter of the KPO's melllbership in 
Remscheid alone. 
See, l3ezirkspJrteitav IU Elberfeld, dell 1. utiLI 2 •• Julli 1919, p. 
17. 
56 HStA DUsseldorf, Reg. O~ss., Ib446, Ldgenbericht. Hericht uber 
den Stand der Arbeltslosbeweguny, Remscheid 1/7/21. 
51 Ibid., Wochenbericht uber dell Nachrichtendienst, i<emscheid 
8/9/21, p. 34. 
~8 I bi d. 
59 Ibid., p. 30. 
The art i cl e referred to in the po 1 ice report appeared in the 
Freie Presse on the !:>th September 1921 and warned Social OeIlIO-
crats against takin!:j part in similar demonstrations with COIll-
lIlunists in future. The article went on to say: 
'Und wenn lIIan die Vorf(ille in Relllscheid, Lennep und 
besonders in Ronsdorf, wo sich die Anh~nyer der Sozial-
demokrat i scllen und Unabtliingi yen Partei aus ei ner kaulII 
verst~ndlichen Art von Friedensliebe heraus dazu her-
gegeben haben, cine Resolution anzunehlllen, die die 
Bewaffnung des Proletariats forderte, Uberleyt, mub 
gesagt werden, die KOllullunisten verfolgten durch ihre 
Beteiligung an den Uemonstrationen den Zweck, durch 
Hineintrdgen besonderer Parteiideen den Eindruck 
unserer Delllonstrationen zu sChwachen. Oas ging so 
weit, daB die kOlllmunistischen Redner am Taye, der der 
Sicherheit und dem Schutzder Republik galt, yegen 
die Republik aussprachen. Was vorn kOlllmunistischen 
Standpunkt nur natLirlich ist, was sich aber Anhdnger 
der Sozialdemokratie in Zukunft unter keint.!1l UlIIstanden 
mehr gefallen lassen dUrfen. So konnen wir keine Er-
oberunyen fur die Republik mdchen.' 
- 188 -
60 Ibid., Bericht uber den Nachrichtendienst, Relllscheid, NovewlJer 
1921. 
As in most constituencies. the majority of USPD melllbers elected 
to merge with the KPD. A.handful of Remscheid lIIelllbers continued 
to maintain a USPDpresence in the town. 
61 . Ibid •• p. 63. 
62 Ibid.: 
"So wurde in der gleichen Sitzuny die Veranstaltuny 
einer gro(3en gellleinsamen Delllonstration geyen die 
Teuerung und fUr Lohnerhbhunyen geplant, die Jedoch 
van der SPD abgelehnt wurde. weil sie nicht aas dritte 
Rad alii Wagen sein wollte, und die deshalb unterblieben 
ist." 
63 Ibid., p. 64. 
64 Ibid., p. 30 ff. 
6~ For an account of the ne!:jotiations between the ZAG and the 
. 
employers" association see Arno Klunne, Oie deutsche Arbeiter-
bewegung. Geschichte - Ziele - Wirkunyen, 2nd edition, OUssel-
dorf, Koln 1981, pp. 192-195. 
66 See Preller, Ope cit., pp. 249-252. 
61 HStA Dusseldorf, Reg. Duss. 15446, Wochenbericht uber Nach-
richtendienst, Relllscheid, 19///21. 
At a meeting of DMV representatives on 17/7/21 tellljJers began tu 
fray when a USPD lIIelllber accused the KPD of bei ny respons i b 1 t:! 
for falling lIIelllbership figures. A KPUcolleague countered by 
charg i ng the USPD witll sabotag i ny the workers I movement, and 
added: "Jetzt sei der Zeitpunkt yekollllllen, wo aus den uewerk-
schaften ei ne Kafllpforyani sat ion gelllacht werden IIIUlj.' 
68 Ibid., Wochenbericllt uber den Nachrichtendienst, Relllscheid 
14/10/21. 
The police spy reported widespread disaffection with the local 
DMV leadership following the failure of the March offensive: 
"Allein 1m Kalendervierteljahr sina etwa IOOAu~tritte 
erfolgt. Die Allgellleine Arbeiterunion. die fruher in 
Remscheid ohne' nennenswerten Einflu(3 war, ist in der 
letzten Zeit an Zah] der Mitglieder ziemlich angewach-
sen. Sie betragt zur Zeit ca. 2,000.' 
During the period 1/4/21 to -1/7/21. melllbershiJ-J in the ]oCdl 
branch of the UMV fell from 14,977 to 12,/bY. 
Ibid., Remscheid 19///21. 
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69 BV. 26/7/21. Die I"letallarbeiterwahlen. 
'Zwar zeigt das Eryebnis das starke Uberwieyen der 
Konununisten, lIlehr als 75 % der abgegebenen Stillullen, 
andererseits spornt das Resultat an zu fleiBiyer, 
z~her und geschickter Aufkldrungsarbeit in den Reihen 
der noch lndifferenten. Die verhaltnisma[:Hg hohe 
St illunenzah l, die die Gegner erha lten haben, s tallMllen 
aus diesem Massenreservoir.' 
In an exceptionally low turn-out the KPD list received ~,422 
votes and the SPD/USPD 773. The result in Solingen was similar: 
KPD 2.330 and SPO/USPD 626. 
70 ·HStA DUsseldorf. Reg DUss. 1b44b, Ope cit., Sonderbericht 
betreffend Nachrichtenwesen, Reruscheid 25/1/22. 
The new cOlllmittee consisted of: first secretary Karl Putz, 
second secretary Otto Weber, Alois Kieven, Ewald Knieling, 
Richard Kottlllann, Rudolf Schleuter/llann, Emil Voss, Max Weidig, 
Walter Krauskopf, Wilhelm Kurtz, Karl Groll and Utto Klein. 
11 BV, 22/1/23, Hauptgeneralversalfunlung der DMV, 1<t:~IIISCheid. 
72 BV, 18/1/23, Weitere Stillllllen zur Lage illl Metallarbeiterver-
band. 
A well-attended lIleeting in the RosenhUgel district passed the 
following resolution: 
'Die Mitglieder des DMV Uezirk RosenhUgel erblicken 
in delll Voryehen des Hauptvorstandes gegen die hiesiye 
Ortsgruppe illl allgemeinen und illl Falle Pi.itz im beson-
deren eine Provokdtion des Uberaus groBten Teils der 
im DMV, Ortsgruppe Remscheid oryanisierten Mitglieder. 
Die Versanmlung protestiert auf das Scharfste gegen 
die diktatorische Handlunysweise des Hauptvorstandes 
und der Bezirksleituny und verlangt, daB die vorye-
nannten Instanzen nicht den WiIlen einiger Norgler, 
sondern den der Gesdmtlllitgliedschaft ausfUhren. UIII ein 
gedeihliches Arbeiten und eine Starkuny der Ortsgruppe 
zu gewdhrl ei sten, verI dngen die Versanulle I ten, daB die 
eingeleiteten AusschluBverfdhren geyen die Kolleyen 
K i even, Benschei d und Weber schne 11 zurUckgenonullen 
werden und daB der Kollege PUtz. weil er das Vertrauen 
der Mitglieder der Ortsgruppe nicht mehr besitzt. aIs 
Angestellter verschwindet.' 
This resolution was echoed in the following days by the dis-
tricts ·of Goldenberg, Stachelhausen, Scheid, Laspert, dnd the 
workforce of the Luisenhutte. 
See BV. 20/1/23, Geyen die Verbandszerstorer. 
- 1YO -
73 BV. 6/3/23. Schliestedts Rache. 
Schllestedt. who had been pOlJular with Remscheid workers during 
. the revolution, joined the OfvlV headquarters in 1Y19 as secre-
tary. During the dispute he was regarded by his forlller collea-
gues in' Remscheid as being the nlain architect of a plan to 
wrest control of the local branch of the DMV from the KPU. 
74 BV, 1/3/23, Gegen die Willkur des Hauptvorstandes des DMV. 
,BV. 10/3/23, Gegen die WillkUr der SChliestedt und Genossen. 
BV, 13/3/23, WeiterfUhruny des Kalllpfes geyen Schliestetits 
Gewa ltak te. 
lfJ The French began their occupation of the Ruhr in January 1923. 
Lennep was the first part of Grof~-Remscheid to be occupied. ltle 
occupat i on was then extended to i ncoq)ora te Relllschei ti proper UII 
1/3/23. 
HStA Di.isseldorf, keg. OUss. 1b!>3b, Remscheid 7/3/23. 
16 Kortmann, olJ. cit. , p. 49. 
77 BV, 17/1/23, Fristlose Entlassuny des Genossen Sctlulz in tier 
Bergischen Stahlindustrie. 
I;)SI factory council chairlllan, Utto Frohlich and council IIleluoer, 
EmU Schulz, were dislIlissed for holding a workers' meeting to 
explain the KPO's stance during the half-hour strike in jJrott::st 
against the French occupation of the Ruhr. 
18 Ibid., Lennep. Ablehnuny des Fruhstucksstreiks: 
'Oie LennejJer Arbeiterschdft hat am Montay durch 
ihreHandluny klar ZUlU Ausdruck gebrdcht, dd/) sie 
nicht gewillt 1st, die gemeinsallle Front lIIit dem 
Unternetullertulll herzustellen, wie es der AOGB und 
die spn wallen. In allen Lenneper ~etrieben der 
Netallindustrie 1st alii r-lontag restlos yearbeitet 
warden. Die Arbeiterschaft hat eben keinen Sinn f~r 
solche Kindereien; sie ist bereit, ernstlich zu 
kampfen. Der ADG~ 1st mit seinen Parolen ,jallllllerl ich 
abyefallen.· 
79 BV, 16/1/23, Oer Generalstreik der ·Schicksalsgemeinschaft'. 
For a' list of factories refusing to participat~ in the f{uhr 
Aid Programme collectio~ See' I:SV, 1U/2/23, "f{uhrspende" und 
"Natopfer" in den Remscheider l:Setrieben. 
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80 BV, 25/,;)/23, Die Betriebsrate fur einheitlichen KalJlpf. 
81 BV, 1/2/23, Oi e Scharfmacherlllethoden der Beryi schen Stah 1 i n-
o dustrie in Relllscheid. 
82 BV, 18/1/23, Zum Sol i daritatsstrei k der Schllle I zerei arbeiter in 
der Stahlindustrie. 
83 BV, 22/1/23, Hauptgeneralversannlung des OMV, Remscheid. 
The newly elected cOllunittee passed a resolution roundly condelll-
ning what they regarded as an impartial judgement. The rejJart 
went on to say: 
'Die Versd~nluny weist die Dffentlichkeit darauf nin, 
daB die Werksleitung der Bergischen Stahlindustrie 
seit vielen Monaten einen VorWiHld gesucht hat, UIII sich 
des ihr unbequemen Betriebsrates zu entledigen.' 
84 BV, 15/2/23, Unternehmerbrutalitdt. 
85 BV, 2/2/23, Uie Schdrflllacherlllethoden der l3eryisctlen Stdhl in-
dustrie Remscheid, Fortsetzuny. 
'Uer SChleier lUftet sich. Uer Arbeitgeberverband 
hatte das Verhalten der Oirektion der l3ergischen 
Stahlindustrie'nicht nur gedeckt, sondern geschurt. 
Die Hetze yegen die Betriebsrate war sorgfaltig vor-
bereitet, und illmer wieder muBte Or. Steinberg be-
weisen, daB die Bergische Stahlindustrie einen ~e­
triebsrat hat, welcher statt Arbeitsgemeinschaft den 
Klassenkalllpf fUhrt.' 
And IjV, 20/1/23, Unerlldrte Brutalitat der Unternehrner. I:.in 
Scharfrnacherspruch des Schlichtunysausschusses: 
'Oer Schlichtungsausschu!3 ist darnit einellllanyyeheyten 
und mit alIen Mitteln verfolgten Wunsch der Stahlin-
dustrie entgegenyekalTunen. Oer Betriebsrat der Bergi-
schen Stahlindustrie so11te schan lanyst entfernt 
werden, weil er gegen verschiedene Uirektoren Straf -
verfahren wegen Obertretung der Bestinunungen ~ber den 
Aehtstundentag anhangiy gemacht, weil infolge seiner 
Waehsamkeit eine Anzahl van Oifferenzen illl Ijetrieb zu-
gunsten der Arbei terse haft entsehi eden wurden. Ureillla 1 
hat die Werksleitung vergeblieh auf Amtsenthebung die-
ses Betriesbrates geklagt, bis sie bzw. der Sehlich-
tungsausschuf3 jetzt den notigen Vorwand gefunden hat. 
And BV, 7/3/23, Beilegung des Streiks iln Glockenstahlwerk, 
The workers of the Gloekenstahlwerk went on strike to fore!;! 
the rei nstatelllent of f dctory council melllber Hardenbrueh tKPU). 
The Gewerbegericht ruled in his fdvour. 
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86 BV, 9/2/23, Der Kampf der Unternehmer yegen die Betriebsrate. 
87 BV, 1/2/,23, Prol etari sche Abwehrhundertschaften. 
88' BV, 16/2/23, Der ADGB Remscheid baut den proletarischen 
Selbstschutz aus. 
89 BV, 25/7/23, Die Metallarbeiterwahlen in Remscheid. 
90 BV, 28/5/24, Generalversarnmlung der DMV Opposition. 
The governing committee comprised of: first secretary Otto 
Weber, second secretary Rudolf Schleutermann, first treasurer 
Emil Schu lz, second treasurer Ewa I d Petermann, 'ass i stant IIldna-
ger Ernst Crone; ordinary cOlIvIIittee members: Wilhellll tlayeboker, 
Heumann, Sbhngen, Diederichs, Alois Kieven, Hahne, Adolf ~en­
scheid and Artur Becker as the youth rt:!presentative. 
91 For tilt:! devtdojJlllclIl ut Lilt! extrt!lJIt! riyht ill Ht!III!:icllClu !:iCC CllujJ..,( 
ter IV. 
92 Information frolll Ernst tiiesecke, who was a member of the JUllydu 
prior to joining the NSUAP. 
93 Information from Wilhelm Schlechtriem. 
94 BV, 13/3/23, Helden des "teutschen" Vaterlandes. 
95 BV, 13/3/23, fin Faschisten-Attentat auf die Heryische Volks-
s t i flune. 
96 Ibid., and Ein faschistisches Bubenstuck. 
97 BV, 13/3/~3, Landfriedensbruch der Hakenkreuzler in Relllscheid. 
In one incident a young girl, who had been observed talking to 
French soldiers at the railway station in Lenne~. was attackeu 
, . 
as she alighted from the train in Relllscheid, by a gany of youlIg 
hot-heads, sOllle of whom were later identified by witllesses and 
nallled in the article. She was then pulled by her hair alld 
kicked all the way to the Markt Where, according to the 
article, a policemansuygested to the young lIIen that they 
should shave the girl's head. She was dragged into one of the 
pubs where she was further abused before a squad of pal icelllt:!1l 
arrived and arrested her. The gi rl' s reputat i on was further 
• damaged by a report in the RGA, which interpreted the incidellct:! 
as the chastisement of a prostitute. The BV article contained a 
sharp attack on the police: 
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,'Aber die ganze Geschichte muB von uns von der 
rein politischen Seite betrachtet werden. Alle diese 
Exzess~ richten sich letzten Endes geyen die Arbeiter-
" schaft. Die Polizei versagt dabei nicht nur vollig, 
sie erweist sich a1s wi1lfahriges Hilfsoryan der 
nationa1en Hord~n.' 
The same article reported another incident' when three youn~ 
hikers were beaten up by a group of right-wing extrelllists for 
talking to French ,soldiers. The article went on to illl~licate 
the police: 
'Die zur Hilfe gerufene Schupolehnte auch hier ein 
Eingreifen ab mit der ~emerkuny: Gut, daB ihr eur£! 
Schlage bekollllllen habt.' 
Another siulilar incident was report~d in ttle ~V on l'J/'I./t.'J in 
an article entitled Uie Unsicherl1eit der Stral3e. rhe article 
repo~ted groups of youths sporting swastikas and black, white 
and red colours conyregating each evening on the Illdrket s4udre 
and then molestiny pass~rs-by, without the police taking any 
action. 
A further BV article on 12/2/23, Proletarischer SelbstscflUtz 
reported an incident in Papenberyer StraBe when a young COHUIIU-
. . ' 
nist was shot at. The article cOllullented: 'Van der Polizei 1st 
eine Hilfe gegen die Hakenkreuz-, Stahlhelm- unll Jun9do-Leute 
nicht zu erwarten.' 
98 I nformat ion frolll Willi Kre 11. 
99 BV, 24/5/23, Der Mob "entrUstet sich". 
This article gives an account of the beating of a IIIJn by Natio-
nal Socialists because he was seen conversing with a French 
officer'in a coffee house. 
100 av. 19/5/23. Severing verbietet die proletarischen Hundert-
schaften. 
101 BV. 14/8/23. Die ~eerdi gung des errnordeten Genossen Lumpe • 
. 1 Aufruf zur Beteiligung an'der Beerdigung des durch die Orgesch-
und Jungdo-Banditen ermordeten Genossen Lumpe in Uabringhausen. 
And ibid., Die Mordtat der Orgesch-Manner in Uabringhausen. 
Also information fr~n Willi Krell. Olya Juny and Wilhelm 
Schlechtriem. Krell and Sch1echtriem were both participants in 
the skirmish, on opposing sides. 
I 
.; 
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102 BV, 31/5/24, Oer Klassenrichterspruch im Dabrinyhauser Land-
friedensbruchprozeB. 
I 
The case is an exal!lple of an unmistakable trend in Wei/llar 
just ice, namely the tendency to puni sh harshly lIIi sdemeanours 
committed by the left and to show remarkable understanding for 
offenders of the right who, as a rule, received absurdly light 
sentences, if they were not acquitted • 
. -
At a meeting of the newly-formed Remscheid History Workshop 
Arthur Windgassen recalled the incident which led to Lumpe's 
death. Windgassen relate~ that he was standing next to.the un-
fortunate Lurnpe when he was hit by a bullet fired frolll the 
barn. According to Windyassen British soldiers arrived on the 
scene first and took-statements of witnesses. When court IJro-
ceedings opened the statelllents made to the British could not 
be found. 
For studies dealiny with political justice in the Weimar Repu-
blic cf. Kurt Kreiler (edit.), Traditionen deutscller Justiz. 
Politische Prozesse 1914 - 1932. Ein Lesebuch zur Geschichte 
der Weimarer Republik, Berlin 1978; 
and E.J. Gumbel, Vier Jahre Politisctler Mord, t>erlin 1ya • 
. 
103 K.H. Jahnke, Atze - so nannten wir dich. Aus dern Leben una 
Kampf Artur Beckers,Berlin-Ost 1964, p. 11. 
104 Kortmann, Ope ci t., p. 45. 
105 Ibid., pp. 46-48. 
106 BV, 10/2/23, uRuhrspende" und "Notopfer" in den Relllscheider 
Betrieben. 
107 BV. 29/1/23, 0 i e Bel egscha ft der Manneslflann I{ohrenwerke gegen 
die "nationale Einheitsfront". 
108 BV. 24/5/23, Streik in der BSI. 
109 BV, 28/5/23, Oer Kampf in der Metallindustrie in Reinscheid. 
no BV. 29/5/23, Oer Lohnkarnpf in der I{emscheider Metallindustrie. 
111 BV. 30/f-.>/23, Oer Lohnkampf in der Remscheider Metallilldustrie. 
This claim was rejected by the BV which said that bakery wor-
kers had been granted an hourly rate of 3,520 marks and yas 
and water board erllp 1 oyees were cu rrent ly negot i at i ny a rate of 
3,400 marks. 
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112 BV, 31/5/23, Die Streil<tage in Relllscheid. 
113 BV, 31/.5/23, Eryebnis der UrabstiHlllluny in den Betrieben. 
. A selection of some of the more important factories: 
114 
Factory Total Workforce Acceptance Rejection 
Glockenstahlwerk 539 77 4tlY 
, BSI 2,229 196 2,033 
Mannesmann Motorenwerk 273 2b 24b 
Mannesmann Rohrenwerk 89tl 37 S03 
Alexanderwerk 933 133 7S5 
Luisenhiitte 279 32 242 
Walter Hentzen & Co. 131 S 121 
Spiralbohrerfabrik 9tl 2 96 
Kl i nyt!l hbery Suhllt! lU1 U IY 
Gebruder Arns 103 0 9U 
Ernst-August-Werk 81 3 I'd 
Hessenbruch 121 2tl 102. 
The employers had retJeatedly stated they would not neyotiate 
until· the strikt!rs returned to work and that they would re-
serve the riyht to pUllish strike leadt!rs. To~m councillor Wal-
ter Eilender, director of the Glockenstahlwerk, reyarded the 
strike leaders as crilllinals. an opinion which was shdr~d by 
the majority of works' di rectors in Relllscheid. 
See BV, 5/6/23, Ocr Lohnkalllpf der Relllsch~ider ,v,dallarbeiter 
vor delll Stadtparlament. 
ll~ BV, 6/6/23 and 7/6/23. 1 i sts of cootri but ions to tht! stri kt! 
fund. 
Local railway workers, for example, donated 1,104.0UU marks, 
and a collection in Hiickeswyen brouyht 3,30/,000 marks. 
BV, 12/6/23, Solidaritat der Relllscheider Eisenbahner. 
116 'Oat Russenbrot' as it becallle known, was a yift from the So-
viet Union in return for work tools collected by local workers 
and dispatched the previous year. 
The flour which arrived in five or six setJarate loads through-
out the summer, was used to bake loaves of bread at the KonsUlII 
bakery. These were distributed gratuitously to striking fami-
lies, pensioners, dependents of I-lolitical prisoners and the 
poor. 
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See ~V, 6/4/23, Die Russisehe Brotspende; 
5/6/23 and 30/7/23, Russenbrot. 
I 
Grete Sd lz reed 11 s that non-party filelllbers were yi ven prefe-
rence in the distribution of breaa (interview with tlrete Salz) 
117 BV, 8/6/23, Sieyreicher AbsehluB des Kaltlpfes. 
118 Bv, 4/8/23, Brotpreise; 
and ibid., Kleinverkaufspreis fUr Milch. 
On 1/'d/23, a litre of milk cost 3'd,000 marks and the dollar 
stood at six million lIlarks. 
On 17/8/23, a three and a half pound loaf of bread (Graubrot) 
was retailing at 112,000 marks. 
119 BV, 10/9/23, Provokdteur Steinberg in der Stahlindustrie. 
120 BV, 20/9/23, Sehwere Oifferenzen illl A 1 exanderwerk. 
121 BV, 24/9/23, OUIIUfles .Volk. 
122 HStA Ousseldorf, I{ey. UUss. 38945, Remscheid 9/'J/23, Gesund-
heitszustand der Bevolkerun~. 
123 Ruhle, Ope eit., p. 350. 
Equivalent figures for other towns were: Breslau 33 %, Elber-
feld 25 %, Uarlllen 50 % and Berlin Sehonebery 24 %. 
124 HStA Dusseldorf, Hey. Ouss. 38945, Ope cit. 
125 Riihle, OPe cit., p. 496. 
According to I{uhle, of the 6b,3/6 deaths due to TB in Genllliny 
in 1925, by far the majority werei n the proletariat: 
'Oie Tuberkulose ist die Krankheit der chronischen 
Unterernahrung, der stauberfUllten, dunstiyen, 
schleeht ventilierten Werkstatten, der gesundheits-
widrigen Korperhaltuny bei der Arbeit, der Uberan-
strengung ulld dauernden Ubermuduny der Korperkrafte, 
der unya.sunden, 1 i cht 1 os en , engen und SCtllllUtz i yell 
Wohnungen, der bettenarlllen Haushaltungen, der uber-
fiillten HauHle.· 
126 HStA Oiisseldorf, Rey. Duss. 38945, 9/5/23, tlesundlleitszu-
stand der Bevolkeruny. 
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127 HStA.DUsse1dorf, .Keg. DUss. 3894b, Ope cit. 
128 See table 13. 
I 
12~ HStA Dusseldorf, keg. Ouss. 38944, 12/1/,[J, Verschlechterung 
des Gesundheitszustandes. 
130 HStA DUsseldorf, Reg. Ouss. 3894b, Ope cit. 
131 See increase in convictions by the local assizes (Schoffen-
gericht), 
ego RGA, 12/10/23; 
RGA, 29/10/23; 
I{GA, 6/11/23; 
RGA, 5/12/23; 
RGA, 8/12/23. 
132 The report explained that the town swillullin!] baths hdd bCl'll 
closed for about a year owing to lack of funds. 
133 Ibid. 
134 Ibid. 
The report notes that five citizens of Kelllscheid had cOllllUitteu 
suicide because of economic hardship. This figure would seell\ 
to be far too low considering the circulIIstances. Unfortunate-
ly, no reliable suicide statistics could be located from which 
the social origin of the perpetrators could be ascertained. 
135 StA Relllscheid, NK Il /4, Deutsche Nutgelllei nschaft. 
The file is full of ap~licatiuns for slllall grants to purchase 
clothing for children, Il~dicine for ailing relatives ana arti-
ficial limbs for dllljJutees. 
136 Stadtbauinspektor John, "Oie Stadt ReOlscheid uno ihre bduliche 
Entwick1ung unter l;)erUcksichtigung der. neuesten Leit", ill: 
Wilhelm Rees, Helllsclleid, I;)erlin-Halensee 1922, p. 42. 
137 60 Jahre Bcikerhbhe 1982. Relllscheids erste Standtrandsiedlung 
einst und jetzt. 
138 HStA Dusse1dorf, Reg. Duss. 38945, Ope cit. 
139 BV, 27/10/23, Schafft heute nochBetriebszeitunuen; 
BV, 30/10/23, Betriebszeitung des Glockenstahlwerks; 
and Kortmann, Ope cit., p. bb. 
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140 BV. 13/10/23. Mannesmann Motorenwerk unter Polizeischutz! Die 
Arbelt~r wollen den Kampf. 
141 BV. 16/10/23, Bel eyschaftsversanvul ung der bSI. 
Despite the r"eference to separat i st-secess ioni sts, no evi dence 
could be found by the author of this kind of activity in I{elll-
scheid. 
142 A number of pal icemen were arrested during the course of the 
year by French troops. Several were detained and questioned in 
connection with the organisation of passive resistance. Seve-
ral detainees were afterwards expelled from the oq:upation 
zone. 
143 Some policelllen were suspected by the French of participating 
in slllug~liny lIenturt!s, or uf lur,liny d blind eye tu er-lilies 
perpetrated"by right-wing extrelllists~ The fre4uellt illcidellce 
of attacks by fdscists on peoIJ1e accused of fraterllisation 
with the enelllY, and the failure to take 'actioll ayainst lIIis-
creants as well as t i p-offs enab 1 i ny suspects to IIlake thei r 
getaway before they could be arrested. indicates a certalll 
amount of co 11 us i Orl betwen Sect ions of the po 1 ice and ri ytlt-
wing extremists. A bond which was strengthened during the oc-
cupation was between some Relllscheid lIlanufacturers and the fas-
cists who slllugyled their products across the zonal boundary. 
144 Information from Hanni Schafer. 
BV. 8/12/23, Ein weiteres Todesopfer in der BSI. 
145 The reason for the lony delay between the incident and the 
appearance of the report is due to the fact that the BV was 
undergoing one of its frequent bans at the tillle~ . 
146 BV, 1/11/23, Die SPD-Instanzen wollen nicht den Abwehrkampf. 
147 BV. 13/12/23,"Vorkrieysarbeitszeit und -arbeitsbedingungen. 
148 BV. 16/10/23, Betriebsratswahl irn Alexanderwerk. 
149 BV. 23/11/23, Metallarbe1terwahl 1m Bez1rk Laspert. 
150 BV, 9/1/24, Aussperrung in der Bergischen Stahlindustrie. 
151 BV," 14/1/24. Generalstreik geht weiter. Ein Schupobeamter 
angeschossen. 
- l~~ -
152 BV/18/1/24, Ein neues Blutbad der Schupo; 
and interview with Erich Thieler - the youny man who was shot 
I 
in the leg. He tells of how an Arbeitersarnariter, accolllpanied 
by Professor Resch, tried to carry him into a public house, 
and these were then at tacked by po 1 i celllen who beat them uver 
the head with their rifles butts. 
153 Neuenhaus was conunonly known in Remscheid as I Neu-Moskau I 
owing to its lIlany conununist residents. The estate was bui It 
between 1921 and 1923 by the town council to house primarily 
working-class families from slum dwe11inys in older J,larts of 
the town. 
154 BV. 2/2/24, Pol izei oder Banditentum ? 
BV, 6/2/24, Zu dem Schupouberfall 101 Neuenhaus; 
and HStA Dusse 1 dorf, Hey. Duss. 16945, Hemschei d 10/21'4. 
A list of arlfls confiscated by the police. 
155 HStA Dusseldorf, Rey. Di.iss. 16945, ibid., BOlllbenattentat auf 
das Haus des Fabrikdirektors Albert. 
Police investiyations soon establisned that prior to the bOlllb 
attack a mel,:tiny of strikers ",t the Rbhrenwerk liad been held 
at the house of locksmith Wi lhelm Gobert. When questioned by 
the police. one of ttle partiCipants, locksmith Otto SChlllidt, 
told of a plan to distribute hand grenades but did not say for 
what reason. Furtherlllore, it became clear that the weapons to 
be distributed were th?se discovered by police at Neuenhaus. 
Schlllidt agreed to act as i nforJllant and to tell the po 1 ice the 
names of those involved in the attack. In return SchJllidt was 
probably granted iJllmunity and did not stand trial. In the end, 
five workers were charyed and four convicted. Two received a 
sentence of six years penitentiary, one was given four years 
and the other three years. They were a 1 so depri ved of thei r 
civil rights for a duration of five years. 
156 Ossip K. Flechtheim; Die KPD in der Weirnarer Republik, Frank-
furt a.M. 1976, pp. 182-190. 
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157 HStA, DUsse 1 dorf, Reg. I)iiss. 16903, op. cl t., Relllschei d 
20/4/24· 
According to a police report the KPD had a 2/3 majority in the 
1 oca 1 trade uni on cartel and its members occulJi ed all the 
salaried posts'in the trade unions and most of the unsalaried 
in the trade unions and KonsulII coo~erdtive society. Eight of 
the ten local militia leaders were also KPD members. lhe mili-
tia leaders were: 
Albin Pantzer 
Wi 11 i GrUtz 
Christian leisten 
Albert Issel 
Karl J annack 
Pau 1 Sch 1 e()jnann 
Jakob Wolf 
KPI) secretary, 
editor of the BV, KPU lIIember, 
KPU lIIelllber and bri ck 1 ayer, 
KPU town council, ~rinter, 
, KPll lIIelllDer and trade un i on secretary, 
KPI) m(~lI\ber and ed itor of the BV. 
chainnan of the KPI) district Remscheid, 
Friedrich Schiffler KPI) member, 
Kurt Braf3 SAJ cha i rlllan,' 
Wi1he1m Horst syndicalist trade unionist. 
158 Des~ite rumuurs of large arllls caches in and around Remscheid, 
these never materialised apart from isolated finds as in 
Neuenhaus, which proved to be slllall quantities and of inferior 
quality. The Proletarian Hundreds appear to have been partly 
armed with revolvers, although the majority of lIIembers were 
equi pped with the usual assortment of cha ins, coshes and 
knives. Hanni Schdfer informed the author that sOllle workers 
sold Dutch tobacco in Germany and bouyht pistols in l3elyiulII 
with the proceeds, but these were only sporadic cases of indi-
vidual initiative and may well have been at d later date, as 
inflation would have rendered the purchase of foreign goods 
almost impossible. 
159 The basis for the study of electoral behaviour in Remscheid is 
an essay written by the author in 1975, entitled "Die Entwick-
lung der Parteien in Relllscheid illl Very1eich zur gesamten Wei-
marer Repub1ik anhand der Wahlergebnisse von 1920 bis 1!H2". 
The essay presents the findings of a reasonably accurate sur-
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vey,of the town's votiny wards made on the basis of inforllla-
tion obtained from the Rernscheid residents' address book 1929, 
I 
and the correlation of these findings with the keichstag elec-
tion results during the period 1920-19J2. The main ~roblel/l for 
our present purposes is the fact that the physical composition 
of the individual wards was changed and the nun~er of wards 
was increased from 29 (1919) to 30 (1920) and 40 after the 
Reichstag election of 6/6/1920, thus altering the electoral 
structure of the town radically. This means that for the elec-
tions to the constitutional assen~ly 19/1/19 and the Reichstag 
. 
6/6/20 only a rough description of the various wards can be 
sUjJplied. Thereafter, until May 1933, theinforlllation con-
tained in ajJ~endix 1 Cdn be taken as being accurate. 
160 StA Remscheid, 1~/22, Sonderakte betreffend Reichstagswahlen 
vom 6/6/20. 
161 Cf. C.D. Thompson. Ope cit., p. 34. 
162 Cf. Alfred Milatz, W~hler und Wahlen in der weimarer Republik. 
Bonn 1965, p. 114: 
'Viele Wahler, die sie lUDP) 1~19 als letztes tloll-
werk gegen eine sozialistische Alleinherrschaft 
betrachtet hatten, waren nun, ndchdem sie mit der 
Mehrheitssozi a 1 delllokrat i e zusallllllenyegangen war und 
fur die in burgerlichen Kreisen unpopularen Notopfer-
und Betriebsrategesetze die Mitverantwortung trug, 
wieder abgesprunyen und weiter nach rechts yer~ckt.' 
163 Ibid., p. 116. 
164 Appendix 1 gives a fairly accurate survey of the social COllljJO-
sition of the 40 voting warus in Alt-RelllsCheid based on infor-
mation taken from tile Relllscheid address book 1929. Although 
individual mobility between these areas continued norlllally 
during the years 1924 to 1933, thi s is not to say that the ! 
composition of the wards changed significantly. In fact, owing 
to the relative economic stability between 1924 and 1929, the 
general tradition of voluntary inullobility and ~reference of 
settling in familiar surroundings which changed only, after the 
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vey .of the town' s vot i ng wards made on the bas is of i nforllla-
tion obtained from the Remscheid residents' address book 1929, 
I 
and the correlation of these findings with the keichstay elec-
tion results during the period 1920-1932. The main jJroblem for 
our present purposes is the fact that the physical composition 
of the i ndi vi dua 1 wards was changed and the number of wards 
was increased from 29 (1919) to 3U ll920) and 40 after the 
Reichstag election of 6/6/1920, thus altering the electoral 
structure of the town radically. This lIIeans that for the elec-, 
tions to the constitutional asselllbly 19/1/19 and the Reichstay 
. 
6/6/20 only _ a rough description of the various wards can be 
supplied. Thereafter, until May 1933, the inforllldtion cun-
tained in apjJendix 1 can be 'taken as bein9 accurate. 
160 StA Remschei d, I ti/22, Sonderakte bet reffend I<ei chstagswatll en 
vam 6/6/20. 
161 Cf. C.D. TtlOlllpson, OPe cit., p. 34. 
162 Cf. Alfred Milatz, W~hler und Wahlen in der weimarer I<epublik, 
Bonn 1965, p. 114: 
'Viel~ Wahler, die sie (UDP) 1~19 als letztes ~oll­
werk gegen eine sozialistische Alleinherrschaft 
betrachtet hatten, waren nun, nachdem sie mit der 
Mehrhei tssozi a 1 delllokrat i e zusalllluengegangen war und 
fUr die in bUrgerlichen Kreisen unpopularen NotojJfer-
und ~etriebsrategesetz~ die Mitverantwortung truy, 
wieder abgesprungen und weiter nach rechts ger~ckt.· 
163 Ibid., p. 116 •. 
164 Appendix 1 gives Cl fairly accurate survey of the social COllljJO- i 
sition of the 40 voting wards in Alt-Relllscheid bast!d on infor-
mation taken from tlte Remscheid. address book 1929. Although 
individual mObility between these areas continued norlllally 
during the years 1924 to 1933, thi s is not to say that the 
composition of the wards changed Significantly. In fact, owiny 
to the relative economic stability between 1924 and 1929, the 
general tradition of voluntary inulIobility and jJreference of 
settling in fallliliar surroundings which changed only after the 
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alllonyst the various cl dsses dnd shou Id thert!fore 
not be overlooked when calculating the social con~ 
position. 
Category G manufacturers (Fabrikanten), industrialists (Unter 
nehlller), export and import-Kauflllann. 
Category H artists and freelancers. 
The address book only lists households and not individual 
falllily members unless th~se are ehlJ,>loyed adults. 
Although the degree of precision regarding this categorisdtion 
remains necessarily uncertain, the groupings do nevertheless 
give us a sufficiently accurate working 1II0del. 
The Sdllle Sy~lCIII w..a::; u~cJ to <.I1I..a 'Iy~c tilt! SUl: id I <':UIII~U5 i tUII U I 
Lennt!p and Luttrin!:lhJusell .which kt!I.H. their ilH.JepellJcllt statu::; 
until the lIlunicipal reorYdnisation of 1929, wllen they were in-
corporated into the town of i<elllscheid which then achieved the 
status of Gr06stadt (town with over 100,UUU inhabitants). 
Alt-Remscheid was structured i~ the following way: 
Category A 13,330 households = b2.1 % 
Category B ~,839 households = 11.1 % 
. Category C 
Category 0 
Category E 
Category El 
Category F 
Category G 
Category H 
lennep: 
Category A 
Category B 
Cateyory C 
Category 0 
Category E 
Category El 
1,132 households = 4.4 % 
1,616 households = b.J % 
1,81~ households = 7.1 % 
~9 households = 0.4 % 
2,Y42 households = 11.6 %(in reality dispersed 
amony the other cate-
gories) 
1,694 households = 6.6 % 
102 households = U.4 %. 
2,121 
2~U 
157 
households = 
households = 
households = 
49.0 % 
5.8 % 
3.b % 
= 13.2 % bb9 households 
361 householas = 8.3 % 
= 3.0 io . 129 households 
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Category F ~/O households = 13.2 1. 
Category G Ibl households = 3.1 1. 
. Category H 7 households = 0.2 % 
Li.ittrin~hausen: 
Category A 2.000 households = 52.~ % 
Category 13 165 households = 4.3 % 
Category C 7'd housellolds = 2.1 % 
Category 0 279 households = 1.3 % 
Category E 276 households = 7.3 % 
Category El 230 lIouseholds = b.l % 
Category F 440 households = ll.b % 
Cate!jory G 319 household!.> = 13.4 % 
Category H 0 households = 0.0 %. 
165 Cf. C.D. Tholll~son, o~. cit •• ~. 3~. 
166 Lucas, Ope cit •• ~. 133. 
167 Owing to the electoral reform a direct cOlllparison is no lonyer 
possible as can be seen frolll the exam~le of ward I, Inlle-
st ra(3e/StrucK, wh i ch roughly corresponds to the 1nU vot i ny 
ward 5. In 1920, 1,464 voters out of the 1,574 who were eli-
gible, went to tht! polls. In In4. 9b~ votes were cast (~OU 
fewer). The reduction in the sizt! of tht! wards would account 
for 1Il0st of the lIIissing votes which were then distributed over 
other wards. viz. Bezirke 6 and 'd. 
168 Ward 13 consistently ~roduced the highest nUlllber of votes for 
the ZentruliI in Remsctleid. The area eentering on the cathol ie 
church also contdined a catholic clubhouse. the Kolpinghdus. 
and a catholic school. The presence of a larger than average 
catholic po~ulation in this ward, however, did flot lIlean an 
automatic preference for the ZentrulII which callle third in ttlis 
election behind the DVP and KPD. whose supporters undoubtedly 
liVed in the Pa~enberger Straf3e/Frei hei tstral3e l-lart of the 
ward. further away from the centre of town. 
, 
j -, 
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169 To these must be added the difficulties eXl-leriertCed particu-
larly by small firms during the French occupation. Small firms 
. 1 i ke those whi ch pro 1 i ferate in Hasten suffered a temporary 
loss of export o~t 1 ets and trade owi ng to the prohi bit i ve 
taxes and other restrictions imposed by the French occupation. 
Small businesses also habitually suffered from cl negative cash 
flaw, cl condition which made thelll extrelllely vulnerable ill 
times of crisis. Whereas large cOlllpanies were in a position to 
turn inflation to their own advantage, small falllily businesses 
of the Hasten-type were cOlllpelled to struggle for th~ir sur-
vi va 1-
170 Cf. Chapter IV, The Extreme IUyht in RelllSClleid. 
III for ca short cart<.llysis of lilt.! UIWP's reservuir ul volers Sct.! 
Anneliese ThillUIlt.!, Flucht in den Mythos. Oie dt.!utschndtionull! 
Volkspartei und die Niederlayc VUII 191H, GottiClyen 1969, I-lp. 
26-32. 
172 Ibid., p. 30. 
Lut tri nghausen wa s overwhe 1 eni ng ly j.J rotestant whereas Lellnel-l 
had a 1 arge cattlO 1 i c lIIi nority, djJj.Jrox i lIIate ly J3 l. 
Cf. Prof. Dr. Erich Keyser (edit.), Ueutsches Stadtebuch. tiand 
111.3. Landschaftsverband Rheinland, Stuttgart 1956, p. 35H. 
173 The following streets were renamed: 
B i slllarckstra{)e 
HindenburgstraBe 
Sedanstra13e 
Konigstra!)e 
Kaiserplatz 
B i rgderkalllper Stra()e 
Neuscheider Stra!)e 
Karl-Mdrx-StrdBe 
August-Bebel-Straue 
Rathausplatz 
Hindenburgpark Stadtl-ldrk, 
see BV, 14/6/24, Monarchistenclub im Remscheider Rathaus. 
174 The lIIayor of Relllsche id, DVP lIIelllber' Wa lter Hartlllann, was 1 ater 
to boast to a Nazi tribunal that he had always insisted on the 
old colours and haa eXjJressly forbidden the official use ot 
black. red and gold flags for decoration purjJoses on special 
occasions: 'Jedenfalls ha be ich, solange ich in Nemscheid bin, 
und zwar seit 1918 als einzigster ijurgerllleister, niellldls 
schwarz-rot-yold geflaggt.' 
HStA Ousseldorf, .Ger. Rep. b/879. 
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175 All information taken from BV. 
176 For Ko§tganger rents see BV, 10/9/23, Grenzenlose Ausbeutun~ 
Uberall. 
Attic room with bed linen provided 
Attic room without bed linen 
Etagenzi~f~r with bed linen provided 
EtagenzilTlmer without .. bed 1 inen 
A better room with bed linen provided 
A bet ter room without bed 1 i nen 
4,~!:lU,OUU marKS. 
3,2UO,OUU hldrks. 
6,200,00U marks. 
4,400,000 marks. 
/,/OU,OOU marks. 
5,900,UOO warks. 
The article described conditions in a house in Wilhel(!lstral~e. 
In a four by four metre room there were four people sleejJiny 
in two beds. One of Hie occupants WdS sufferi n~ frOl1l i! j.JU 1111U/I-
ry disease. The bed clothes were uld dnu tattered JrHj Wl:!re 
washed only every three to four lIIonths. The rOOlIl was never 
cleaned. 
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C H APT E RIll 
The Remscheid Workers' Movement 1924 to lY~~ 
The defeat of the workers' movement in October 1923 and the intro-
duction of the nine and t,en-hour workin~ day brou~ht to an end tne 
revolutionary period in Remscheid as in the rest of Germany. The 
following years until 1929 witnessed a partial stabilisdtion of the 
capitalist system. and this period was used by the workers' move-
ment to regroup and prepare for the next revolutionary situation to 
develop. The defeat of 1923 also had far-reachiny consequences for 
the local workers' movement in Remscheid. The KPD had developed 
into the strongest workers' party in the town and had taken over 
the leadership of the workers' movement. The cost of this success, 
however, was a temporary reduction in party and trade union nlelllber-
ship, ,which was also 1n part a result of demoralisation and per-
sonal hardship. The disaffection of local workers was reflected in 
the Reichstag elections of 19241, rather by the low turn-out than 
by the switching of allegiance. 
The defeat of 1923 showed that the active base of the workers' 
movement needed to be widened and that different and more varied 
strategies would have to be devised. if the movement was to succeed 
in its aims. During the revolutionary period the KPD had been split 
by right- and left-wing ~roup.5 so that at crucial moments it 
was not always able to' provide clear and effective leaderShip. A 
new line of policy needed to be established to enable the party to 
concentrate on winning over the bulk of the workers and to develop 
into a mass-movement. The new course was finally established with 
the elevation of £rnst Thalmann to the pOSition of party chairman 
in 192!>. This change, waS paralleled in Remscheid by the emergence 
of a"more energetic style of leadership provided uy a radical and 
younger group of 1 eaders. The change, i n po 11 cy dnd 1 eadersh i p i n-
jected a new sense of determination into the local movement. 
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. 1. The Sta1inisation of the KPD in Remscheid. 
The new course which was referred to by the Corrununists thelllse Ives 
as the 'bolshevisation' of the party, has since been termed 'stali-
nisation' by critics in the West. 2 
The essential characteristics of this poli cy3 were the complete 
subordination of the party to the Co~"unist International and the 
leadership of the Soviet Union, the suppression of internal opposi-
tion by increasing resort to expulsion, the acceptance of Soviet 
i"" 
revolutionary theory, which amountedAa rejection of the very. tradi-
tion of the KP04 and the constant mobil isation of party members 
and the workers in extra-parliamentary activities. 
The enthusiasm and conviction with which the new line was received 
by Remschei d comnun i st I eaders can be gauged by the comments made 
by their delegate, Adolf Benscheid. at the 12th party congress in 
lY29. 
'In den verschiedenen Situationen haben die russischen 
Genossen ••• die deutsche Zentrale korrigieren mussen. Und 
hier mu6 man erklaren. daB der Partei~ geschlossen die 
Hegemonie der russischen Partei anerkennen muB. Unsere 
russischen Genossen haben gro6ere lrfahrungen auf dem 
Gebiet der revolution~ren Politik und Taktik. Wir rnUssen 
dtese Hegemonie aufs vollste anerkennen und fordern ••• 
Wir werden mit den russischen Genossen, die groBe revo-
lutionareErfahrungen haben. gemeinsarn auch die R~volution 
in Oeutschland weiter fortsetzen und in der Tat siegreich ' 
durchfUhren. '!:> 
In Remscheid the major institutions of the working-class moven~nt 
were stil J intact, although it ~as recognised that new organisa-
tions·would have to be founded if the movement was to expand alony 
the Hnes dictated by KPD pol icy., The Communists intenaed to mobi-
lise the whole of the working-class population by the creation of 
new sub-organisations. incorporating specific target groups such as 
women. children. youths. unemployed workers, war-disabled and pen-
sioners~ Once'these groups had been attached to the movement, they 
were to be kept in a state of perpetual agitation, carrying out the 
directives handed down to them from the local party leadership. It 
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was widely. agreed that one of the most serious shortcomings of the 
old street cells - a legacy from the fonner SPD organisation - was 
the sporadic nature of their work. As a rule they would remain dor-
mant for months, only becoming active prior to elections or on 
occasions when residents were directly affected, for instance, when 
evictions were being carried out. Furthermore activities tended to 
be uncoordinated and frequently dependent on the initiative and 
ability of individuals. 'If such figures were absent or in any way 
hindered, local organisation tended to suffer considerably. In 
addition, younger activists complained that the work of. street 
cells was often hampered by the drinking habits of party members. 
Whilst youths were on the street either recruiting or agitating, 
older party comrades were sitting in the pub consuming large quan-
tities of alcohol, discussing the prospects of a better life after 
the revolution. 6 
In order to take full advantage of the next revolutionary situation 
the KPD did not intend to rely merely on the spontaneity of the 
masses, but instead wanted to build a coherent, well-schooled and 
. disciplined mass organisation whose members fully grasped the rea-
sons for, and the consequences of, their actions. 
It was decided, however, that the main channel for expansion was 
the factory cell which had been neglected too often in the past. In 
agreement with Leni ni st theory. factory workers were to form the 
vanguard of the proletariat. 
It was here then, that the KPD planned its main offensive, thus in-
dUCing a shift of emphasis away from the housing estates to the 
place of work. It was hoped that this strategy would prove more 
fruitful in attracting activists into the movement,' as it was in 
the factories where class hostility was consistently ~resent. Expe-
rience had shown that works council meet 1 ngs attracted a far hi yher 
percentage of workers than street cell meetings in the hous i rl9 
estates or even party gatherings. Experience in Remscheid had al-
r~ady indicated that this shift in emphasis would bring the desired 
resu lts, but even here much work had to be done in the majority at 
- by Rernscheid standards - middle-sized factories and workshops, 
.. llO .. 
employing. between 25 and 100 workers. In the bulk of Remscheid 
establishments, ie. the small family businesses employing less than 
te~ workers, the outlook for the successful execution of this stra-
tegy was believed to be bleak, and for this reason these did not 
receive as much attention from the local party organisation. Ihe 
workers'i n the smaller estab 1'1 shments were, however, encouraged to 
jOin trade unions and the party, and indeed some of them did sQ, 
but 1n general the party's influence remained limited in the slIIall 
workshops. 
In the large factories like the BSI, Richard Lindenberg, Alexander-
. 
werk and Mannesmann, members of factory ce 11 s were better ab le' to 
spread their influence amongst the workers whilst enjoying the pro-
tect i on of numbers. I t was ca I cu 1 ated that the factory ce 11 wou Id 
be compelled to discuss problems of immediate significance to the 
workforce, and not become side-tracked by, and entangled in, ab-
stractions which often frustrated or else demoralised workers who 
only had their own experience and little or no schooling to rely 
on. 'The successful conclusion of the factory cell strategy demanded 
rigid self-discipline on the part of functionaries~ the need to be 
well-informed and constantly avai lable to give advice left little 
time for private interests. 
The leadership of the KPD had changed over the revolutionary period 
not only at the national level but also in Remscheid. The changes 
reflected a loss of sympathy amongst local workers for their lea-
ders8, many of whom were adj udged to have adopted an independent 
1 ine and thereby to have jeopardised the aChievements made by the 
workers' moven~nt. 
~ As we have already seen, Otto Braf3, Heinrich Schliestedt, WaIter 
freytag, Wilhelm Dittmann. Rudolf BLihler and Friedrich Wolf, who 
had led Remscheid workers very' ably during the revolution, and had 
organised the strike and ensuing armed resistance during the Kapp-
Putsch in March 1920. had all returned to the MSPO and/or moved 
away from Remscheid. Wi 11 i GrLitz," the forrner editor of the Beryi .. 
sche Volksstinme (BV), became involved in an inner-party dispute 
which resulted in hh sUlflnary expulsion from the KPD, after which 
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he took n,o further part in the movement. A similar fate met Jo-
hannes Resch when he accused the KPO of intolerance and inflexibi-
li~y in its attitude towards the Freie Volkshochschule. Resch who 
came nei ther from Remscheid nor the working cl ass was re~arded by 
some local workers with distrust and suspicion, and therefore faced 
considerable prejudice, despite his prodigious achievements local-
ly. He maintained, however, an uneasy truce with the KPD - which 
eventually led to his reinstatement - and continued to take part in 
, . 
various ~ffiliated organisations up to his departure frolll Reruscheid 
The cases of GrUtz and Resch illustrate the drastic and inflexible 
. 
sanctions which, the party employed to quell deviations from ,the 
, I 
party 1 i ne. 
Wilhelm Koch, another very able and popular leader of the workin~­
class movement in Relllscheid during the revolutionary lJeriod, ~uS 
oJ.so eJ(pi.U~d. 
Yet another 
member of, the old leadership, Cornel ius Gohr, joined the KPO but 
was already too advanced in age to play a decisive role in the 
movement after 1923. 
Gradually another generation of leaders superseded the old one. Ihe 
majority of these younger men were, born between 1B9!> and 190b. 
These were representatives of the war generation, those who had 
been called up early in the war and spent years in the trenches. 
Their experiences at the front coupled with their already partly 
formed socialist ideas left a deep impression on them •. Ihey re-
turned,to Remscheid as tra;ned soldiers who were not afraid to take 
up arllls to, fight against the forces of restauration. Ihese were the 
people who during the Kapp-Putsch illlllledi,ately rallied to the ~ 
Armee (Red Army of the Ruhr) and took part in the fierce street 
fighting against the Freik~rps troops. Ihis was a generation of 
young men prepared 1 iterally to die for thei r ideal s. Ihey had wit-
nessed at first hand the demise of the Wilhelmine Reich, but then 
, fe I t cheated of vi ctory . by ,the apparent wi'll i nyness of thei r own 
leaders to compromise with the representatives of the old order • 
. This generation of highly motivated and dedicated leaders had seen 
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the chances of establishing a dictatorship of the proletariat slip 
away, partly due to ~hat they regarded as betrayal by the SPD, and 
par,tly due to the failure to widen the base of the movement in time 
to sustain the spirit of the revolution. They had also recently 
witnessed the successful seizure of power by the Russian workers. 
which reinforced their belief in their ultimate victory. For these 
reasons they were all the more determined ·to succeed at the next 
suitab I e opportunity, and set about prepari ng the ground for the 
next revolutionary situation to occur. They tended to base their 
strategy more and more on the Russi~n experience and were committed 
to the Leninist theory of a rigidly disciplined and totally politi-
cised industrial proletariat forlllin!;l the vanguard of tile revolu-
tion. This generation looked increasinyly towards Moscow. tor yuid-
ance' and inspiration. and their leaders) anxious to insti I their 
fe 11 ow-workers wi th the same kind of fervour that they thelllse Ives 
felt for the cause. This enthusiasm for the Soviet Union lIIanifested 
itself on many occasions outwardly during the middle years of the 
Weimar Republic in Remscheid, as for example when a delegation of 
local workers led by Albert lssel returned from Moscow wearing. 
Russian peasant-style shirt~ in b~ight red.9 
. 
The most prominent leaders of the Relllscheid workers IlIovelllent duriny 
the middle and later years of the Weimar Republic were: Peter 
Leyendecker - a KPD town councillor who tauyht at the party school 
in Leichlingen and was one of the few real intellectuals at the 
I oca I 1 eve I. Leyendecker was a pass i onate proponent of non-denom i-
national schools10 • and together with Johannes Resch ~Iayed a 
dominant role in the Arbeiterkulturkartell (workers i cultural orga-
nisation) as did Karl Sothmann. another teacher, who was also in 
charge of the. Juny-Spartakus group whi ch made its appearance in 
Remscheid in 1925. Another important melllber of the local leadership 
was Adolf Benscheid who belonged to the older generation. yet re-
mained active as a member of the Landtag throughout the Weimar 
years. Bensche1d was a talented speaker with a quick and alert mind 
which helped him to deal effecti~ely with hecklers whenever neces-
sary. Benscheid was a favourite of the local workers and constitu-
· . 
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ted something of an exception in the local movement in that he was 
a small manufacturer. It was a grave blow to the KPO when after the 
Se~ond World War he abandonned the official party line in favour of 
Titoism. His expulsion from the KPD weakened the local movement, as 
a number of other members fo 11 owed his examp I e and were either 
ejected from, ~r else left the party voluntarily.ll 
An important figure in the Remscheid workers' movement during the 
mid- and late-20s was Bernhard B~stlein who was later destined to 
play a significant role in the resistance movement in Halllburg and 
Berlin, where he,.led a group of KPD members and sympathisers to-
gether with Anton Saefkow. Bernhard Bastlein came to Rems~heid to 
take up the post of editor-in-chief of the BV, but also took charye 
of the Remscheid RFB-group. He also appeared regularly as a propa-
ganda speaker of the KPD and was sadly missed when he moved on to 
take over the post of chief editor of .the party newspaper "frei-
heit" in Ousseldorf. Ernst Zulauf held the post of editor of the BV 
for many years, and enjoyed great popularity with the workers and d 
certain notoriety with bourgeois circles in Remscheid, because of 
the papers' frequent po I emic attacks on the Remschei der Genera 1-
Anzeige'r, the local authorities and local manufacturers. Other im-
portant local leaders were: Gustav Eckardt, one of the founder-mem-
bers of the Remschei d I oca I group of the Naturfreunde and former 
USPD member; Max Guschinski who was a KPO councillor as well as the 
political instructor of the KPO's trade union organisation Revolu-
tionare Gewerkschaftsopposition (RGO) for the Rernscheid district 
towards the end of the twenties, WaIter Koster, chairman of the 
Ortsgruppe Lennep; Gustav Flohr, leader of the Rernscheid Ortsgruppe 
of the RFB. who was appOinted as mayor in 1946 by the British; Otto 
Weber and Jakob Wolf who were both KPO-Reichstagsabyeordnete. Alwin 
Panzer, Alois Kieven, Paul Brozulat, Paul Orbach. Albert Pardon and 
Karl ZUlch were other notable local functionaries ,of the KPO. 
Alfred Oelsner12 spent several years in the town and founded 
the local group of the Rotfront-Madchenbund (the Red Front Girls' 
League). A I bert Norden13 who 1 i ved in nearby El berfe 1 d belonged 
to the editorial committee 'of the Bergische Volksstirrllle in Rem-
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scheid in 1924. Willi Adams 14 who also came from I:.lberfeld 
worked for a ,time in the Remscheid KPD headquarters; and Iheodor 
Neubauer15 from DUsseldorf was a frequent visitor to the town 
throughout the Weimar years. 
A further group of leaders were products of the local KJVD which. 
as we shall see. was particularly strong and active. Ihe best-known 
of these was Artur Secker, born in 1905 and leadet of the Remscheid 
Ortsgruppe of the KJVD in the mid-20s before moving on to Oussel-
dorf where he became chairman of the KJVD Bezirk Niederrhein (Lower 
Rhineland reyion). Becker who became a close friend of lhalrnann's • 
. 
was voted onto the central committee of the KJVD in 1ny and 1 ed 
the conmittee from 1931 onwards. 16 Seeker was extreme ly popular 
in Remscheid and particularly admired for his courage and sense of 
humour. His friend Emll Kortmann17 recalls that Hecker was par-
t i cu I arly i nfl uenced by Sothmann, Leyendecker and Resch ~ l~ 
Friedrich Wolf who was a doctor in Remscheid for a tillle after the 
war and who taught at the Freie Volkshochschule also played a major 
role during Secker's formative years. Artur Becker becan~ the youn-
gest member ever to sit in the Reichstag when he was elected to re-
present the KPD in 1930.1~ 
Another promi nent member of the younger gene rat i on of workers' 
leaders was Hu~o Paul 20 , born in the same year as 8ecker. He 
was a fitter-mechanic by profession and came to the KPD in 1923 via 
the local branch of the.DMV and Freie Sozialistische Jugend. After 
Artur Secker's departure for Dusseldorf, Hugo Paul succeeded to the 
leadership of the local group of the KJVD, and in 19~tl himself be-
callle a member of the Bezirksleitung Niederrhein. Hugo Paul also re-
presented the KPD in the Reichstag from July to November lYJ2. In 
contrast to Secker, however. Paul remained in the Niederrhein nlore 
or less all his life. and this fact particularly endeared him to 
the local workers. According to Kortmann21 there were those who 
a'ccused Secker of tryi n9 to secure a comfortab I e career for hi mse 1 f 
in the upper echelons of the party apparatus. 22 Ihis career 
proved to be anything but comfortable, ending abruptly at the age 
of 33 at the hands of Spanish fascists in Surgos in 193H whi 1st 
fighting for the International Brigade in the Spanish Civil 
War. 23 
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Another leading figure belonging to the younger generation of wor-
kers' leaders in Remscheid was Robert Stamm, born in 1~UU, who was 
a ·fitter-mechanic by trade, but who after his discharge from the 
army in 1918 successfu Ily completed a course of study to become a 
technician. Starruu joined the SPD youth movement in 1914 and became 
a sympathiser of the Spartakists as a result of his experiences at 
the front. He joined the local KPD group in 1920 and took part in 
the,battle of Remscheid during the Kapp-Putsch. In 1924 he moved to 
Barmen to become secretary of the KPD Unterbezirk Barmen/Elberfeld. 
Although Stamm's sphere of activity was from now on primari Iy out-
. 
side Remscheid. he was nevertheless a frequent visitor and WdS pdr-
, ticularly well-known for his work as trade union secretary and edi-
tor of the OUsseldorf KPO newspaper "Freiheit".24 Stan~ like 
Becker was a victim of the Nazi regime. He was'executed in Be~lin 
Plotzensee in 1937 for his part in the resistance to the Nazis • 
. Other important members of the group of younger 1 eaders were Ewa 1 d 
Funke. Hans Katzenberger, Karl Giersiepen and Kurt Bral3. Ihis list 
. . 
by no means exhausts the leadership cadre of the workers' movement 
which succeeded the old SPD cadre after the defeat of 1923, but it 
does contain the most prominent fiyures who were actively enyayed 
locally in the struggle to overthrow the bouryeois order. Apart 
from those a I ready mentioned there were other important fi gures in 
the workers' movement who spent periods working in Relllscheid. tlest 
known amongst these is Dr. Richard Sorge who taught at the Volks-
hochschule as well as assisting the BV in an editorial capacity. 
This group of young leaders was supported by an equally determined 
cadre of KPD. trade union and workers' sports and recreational club 
functionaries. 
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2. The Deteriorating Relationship between the KPD and· SPD in 
Remscheid. 
As we have already seen tht! relationship between the KPD and SPD 
was at best strained and at worst exceedingly hostilt!. In Relll-
sche~d, 'the positions of the parties were the rt!verse of those at 
the Reich level, with the SPD enjoying only exiguous local support. 
As already noted, there. were frequent disagreements on the town 
council between the KPD and SPD councillors. The bitter internecine 
quarrel between the two parties was a constant feature of PQlitical 
life in Remscheid throughout the Weimar period. Particularly during 
the.20s it enabled the weaker bourgeois parties to play a political 
rolt! far in excess of their proportional support, by virtue of the 
fact that locally they were able to enter and sustain d coal ltiOIl 
whose ra i son d' etre was largely to. prevent the workers' lIIovement 
from taking control. The rancorous relationship between the KPD and 
SPD was aired in the BV and the SPD's closest newspaper, the "Freie 
Presse" published in Elberfeld. These two newspapers carried .on a 
vehement war of words with da tly columns devoted to the slander of 
the opposing party, its .10ca1 leaders and its rival newspaper and 
to the. denial of accusations emanating from the other side. This 
situation furnished bourgeois papers like the RGA with a similar 
advantage over the socialist press as the one exploited by the 
bourgeoi s part ies at the expense of the spn and KPJ) on the town 
counci I. Thus the RGA was able to imply that it was a lUore st!rious 
journal which did not willinyly involve itself in petty squabbles 
like its socialist counterparts. In reality the RGA was not above 
participating in such feuds •. and indeed did so regularly. The tone 
of its attacks on the BV tended to be disdainful, endeavouring to 
suggest that the communi~t newspaper could not be taken seriously. 
The claim to seriousness stenmed principally from the fact that it 
enjoyed a good relationship with the mayor and his local government 
administration and was therefore accorded a quasi-official status. 
The BV which was evidently read by both KPD) and SPD supporters 
appealed incessantly to the· latter to abandon their party in favour 
-------------------------------
- 217 -
of the former. -At the individual level, it would appear there was 
little evidence of the hostility which dominated the official rela-
tionship between the two workers' parties. In the factories members 
and -sympathisers of both parties worked side by side and in the 
evening frequented the same pubs, so that they had ample opportuni-
ty to discuss the political situation and the quarrel between their 
two parties. Workmates were often able to attain the broad agree-
ment whi ch thei r respecti ve party organi sat ions at times rejec-
ted. 25 
Despite disagreements between the two parties, RFB/Kgdf and Reichs-
banner groups were always ready to help and protect each other in 
skirmishes with a clearly identifiable enemy such as the Stahlhellll 
or the Nazi s.£6 At the- i ndivi dua I I eve 1 there was contact be-
tween members and sYlllpathisers of both parties, desjJit~ the otti-
cial disapproval of fraternisation particularly on the side of the 
SPD. It is possibly a measure of the SPO's weakness that at the lo-
cal level during the 20s it often tended to cooperate lIIore wi Iliny-
ly with the BUrgerblock than with the KPD. The SPO obviously felt 
threatened by its more powerfu I ~ruderpartei, and was therefore 
anxious to keep a clear distance between itself and the KPO. Ihe 
overwhe 1 lIIi n9 strength of the KPO in numeri ca 1 terms, its into I e-
rance towards independent ideas, and the fact that the local SPD 
leadership -identified with the government and the Republ ic's insti-
tutions, were the main reasons for the abysmal relationship between 
the two workers' parties in Remscheid. The fact that prominent SPU 
leaders held important positions in the local government adminis--
tration, the police and the workers' sickness insurance offices, 
was interpreted by younger Communi sts as careeri sm '{Postchen-
jagerei).27 In an official capacity they frequently came into 
conflict with the KPO and were branded as traitors. Firstly, these 
SPD 1 eaders were on average older than the majority of conunun i st 
activists who were now proceeding to occupy pOSitions of leadershijJ I 
in the 'party and its affiliated organisations. Secondly, their mode 
of dress, directed by the requirements of their jobs, tended to set 
them off from the majority of workers. In addition, job security 
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and responsibility to higher (ie. not working-class) authority were 
other factors separating these people from the mass of workers. In 
some· cases there was also at least a suspicion of nepotism in the 
way other family members were given employment, either in the same 
office or else in other departments. 28 
Finally, the question of personal antipathy was constantly present 
( 
in Remscheid, as indeed elsewhere, and both parties had their 
favourite taryets in the opposite camp. Critici~m of the other 
party's policy was often couched' in particularly invidious personal 
attacks and gave the impression that often the root of the ~onflict 
between the two parties lay in the question of personalities rather 
than issues. 
Although the terlllSozidlfdscllist ($ocidl fascist) WdS coined .is 
early as 1924 it was not in general use until much later. !he 
acceptance and increasing employment of this obnoxious term in the 
KPD towards the end of the 20s reflected the growing exasperation 
of the COITU"lIunists with the SPD leadership. The Social fascist 
theory expounded by Ernst Tha Imann so forcefully at the party' s 
12th congress in 1929, in the aftermath of the shooting of workers 
in Berlin on 1st May by Zorgiebe1's police, was an extension of the 
Leninist theory of the worker aristocracy. In this version the 
aristocrats of labour, who dominated the SPD and trade union 
bureaucracy had penetrated and become part of the state apparatus. 
Their function in this merger of party, trade union and state was 
to form the front 1 ine in the defence of capital ism .in its fascist 
phase. 29 The Social fascist theory was finally abandoned' by the 
Co~nunist International in 1934/35 as erroneous •. With the propaga-
tion of this theory the KPD had hoped to strengthen its yrass-roots 
united front policy (Einheitsfront von unten). The effect of the 
Social fascist theory. however. proved damaging as it contributed 
substant i a lly " to exacerbating the sp 1 it in the workers' movement 
during the crucial period leading up to the Nazi seizure of 
power. 30 Social Democrats retal iated over the same period with 
the epithet Kozi (Communist-Nazi), after jOin~ actions between the 
KPD and the NSDAP.31 
------------------.------------ ------------------------
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The already strained relationship deteriorated further in Relllscheid 
duri~g the course of 1929 fallowing the expulsion of the majority 
of the I oca I branch of the Arbei ter Turn- und Sportbund the pre-
vious year32 which led to, the founding of a local group ot the 
Roter Sportbund. After the May-Day shoot i nys in Ber I in and the 
founding of a revolutionary trade union organisation (RGU) in Rem-
scheid, relations between the two socialist parties reached an all-
time low. The temporary ban on the Rote Fahne and the outlawing of 
the RFB33 appeared to offer ample confirmation that the Social 
Fascist theory was correct. 
Recr;minations were hurled back and forth between the BV and Freie 
Presse and at publ ic meetings by representatives of the KPO and 
SPD, until on 17th August leading members of the local party orYd-
nisations came to blows outside the 'Volkshaus. 34 lhe brawl 
followed an SPD meeting addressed by local chairman Max Blank. Itle 
meeting ended with a heated exchange of words between SPU and KPU 
members which was continued downstairs in the pub and then outside, 
where two policemen also became involved. The upshot of the brawl 
, was the conviction of two KPD members for slander, and of two other 
KPD members for resisting arrest and con~nitting grievous bodt Iy 
harm. 35 The extent to which personal animosities as well as 
party differences counted, is amply reflected in the BV's report of 
the incident,36 ~hich was concerned with apportioning blame 
without adequately explaining the issues behind the aftair. 
'Relations between the parties continued to deteriorate, so that 
c;n<. 
s imi 1 ar c I ashes began to occur more frequently. On such occas i on 
the band of the Remscheid Reichsbanner was stoned by'\ntenSelY hos-
tile inhabitants of a working-class district whilst taking part in 
a recruitment drive. 37 The KPD regarded the SPD leadership as 
traitors, in the pay of the bourgeoisie. Symptomatic of this belief 
was the reaction of the BV to the town council's decision in July 
1930 to withdraw the use of sports faclities by the Rotsport orga-
nisation which the council claimed to be an enemy of the state. 
Local workers could not understand how the SPD could bring itself 
to employ a ban which had for many years been implemented against 
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its own organisations during the Kaiserreich. The BV, in an article 
entitled "BUttel der Bourgeoisie die Sozialfaschisten"38 
ac~used the SPD of constituting the driving force against the revo-
lutionary workers' organisations and suggested that in Remscheid 
there was close collusion between the chairman of the SPU-Ied A1SB 
(Arbeiter Turn- und SportbundJ, Hei nri ch SChci.'fer, and the town.' s 
Turnrat (Physical Education InspectorJ, Dr. Bergmann, a passionate 
anti-Corrununist and former Baltikumkampfer. A few days later the BV 
reported on a Rotsport demonstration march through LUttringhausen 
in protest at the withdrawal of facilities •. KPD councillor Rongen 
. 
addressed the protesters and accused social d~"ocrat functionaries 
of the ATSB of being the true initiators of the ban in answer to 
their loss of influence in the local workers' sports dssocia-
tion. 39 Whereas in the earlier years of the Weimar Republic, 
despite considerable differences of opinion, the KPD and SPD were 
able to establish cO/llnon ground and work together against the 
middle-class parties, after 1929 cooperation was no longer 
possible. With the onset of the economic crisis and the ensuing 
depression, the SPD in Remscheid became increasingly isolated in 
its role as the sole defender of the Republic. By its tolerance of 
the 'lesser evil', namely the Briining government, it succeeded in 
alienating former supporters from the ranks of the working class 
without making substantial gains on the right. In a town like Rem-
scheid with a strong tradition of radical socialism, local SPD 
I eaders were unable to effect he ly counter the argUlllents of the 
. Conlllunists. With modest act i ve support at the grass-roots I eve 1 and 
: . 
only a tentative foothold in local workers' institutions, the SPD 
lacked the required muscle to assert itself against its powerful 
riva 1. 
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3. Organisations and Institutions of the Workers' "'lovelllent in Rem-
sCheid. 
At the climax of polarisation the KPO is still the stronyest party 
in Remscheid and still expanding. This success was in some measure 
due to the intensive recruitment and, propaganda campaigns, in which 
the expansion of recreational facilities and political education 
played an important role. The; sheer depth and variety of organisa-
tions and institutions were both a result of. and a reason for. the 
strength and vitality of the local workers' movement duriny the 
. 
Weimar Republic. These organisations constantly demonstrated the 
strong presence of working-class culture to the workers and in this 
WdY served a se I f-perpetuat i ng funct i on J in that they encouraued 
workers to play an active role. They provided a system in which 
members of this class could operate, without resorting to bouryeois 
organisations and institutions, which Socialists aryued would 
morally and politically corrupt them. Socialist mass culture was dn 
attempt to involve as many working-class members as ~ossible in 
socially meaningful pursuits. providing enormous scope to develo~ 
interests and i!lIprove on I imited education. By the mid 20s the idea 
of socialist mass culture was already wide spread with the majority 
of workers' organisations being able to look back on an illustrious 
past. 
The most important workers' organisations in Remscheid duriny the 
last years of the Weimar'Republic were as fol'lows. 40 
The KPO completely domi.nated the working-class districts of I-Ions-
berg. Laspert, Struck, Neuenhaus, Kremenholl, Rosenhugel, Stachel-
hausen and Bliedinghausen and also had strong groups in Lennep and 
Luttringhausen. The KPO's headquarters were in the Volkshaus. one 
of the most important institutions of the workers' movement in Rem-
scheid. The Volkshaus was a cooperative venture and provided a cen-
tral meeting place for all its various organisations. lhis meant 
that the workers did not have to depend any longer on the favour of 
landlords or other proprietors in finding a home for clubs and· 
societies. The Volkshaus was a large building accolllmodating llIany ot 
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the workers· organisations in the upper rooms, which were divided 
into offices and meeting 'halls. Downstairs there was a public bar 
whi.ch served drinks and food. The location of the Volkshaus was 
particularly propitious. It was easily accessible to most parts of 
Remscheid. Its close proximity to the station was ideal for COllfllU-
nications purposes, and it was an ideal starting point fur demons-
tration marches. Behind the Volkshaus in a building which belunged 
to the cooperative, the editorial offices and printing shop of the 
Bergi sche Vo lksst imme was housed. Li ke the Vo 1 kshaus the BV was 
also a cooperative undertaking. The publication of a 10ca) party 
newspaper was a significant factor regarding the strength of the 
KPD during the Weimar years. Th'e decision not to continue local 
publication after the Second World War was possibly a yrave error 
with serious consequences for the KPD in a town which des~ite the 
experiences of the Third Reich provided a membershi~ of over two' 
and a half thousand.41 
The newspaper played a central role in the social, cultural and 
political life of hundreds of Remscheid families. Ihe paper was a 
powerful integrating force in the workers· movement informing wor-
kers about international and national events, but probably most im-
portantly about local events. The immediate presence of the news-
paper accelerated the process of evaluation of local issues, and in 
this way contributed to the dynamism of the movement. Ihe'Bergische 
Volkssti~ne attracted energetic and young journalists like Bernhard 
Bastlein and A1bert Norden, and ,in this way demonstrated to the 
local workers its considerable importance in the party oryanisa-
tion. It should be remembered that most KPD groulJs in towns of the 
size of Remscheid could not boast their own party press. Ihe exis-
tence of the local party press was a constant threat to opponents 
of the KPO. whether authorities, manufacturers, or men~ers of the 
other parties. The ability to attack the system by access to the 
press undoubtedly enhanced the confidence of Remscheid workers, for 
the authorities and political opponents could not ignore the av's 
criticism. 42 The presence, of the newspaper constantly placed 
opponents under pressure. Al though opponents customari ly derided 
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the style'and, content of the newspaper, they nevertheless felt COIII-
pelled to provide counter-arguments in the Remscheider General 
Anzeiger. The authorities employed a series of different strategies 
against the BV, ranging from frequent libel actions to temporary 
bans. In 1930 a new ploy was attempted in order to discredit the 
irritating champion of the workers. The authorities began to with-
hold information which had hitherto been available to all newspa-
pers, from the BV.43 The BV, for all its faults, supplied the 
working class of Remscheid with information which could otherwise 
not have been forthcoming. It campaigned unceasinyly for th.e rights 
of the workers and was forever ready to attack the numerous ex-
cesses ';and discrepancies of the capital ist system. The newspaper 
WdS indubitably one of the KPO's stron~est and IIIOSt effective wea-
pons in Remscheid and was instrumental in inte9ratin~ the local 
movement. 
A further powerfu I support of the workers' movement was the KonSUlll-
genossenschaft "Einiykeit" which by 1925 served 14 thousand fallli-
lies'in Relllscheid from 36 shops and one warehouse. 44 The Konsum 
(coop) had one major advantage over all the other local organisa-
tions of the workers' movement in that it was able to reach even 
those members of the working class who were politically less en-
lightened. indifferent or who avoided all overtly political advan-
ces. The Konsum's main ideological task was to demonstrate to its 
members the fact that shopping was a political act, which streng-
thened the movement and weakened its opponents. In order to aChieve 
these aims the Konsum held fairly frequent meetings dealing with 
various aspects of the cooperative movement. Both the KPU and SPU 
were rejJresented in the consumer coop liE i ni gkei t" • although once 
again overall control lay in the hands of the forlller. 4!) Ihere 
were annual elections for the managing comnittee in which all mem-
bers over the age of 21 were eligible to vote. lhe Konsum's image 
was carefully cultivated as the ubiquitous friend of the family 
which could be relied upon to give a fair deal. Many of the Kon-
-sum's shops still retained the corner shop atmosphere which encou-
raged customers to shop and exchange news and gossip, so that it 
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also functioned as a kind of COllullunication centre for its clien-
tele. The Konsum always supplied food and'drink at locdl functions 
of. the, workers' movement. Here again, the Konsumyenossenschaft 
could look back on a long and illustrious tradition so that it too 
was both a result of, and a stin~lus for, the continued strength ot 
the local workers' movement. Whenever possible at Christlllas time 
, ' 
the Konsumyenossenschaft used to de liver a food hamper free of 
charge to its unemployed members. 46 Such demonstrations of 
solidarity were impressive examples of practical Socialism and con-
tributed much to winning support fdr the movement. Ihe Konsulll was, 
of course, cheap, its only major rivals in RelTlscheid were the chain 
of shops owned by Schi.irlllann and the Jewi sh-owned departlllent storc 
Leonhard Tietz in Alleestraj.lc which oHcretl ccrtJln jJruduct~ III '" 
marginally cheaper price, yet after deduction of the Konsulll's Oivi-
dend, there was lit tIe di fference. 47 • I he KonsulIlyenossensctJaft 
"Einigkeit" was therefore an important link in the ctlain. its con": 
tribution to the local workers' move"~nt in terms of arouslng class 
consciousness whilst at the Sdllle time providing a vital service tor 
Remscheid's workers and their families, was impressive. 
In many ways one of the most interesting institutions of the wor-
kers' movement in RemsctJeid was the Freie VolkshoctJschule which was 
founded in 1!:J22. 48 This institute was an offshoot of the lIIuni-
cipal adult evening school inaugurated in September 191949 on 
ihesuggestion of Professor Johannes Resch, a senior teacher at the 
Girls' High School. Resch, who was a melllber of the DDP, becallle its 
first director. 
Resch was born on IJth December 187!> in Zeu I enrodaOU , Thuri ngi a, 
and was the youngest son of a consistorian of the Lutheran church. 
Following in the footsteps of his authoritarian father, Resch 
studied theology in Leipzig and Halle, before returning to his 
home-town not as a parson, to the displeasure of his father, but as 
a school teacher.!>l However, in an attempt to achive recon-
ciliation, Resch accepted the post of village parson in ECKstedt 
near Weimar, but continued to pursue his interests in education 
I 
eventually taking a post at the Girls' High School in Sondershausen 
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In 1912 he moved to the Girls' High School in Relllscheid. He en-
listed as a volunteer in the army in 1910 and served as an officer 
un~il the end of the war. The disturbed relationship with his 
father02 and the experience of the war followed by the revolu-
t i on. were most likely the reasons whi ch induced Resch to break 
with the church. He . resumed his work at the Girls' High $ctlOOJ 
after demobilisation. but already convinced of the need tor change. 
appears to have devoted much ti"~ and energy to the developn~nt at 
the municipal evening school. In his memoirsb3 Resch .enthusias-
tically relates the influences at work at this vital conjuncture of 
his life. A close relationship with Friedrich Wolf. the seemingly 
boundless energy and enthusiasm of local workers, tht!1r lIeterlllina-
tion to create a better and "fairer society. which led to his 'dis-
covery' of the works of Karl Marx. and the intense hosti lity of the 
local middle classes to the Volkshochschul(e) venture were all cru-
cial factors which influenced the course of Resch's life trom this 
poi nt onwards. lmpresse~ by the workers' thi rst for know I edye and 
their desire to play an active role in the running of the school. 
Resch encouraged the establ ishment of student conuuittees to decide 
issues pertaining to specific courses. as well as general policy 
for the institute. Despite reservations on the part of the munici-
pal a~"inistration. Resch was allowed to continue with his experi-
ment ip democracy. He himself taught d seminar on Goethe's Faust 
which attracted large nUl1lbers of participants frolll all classes of 
local society, but particularly from the working class. Discussions 
of the text with cl ass-consci ous workers opened new perspect i yes 
for Resch, and it is possible that his first encounter with fi~rxist 
ideas ensued directly from this seminar. DisapPOinted with the 
policies of his own party and enraged by the murder of Liebknecht 
and Luxelllburg, Resch found himself unequivocally on the side of 
local workers during the defeat of Kappist forces in Remscheid. He 
recalled the events in the following way: 
- 226 -
"Di~ Remscheider Arbeiterschaft war an dem schnellen 
Sieg uber die Kapp-Clique entscheidend beteiJigt. Die 
Reichswehr unter Fuhrung des Generals LUttwitz (the 
general in 'question was Lutzow.Dl.), verstarkt durch 
die 'Burgerwehr', hatte im rheinisch-westfalischen 
lndustriegebiet starke Truppenverbande zusammengezoyen 
und alle bffentlichen Gebaude besetzt. Aber sehr schnell 
wendete sich das Blatt. Mit einer 8ravour sondergleichen 
warfen sich die Arbeiter/llassen den Truppen entgegen und 
lieferten ihnen in einer Talsohle zwischen Remscheid und 
Solingen eine Schlacht, die auf beiden Seiten groBe Opfer 
forderte, in der aber Luttwitz{Lutzow.DT.)-Truppen vollig 
aufgerieben wurden. lch aber erlebte /IIit tiefer Erschutte-
rung die Kraft und den opferbereiten Mut einer vereinigten 
Arbeiterklasse. Jetzt verstand ich, was Klassenkampf }'lie!.)! 
Aber ich wu!.)te auch, wohin ich gehorte, ich schwankte 
keinen Aygenblick und trat auf die Seite der Arbeiter-
k 1 ass e. ,54 . , . 
InMnediately following this victory Resch joined the KPU and 
announced his membership to bewildered colleagues dt the Liirls' 
High School. A~ the next. Faust-seminar, the discussion centred 
around the experience of recent events, which clearly disturbed 
some of the middle-class students. Resch, however, recollects that 
others began to view the situation in a different light: 
'Vor dieser drangenden Gegenwart mu!.)te selbst Goethe 
an diesem Abend schweigen. Einige burgerliche Hbrer, 
die das, was oa vor sich gegangen war, nicht recht 
begriffen. machten betretene Gesichter. Manchen aber 
ist dabei, wie sie mir spater sagten, ein Licht auf-
gegangen: es war eb~n ein Anderes, die Dinge vom Stand-
punkt der.Arbeiterklasse betrachtet zu sehen als durch 
die reaktionare "Generalanzeiger"-Presse.,5b . 
. , 
The summer of 1920 saw the first of the annual solstice festivals 
organised by the participants of the Remscheid Volkshochschule, 
which attracted many thousands of visitors from other evening 
schools in Germany and workers from towns throughout the Ruhr and 
Rhineland who were acconullodated by local families free. of charge. 
The festivals were held in the open air_on a large n~adow at "Dicke 
EicheU • Plays were performed, both by evening school students and 
visiting professional theatrical groups. Folk dances and cOlllmunal 
songs enjoyed a prominent place in the proceedings, as well as pup-
pet shows and various ga/lles for children. The first evening was 
brought to a close with the lighting of a huge bonfire which syn~o-
1 i sed the destruction of the old and the dawni n9 of d new ayeo6 
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This act ,was accompanied by speeches, poetry readings, folk songs 
and songs of the workers' movement. Ihe festivals were wholly 
fi~anced by the participants of the evening school and their fami-
lies, and by proceeds from the festivals themselves. 
At this point in time llY2UJ Resch appears to have been aiming at 
the creation of a new form of egalitarian society (neue Lebens-
gemeinschaft) cutting across established class lines to incorporate 
individuals frum all walks of life. Ihe only list of participants 
of the Volkshochschule stil I known to exist, containing around j~U 
nallles, would seem to indicate a certain measure of success, as it 
riveals a fairly equal balance between workers and white-collar 
employees, with a considerable number ot civi I servants, shojJ-
k~epers and small manufacturers also taking part. bH Ihis was 
probab ly the only instance duri ng the Weimar years when such a 
broad consensus of opinion was aChieved in an institution which WdS 
rapidly developing in the direction of the workers' movement. Ihe 
experiment, however, soon began to attract criticisnl from both the 
employers and 10Cdl· authorities as well as the KPD. Parents ot 
Resch's pupils at the Girls' High School, alarmed by his conversion 
to marxism, threatened to send their children to other schools, 
unless Resch was removed from his post. Ihe local authorities and 
leading bourgeois circles were also perturbed by the increaSing 
nunbers of youngsters flocking to evening classes taught by people 
like Resch, friedrich Wolf and Richard Sorge. lhe chi Idren of 
midd I e-cl ass parents joi ned the bands of "Resch 1 ndi aner"bY tur 
weekend hikes into the surrounding countryside, and thereby came 
into contact with working-class culture and torllled relationships 
which only a few years earlier had been unthinkable. Ihe wrangle 
ov~r Resch's position at the Girls' High School continued through-
out the following years until he was finally suspended. His posi-
tion at the municipal evening school also became increasingly un-
tenable for the same reason.with the result that he was finally 
dismissed. Resch's dismissal was answered by the decision of the 
majority of participants to found their own independent evening 
school bO under Resch's leaderShip. Ihe impact of Resch's ideas 
and teaching methods can be gauged by the considerable number ot 
middle-class students who elected· to follow him. b1 Lt was above 
all young middle-class women who proved most receptive to the ideas 
and aims propagated by Resch and his collea~ues as they experienced 
per~onal emancipation from the narrow contines of their traditional 
ro1es. 62 . 
The members of the Freie Volkshochschule, now organised in acoope-
rative SOCiety, began to build their own school and club house on 
the wooded slope behinQ the working-class district of Honsberg. 
Large numbers of unemployed workers enthusiastically seized the 
opportunity to demonstrate their considerable skills in an under-
taking which drew an impressive response from local "residents. 
Collections were, held and a soup-kitchen was organised to teed 
those engaged in the construction of the "Reschhutte". Having 
quickly erected the outer Shell of the building, the workers were 
. faced with the seelllingly insurlllountable problem at provldlllY suit-
able material for the root. 'Ihe problem was solved by the discovery 
of a large quantity at corned beef tins on a retuse tip. Ihese were 
collected, hammered out and stapled together to form a weatherlJroot 
roofing, of which the only disadvantage was the noise made by the 
beating of rain. b3 The school used mainly by adults in the eve-
ni ng. housed a day-nursery for chi I dren. Grete ~usCh, who on COIII-
pletion of her training was charyed with the responsibility tor the 
nursery. would collect the chi Idren every morning and march with 
these through the streets of Hons,berg. LOCd I women supervi sed the 
provision of meals which were financed by collections at money and 
food. In the afternoon the chi Idren returned by the same route 
marching in fonnation and singing songs.b40eslJite the aplJdl-
ling depri vat i on suffered by the maj ori ty of Honsberg tam i lies 
during the period of hyper-inflation, efforts were made to continue 
to provide nutritious meals for the chi Idren at the nursery. At 
times this was only possible by direct contribution f'rom the 
teachers' own pockets. This was, a considerable sacrifice as they 
received little or no remuneration for their work and were forced 
to rely on earnings accruing from their day-time jabs. Ihe local 
authorities provided no assistance whatsoever. despite a socialist 
majority on the town countil. Eventually meals for the"children had 
to be discontinued owing to lack of funds, and at some stage, 
possibly in 1926, the nursery was abandoned. 
Althoughthe Freie Volkshochschule provoked hostile reactions from 
the middle-class circles and the local authorities, it was the 
opposition of the KPD which inflicted most damage on this institu-
tion. Criticism of the independent school was voiced illunediately by 
local Communists who derisively referred to the venture as Volks-
tanzsozialislllus (folk dance socialism), and claimed that it dis-
tracted the workers from class conflict. 
Disturbed by the massive support for Resch by workers, the KPD dis-
patched Edwin Hoernle65 to Remscheid to reiterate party policy 
towards independent and municipal evening institutes. Hoernle 
. 
publicly admonished Resch. for encouraging the spread of empty illu-
sions amongst the working class with a 'return to rh.lturc' which 
amounted to mere reverie. 66 Instead, the party wanted class-· 
conscious workers who were ready to fight when the time callle to 
seize power. Resch countered this attack by pointing to the failure 
of 1918 and forcefully argued that the party needed to prepare the 
workers more completely if it was to succeed in its aims. When the 
working class took power it had to be in a position to retain it, 
and this would only be possible if the workers were in a positlon 
to form thei r own opi nions and rely on thei r own judgements. 
Furthermore, Resch di scounted the theory that the Gcrmdn workers' 
revolution would follow the example of the Soviet model,as the pre-
v~i1ing conditions were incolllparable. Finally, Resch maintained 
that the attempt to gain deCisive influence in thc municipal eve-
ni n9 schools was itself 111 usory as the bureaucracy was tar too 
powerful. Despite this altercation, Resch regarded his position as 
being akin to that of the party, and hoped for better cooperation 
in the future. ~esch·s pleas, however, went unheeded and the party 
called a boycott ofaJI independent evening schools, whiCh, accord-
ing to Artur Rosenberg6', only spread confusion amongst the 
workers and distracted them from politics. b8 In September 192~ 
the KPD reinforced its attack on Resch and the ~reie VOlkshoch-
schu 1 e at a conference he J din I)(jsse I dort. One of the speakers, 
Werner, of the KPD-branch DUsseldorf, started: 
, 
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'Auch die Freien Volkshochschulen von Remscheid und 
Bochum kbnnen nicht als proletarische Kampfesorgani-
sationen angesehen werden. Ihre Bestrebungen volliyer 
Unabhangigkeit der SchUler und Lehrer offnen nicht nur 
freideutschen Schwarmern, sondern auch ausgesprochenen 
Konterrevolutionaren ihre lore und wirken somit arbeiter-
feindlich. Wir durfen daher den Proletariern nur solche 
Kurse empfehlen, die das Wissensgebiet des NarxisllluS 
betreffen und von kOlfullunistischen Lehrern abgehalten 
werden. ,69 
The dispute now developed. into a serious quarrel which resulted 
in Resch's expulsion from the party)U Reporting the incident, 
the RGA quoted the Bergische Volksstinlllle: 
'Resch befindet sich bei seiner latigkeit in seiner so-
genannten "Freien Volkshochschule" in einem dauernden, 
bewu~ten und betonten Gegensatz zu den Richtlinien der 
Partei Uber Arbeiterbildungsfragen. Seine yleich plumpen 
wie ma~losen und vollig unbegrundeten Angriffe gegen die 
Partei in einer b~ryerlichen Zeitschrift '"Die lat") be-
deuten eine so schwere und gewollte Schadigung der Partei, 
daB das Verbleiben Resch in der Partei nicht langer ~e­
duldet werden konnte.' 
Although the KPD remained adamant with regard to its boycott of 
the school, Resch appears to have remained close to the party. At 
some point after 1923, he himself does not fix the date, Resch 
recanted, and was accepted back into the KPD, where he continued to 
play a significant role. particularly in the Kulturkartel I, organi-
sin9 and delivering lectures. The Freie Volkshochschule continued 
its work for a nUlllber of years although it appears to have deterio-
rated into a workers' discussion club. Ihe building was eventually 
turned over to the Internationale Arbeiter Hilfe llAH)71. and 
was used amongst other thin!;ls as a weekend hostel for children's 
groups. The decision by Resch to return to the fold was not shared 
by all of his followers. some drifted away disappointed and dis-
11lusioned, others continued to meet for· hiking excursions, but 
many did find their way into the workers' movement, if not into the 
KPD. 
In his memoirs71 · Resch blamed his own ignorance of Marxist 
theory for the dispute with the party and praised the KPD tor its 
guidance, although he firmly rejected the criticism that the school 
distracted from the class struggle: 
- 2Jl -
'Nein, zu einer "Ablenkung 'lam Klassenkampf" war 
unsere Betatgigung nicht yeworden.-Eine Gefahr sehen, 
heiBt auch, ihr begegnen zu konnen. Und so war es bei 
uns oberstes'Gesetz, daB, wenn die Partei rief, wir 
alle zur Stelle waren. Zu unserem Kreis gehortell Ge-
nossen, die lange Kalllpferfahrung hatten, sie haben 
nach wie vor der Partei mit der gleichen Hinyabe ye-
dient und ihre funktionen in Partei und Massenoryani-
sationen mit der gleichen Treue erfullt. Und wenn es 
gaIt zu agitieren, oder bei Nacht und Nebel hinter dem 
RiJcken der Polizei Parolen zu malen, waren unsere Ge-
nossen stets dabei.'/3 
. -
Resch left Remscheid in 1928 to take up a post in Berlin. His de-
parture was undoubtedly an irreplaceable loss to the local .workers' 
movement. A small number of his closest friends actually followed 
him. Despite Resch's readiness to admit his 'mistakes', this by no 
means adequately explains which of tile pdrties 1n the dispute rCdl-
ly erred. One cannot easily discount the suspicion that by its in-
tolerance and lack of. vision the ConK'nunist Party ignored a vital 
opportunity to extend its influence to sections of the middle 
classes and thus widen the base of socialism. In the interests ot 
short-term goals the KPD neglected Kesch's progressive strategy 
which might have been developed further to provide a working model 
for the whole of Gennany. The substantial numbers of white-collar 
workers who participated in Resch's seminars, both at the municipal 
evening institute and -at the freie Volkshochschule, at the very 
least indicates a potential reservoir of support for an alternative 
system to capitalism. As we shall see in the following chapters, 
the wo rkers' movelllent fa i 1 ed camp 1 ete Iy to make an impact on the 
lower-middle class, whose distaste for capitalislll was then fully 
exploited by the National Socialists. The case of Max l3enscheid, 
a 1 though only an i nd i vi dua I yet nonethel ess revea 1 i ng examp le, 
serves to i 11 ustrate the deve lopment of certai n ' sect ions of the 
1 ower-mi dd I e c I ass from a potential a 11 i ance with the workers' 
movement in the early years of the Weimar Republic. to fervent ad-
herence of National Socialism in the Ihirties. Benscheid was one of 
the original partiCipants of" the Goethe seminars,who in July 1nu 
, , 
tatter Resch's conversion to comnunism) affixed their signatures to 
a declaration of support for the director and for the retention at 
the democratic constitution of the Volkshochschule. Ihis declara-
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tion furthermore considered the possiblitiy of a break-away inde-
pendent institution, if, participants' demands were not upheld. 
Benschei d was I ater to joi n the NSDAP and became deputy mayor of 
Remscheid in 1936. 
Resch retained a strong feeling of admiration for the workers of 
RemscheidJabout whom he once wrote: 
'Nie wider bin ich in meinem Leben auf einen so 
bildungshungrigen und bildungsfahigen, aUf einen so 
geistig beweglichen, autgeschlossenen, durch und durch 
positiv eingestellteri, zum kulturellen Aufbau bereiten 
und fur ihn sich kraftvoll und wagemutig einsetzenden 
Kreis von Arbeitern gestoben, wie ich ,hn damals in 
Remscheid in der Volkshochschule ZUSillm~ntassen 
durfte. 74 
Reviewing the years in RelllscheicJ, Resch elllphasisecJ the buno WllH.:1I 
lasted throughout his lifetime, and still relllained cOllvinced U\dt 
his experiment proved fruitful: 
'Die groBe Freiwilligkeitsleistung wurde ununterbrochen, 
auch nachdem ich 1Yl~ Remscheid verlassen mu/)te, bis 
1933 fortgesetzt. Nein, es war kein Strohfeuer yewesen! 
Unsere Freunde una uenossen vertraten und betreuten hier 
ihre eigene Sache - ihr Werk, das ihnen in den kampf-
und entbehrungsreichen Jahren einen Halt gab. Ua/) man 
im Klubhaus ilruner einen Kreis van Genossen und ~reunden 
traf, mit denen lIIan durch Not und Kampf verbunden war, 
mit denen lIIan sich aussprechen und - allem Elend ZUIII 
Trotz - auch mal ordentlich lachen konnte, gab ihnen 
Kraft. Es hat mich tief ersch~ttert, als vor ein paar 
Jahren eine alte Genossin zu mir sagte, die "Kinder-
heimjahre" waren die schbnsten ihres Lebens gewesen."7b 
The quest 1 on as to the poss i b I e extent of the success tor the 
Gerlllan workers' movement, had Resch been able to count on the sup-
port of the KPD instead of its short-sighted opposition, remains 
one of the imponderables emanating from that particular conjuncture 
of the workers' movement. 
I 
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Yet' another important organisation within the workers' movelllent was 
the Workers' Sports Organisation which in Relllscheid was represented 
by nine districts with an active membership of several hundred men, 
women and children. As we have already seen, the Workers' Sports 
Organsiation had a twofold function, namely to encourage the pur-
suit of good health by way of· physical exercise, and to educate its 
. . 
members politically, above all chifdren and youth.'o Arbeiter-
sport rejected the preoccupation with records and medals which 
bourgeois sports idealised, and regarded sport as a healthy pastime 
for everyone, no matter how skilled or unskilled the individual 
mi ght be. Whereas bourgeoi s sport tended to focus on the most 
successful and on the sensational and encouraged the image at the 
sportsman as the' Trager der sport 11 chen Hochs t I ei s tuny ./1 , 
Arbeitersport stressed 'die korperliche Ertuchtigung der Sporttrel~ 
benuen illl Rahlllcn ucr gcgclwllclI gcscllsctldtll ictlcn VcrhdlLllissc UIIU 
in der Richtung der vorhandenen korperlichen Anforderungen'/H. 
The Workers' Sports Organisation constantly stipulated the necessi-
ty of a healthy mind and body in the class struggle, which contrary 
to bourgeois ·ideology was also present on the sports field. In Rem-
scheid, the most important clubs in the Arbeitersport organisation 
were: the Freie Turnervereinigung (Gymnastics Association) under 
the chairmanship of Ernst lirrullermann and liustav lesche; the Arbei-
terschwinunverein, led at different times by Ernil fechner, WaIter 
Piller. ferdinand Thieler and Hermann Haddenbrock. the louristen-
verei n Naturfreunde and the Arbeiterradfahrerbund leyc lists Asso-
ciation) "Solidarit~t". 
The Freie Turnervereiniyuny' was represented by eight districts: 
Stadt. Honsberg, Vieringhausen, Hasten, Dicke Eiche, StrUCk, Lennep 
and LUttringhausen. There was another strong club in Pohlhau-
sen'9 . which, although bordering on Relllscheid rnr.ftjhQ,\oISt.", 
belonged to Wermelskirchen, which also had a strong workers' sports 
movement. The Remscheid Workers' Swimming Club also had eight 
d1fferentgroups and specialised 1n waterpolo and handball as wel I 
as swimming. 
Arbeitersport was particularly strong both in nun~rical terms and 
in. quality in the Lower Rhineland. Dusseldorf, Solingen and Wupper-
tal also had a large network of clubs, so that Remscheid clubs were 
never short of opposition. 
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As was the case elsewhere in Germany the Remscheid workers' oryani-
sation was permanently plagued by a shortage of funas. Ihis fact 
severely restricted the movement's potential, and was a serious 
disadvantage compared with middle-class sports clubs, which usually 
had generous financial support fr~n local manufactur~rs. During the 
middle years of the Weimar Republic some help was forthcollliny from 
the town council, depending on the strength of the KPD/SPD on the 
necessary committees. In 1921 for example, the Struck/Neuenhot 
sports club applied for a loan from the Remscheid savinys bank to 
he I p fi nance the buil d i ng of a club house and yymnas i urn. I he 10dn 
was granted and the town council also agreed to provide 2,25u work-
days for unemployed workers. Help was also forthcollling trom the 
Jugendpflegerfond (youth activities fund) of the DUsseldort Landtau 
government as well as from the welfare minister's fund. N~verthe­
less much of the work and fund raising was done by the club members 
themselves. In this instance the workers' sports movement was suc-
cessfu I in obtai ni ng support from the town counci I. tlU However, 
after the spl it withi n the movement, council grants were no lonyer 
available. Instead, existing facilities were withdrawn and the wor-
kers' Rotsport organisation was banned from Remscheid gymnasiums 
a.nd swinuning baths.S1 "This measure urged by the Social Democra-
tic Landtag government was eagerly implemented in Remscheid, where 
the Rotsport organisation outnumbered its spn orientated rival, 
despite indignant protests from the strong KPD faction on the coun-
cil. lhe SPD council1ors who were petitioned by Heinrich Schater, 
chairman of the Kartell· fUr Sport- und Korperpflege (cartel tor 
sport and physical recreation), and of the Sportlerheilll (clun 
house) Neuenhof, voted with the bourgeois parties to deprive the 
Rotsport members of existing public facilities. A workers' cOIlMnis-
sion pleaded in vain with the town's physical education inspector 
Dr. Bergrnann to resci nd the ban. on the grounds that even mayor 
Adenauer of Cologne had seen fit to restore the facilities to wor-
kers there. An article in the BV referred to the SPD as "BUttel der 
Bourgeoisie - die Sozialfaschisten" (catchpol I of the bourgeoisie -
the Social faSCists). and bitterly condemend the collusion between 
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Schafer C\nd Berymann.~2 Numerous protests in Remscheid, Lennep 
and Liittringhausen were to no avail, so that the sportsmen had to 
se~rch for alternative venues. Ihe workers' swimming club was par-
t i cu I arly hard hit by the ban, so a number of members yathered to-
gether to formulate a plan of self-help, in order to finance and 
carry out the construction, or rather the conversion ot the 
"Teufelsteich" at Hagener Miihle. Ihe group received financial 
assistence from one or two sympathisers, so that it could take a 
leasf.on the land, buy buildiny materials and make a start. The 
construct i on work extended over two summers and was fi na I Iy com-
pleted in the sunmer of 1933, althou~h the unfinished pool was open 
for bathers .in the summers of 1931 and l!:Jj~. Altogether about WU 
members of the club, the majority of them a 1 ready unelllp 1 oyed for d 
substantial period, took part in the construction work. tlJ Most 
of the necessary skills wert! alreday present in the shape at t!dyer 
members, so that the group was able to complete the project without 
outside help.~4 The town council refused, however, to yive any 
assistance, despite the fact that the town was to benefit frODI this 
added facility for many years.to come.Photos taken at the "Teutels-
teich":s inauguration on 7th August 1931 bear testimony to its 
popularity. The workers'. swilluning club which by 1932 was already 
organised in armed gr6ups of ten~5, in preparation for the 
approaching confl ict with the Nazis, was soon to be denied the 
fruits of its labour, as by the summer of 1933 the lIIajority of mem-
bers had already been arrested and interned in the notorious con-
. centration camp at Kemna. 
I he workers' sports movement and parti cu I ar Iy the RotsportDund was 
accustomed to relying on self-help. as applications for grants and 
the use of facilities were frequently retused by an obdurately hos-
tile council. In January 1928. Mayor Hartmann had written: 
'Oie Erziehung unseres Volkes zu korperlicher und 
geistiger TUcht1gke1t 1st gerade in unserer wirtschatt-
11ch so auBerordentlich schweren Zeit ein Gebot der 
Stunde. Staat und Geme1nden mlissen deshalb alle ver-
fUgbaren Mittel aufwenden, urn diese hohen Liele zu 
erreichen ••• ·~b 
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Yet he ana his tellow party members supported by the other bour-
geo1s part1e~ mak1ng up the ~uryerblock cont1nued to d1scrlm1nate 
aycunst the workers' sports' lIIovement. Ihe one-Slaeo extenslOn or 
grants trom Wh1Ch the workers' sports clubs were generally exClu-
ded. served to strengthen thelr resolve. and bound the melllDers 
t1yhter together. maklnY them more sympatllet1c to the KPU. lh1S was 
even trequent Iy the case with 1 ndl v10ua I sportsmen. who themse Ives 
were not COllllllun1sts. 1n June 1~~~ the ljallsp1elVerelnl~uny "1:.1n1g-
kelt" ot Krelllenholl (tootball club) appl1ed tor ~~U markS to seno d 
youth group to ttle Workers'. ~ports AcaaelllY in Le1pz1Y to ta.ke part 
in a course. Ttle appl ication was turneo down on the groundS tllat 
there was no lUore money avallable.H7 1n the SUIIMller or l~J~ tile 
1 nteressengelllei nschdtt tur Arbei terku I tur. !jezl rk Nl ederrhel n 
(Assoclatlon tor workiny-class culture ot the Lower I<h1neland) 
applled to the /{elllscheld town counci I tor the use at tile I<elnshayen 
stadlUm tor a mass meeting ot the local branCh. The jJrogralUlIle Wh1Ch 
env1sayed marches by workers' bands and male voice and lIIixed 
choirs. gymnastic demonstrations jJresented by members ot the IWt-
sport yymnastics clubs. as wel I as yames tor ch1ldrell. dnd WhlCh 
. accordi ng to experl ence was expected to attract at I east 1~. UUU 
spectators. was retused' on the yrounds ot the Prusslan lnnen-
minlster's decrees ot the ~7/1~/JU and ~7/11IJl.H~ Ijetween 
these two refusals were countless others,whereas the UTv lUeutsche 
Turner Vereinigung - Nat10nal. German Gymnastlcs Assoclation) and 
other bourgeois sports organisations usually enjoyed the support ot 
the well-dlsposed authorltles. Thus bourgeo1s sports clubs were 
dble to fJut on elaborate public demonstrations on a reyular baslS. 
without. however. enjoY1ny the klnd ot sUfJport trom spectators 
WhlCh was usually evident at Arbeitersport tunctions. ~ootbal I 
matches in Honsberg reyu I ar Iy attracted I arye crowds. 1 n Auyust 
l~JU. tor exalOple. an Austrian lnternatlOnal team Wh1Ch belonged to 
the Luzern Sports InternatlonalH~ competed against a KemschelCl 
selection tOrom the Hotsport-atti liated teallls. which had been ex-
pel led the previous year. Uver 2.UUU spectators turned out to see 
th1S gallle. YU 
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Atter the split in the workers' sports movement the local kotsport 
or!:jan1satlon grew rap1C1ly as /IIore and more clubs Joined those al-
ready expe I led. A report in the ~V p roe I a lined a pos it 1 ve deve I op-
ment in the ~er!:jische Land WhlCh had 15U teams tor ttle season ot 
l!::lJU/Jl!H. In March l!::lJ't. the ~V listed JU I{otsport teams trom 
the Bergische Land, lnCludiny trom kelfischeid: Uicke 1:.1Che, LasjJert, 
Lennep, Luttrinyhausen, teld, !:itruck and kemscheid-!:itadt, cOlllpetlny 
tor the tootball title.Y't. 1n the men's handball sectlon ttlt:!re 
were three Relllschei d teams: 01 cke . El che and the kemschei d workers' 
sw1mminy club teams 1 and'/. cOnljJet1ng in a jJool ot 14 1n the 
hiyhest d1viS10n. The BV report1ny on the yaflle between AS(JV walo 
and J<emscheid U1cke I:.iche mentioned that the money taken at the 
turnstiles WOuld be donated to the KPU's election tund. Itlree 
wOlllen's teams trolll l<elllsche1o were also 1nvolved HI futures 1n We 
h1yhest dlvislon. 11le IjV tlaa a weekly report on the cOlillny t"lxtures 
statiny tlme and venue and constantly encouraYlng support ot tIle 
I oca I J<otsport t utures. 1 t a I so t re4uent Iy reiterated the jJrlll-
ci pies ot workers' sport, so that its readers understood tile lmjJor-
tance ot the1r attendance. 1n June l!::lJ't. the local I<otsport oryarll-
sat10n achieved what 1t claimed to be an lmportant breakthrouyll, 
when the middle class Relllscheld I~etzyerinnuny (butchers' YUild) 
Wh1Ch was duly reintorced by talent trom leadiny local bourgeols 
clubs such as the wuppertaler !:iportverein, Vf~ J<emschelO, ~V 1U ana 
Go I denDerg, agreed to lIIeet the I oca I Rotsport champlons ~V 1:.1 n1 y-
keit at Honsbery. Ihe ~V called tor strong support tor the ~V 
I:.iniykeit to show the bour!:jeoisie that the workers prOduced the 
better footballers as well as the Detter all-round sportsmen. The. 
newspaper noted that thi s was hopetu Ily to be the t1 rst ot many 
meetwys between Rotseort and bouryois clubs 10 Relllsche1d.!::IJ 
The game was not reported in the I oca I. p.ress, theretore it rllust De 
assumed that it did not take place~ The strict segregation ot sjJort 
in the 'Wellllar J<epublic was a further manHestatlon ot class hostl-
lity, in this case extend;Il.9 to the tootball tield. It WOuld ajJjJear 
troUl the build-UP ot the t hture in the communi stp ress that tile 
kotsportor~anisation was anxio~s to Dreak out ot its isolatlon and 
demonstrate its own considerable talent. 
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I he Arbeiterradtahrerbund "So I i daritat" under the cha 1 rlllanshl p ot 
Altred Mertenwas another att1l1atlon to the local workers' lIIove-
ment with a siyrl1ticant role to play. "Solldaritat" WhlCh nUlllbered 
almost a quarter ot.a million members in liermany at the !-leak ot ltS 
success~4, was relatively small :in Kemscheld, Jjossibly owin!;! to 
the h1 I Iy terra1n. The smal I number ot active part1c1~ants, tlOW-
ever, iri no way diminished the siynlticance ot the club which be-
cause ot its. cheaj.ler mobil1 ty was in great demand as a sUj.lport 1 ng 
group tor Landpropaganda in the aj.lproach to elect 1 ons. Y5 Loca I 
worker. cyCllsts were constantly ·aware ot their propdyanda value 
. 
even on club excursions; and on weekendS and summer evenlnys 
columns ot. cyclists, thelr bicycles sporting red tlays, could be 
seen headiny out ot working class distr1cts ot the town. tn August 
l~~U the I3V deScrlbed a journey made by eight Kemsche1C1 COIIUllunlsts 
to the fAH demonstrat10n "Verteidiyuny der Sowjetunion" (detence at 
the Soviet Union) at Stollberg on the Uutch and ~elyian border. The 
report states that the cyclists attracted a lot ot attentlOn 1n 
towns they passed throuyh. and were greeted by red t I ags and 
shouts ot 'Kottront'.Yo 
lhe Arbeitersamariterbund (WOrkers' First· Aid Assoclation) WhlCh 
was Ilkewise numerlcally not very strong in Kernsche1d, was also an 
organlsat10n with an important role to play. The organisation was 
tounded in 19U~ as a sett-help o~9anisatlon tor the workers, be-
cause the ijerman Ked Cross organlsatl0n allegedly retused first ald 
to the SPU, trade unions and workers' sports clubs.~7 Ihe local 
group wiih its headquarters behind the Volkshaus held ~eyular cour-
. ses in tlrst aid tor men, wOlllen and youth. The I3V reported on the 
tinal examinatin ot the winter course on Sunday £~th Feoruary lYJ~. 
All l~ candidated were successt"ul, but the article bemoaned the· 
lack ot interest. shown by HemsChei d workers, and announced that 
according to demand, the ASIi would consider running courses in dlt-
- . 
terent districts ot Hemscheid as it had done HI former years.Y~ 
The ASI3, led by Hugo Pattrath, Karl Picard, Hans liruber, Karl· 
SCheer, Otto Rau and [ugen lieCker, was required to provide aSS1S-
tance at all demonstrations and functions ot the workers' movement 
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includlng meetlngs, tootbal I matches and testivals. The KemschelO 
group which after l~~~. belonged to the Westdeutscher Arbelter-
samariter Verband e.V.!:lY and reterred to itselt as the 'ausye-
schlossene Mehrheit (expel led majority) des 5. Kreises des Arbel-
tersamariterbundes e.V., Sitz (;hemnitz', played an important role 
in the new organisation which had its headquarters in nearby Solln-
gen. 100 It de~cribed itselt in the following way: 
'Uer Verband steht aut dem lioden des Klassenkamptes 
und unterstUtzt um seiner Liele Willen alle ~estre­
bungen zur Uberwindung der kapltalistischen wlrtschatt 
als des Hindernisses einer wirklichen VolksyesunOhelts-
politik. • 
A monthly subscription of JO pfennigs tor members over ~U, and of 
lU ptennlgs tor those under lU was exacted by the organlsatlon. The 
new oryanlsation also hao a youth sectlon split into two groups, l~ 
to 14-year olds and .14 to ~U-yedr oldS, tor boys dnd Ylrls. Unly 
active members ot the Westdeutscher Areitersarnarlter Verl.lana were 
required to pass tirst aid exalllinatlons and volunteer tor duty, 
whereas passive members, who were not eligible tor ottlce, constl-
tuted a kind ot fee payHlg supporters club. 
I he louri stenverei n Naturfreunde was an important arlll ot ttle wor-
. ... I kers' movement and occupled a somewtlat unlque pOSltlon posed be-
. ~ 
tween the sports organisations and cultural. oryanisatlons In the 
narrower sense. lhe local group - as we have alreddy seen 1U .1 
- was tounded in lYlJ but experienced a real upsurge only atter Ule. 
First World War when already existlng hiking clubs like "Fruhaut", 
"Wanderb I ut" and "Stache I hauser Wanderverei n" joi ned the Natur-
treunde. Interest was further boosted in lYlU when the Naturtreunde 
erected thelr own club house on land acquired trom the town Council 
near the Remscheid reservoir. Ihe project was largely financed by 
the local trade unions and these also provided some ot the neces-
sary expertise in construction, although the IlIaJor part ot the work 
was done by the Naturtreunde thelllselves)O~ Apart trom walk-
ing and hiking the Naturfreunde provided tacilities tor CyCling, 
folk-dancing, winter sports, mUSiC, photography and tor the study 
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at botany" natural and local history. From l!:lJI onwards the Natur-
treunde shared the same bui Iding as the ArbelterSdlllarlter beh1nd 
the Volkshaus. The louristenverein under the chairmanship ot Max 
I<ontgen had a youth group ot ID 1n .1nblUJ, and a total melll-
bership ot possibly !:lUU adults 1n the period immed1ately preced1ny 
the Nazi seizure ot power. Ihe Touristenverein ap~ealed very 
strongly to tami I ies as it was able to provide SUCh var1ed taci 11-
ties. As well as holding its own tunct10ns and outdoor testivals, 
the Touristenvere1n took part in concerts and t'estivdls promoted by 
other workers' organi sat ions, canvassed tor the KPU in elect 1 ons, 
and worked closely with Kesch's freie Volkshochschule. Utto"Kau who 
was a member ot the Naturtreunde had a selection ot indiyenous rep-
tiles which were housed in the buildings behind the Vulkshaus ana 
wtlich he displayed in schools in the area. 1U4 
Ihe local workers' sports lIIovelllent was an impresslVe torce. Sports-
men and sportswomen trom Kelllscheid tOOk part in all the IlIaJor 
national and international festlvals like the Workers' UIYlllpics 1n 
rranktutt in lY2!:l, to which they sent a team ot UU, drlQ the AISll 
Natlonal Festival in Nurnberg in lY2Y. the "Iag aer roten Sport-
einheit" in Erturt in lYJU as well as regional meetlnys 1n Uussel-
dort. liecause of the permanent shortage ot tunds, Kelllscheid sports-
lIIen and women used to combine the yreat sIJorts test1vals with ttlree 
or tour-day hikes, dependi ng on the di stance. A contellllJorary photo 
shows a group at Remscheid sportsmen resting in the Hdrz IIJOunta1ns 
on the return hike trom the rirst Workers' liYlllnastlcs lournament 1n 
Leipzlg 1n l!:la. AIJart trolll partlclpat10n in sports testivals, Kelll-
scheid worker-sportsmen were a I ways present at May-Uay delllOnstra-
t10ns and other 1111portant workers' t'estivals. Ihey also provH1ed 
protection groupslUb tor working-class districts in perioas 
of' increasing tension, which were wont to occur stlOrtly betore 
elections, and as we have already seen, Arbeitersportler participa-
ted in election propaganda, handing out leatlets, paintiny Sloyans 
and collecting tor the party election campaign. Atter lYjj some 
Arbeitersport I er who had never been members at either the KPU or 
SPU participated in the, resistance against the Nazis. 
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Ihe workers' movement was so broad as to contain lIIany other d1verse 
clubs and organisations which had' local groups in l<elllsctleHl. /tIe 
Arbeiter-Photographen-Verei n i gung (workers' photoyraph i c soc i ety ) , 
fo~ instance, was tounded in August lY~7 at a meeting held 1n the 
Volkshaus. Ihe chairman ot the club was Hermann Michel, a member ot 
the KPU. The group held technical courses on Monday even1nys in the 
Volkshaus. Apart trom teaching photographic technique~ the Photo-
graphen-Vere1nigung's most significant taSk was toaocument the 
history.ot the local workers 1n their struggle tor power. The 
groups's work was displayed on occasions in the volkshaus 1U6 
and s~ne contributions even appeared in journals like the ~rbelter 
Illustrierte Zeitung. 1U1 
The Arbeiterschachbund (workers' chess Club) a I so lIIade as apped-
rance in Kemscheid during the mlddle years ot the Welllldr KejJubllC. 
I here were teams 1 n l<elflsche1 d, Lennep and Kadevorlllwd I (J. The IIIdJ or 
alms of the chess club were to teach young workers to improve thelr 
concentration and their capacity for strate!:pc thinklny by means ot 
a game which hitherto had been the preserve ot the bouryeolsie, to 
encourage workers to meet and d1SCUSS their problellls 1n a non-ver-
bal environment, and to occujJY the mindS, ot unemployed workers In 
particular. in a positive and meaningful way. As was the case with 
all workers' clubS and organ1sations, the chess Club trled to glve 
its melllbers a pOlitical education which stressed the need tor co-
operat i on and c I ass' so I i darity., Tournaments and team matches were 
an ettective medium for the eXChange ot ideas ana experience w1th 
workers tr~n other, towns and areas, as not al I time was devotea to 
playing chess. 1Utl In Remsche1d and Lennep the workers' chess 
club taced little competition tr~1I bourgeois Clubs, so that it was 
not troubled by attelllpts to tempt away gOOd jJlayers with ttlt:! pro-
mi se ot money or a job • 
. 
In Inb a group ot young /{elllscheld workers began to attend tSperdn-
to classes given by Prot. ~reden, a senior teacher at the uirls' 
High School. Ihis groujJ formed the ba,sls ot the local branch ot the 
Arbeiter tsperanto Verei n (wOrkers' Esperanto club) .LU~ 1 n 
accordance with the widespread belief in the workiny class mOvelllent 
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9uring the late-lUs that Esperanto would becollle a J.JOwertul 
medium tor the dissern1nation ot socialist ldeas and the delllonstra-
tion ot workers' solidarity throuyhout the world. the ~V tr1~d to 
encourage local workers to join the club and learn the lanyuaye. 1n 
an appeal to local workers in lYjU tile ~V said: 
'tsperanto ist ein sehr wichtiyes H11tsm1ttel tur den 
internationalen Klassenkampt. Ule Arbeiter der ver-
sch i edenen Lanaer s tehen si ch heute n1 cht mehr t rellld 
gegenUber. sondern durch Esperanto ist Jed~n d1e Mog-
lichkeit gegeben. mlt seinen Klassenyenossen in alien 
Landern der Welt. schrlttlich oder mundlich. 1n ~eddnken­
austausch zu treten ••• Proletarier aller Lander verelqiyt 
euch. und wir setzen hinzu: und verstandiyt euch durch 
Esperanto! ' 
Members were a I so encouraged to read the ill ustrated "Arbel ter-
~sperantist"-journal whicll contained articles. reVlews and addres-
ses trom al lover the world. CorreStJondence with SOv1et I:.stJeran-
tists was particularly encouraged. but relationships were struck utJ 
wi th a II parts of the 9 lobe. 1n June Inti the centra I COllllnlttee at 
. 
the KJVU Cl rcu I ated a document encouragl ny the estab 11 shment ot 
international connections between ~erman tactory cells and Sovlet 
workers by correspondence. I he Kemsctlei d area was des i ynated the 
area around Lugansk. 111 
uuring the n!lddle and late-lUs there were one or two 'cultural' 
groups attlliated to the KPU which were interested in prolllotlny 
solidarity with the Soviet Union. Une such group. the Verelnlyuny 
der Freunde Sowjetrusslands (fr~ends ot Soviet I{ussia) was tounded 
on lIst May lYlylll· at a lIIeetlny cal led by Albert 1ssel and 
Ernst Zulaut. Kemscheid workers had enJoyed close rt!lations with 
the Soviet Union tor several years and the meetiny had been called 
to fou~d a local organlsatlon, WhlCh would place the relationshlp 
on a more official basis. lhe oryanisation statutes stated lts 
aim, 
'den wirtschattlichen Autbau, den kulturellen tortschrltt· 
und die I{echte der Arbeiterschatt in Cler SowJetun1on zu 
stud1eren und den hohert!n Wert des sozlalen tortschritts 
unter der Sowjetmacht geyenuber delll kapitalistlschen 
I{eyime der Arbeiterschatt darzustellen', 
and' 
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'urn bei den Feststellungen uber die Verhaltnisse in der 
Sowjetunion nicht nur auf theoretische und statistische 
Unterlayen allein angewiesen zu sein, erstrebt die Ver-
einigung dle Moglichkelt an, Uelegationen zurn Stud1W" 
der politischen, kulturellen und wirtschaftlichen Ver-
haltnisse nach der Sowjetunion zu entsenden.,11J 
Uuring the discussion concerning the subscri~tion charye, the ac-
cusation was raised that the group was be1ng fon"ea 1n oraer to 
provide cheap visits to the Soviet Union tor comlllittee lIIembers. Ihe 
subscription fee which was fixed at ~U pfennigs per week, was In-
. 
deed quite substantial, considering the f'act that many members were 
at the same time paying subscr1~tions to various other oryanlsa-
tions. Ihe Verelnlyung der I-reunde Sowjetrusslands had a tounaer 
membership of IU and had I oca I groups in ei yht d1 tterent ~elilscllel u 
districts. The chairman of the l{emsche1d cOllllllittee was Utto Weber. 
lhe Kulturkartell under the ChalrmanShi~ of KPU town councillor 
Waiter Kaiser wasanotller local oryanisat10n which regularly con-
cerned itself with d~fferent aspects ot Soviet lite. This oryanlsa-
tion held numerous tunct10ns which were addresseo by delegates 
recently returned fr~n the East, who related their experiences and 
generally extolled the cOllllllunist systelll. 1n connection with tne 
'Kulturkartell in 1!)~b Kesch held a series of lectures and invlted 
different speakers to R~nscheld to ex~ound on the Subject h~rwachen 
des Ustens" phe Awakenlng of' the East). Ihe tlrst lecture Wh1Ctl 
was held in the hAlter Katskeller" on 14th Uctober 1~~b was atten-
ded by ~!)U peo~ le, and was addressed by KPU member Th i ellle tr011l 
Krefeld who had recen,tly returned from the So~iet Un10n. Kesch also 
spoke about the situation in China in preparation for the next 
meeting. The meeting closed with the singing of the "Kotyardisten-
marsch"1l4. E I even days I ater the second lecture in the serH!S 
was addressed by a member of the Canton army and Kuomi ntang nallled 
Tscheng I'ai Po who was on his way back to China havlllY spent some 
time studying in Gottingen. 115 Ihe guest speaker was rece1ved 
at the rallway station by two bands and a troop of KH~ ruen who es-
corted him to the Stadtpark. Uver ~UU people turnea out to 11sten 
to the speaker who, ,after stammering a few sentences in broken 
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German. launched lnto a speech in Chinese which was elUCldatea by 
the inimitable Kesch. readlng tram a preparea paper. The. exotic 
guest ended his speech again in German with the slo!;!an "kelnen 
"'tenni!:! fur die ~ursten" alluding to the imminent plebiscite. lhe 
speaker was then presented with a meda I beari n9 the elllb I ellls at the 
RI-B by ~ernhard ~astlein. and the gathering san!;! the "internatlo-
nale". Tscheng was then hOisted onto the shoulders at KI-~ men ana 
carned out of the hall anllast enthusiastlc cneers Whllst tile balHt 
played. Ihe escort made its way to. the station where, atter 
. . 
speeches by Kesch and Bastlein. the speaker received !:Jltts ot 
social 1st Ilterature tor members at the Chinese youttl oryah1sat10n 
tram Karl Sothmann, representing tne Jungspartakusbund. IhlS kHlO 
ot tunction was enthusiastically received by local workers. In 
arranging for such an.exotic speaker to address the lIIeetlny, t<esch 
was actually creatlnY a plece ot COIIUIIUnlSt tradition in Kelllsctleld. 
It}e visas at Chlnese and Kusslans to Kemscheld enhanced the local 
party oryanisation's reputation. 
Ihe dispatChing ot KPU deleyates to the ~ovlet Unlon was otten 
cnticised by those attiliated members ot workers organ1satlOns who 
were not party members. ~ome ~PU and unorganised workers were scelJ-
tical ot the otten one-sided superticial reports. in an ettort to 
combat the criticism and appear more credible the local iAH COIIUlIlt-
tee under Peter Leyendecker askeo tor a non-party lIIelllDer to be ttl~ 
next oe I eyate t roul Kernschelo. I he ~V reporteo ttle lIIatter in an 
artlcle on the lHth February l!:lJ~.llb 
Organisations like the Kulturkartell dnd ~reunde der ~owJetunlon 
helped to lnform local workers about conditions elsewhere and to 
make them more outwara-Iookiny in thelr attitudes. KelllscheHI Wlt-
nessed many demonstrations ot sympathy and so 11 darlty W1 th . 
oppressed foreign workers throughout .the Welmar years. 117 In 
. this way local workers came to understand the permanent ana ubiqUl-
tous nature of the struggle against capitalism. 1t was Clear to 
many taul1lies that Russian workers tor example were fighting the 
same battle as they themselves. And thlS realisation lIIaoe thelll more 
sympathetic to pleas t~r help. 
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In lY~l, .tollowing long periods at draught along the WOlya, the 
Soviet Unlon, beset by already massiveproblems at reconstructlon 
an~ simultaneously racked by chi I war, had directed a plea tor 
help to workers at the world and as a consequerice at thlS ap~eal 
the lAH Internationale Arbeiter Hilte was tounded. 1U Ihe lAH 
which had groups in most towns includin~ Kemsclleid, held re~ular 
Collections particularly to finance meals tar children at poor ana 
striking families. In time, the lAH became an extens1ve oryanlsa-
tion primari Iy providing support tar strikes, althouyh by no lIIeans 
exclusively. Towards the end ot the Twenties., the Kote H11te orya-
. 
nisation became increasingly more important.as workers wereillllJrl-
soned as a result ot lIIore trequent clashes with police dnd ~Olltl­
cal opponents. The Kote Hi Ite oryanisatlOn JJrovided ald tor the 
tamilies ot internees. Here again the ~V provided reyular intorllld-
tion and incentive, publ1shingthe results at collections by dlt-
terent district sub-groups and prd1siny extraordlnary ettorts 
whereever apJ,Jropriate. l1Y In lyn the lAH organlsed d tour ot 
Germany by the "~Iaue Ijlusen", a talllous A9itproptruppe trolll the 
Soviet Union. Ihe tour which visited all the major towns and c1tles 
ot Germany also callle to Remscheld.l~U Ihe "ljlaue ~Iusen" 
tired the imayination ot enthusiastic audiences w1th their sun':;ls 
and sketches in the torm ot proletarian cabaret. Uver n1~ht German 
Agitproptruppen apJJeared an the scene tollow1ny the Kussldn 
example. Remscheid workers tonued a group called the "Kote Kaketen" 
atter the more illustrious trooJ,J tram Ijerlin which yained tame 1n 
the I ate-~Us wah thei r theme-sang at the same nallle. Ayltprop wltn 
its songs, satyrical sketches and unflag9iny energy alJ~ealed 
strongly to the workers' sense of humour. With songs by !:.isler, 
Brecht and Wei nert, like uRoter Weddi ny". "Uas Lied der latscher", 
NGustav Kuhlke" and "Vorwarts, und nicht vergessen", various A~it­
~ troops visited Remscheid raj sing money tor the lAH. In lYjU 
the lJerlin Agitprop troop "Alarlll" came to Remscheid atter success-
ful performances in Elberteld and ~olingen.l~l Ihe gruup 
finished its act with the message 'Prolet, du lIIupt IlIithelten, tritt 
ein in dle proletarischen Organisationen·.l~~ 
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Apart trom publ1C pertormances, A~ltprop groups 11ke the "Wote Wa-
keten" were also 1nvolved 1n Lanapropaganda wurk, jJdrtlcularly 
dUflng the approach ot electlons. Ihey useO to tour outlylng 01S-
tr1cts sometllnes on the back ot a renteo. lorry or on l)lcyCles. in 
the sununer ot J.YjU, Hemscheid's "Wote Haketen" challen~eo the "Hot!:! 
Lanzen" ot !)olingen to a cOllljJet1i10n to recrult t>U new KPU members 
and ga1n It> subscr1ptlOns tor the COIIUIlUnlSt press.J.~j In th1S 
way the KPU constant Iy ga 1 ned new members and bad Iy neeoeO SUDSCrl jJ 
tlon towarOs the end ot the Welmar Hepubl1c. Ih1S strategy was 
employed constantly by the KPU at all levels. Ihe tiV regularly 
. 
reported on recrultment call1pa1yns 11ke the one in March J.Yj~ wllen 
the party succeeded 1n ga1n1ny J5 new members as well as WU new 
readers tor the COIIUllun1st press, and ~U5 lIIarks tor the electlOn 
tund .1,4 Another success was recorded a tew days I ater when d 
street cell in Hosentlugel/IH1edin~hausen reported the cOlllpletlOn ot 
a year's work which hao ra1sed the membershlp trom seven to ~j, 
with extra membersh1 p tor the Hote H11 te and the Kamptbuna ~e~en 
·den faschismus lK~Of). !)uccess in th1S case was all the more re-
, 
markable because at the beg1nn1ny ot the campa1yn lt had generally 
been belleved that local resldents were 1ndltterent. Ih!:! result ot 
concerted ettort, patient canvassiny and a detenoratlny econOllllC 
s ituat ion revea I ed the extent. ot progress wh1 ch cou lObe 
achieved. 1,5 Ihe same issue reported the result ot the re-
crultment ettort ot the women's group ot district ~. Ihey obta1nea 
1, new members tor the KPU and t>t> subscriptions to the "Hote 
Kampter1n".1'b Accord~ng to these tigures it 1S eviaent that 
the KPU was exper1encing an upward surge in m~llberShlp 1n the late 
winter and early sprlng ot l~Jl/J'. as the HV had reported turther 
successes a week berore 1n the Fe~ruary campaign, whicn had brought 
1JY new KPU members pS ot WhlCh were employed), ,5 new members for 
the Hote Hilte. ,!) members tor the KgOr, tive tor the IUiU, two 
members at the Mieterschutzbund (tenants' association) and two new 
KJVU members. In addltion to this there were 15 new subscrljJtlons 
to the communist press and ,!) marks tor the electlon tund.1n 
Ihe Volkschor also played its part in recrultment drives, on one 
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occasion managlng to sell newspapers to farmers ln H"acken-
berg.!ll:$ Hate Helter played their part- with winter ald' calll-
pai,yns supp Iyi ny the NSUAP with an idea whi ch it later lIIade re~ed­
ted use ot. In the February ot l~J't. a Hate H11 te conference 
announced that more attention had to be pald to the recrultment ot 
members ln the -factofles. it was sU!;j!;jested that ttH~ orgarllsdtion 
cou I d be made more dynaml c by the format 1 on ot Zehnergruppen 
lyroups of ten). it was also announced that in the Winterhilfskalll-
payne lwinter aid call1paign) the I<elllscheld section had achleved 01:$ l 
ot its target and that both Lennep and Werlllelsklrchen had tultlllea 
. 
the1r goals. and lndeed collected lIIore. Winter aid in Honsber!;j 
yielded llU marks and a large amount ot clothlng ana paper. but a 
better result could not be achieved owin!;j to the fact that 1lI0st or 
the small shops were already bankrupt and unable to contrl-
bute. 1lY A further art1cle by the ~V at the end ot ~ebruary 
lYJl claimed that JJU new KPU members had been recrulted ln the 
previous three weeks in the Remscheld area and lt addeCJ ters Iy Ulat 
amongst these were some tormer SPU supporters. 1JU 
These figures clearly show a new radical trend WhlCh set in durlng 
the winter lYJ1/Jl and was to continue throughout the year. 
Apart trom the events menti oned above there were a I sO CU I tura I 
tunctions organised by the Kulturkartell. lAH. and the Kote Hilte. 
Ihe workers' movement also be!;jan to make use ot new media like the 
cwellla. although access and supply were restricted by a laCk or 
tunds and perhaps a fail ure to rea li se the tu II potent 1 a I at tile 
. t11m as: an important medlUIII tor propa!;janda. Nevertheless. on occa-
sions the workers' movelllent rente~ ClnellldS in I<elllscheld 1n orCJer to 
show at least a tew films to as members. Sports lIIee~ln!;js like the 
Workers' Olympics 10 t-rankturt and Vlenna were part1cular tavou-
rites. as well as certaln l<uss1an tilms. lnlYJU "Telllpo lOO openeCJ 
1tS first Film festival with the Soviet tilm, Uer Mann, der se1n 
uedachtnls verlor. lJ1 Ihis success was . followed the next 
month by a double bl Iling at the i{eichstreffen 'der i{oten Arbe1ter-
sportier in I:.rturt and the Westdeutsches Tretten in Uusseldort, 
tollowed by another Soviet fi Im-Turks1b" .lJl 
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Yet another p111ar ot the workers' I/Iovelllent wlth a strony tOllow1n!:j 
1n KemsChel<l was the ~ relOenkerverbana Wh1 ch ar!:juea the case tor 
sOC1al1sm against the 'myst1c1sm' ot Chrlst1anlty. Althou!:jh lar!:je 
sections ot KelllscheHl's work1ng class were host11e towards the 
.church, many st111 cont1nued to pay church taxes ana attend ser-
V1ces. 'lhe Fre1denker provided parallel serV1ces to those otterea 
by the. church. Dj Ihe Secular Contumat10n became popular 
dUrlng the Weimar Kepubllc as an alternat1ve to cont1rllldtlOn cere-
mon1 es performed by the church. I here were somet lilies vi 0 lent dl s-
putes in work1ny Class tallnlies where fathers ins1stea on thelr 
ch11dren attendiny Secular Contirmation and wives pleaded 'for tile 
Chr1stian ceremony. In sOllle cases wives arranyed tor their ctnlaren 
to be secretly confirmed in church, Wh1Ch at times lea to beatlny 
when husbandS learned the truth. 1j4 The ~re1denker also pro-
vided.funeral orators and held reyular meetlngs expla1nHlY tile IJro-
cedure ot seceSS10n troll! the church. At tile beyinniny ot ln~ the 
I oca I group sp I it with the maJority ot members ojJt 1 n!;l tor tile KPU-
led movement. lhe HV warned members of an attempt by SPU supporters 
who were trywg to co II ect subscr1 pt 1 ons without the authOrlty ot 
the co~nittee. A Frankturt court had ruled that expulslons ot 1n01-
vidual members by the Freidenker's yoverning bOdy and the wltll-
drawa I of powers t r01l1 reY1 ona I and I oca I cOlllllli ttees were 111 eya I. 
The I oca I newspaper a I so puD I i shed a list ot co II ectors who were 
authorlSed Dy the local conunittee, toyether with the nallles ot ttle 
SPucollectors. 1j5 Uuriny the late summer ot l!:ljU the ~rel­
denker found it necessary to move to larger premises 1n ttle VolkS-
~. Accordi ny to the HV the reason tor the. move was a grOWl ny 
melllDership and an increasiny number at peolJle leaviny the 
cnurch.Ut> 
Male V01ce and mixed ChOl~S were traditionally a popular torm at 
cultural expression amongst Germany's workers, and many Kelllscheld 
workers continued thlS old tradition. Some ot the laryer local fac-
torles like the HSl had their own male VOlce chairs and there were 
also a large number ot bouryeois chOirs, but class-consclOus wor-
kers joined the Volkschor which had male, temale, chi Idren's ana 
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mixed chOlrs. 1J7 rhe Volkschor had weekly practice seSS10ns 
1n the Volkshaus and had a large re~ertoire includlny Arbeiterlle-
der, Kampt I i eder, but a I so c I ass i ca I pi eces. The I oca I workers' 
movement· had severa I Tambour- and Sctla Imelenkorps and a very ~OOd 
mandolin ensemble as well as the many bands representlny lndlVl0ual 
organl sat 1 ons like the RFti, Rei chsbanner and workers'· sports move-
ment. liands were used constantly durin~ the Welmar RepuDI ic bOttl 
tor propaganda and enterta 1 nment va I ue. so it was a common s 1 ytlt to 
see brass bands marching through the town. 
An Old workers' traditlon with its roots in the J.nh century was 
. 
the practice of receiv1ng 'martyrs at class Justice' at the rallway 
statl0n on thelr release trolll prlson. Atter speeches ot welcollle Dy 
, 
prominent local leaders ot the movement. the 'returnin~ hero' woulu 
be I i tted onto the shou I ders ot comrades and marched ttlrou~h the 
town to his hOllle. 1J/j 
As already shown in the prev10us chapter, durlng the period at eSCd-
latiny violence in J.nJ workers' leaders had deciaed to torlll I-'ro-
letarianHundreds to protect the working-class dlstricts trolll 
attacks by ri yht-wi ng· extrelOi sts. Short Iy atter the torlllat 1 on at 
these armed groups which existed al lover Gerlllany, the KPU. recently 
restored to legality. createa a permanent protectlve torce, the 
Rotfrontkampferbund lKFli) which - I ik.e the I{elchsbanner - was a 
supra-party Organlsat10n.J.J~ The R~I$ in Relllschela was rejJre-
sented by seven district sub-groups and in the spring ot J.~~/j hao 
one of the strongest contingents in the area, nUlllber1ng 54U I ana 
the Rote· Junytront, the youth wing, prov1aed a turther· £5.J.4U 
Not only was the Remscheia Urtsgruppe strony 1n nUlllbers but also 1n 
lnfJuence and provlded the regional· leader ot the Lower Khlneland, 
Alwln Panzer. J{emscheld's RFli was reyaraed as an exemplary unlt, 
renouned for its energy and fighting spirlt.J.4J. The local 
urtsgruppe was led by plumber Gustav F'lohr. Karl Gortz. Karl Gorny, 
Emil llligmann. Willlelrn Krelllershott. August Kuhne. [wald Motzkat, 
Hugo Paul (RJF-group leader). Ernst Tuck.mantel and Auyust Wahl. The 
R~Jj had an ottice in the Volkshaus and held evening courses tWlce a 
week. for new members on the aims and cOlllbat lIIethoos ot the organl-
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sat10n. In addltlOn to these there were also regular courses tor 
ott1ClalS on such tOP1CS as "Kr1eysteChnlk yeyner1scher Verbancte" 
(c~mbat strategy of enemy tormations) and "1l11penal1slllus unCI 
Krieysgetahr" lillljJerialism anCl the danger ot war).!4~ 
Apart t rom its funct10n ot protectlnY work i ng-c I ass Cll s tn cts, pro-
v101ng protection squads tor meetings and const1tutlng the nucleous 
ot· a future 'Hed Army', the Rl-li was regarded by the KPU as an orga-
nisaton which would attract new recruits who would eventually opt 
to join the part~.14J In the· tive years ot its existence un-
t11 the ban in l!:l~!:I the IH'Ij ruled the streets ot Hemscheid, The 
. 
11St ot, actlvlt1es drawn up by the reglonal policy COlllllllttee for 
l!:l,~ with nine major tunctlons as well as the many local ones untll 
the ban, amply delllonstrates the act1ve part played by tIle 
RfH.144 ~urthenllore, a police report ot September 1!:1'~ shows 
that Remscheid's Kftl also took ·part 1n mllitary manoeuvres at week-
ends near Leichlingen,145 Atter the ban, the RFb appears to 
have contlnued as a losely connected tormatlon deSJ,llte the eX1S-
tence ot the quasi-I ega I Kamptbund gegen den ~aschi SIlIUS lK~dt-). Un 
the ,~th February l!:lJU there was a KPU demonstrdtion in WInch IlIelll-
bers ot the KJVU and R~B marched through the workin!;j-class d1S-
tricts ot Honsberg, Stachelhausen and Kremenholl in unl-
torrn. 14b When the po lice arri ved on the scene, tlley mere Iy 
found empty streets. 
From the point ot view otcont1nu1ty the KJVU was an extremely 1111-
portant organisation with1n the workers' movement. tiy the beyinning 
, 
ot .l~'b the district oryanisat10n ot the KJVU Relllscheld had over 
,uu members· organised in six local groups and three tactory 
cells. 147 Here again the Remscheid local group played an 110-
portant role in the region. and the town provided the venue tor 1111-
portant meetings of the organisation as tor example the Internat10-
nal Uay ot Youth stayed by the KJVU's Lower Rhineland sectlOn in 
lY,Y. On this occasion regional leader Ernst tiertram pointed to the 
increasing danger ot wa~ saying: 
- lol -
'das Jugendproletar1at soil wieder das Kanonentutter 
werden. In den bUrgerlichen Vereinen wird die m1li-
tarische Erziehung der Jugend emsiy betrieben una die 
Sozialdemokratie lelstet hierbei Handlanyerdienste. ts 
ist Pflicht eines jeden proletar1schen Arbeiters~ se1ne 
Sohne van diesen Urganisationen ternzuhalten.'140 
I he event attracted I arge numbers at" KJVU members and sympathl-
sers. Ihe KJVU was a particularly active winy of the local KPU,'and 
held regular weekly meetings, participated in recru1Unent and pro-
paganda campaigns and provided tund raisers and leat let· distribu-
tors. KJVU members who in the main were Single and haa more tlme to 
devote to political work than fathers at families. and at wQrk were 
subject to less pressure in that the consequences ot losing tneir 
jObs were perhaps not qui te as tragic as 1n the cases ot those wllo 
had larye talllilH:!s to support. Un the other hdlld IIldllY ut the KJVU 
members were apprentices ana suttered daily hUllliliation dnd at 
times even ma I treatment at the hands ot thei r bosses or tore-
men. 14Y · 
The Jungspartakusbund which was the children's groulJ at the KPU, 
was founded in July Ino in Remscheid and was regaraed dS an illllJor-
tant 11nk in the chain. It ottered children a wide range ot activi-
ties and tried to counter the influence ot teachers and an authurl-
tarian school system. When the group was founded it nUlllbered bl ana 
elected representatlves to recruit new members and develop prolJa-
y~nda campaigns in their schools. The high priority given to the 
pOlitlcal organisation ot children and youths in the local workers' 
movement can be gauged by the tact that the children rece1ved tllelr 
own club house in Honsberg, the newly-constructea wing ot the 
Resch-HUtte. !he opening cerelllony in lYlb was attended by roughly 
l,UUU children and 5UU adults and was addressed by Kesch who 
said: 
'Uas Heim, das ein Werkzeug proletarischer Solidaritat 
ist, soil stets eine Ptlegestatte proletarisch-revolu-
tionaren Uenkens sein.'l~U 
The club house solved the problem of shortage of space in the 
Jugendhaus behi nd the Vo I kshaus whi ch the chll dren' s group had 
hitherto shared with the KJVU. 
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This survey by no lIIeans exhausts the ran!:je ot organisations and 
institutions aftiliated to the local workers' movement but it does 
cOI~prise the most eftective ones. lhe tormidable combination ot the 
Bergische Volksstimne, the Volkshaus and the frele Volkshochschule 
together with the many sports and recreati ona I cl UDS, whl ch bene-
fited tr~n the experience ot a long-standing radical traoition, was 
to a large measure responsible tor the development ot a well-inte-
grated and cohesive movement in I{elilscheid during the Weiluar l{eJ,lub-
lic. lhe dynalllic inter-play ot tradition and institutlons was con-
stantly visible in the local workers' movement and was re.H1torced 
and intensified by the influx ot talented indiviauals trolll other 
areas who perceived in I{elllscheid a prolllising arena tor thelr 10ed5 
and skills. Both, politically and culturally, tile workers' movelllent 
in I{emscheid J,lrovided exciting and stilllulatin!;J of}IJOrtunltles tur 
journalists, writers and artists to strike up a mutual rapport with 
an interested and appreclative public who did not lIIerely consume 
but also actively contributed. In 'cultural terms, Helllscheid experi-
enced a heyday during the first half of the twenties which con-
trasts sharply with what the town has known at any time Slnce. 
Whilst the I-reie Volkshochschule was the principal catalyst, as 
Resch himself' testifies, it was indeed the Hemscheid workers who by 
their enthusiastic reception and involvement supplled the imJ,lulses 
for tur'ther activity. lhe annual festivals held by the Volkshoch-
schule and later the freie Volkshochschule attracted amon!:jst 
others, Ernst Toiler, Lieory Kaiser, I-ranz WerteI1b1.the- Hajj-
be~kow and Schunnann-Horster theatrical groups, Heinrich Voyler ot 
the tiarkenhoff colony, Kathe Kollwitz, Lieorye Lirosz and Utto Uix. 
upen-,air jJroductlons of "Masse Mensch", "Spieyellllensch", "lholllas 
MLinzer" amongst others. were seen by thousands of workers duri ny 
the VolkShOchschul{e) testivals and a stage was provided tor local 
workers' own plays. The effect at such experiences was a reintorce-
ment of the political institutions, despite the dispute between the 
KPU and Resch. 
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CHAP 11:1{ I V 
N U E S 
1 See Chapter 11 tor the Reichstag election of 4/~/~4. 
I{esult ot the Kelchsta~ election ot l/l~/24 tor KelllscheHl: 
c 
lurn-out ~n. 0 %. 
KPU 1~,ti~1 = jl.b % 
SPU J,JUti = ti.l % 
Lentrum J,lUti = ti.l % 
UNVP 4,IU~ = lU.l A. 
UVP lU,54J = 2!>.ti % 
UUP 4,~U7 = lU,J % 
Volkisch-sozialer ~Iock 24~ = U.b % 
Wlrtschattspdrtei till = ~.U A. 
USPD Ib!> = U.4 ~ 
Autwertpartei I,I~1 = l,~ :t 
Polenpartei 61 = U.l ~ 
t.:hrist.-soz. Voll<s~ellleinschatt 57 = U.l ~ 
See C.U. Ihompson, OPe cit •• p. J6. 
'(. Ct. Hermann Weber, "Uie KPU und die linke UppOS1tlon in Oer 
Sowjetunlon. Lur Problematik der Vertlechtung des Stalinisle-
rungsprozesses der KPU, der Komintern und der KPaSU" in: Ult 
Wolter (edit.): Sozialismusdebatte, ~erlin 1~/ti, pp. IbU-l~U; 
also idem., Uer deutsche KOllllllunismus, '(. volumes, Koln 1~/J; 
idem, Uie Wandlung des deutschen KOllullunislllus, l volullles, ~rank­
furt a.M. l~b~; especially Volume 1 with the Sub-tltle Ule 
Stalinisierung der KPU in der Weimarer Kepublik. 
J Weber, "Die KPU und die linke UPPosltion ••• ", OPe cit. pp. 17U-
17J. 
4 Ibid., P~ IbJ. 
!> ~ I echtheim, Ope ci~., p. '(.b2 t. 
b Interview with Utto Kau. 
I HStA ULisseldorf, Reg. Uuss. JUb4~a, Ury.-Instruktion Nr. I,. 
7/2/1Y27; 
also flechtheim, OPe cit., p. 21b. 
~ Otto ~rafj, co-signatory ot the IHeletelder Abkollllllen (Ireaty ot 
•. Bieleteld) was branded by local workers as a traitor. He even-
tually returned to the SPU in tlerlin. H. SChllestedt and w. 
~ reytag represented the UMV headquarters in the a1 spute wi th 
the I{emscheid Urtsgruppe ot the UMV in lYl4. I<udolt I)uhler 
returned to the SPU in I{emscheid. 
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Y Interview with Grete Salz 11/1/~1. 
Albert Issei and his comrades were the envy ot many KPU members 
10 Leyendecker taught at one ot the town's non-denoltlinational 
schools. 
11 Interview with Erich Ihieler, May lY~U. 
1£ Intormation tram Milli Hilbert who was herselt a member at the 
~ed Front Girls' Lea~ue. 
IJ See Albert Norden, Ereignlsse und lrlebnisse, ~erlin 1~til, pp. 
£~-4/. 
14 Information trom Milli Hilbert who worked with Adams HI th~ 
party ott i ce 1 n Remschei d. 
I!) Ibid. 
, , 
Ib Institut fur Mdrxislllus-Leninislllus bellll ZK der SlUt tjeschlclltl~ 
der deutschen Arbelterbewe~uny. ~iayraphlsches Lexikon, ~erlin­
Ust l~/U, pp. 31/J2. 
11 Emil Karunann. Ope cit. 
1~ Ibid •• p. !)b. 
lY Institut tur Marxislllus-Lenlnismus beim LK der SlU, leXlkon. OPe 
cit. 
£U Ibid., pp. Jbl/Jb£. Hugo Paul played a leading role in Uussel-
dart and Remscheid 10 the reslstance movement ayainst Ule Nazls 
during the lhird Reich. After the war he was the Minister tor 
Reconstruction in the Landtay in Uusseldarf. 
21 Kortmann. Ope cit. 
22 Accordlng to Otto and Linnie Alders. Korunann's opinion was un-
tounded. on the contrary. local workers were proud at ~ecker's 
success. 
2J To this day the town at Relllscheld has retused to' aCknuwledye 
Artur Hecker's contribution to the resistance against the Nazl 
dlctatorship. as lndeed it has that ot all anti-tascists. 
Hecker is the patron at the East German youth movement. and 
throughout the country there are streets and schoo Is nametl 
atter him. 
24 Institut hir Mdrxismus-Leninislllus beim LK der SW. OPe clt., 
pp. 44U/441. 
• 
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~5 Interview with Paul Schneider, Willi Krell, Utto and Llnllle 
Alders, Utto Rau and Erich Thieler. All contirlll that there was 
more otten than not broad agreement between workmates irrespec-
tive of party attiliation. All ot them evoke the mutual aSS1S-
tance against Stahlhelm, Junydos and Nazis. 
~b Interview with Willi Krell: 'fs ist ott vuryekulIIlIl~nJ dal':> 
Rei chsbannerl eute in I etzter Mi nute von 1<0tkalllJJteryruPJJen 
yerettet wurden.' 
Also HStA Ousseldort, Rey. Ouss. 171Y~, wUJJJJertal-l:.lbertelo 
4/11/Jl, report concerning Pol itische Lusammensto(.)e 1n I<em-
scheid in der leit vom ~4. bis ~tl. Oktober dieses Jahres. 
~I Interview with Erich Thieler. Wi Ili Krel I, Ulya Jung and Frltz 
Knapper. 
~ts I:.g. the son and dauyhter-ln-Iaw of deputy mayor franz Iserloll 
were Doth yiven work In the I<elllscheld elllJJloYl/lent ottlce. 
See I<liA, ~/':JrjJ. Entl assunyen am Arbeitsdlllt. 
·Ihere were reputedly other exalllples ot alleged neJJutislll, but 
the author was not able to substantldte such clalll15. 
2Y flechtheim, Ope cit., pp. 2~b-~bU. 
JU See l:hapter VI. Nearly all the tormer KPU members wholll the 
author interviewed, readi Iy agreed that the theury was Doth 
erroneous and damaglng to the workers' 1II0velllent. 
Jl Examples ot joint ventures between the KPU and NSUAP were the 
referendum ayainst tile Prussian government dnO the tierlln 
transJJort workers' strike. 
J2 The expuls10n followed a weekena testival in whlCh Kemscheia 
teams competed with the-already expelled Uusselaort-uerreshellll 
group. Information from Erich Thieler who partic1pated 1n the 
handball game. According to Thieler the l<elllscheHl sportsmen ana 
women were aware ot the possible consequences ot their dec1s10n 
. to play against a proscri.bed club. 
jj HStA UUsseldort, I<eg. Uuss. JUb':J~b. 
J4 HStA Uusseldort. Ger. Kep. 5/tlU~. 
J~ HStA Uusseldort. Ger. Rep. 5/tlU~, ibid. 
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;jb BV, l~/~n!:l, Provokateure im Volkshaus - sozialfaschlst1scher 
Oberfa II auf kOlllllluni sti sche Aroei ter. 
The report gives the impression that a strony detachment ot 
pol icemen had been re4uested oy the SPU mellloers prior to the 
meeting, as they were expectiny trouble. Ihe report goes on to 
say that it was the SPU contingent which triea to provoke a 
brawl •. rhe SPD melllbers. were, . however, heavi Iy outnulllbered, 
according to evidence given at the trial, so that the tiV'S 
report would seem ,to be inaccurate. An inCident awears to have 
been provoked by a meeti ng of' the SPU ca II ed by clla i rman Max 
liI ank to consider a boycott of the Vo I kshaus. tH ank is reterrea 
to 1n the ~V as "L~yen-Jjlank", and another speaker. Heimbacher. 
a representative ot the building workers' union, is callea d 
tollower at the "~erliner ~Iutsozialisten". 
'J7 ~V, 'J/I/'JU, Meine Herren, bleiben Sie doch stehen ••• ~e1chs-
banner flUchtet vor Arbeiterfausten. 
'JH ~V, lU/I/JU ~Uttel der ~ourgoisie - die Sozialtaschisten. 
'JY av. l~/I/JU, N1cht locker lassen. 
4U Owi n9 to the I ack of documentary evi dence, melllbershi p f1 gures 
of individual organisations are rough est1mates based on reCOl-
lections ot interviewees, unless otherwise stdtea •. 
41 from 1~4b onwards publication continuea HI Uusseldort. Ihe KPU-
daily Freiheit contained a single page for local news in ~elll­
sche1d. 
Ihe tigure of two and a halt thou~and is a rough estimate con-
firmed by several lnterviewees. Ihe author was permitted to in-
spect tiles ot application tOflllS in the possesslon ot t-ritz 
~ei nersdort. torlller chai rlllan of the UK? branch 1 n ~elllschei d. 
from these t11es alone it woula seem that the above estilllate is 
by no means an exaggeration. furtherlllore the above estimate is 
supported by the proportion of votes to pary members l in the 
Landtag election ot April l!:l47 the KPU won l'J.l!:ll votes, ayaln 
becoming the strongest party in ~emscheid. See freltleit, 
ll/4/47. Uie KPU errany den Siey). Ihe relationShip between 
votes and members aJJpears to be roughly consistent with dOCU-
mented evidence for the Weilllar Republic. 
· ' 
, . 
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42 The BV had a circulation of around lU,UUU. 
43 An 'instance of the withholding ot int"ormation by the duthorit-
ies occurred on IH/!;I/JU. Ihe employment ottice retusedto sup-
ply the BV with that month's unemployment figures, so that the 
latter had to wait for this intormation in the RGA betore beiny 
able to cOllUllent. Needless to say the f'iyures tor September 1YJLJ 
were particularly unpleasant with over tive ana a halt thousand 
receiving u'nemployment benefit 1n the Remscheid area, ana a 
further two and a halt thousand receiving no benetlt whatso-
ever. 
See JjV, l!;l/!;I/3U. 
44 See report JjV, b/l/l~. 
4~ In February lY25, tor exalllple, in a poor turn-out ot unly !],jU. 
the Crnnmun1sts received 1,241 and the SPU 4b4 vutes.' 
See Reg. Uuss. IbY45, 1U/2/25. 
4b See RGA, 22/12/25. 
41 Comparison ot prices, lietz, Schurmann and Konsum. 
4H It is intended to gi ve on Iy a bri et summary of sOllle at the ac-
tivities which were carried out by this 111lIJOrtant workers' 111-
stitution which was the first at its kind in Germany. Untll 
now, the Freie Volkshochschule in Relllscheid has r~celved only 
scant attention, but this Situation ought to be redressed Wlth 
the appearance of a dissertation now being written by Wolt~any 
Fey, to whom the author is deeply inaebteo tor providiny a con-
siderable alllount ot material on which this survey is baseo. 
,~or other works concerned inter alia with the Kemscheid school 
see: . 
Thomas ferber, Sozlal istlsche Arbeiterbllduny: fur Auselnan-
dersetzung zwichen Marxlsten und Revislonisten um die Konzep-
tlon der Arbei terbi I dung und 1 hre Verwi rk I i chung in der Jje-
triebsrateschuluny nach der Novemberrevolution lYltl-1Y2J, Wup-
perta I lYHU; 
Johannes Resch, "Die freie proletarische VolkstlOchschule in 
Remscheid", in: Joset Ulbrich (edit.), Arbeiterbildung in der 
Weimarer Leit. Konzeption und Praxis. Brclunschweiy lY11. pp. 
27!;1-2YJ. 
Hans Peter .Veraguth. £rwachsenenbilaung zwischen Rellyion una 
Po 11 t1 k: 01 e protestanti sche I:.rwachsenenbi I dunysarbeit in una 
auBerhalb der freien Volksbilauny in Ueutschlana van lYlY bis 
194H, Stuttyart IY71. 
Artur Meier, Proletarische £rwachsenenbilduny. Uie tiestrebun~en 
der revolutionaren deutschen Arbeiterbeweyuny zur systemati-
schen sozialistischen~ildung und Erziehung erwachsener Werk-
tatiger (lYIH - 19:n), Halllburg 1971. 
4Y StA I{emscheia. IV M/J. 
~U StA I{emscheid, IV M/J, Abschritt. ~riearich Lorenz Sctlllliat, 
Leulenroaa b/9/7H. 
~1 Ibid. 
bl Ibid. 
~or his own account ot his childhooa years ana ot his disturbed 
relationshlp with hlstather see Johannes l{esch,"I:.r1nnerun~t:!I\", 
copy in !itA Remscheia, IV M/J. 
~J Johannes Resch, Vom Pietismus ZUIII Kallllllunislllus - Eine Entwlck-
~, chapter Il,. pp. I-Jl, unfinished lIIanuscript, 01J. cit. 
Copy provided by Woltgang Fey. 
~4 Ibid., p. lU. 
bb ibid., p. 11. 
~b Ibid., pp. Il-lb; 
and Resch, "Uas Sonnwend-Volkstest aer Relllscheiaer VolkshoCh-
.schule", copy in StA i<emscheid, IV M/J. 
';)7 Resch, VOIII Pietismus zum KOllllllunismus ••• , OPe cit., p. lb. 
bH StA Remscheid, IV M/J, An das Stadtveroranetenkolleyiulll Rem-
scheid. Ib/l/lU. 
bY Interview with Hertha Glas, Otto i<au, I:.nlllli Leyelldecker, Grete 
~usch and Hannah (Juaas. Ihe tertII "lndianer" referred to the 
practice of young girls of wearing sweat-bands round the tore-
head. 
bU Iholllas terber, Sozialistische Arbeiterbildung. OPe cit.,p. lU4t 
and kesch. VOIII Pietislllus ZUIll KOllullunismus, OPe cit., p. llt. 
At a meeting held on lUth January 19a, IlH participants voted 
to found an independent school against tour who were not in 
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agreement and ten abstentions. Ihe meeting issued a declaration 
in which it protested against the dictatorial methods ot mayor 
Or. HarUnann who had ignored the Volkshochschul(e) constitution 
and apPointed another director 'without consulting the students. 
Paragraph 2 of the declaration retlected the anger ot the ~ar­
ticipants: 
"Wir legen sodann ausdrucklich Verwahruny ein yegen 
die Obertrayuny des ~"tes eines Volkshochschul lehrers 
an einen Dozenten durch den stadtischen Bildunys-
(Verwaltungs-) Ausschu~ sowie gegen die Ankundigung 
einer vwn Bildungsausschu~ vorzulegenden Satzuny -
unter volliger Ausschaltung der Horerschatt. Wir er-
blicken darin eine Anmassung von Rechten, die seit 
Bestehen der Volkshochschule dem Bildunysausschujj ni~ 
zugestanden worden sind, und die die ganze bisher1ye 
Grundlaye der Relllscheider VOlkShochschule zerstur~n. 
Uiese Handlunysweise bedeutet nach unserer Ansicht 
eine 'vol11ge Entrechtuny der Horerschatt, <lle Wle kaUlII 
eine zwelte in Ueutschland lhre yanze Kratt IIllt bel-
spiel loser Hingabe fur ihre Volkshochschule einyesetzt 
hat. Sle bedeutet die Auslieferung Cler blsher ausser-
ordentlich lebendiy entwickelten Volkshochschule an eine 
burokratische Bevormunduny reaktionarster Art. Ualldt 
wird der Selbstverwaltung, d.h. der chardkteristischen 
Eiyenart der Helllscheider VolkShOchschule, <l1e Wle weniye 
ihresgleichen im Volk und insbesondere in der Arbeiter-
, schatt wurzelte, das Ruckgrat gebrochen: Uie Volks-
hochschule hat aUf~eh0rt, eine Hochschule des Volkes 
zu seine Fur al le olgen, die aus dieselll bltteren Un-
recht flie0en, das hier der Horerschatt anyetan worden 
1st, machen wir alle dle verantwortlich, die an ihm 
mitgewirkt haben ••• • 
01 Ibid., p. lJJ; 
and Artur Meier. OPe cit., p. lU4 f. 
62 Hertha G I as. Enunl Leyendecker and Grete Busch are exalllp I es ot 
young women who came trolll lIIiddle- and 10wer-lIIiddle,class tallll-
lies. Grete Busch, who came'trom a local manutacturing tami Iy, 
exp,erienced considerable personal conflict when she decided to 
terminate her employment at the telephone exchange in order to 
cOlluuence training tor the post ot' Kindergarten teacher at the 
~reie Volkshochschule day nursery. Inte~view with Grete BUSCh, 
2Y/I/H2 in East Berlin. 
Hertha Glas recalled the hopes and pr~"ises awakened during the 
ear Iy Weimar years, whi ch were experi enced by her and many at 
her triends as the beginning at' a new era. ACCOrdiny to her, 
there was a widely-held beliet that here in Hemscheid the toun-
dations at a new and more just society were beiny lal<1 WhlCh 
wOU I Cl f>ventUrt I I Y oVi'rcotll(~ the d 1 veryence ot I 
C ass 1 nteres ts. 
, 
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bJ Information from Grete ~u~ch; 
and Resch, Vom Pietismus ZUlU KoullllunisHlus, OPe cit., pp. ~4-~b. 
b4 Information from Grete l3uSCh. 
60 Edwin Hoernle, born 11th Uecember ltitiJ in Canstatt, Wurtterllber~, 
was a member of the executive of the' Comlllunist International 
and was one of the KPU's experts on eaucation who led the cen-
tral department of 8i Idung und Propayanda. (;t. Institut tur 
Marxislllus-Leninismus beirn LK der SEU, l:Sioyraphisches Lexikon, 
OPe cit., pp. 2lJ-~16; , 
and Uie Rote Fahne, tl/tl/~l, Uie erste ~eichskonterenz der ~il­
aungsobleute. 
bb I3V, ll/I/ll, Uie Bildungsbestrebungen des Proletariat~ una ale 
Komllluni sti SCtll:! Partei. 
bl Cf. lnstitut fur Marxismus-Leninlslllus beilll LK der SI:.U, l:Sloyrd-
phisches Lexlkon, OPe cit., p. JtiJ f. 
Artur ~osenbery, born l~th Uecelllber, Itlti~ in !lerl in, was d KPU 
Reichstag deputy and city counclllor. 1n InJ he became a llIelll-
ber of the regional cOlllmittee of the KPU for ~erlin-branoenDUrlj , 
and i n 1~l4 was a member ot the party' s centra I cOlllllli ttee as 
well as the pOlitica'1 office. In the sallle year he was coopted 
onto the executive ot the COlllmunist InternatlOnal. ~oSenbery 
was closely associated with the ultra-left winlj ot the KPU. He 
lett the party in l~ll. 
bti Uie Rote fahne, tl/ti/~~, Ope cit. 
b~ Bergi sche Arbeiters tiuulle, 14/Y/'Ll, KOllulluni s ti sche Erzi ehunlJs-
und l3ildungsarbelt. 
7U RGA, l!>/ll/ll, Johannes I{esch weyen "unkolllmuni sti scher An-
schauungen und partei schadi genden Verha I tens" aus der Partei 
ausgeschlossen. 
71 The VolkshOChschul(e) cooperative built an extension in 1Ylb to 
house dormitories tor visitiny chi Idren. lhis was partly ti-
nanced trom lAH tunds, but the remainder was raised in a number 
of nove I ways by members themse Ives. Severa I unemp I uyed shoe-
makers, tor instance, prOduced ballet and gym-shoes which were 
so I d to clubs and thea tri ca I groups. Some ot the women made 
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baskets and ornaments which were sold to souvenir sho~s in 
Cologne and Dusseldort, and a substantial amount ot IlIoney was 
raised by 'tornbolas and sales of coftee and cakes at annual 
t"estivals. 
Resch, Yom Pietismus zum Kommunismus, o~. cit., p. 't.7. 
II Written about l~~~ as a member ot the Sozialistische ~inheits­
partei Oeutschlands (S~U) and .as an important tunctionary in 
the Kultuslllinisterium in the German Uemocratic I<e~ubllc. 
7J Resch, Yom Pietismus zum Kommunismus, OPe cit., p. 't.t> •. 
74 See Berlin Document Centre (BUC), Personal ~ile Johannes 
Resch. Excerpt trom Resch's appl ication for membership .1n the 
Reichsschrifttumskammer IYJt>. Extract kindly provided by Wolt-
yang fey. 
/~ I<esch, Vom Pietislllus ZUlU KOllllllunismus, olJ. cit., ",. ~Y. 
It> See HeJmut Wdgner, Sport una ArbelterSport, rejJrint. Koln lY/J, 
• J,I. Lil. 
'Uer Arbeitersport steht in zweitacher Hinsicht 1m 
Uienste des Klassenkalllptes der Arbeiter. ~r yreitt 
einlllal an im eiyentJichen Sport, 1n se1ner Uurchtull-
rung, in seiner Autfassuny. ~r greift mit se1nem 
Sport den kapitalistischen Sportbetrieb an. LUIII 
zweiten aber bekennt er sich entyegen den "Neutrali-
tats"behauptungen aJler buryerlichen Sportverbande 
als politische ~eweyung. ~r nimllt Stellung tur den 
proJetarischen Klassenkalllpf. Er stellt sich unter 
das rote Hanner des proJetarischen Sozialislllus. tr 
yreift die kapitalistische Gedankenwelt dn.' 
71 Ibid., p. IJJ. 
/~ Ibid., p. IJJ. 
/~ The pohlhausen club which had around IUU members, male and fe-
male, specialised in gymnastics and tootball. 
See interview with Fritz Knapper and UJga Jung, 12/~/~U. 
HU StA Relllscheid, Sonderakte betr. Sport- und Spielplatze, IV L 
11, l~l~-IYJH. 
~l ~V, l/7/JU, Rote Arbeitersportler heraus zur Protestdemonstra-
tion. 
H2 BV, lU/l/JU, sportier, verschart"t den Abwehrkalllpt! 
HJ lntervlew with Erich Jhieler lY/tl, lY/Y and lYHU. 
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~4 BV, lb/b/Jl, Uer Teufelsteich wird zur Statte der trholuny. 
~b Interview with Erich lhieler~ 
Hb, StA Remscheid, Sonderakte betr. Sporhereine inl AI'lgellleinen, 
V II M 22. 
HI Ibid. 
HH StA Remscheid, Sonderakte betr. Sport- und Spielplatze, ofJ. 
cit. 
HY The SPU orientated intern~tional organisation which torbaae its 
members to play against the cOllullunist Moskduer Internationdle 
lhe Austrians were an exception in that they still continued to 
play against the Russians. 
YU ~II, 4/~/JU. 
Yl Ijll, 4/IOU, I{oter Sport 1111 Ueryischen. Geht es vorwdrts '/ 
Y2 ~V,:4/J/J2, Rotsport Fu0ball. 
YJ BV, H/b/J2, Uie Schranken tallen: Ijuryerliche ~ubballer spielen 
'gegen rote Arbeitersportler. 
The author was unable to aetermine whether this wiSh was tinal-
Iy justified in what was to be the Rotsport orYdnisations' last 
season. 
Y4 Uie Neue, l~/J/'dU, Als der deutsche Meister noch Lorbeer Ub 
~, by Werner Skrentny. 
Yb See Bv, 14/'d/JU. 
Yb BV, Y/Hj'JU, Rote Kavallerie lIlit Rot front von Relllscheid nach 
Stollberg. 
YI Kuns tamt Kreuzbery und das lnstitut fUr Thea terwl ssensCha tten 
der'Universitat Koln (edit.), Weimarer Republik, Ijerlin und 
Hamburg 1Y77, p. b14. 
9H BV. 9/J/j2, AbschluBprUfung der Arbeitersamariter. 
YY HStA Uusseldorf, Reg. Uuss. JUb4Yf. Satzungen des Westdeutschen 
Arbeiter-Sallldriter-Ijundes e.V •• 
1UU HStA Uusseldort', Reg. Uuss. JUb4!H', POlizeljJrasiaiulll Wuppertal, 
1'd/b/1YJU. 
'Ihe report states that the Westdeutscher Arbelter-Sallldrlter-
Verband Remscheid e.V. numbered bU members. Ihe yoverniny bOdy 
was C~lIpletely KPU orlentated. Ihe ASB Lennep which had 4U ac-
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tive ~embers was sti 11 loyal to the Chemnitz organisation, but 
~O % of the lIIembers belonyed to the.opposition. Kaaevorlllwald 
had 1~ members consistiny of 10 SPU followers, the rest KPU, 
and the organisation still in the hands of the Chelllnitzyroup. 
HUckeswagen and Werlllelskirchen both went over to the Solingen 
Verband. 
lUl See Introduction. 
lU~ Festschrift. bO Jahre Touristenverein die Naturfreunde, Urts-
gruppe Remscheid. Ope cit. 
103 StA Remscheid. Sonderakte betr. Urtsausschub fur Jugendptleye 
Stadt Remscheid. IV L B. lY11-1Y3J. 
lU4 Interview with Utto Rauj 
and Festschrift. OPe cit. 
IU~ .BV. lU/b/Jl, Arbeiterturner inl Roten Massenselbstschutz. 
IUb Interview with Utto Rau; 
and HStA Uusseldort. Reg. Uuss.3Ub4Yt. Arbeiterphotoyraphen. 
101 Ibid. 
lOB Interview with Karl Engels, tl/l/Bl. 
10Y Interview with Karl Engels, tl/l/tll. 
l1U HV. ~~/Y/3U. Klassengenossen. lernt ~speranto. 
III HStA UUsseldort. Reg. Uuss. 3Ub4bb. Interllationale Verl)1ndun~ 
Nr. 1. 
lit! HStA UUsseldort. Rey. Uuss. JU4bYa. ll/b/~Y. Ver~iniyuny der 
Freunde Sowjetrublands. 
113 Ibid. 
114 HStA uusseldort. Reg. Uuss. IbY4~, lY/1U/~b. Offentlictler 
Vortrag der KPU uber das I hema "Erwachen des Us tens" aUI 
14/1U/lb in Remscheid. 
ll~ HStA Uusseldorf, Rey. Uuss. 1694!>, lB/IU/lb, Vortragsabena 
verans ta I tet VOIII Ei nheitskolluuittee der KPU Remscheia uber ddS 
Thellla N£rwachen des Ostens" alii l~/lO/lb in der Stadtparkhal le 
von Relllscheid 
lib BV, 1~/l/3l, Katholische, indifferente Arbeiterfrau als Uele-
gierte nach Sowjetunion. 
III See, for example, HStA Uusseldorf, Heg. Uuss., IbY4~. ll/lU/~b 
SYlllpathiekundgebung der KPU fur ·die englischen tler\;larbeiter 
alll ~J/IU/£b. 
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11H Weim~rer Republik, OPe cit., p. ~/U. 
BY HV, 7/T/"JU, Sallllllelt tiJr' die Rote Hilte. U1e GenOSSlfl Hott~es 
I ietert ab. 
Th~ ~,').ove-named member had collec1::!;d a total ot 4~.oU marks in 
a weekly collection. 
1iW Willi MiJnzenberg, "Solidaritat", in: Weimarer I{epublik, Ope 
cit.,pp.,oOO/bUl. 
1~1 BV, "J/7/JO, Agitproptruppe Alann der I{oten Hilfe aus ~erl1n 1n 
der Stadtparkhalle. 
III BV, 4/IIJO, Alarm in I{elllscheid. 
12J HV, ':J/'d{JU. 
114 BV, 7/"J/"J2, Wo stehen wir im Arbeitsgebiet. 
12':J BV, lO/J/J2, Jahresbi I anl ei ner ~tra13enze I le: von 7 aut HJ 
Mitglieder yestiegen. 
Ilb ~V, 10/J/Jl, ~rauenyruppe des ~tadtteils l in der WerDetront. 
111 HV, lY/l/Jl. 
l~H BV, l/J/Jl. Volkschor aUf Landpropaganaa. 
1lY BV, 1J/l/Jl, Uie roten Heifer sind aut dem Posten. 
1JU ~V, U/l/Jl, Remscheid lIlu(3 mithelfen. das lhalmann Aufyebot 
erti.i lien. 
131 BV, 1Y/I/JU. Uie erste proletarische Filmveranstaltuny - ein 
voller Erfolg. 
132 BV~ l':J/H/"JO, Hoter Sport. 
13J BV, 1H/l/Jl, Proletdrische Juyendweihe. 
In, this article the author criticises the torm of the cere-
I 
mony which he calls an "Abklatsch der buryerlichen Kontlrllla-
tion" with the strains of Handel's Laryo preceding the entry 
of' little girls dressed like angels in white dresses. Ihe 
author of the article called tor an end to this kind ot cere-
mony, as the only important aim should be to make it clear to 
the children that they have to take their places in the orya-
nisations of the revolutionary workers' movement and tiyht tor 
thei r freedom. 
1J4 Interview ~ith Hannah ~uaas, 1'd/'d/'dO. 
IJ~ HV, 4/1/'t.':J, I)ie Spaltuny lm ~reidenkerverband von den "Aut-
bauern" vollzogen. 
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IJb HV; ,~b/9/JU, freidenker ziehen um. 
1~1 StA Remscheid, Sonderakte betr. Urtsausschu~ tur Juyendptlege, 
IV L H, 1911-1~jJ. 
1n .1~lb the children's choir section ot the Volkschor unaer 
the ,Ieaaership of Karl Pientka and Adam Schater had 17U melll-
bers. 
IJts Karl-Heinz Jahnke, Atze - so nannten wir dich ••• " OPe cit., 
p. 1~ tor the description of Artur Hecker's return tram prison· 
, , 
and HStA Uusseldorf, Reg. Uuss. Ib~45, ~~/7/~5, betr. ~aCkkehr 
des Kommunisten Max Voss aus de," Getangnis; 
. 
and ibid., 5/1/2~, a report on the arrival ot Artur Seialer on 
hlS release tr~n prison. 
IJ~ for details at the tounainy at the HHi and events leadiny uiJ 
to thi s, ct. Kurt G.P. schuster, Uer Rote-t- ront-Kampterbund 
1924 - 192~, UUsseldort 197~, p. l~-J~. 
14U HStA Dusseldort, Reg. Uuss. JUb4ba, ll/4/lts betr. Verhaltnlsse 
beim RFH and ~Jt-. 
Ihe report gave the tollowing tigures showing the strength at 
various illlportant Ortsgruppen in the area: 
1:.1 berte I d 
Harmen 
Ronsdort 
Remscheid 
Lennep 
,Luttri nghausen 
Cronenberg 
So 11nyen 
vohwinkel 
~ ltsU 
5UU 
tsU 
5UU 
4U 
~JF 
5U 
.1~U 
bU 
lie 
1n the light ot Werner Jurr's criticism ot the orgdnisatlon 
there is no guanrantee'that the membershlV tigures are accu-
rate, as there were discrepancies in the otticial statlstlcS. 
On the other hand the police had a very widespread network at 
intormers. 
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141 HStA Uusseldort, Reg. Ouss. JUb4ba, lU/1l/1~'tst Generalver-
sammlung der Ortsgr,uppe Solingen des I{~~ und der I<J~ am 
Ib/12/1~lts 1m Gewerkschattshaus in Solingen. 
At this meeting Gautuhrer Panzer rebuked the policy CO~"lttee 
and functionaries of the Solingen group tor the1r lethargy in 
recent months which had led to the loss ot nearly halt ot its 
members. 1n contrast, Panzer praised the recruitment drive ot 
ne1ghbouring Remscheid which had gained a membership increase 
. ot 17 :4. 
14~ HStA Uusseldorf, Reg. Uuss., JOb4bf, 1b/1/~~, SChulunysarbeit 
des I{~~. 
14J Schuster, OPe cit., p. 1J. 
144 HStA Uusseldort. Reg. uuss. JU040a, RFIi Gautuhrung Nieder-
rhein, JahresprograIJun lY,Y. 
145 HStA Uusseldort, Reg. Uuss. JUb4ba, ~Iberteld, ll/~/'ts • 
. 140 HStA Uusseldort, Reg •. Uuss. JUb4~a, Wuppertal-tlberteld, 
b/'j/JU, I{~~ Uemonstrationen in ~emscheid und ~Iberteld. 
147 Kortmann, Ope cit., p. 14. 
14ts HStA Uusselaorf, Key. Uuss. JU04ta, ~Iberteld, 'j/Y/1~l~. 
14Y Interviews with frich Ihieler and Otto Rau. ~oth testlty that 
it. was still usual to see, overlookers and toremen str11nng 
apprentices. 
15u HStA Uusseldort, Reg. Uuss •• IbY4~, ltsllllb. 
151 The tlrst three, 10IJer, Kaiser and Wertel, are ment10ned by 
Adolt Stephan in an unpublished essay, Erinnerunyen an die 
Volkshochschule in Remscheid, copy in StA Remsche1d, 1V M/J, 
as having been yuests at the school, however, there lS no con-
firmation ot this in Resch's memoirs. 
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C H APT E R lV 
Ihe Extreme Right in Reanscheid 
A further question to be considered in relation to the Class Soli-
darity of Remscheid's workers is thatof'the workers who actively 
supported anti-socialist parties and in particular those who became 
Nazis in a Communist stronghold, at a time when the NSUAP ~as stlll 
insignificant. One aim of this chapter is to trace the development 
'of the 'NSUAP at the local level, and its relationship to various 
other right-wing groups and pa~ties ~peratlng in Remscheld during 
the Weimar periOd. 
The other right-wing groups are examined for two reasons. firstly, 
they must be seen in the context of' polarisation ot Remscheld 
society from 1~17 onwardS, and the combined strength of torces 
ranged primarily against the KPU, trade unions and to a lesser ex-
tent the SPU. Setondly, it is important to remember that the Nazis 
did not appear suddenly trom nowhere, but that many active Nazls 
had already been involved with other groups before tinding their 
way into the NSUAP, and many of the other riyht-winy groups proved 
to be temporary lay-bys for Remscheid Nazls, with the ettect that 
many of them became known to, and, in some cases, acceptea and re-
spected by, the local BUrgertum lmidale classes). 
It was also decided to make a close study of local Alte Karnpter1 
with the aim ot determining the SOCial compos1tion ot this group, 
in oraer to shed light on the questlon of industrial worker parti-
Cipatlon 1n the SA and NSUAP~ during the Kamptzeit. It is hoped 
that such a close study will show what kind of people riSked life 
and limb dally for a party which lacked significant tradition and 
following 1n the area, and will reveal differences of backyrouna 
and atti tude between those workers who becam( Nazi s and those who 
joined either the SPU or KPU. lt is ,also hoped that these findings 
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will make ,a usetul contribution to the recent Fischer-~essel debate 
concerning the social composition of the5A rank and tile. Ihe dis-
agreement between those two historians revolves around the question 
as to whether the5A was a movement consisting mainly ot 'workers' 
"-in the sense of proletarian blue-collar operatlves, or whether lt 
was ~ssentially a lower-middle class organisation whose alm was to 
oppress the workers' movement, a thesis which has been advanced by 
lim Mason. J Conan fisCher4 bases his conclusion that the ~A 
was, to all lntentsand purposes, a mainly proletarian oryanlsation 
for the penetration of the working 'class, on contemporary reports 
and samples from many dltferent parts ot the Reich and on a~ analy-
sis of census statistiCS. Because ot its supra-reyional. nature thlS 
study rei ies heavi lyon the subjective notlons of the term 'worker' 
held by the responsible ,SA local leaders and NSUAjJ otticials, as 
well as the acceptance of membership lists taken at face value. 
Ihere is no evidence of closer research into the case hlstory at 
individuals contained in such lists, with the result that essentlal 
aspects determininy class adherence have almost certalnly been 
overlooked, so that what emerges is a misleadiny plcture based 
solely on the situational economic status ot those concerned. Up-
bringing, education, values and attitudes, which are slyniticant 
factors in the fonnation ot class consciousness, cannot be consl-
dered in an examination like that carned out by ~ischer. The 
author implicitly rejects the detlniton of a Klasse tur siCh (class 
for itself) on the groundS that this excludes those elements at the 
workiny class who did not identity' with the common aims ot .the 
movement. Whilst he is right in suggestiny that the Klasse tur sich 
detiniton is .too narrow, his acceptance ot all individuals engayed 
1n proletarian-type occupatlons as belong1ny to the workiny Class 
is erroneous. as this admits not only those who did not identlfy 
with the aims ot the workiny-class movement but also those who by 
upbrinying and attltude did not identity.with their fellow workers, 
namely the declass~ who, as a result of the massive soclal Changes 
occurring in the wake at the defeat in the ~irst World War and the 
ensuing economiC difticulties, very likely constituted a substan-
tially numerous group, hidden trom the statisticlan.5 
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I he toll Qwi ng study ot the Hemschei a ~A and I oca I . NSUAP yroup 
aitempts to take account of the declasse phenomenon ot lower-miadl, 
CI~ss elements in proletarlan-type occupatlons. The results suggest 
a p"icture much more in line with Hichard ~essel'sb ana Michael 
Kater's' conclusion, namely. that the SA conslsted over-propor-
.tionately of the sons ot the Mittelstand lmiadle classes)H, and a 
strongly under-represented number ot workers. The tOllowlny stUdy 
will show that much more detailed work at the local level needs to 
be undertaken betore one is able to judge sutficiently the SOCial 
composition ot the SA or the NSUAP. 
So far there have been relatively tew att~mpts to analyse ~SUAP ana 
SA groups at a local level. Y Wlth the exceptlon ot· Stoke's inves-
tlyation of the NSUAP Urtsyruppe Eutin. al I ot the analyses are ot 
a regional "or supra-regional nature, whlCh, whilst givlny us an 
overall" impression of the kind ot elements that jOlnedthe party 
and its attiliated organlsatlons, cannot supply us with the local 
nuances, whi ch give us the more tundamenta I grasp ot the reasons 
which motivated people to jOln. 
Ihe int"ormation on which this chapter is based was obtalned mainly 
from archive material whilst a study of Remscheid newspapers provl-
I 
ded the background knowledge ot events of local importance. fi les 
of the Hauptstaatsarchiv in Uusseldort supplied infonndtlon on the 
structure and development ot the I oca I NSUAP. and denazHi catl on 
questionnaires aided the compilatlon ot a list ot HemSChelQ'S pre-
"l~~U SA and N~UAP groups. ~ortunately. there still eXlsts a nearly 
complete NSUAP rnembershlp list tor the town datlny trom the last 
elghteen months or so ot the war. (he listW aplJears to have 
been removed from the NSUAP headquarters by COlil/nun is ts i nUlled i ate Iy 
prior to the entry ot American forces into the town in Apri I lY45. 
It consists of b~ typewritten sheets contalnlng J.b5u nallles. ana 
incorporates all ten Hemscheid Urtsyruppen wlth the exception ot a 
tew outlying cells situated mainly in Lennep and Luttnnghausen. 
The mebership 11st is set out in six columns giving surname. tlrst 
name. address. date ot birth and sometimes occupation and tunction 
1n the party. Untortunately. all but a few cells neylected to sup-
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ply all;the required intormation. so that a great d~al ot work was 
necessary to till in the missing details. With the aia ot the avai-
lable address books it was possible in most cases to establish the 
oc~upation of the members. lhere must. however, be a certain marYln 
of error owing to the fact that in cases where only the surname is 
supplied, it is not always clear whether father or son is meant. In 
, 
cases where father and son have the same Christian name - and th1S 
was frequently the case - there is also contUSion as to who 1S 
meant. In the case of sons under the age ot II it is not pOSSible 
to ascertain the occupation as they are not listed in tile address 
bookS. However. the researcher does have some idea ot th'e tanll Iy 
background from the father's occupat10n and the area ot residence, 
and whether. or not the tami Iy owned the house it OCCu(.J1ed. Atter 
the name. the single most important item ot intormation is the date 
·of birth, which, in many cases was unfortunately not su~pI1ed. lhe 
Berlin Uocument Centre, which contains somethlny like 1~ million 
personal fi les and index cards and from which intormation on the 
individuals was obtained, normally requires the name and date ot 
birth betore a search can be authorised. Ihe date ot birth could 
not be traced trom the indeX of registered citizens, because thlS 
is arranged accordiny to the date ot removal or decease, so that· 
one must firstly determwe the date of death betore one can trace 
the date of birth. As a result of the recent data protect1on law, 
the author was not granted access to the data contained 1n the in-
dex of registered citizens. lherefore, only in specit1C cases could 
the index be resorted to~ In the end it was deCided to use the 11St 
only as an aid to tracing the Alte Kampter because it is quest10n-
able whether a thorough examination ot a list c~npiled aur1ny the 
last years of the lhird Reich would really tell u~ anything about 
the early NazlS. furthermore, the.list cannot even tell us who was 
and whO was not a convinced Nazi. People who Joined the party atter 
19JJ did so for various reasons, some, like civil servants, were 
strongly encouraged to join the·party, some jOined tor opportunis-
tic reasons and others entered in the hope that it would guarantee 
a quiet IHe. 
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Finally, ,a thorough analY,sis ot a list containing 'over J,5UU nallles 
would be too time-co,nsuming for a project ot this kind. 1n orOer to 
acquire a more complete picture of events in Hemscheid during this 
periOd, the author also interviewed several people who were in-
volved, two of them Alte Kampter, as well as the tormer Kreislei-
ter, Alfred Stra0weg. 
The researcher, tryi ng to recons true t the soc i a I compos iti on and 
structure of local NSUAP party groups, is faced with particular 
prOblems. Firstly, there 1s the unfortunate but nevertheless under-
standable tendency to deny former sympathy for, or membership ot, 
the party. and a mistrust of anyone showing more than supertlcial 
interest. Secondly. the recent data protection law makes the re-
siarcher's task infinitely more difficult, to the extent that even 
when access to files has been granted by the Kultusminister, the 
researcher is left to rely on the help and cooperation ot lndivi-
dual archive personnel. And lastly, the greatest ditficulty ot all 
is the lack of documentary material concerning the Nazis both in 
the Kampfzeit and after the seizure of power. In various newspaper 
articles after 19JJ, there are reports of the existe.nce ot an SA 
archive relating to the Kampfzeit, which was later used in an exhi-
bition in the Remscheid museum. It is not known what became ot thlS 
material afterwards, whether it was kept in private handS or 
whether it was destroyed in the heavy bombing raids on Helllscheid in 
194J/44 or whether the Nazis themselves destroyed it along with all 
the other documentary material on the eve of American occupation. 
Ihe starting point in the search for Remscheid's Alte Kampter was 
an article in the local press and a photo beariny the captlon 
"Remscheid's SA. Treue Gefolgsmanner hinter F~hrer und ~ahne.' Alte 
Kampfer, die alle vor dem JU.~.1~JU unter der Fahne Adolf Hitlers 
marschierten".ll The photograph shows b1 Rernscheid Alte Kampter 
wlth Standartenfuhrer Frowein from Wuppertal and Paula L~ttkemeyer 
l"Tante Paula"), landlady of the SA-pub [urn alten Ratskeller in 
AlleestraBe~ Despite the fact that in most cases only surnames are 
supplied beneath the photo, and not all of these are spelt correct-
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Iy, it was possible to trace almost all of those depicted. from 
other sources it was possible to trace a further 5b who were either 
members·of the NSUAP and/or SA, or else active sympathisers before 
1~32 at. the la ·test. By tar the majority of those examined were 
active supporters of the party before September l~jU a I thou!;lh in 
some cases they did not officially join the N!lUAP unti I later, Ihe 
same article claims the strength of the NSUAP Ortsgruppe Hemscheld 
to be 42 at the beginniny of l~~~., but also states that a contin-
gent of 70 or ~O could usually be counted on when needed. 1t would 
seem tram this information, t~erefore, that alsmost all Relllscheld's 
Alte K~npfer have been incorporated in this study. further~ore, it 
,is like!y that not allot· the lU or ~U reterred to in the artlcle 
-
came from Hemschei d. Many were brought in trolll other towns in the 
area like, Radevorruwald. Werlllelskirchen, Uabringhausen, Uhunn and· 
Sol ingen to strengthen the numerically weak H~mschela SA when they 
were needed to protect meetings. Ihe aratting ot SA grouj.)s trom 
outside offered protection and swelled the attendance at lIleetin~s. 
givin~ the impression that the party was stronyer than it actually 
was, and also. in the event ofa brawl, made identification and 
hence prosecution more unlikely. 
1. Early Extreme Right-Wing Groups. 
Unfortunately. there appears to be no record at the founding ot the 
local NSDAP Ortsgruppe in Hemscheid. 1l EVidence, however, 
points to the,end of 1~2l or the beginning otl~lJ. Ihe appearance 
at the NSUAP 1 n Remsche id seellls to be linked close Iy with the ban-
n1 ng of the Ueutsch-Villk i scher Schutz- und I rutzbund in the SUlllmer 
ot 1~22. There are also other pOints ot comparison whiCh seelll to 
link the SChutz- una Trutzbund with the NSUAP and would point to 
the tormer as being a torerunner of the· latter, as Uwe LOha 110 
claims 1n his book1J• However, the leaders of the local Orts-
gruppe ot the Deutsch-Vo I k i scher Schutz- und I rutzbund were not 
identical with the early Nazis and some of them, like Ur. I:.walCl 
Weisemann, never joined the NSUAP.14 
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The Schutz- und Trutzbund in Remscheid was very much a middle-class 
movement and was very strong. Estimates at membership in /{emscheid 
ra~ge from around 3!>ul ~ to b, UOU in a secret po li ce report ot 
l!:l.l.l!:lll; the latter fiyure 1s doubtlessly a typing error and 
should read "600", which would be more in the line with Lohalm's 
intormation.lb A circular dated :a.H.2u17, refers to an in-
crease in membership to about 300, so it is quite conceivable that 
the movement gained a further 3UU members in the tOllowing 1~ 
months. The Schutz- und Trutzbund was led by the atore-mentioned 
Studienrat. Ewald Weisemann, who was a member of' the Landtag and 
chairman of the local branch of the UNVP. AI Ideutscher Verb~na lPan 
lierman League) . and I eader of the lei ttreiwi II i genkorps lbouryeoi s 
citizens' militia), which tought alongside the ~reikorps LOtzow 
against the workers duri ng the Kapp-PutSCh. Other leaders ot the 
Schutz- und lrutzbund were Karl Linder, who had a wholesale and 
retail trade in tobacco and kept a shop and two or three klosks in 
the town. Linder, like Weisemann, was also a chairman ot the UNVP 
Ortsgruppe /{emscheid. Ihe dentist Ur. I:.wald Schnautz was also 
. chairman for a time. He tried to organise a local group ot the 
Jreubund even before the $chutz- und Irutzbund was bannea.1H 
According to the police report, the Ireubund 
'soll in seinen Zielen weitergehen wie lsic.) der 
deutsch-volkische Schutz- und lrutzbund. I:.r will im 
falJe der Stdrung der.tiffentlichen Urdnuny sich aktiv 
gegen die Ordnungsstorer zur Wehr setzen.'l!:l 
Ihe lreubund, however, did not play a maJor role in local POI1-
ties. Schnautz remained a member of the $chutz- und Irutzbund and 
other right-wing groups until he left Remscheld in l~l~. He joined 
the NSUAP on 1.~~1!:l3J in Had PyrJllOnt. 2U * 
Two further COllunittee members of the local ~chutz- und Irutzbund 
were shop assistant, Hermann SChmidt. from Hasten and the leader of 
the youth group. Karl' Rtider, who, after the dissolution at the 
Schutz- und lrutzbund led the Remscheid Wikingbund and. was later 
chairman of the Stahlhelm Urtsgruppe Remscheid. 21 Yet another 
respected member of Remscheid society was Gus tav Herlllann Ha I bach I 
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shop assistant and local poet, who was simultaneously d m~nber ot 
the DVP and the Kreis-corrunittee ot the Alldeutscher Verband las 
wer,e many 'of his Schutz- und Irutzbund comrades) and a leadiny 
member. 
The Rernscheid Schutz- und Trutzbund was formed in l!:l~U tollowin\;j 
the attendance of Remscheid anti-Semites at a meeting ot the Orts-
gruppe Elberfeld, which was one the Schutz- und Irutzbund's stron-
gest groups. Ihe Elberfeld group, led by Alfred Gunther~l, Hans 
Hus tert2J , ' Kar I Kaufmann24 and Wi 11 i Rabensch I ayes ta-
blished ties with the Organisation Consul when about 40 members 
volunteered for Freikorps duties in Upper Silesia. l5 Ihere is 
no evidence ot' any members of the Remscheld Ortsgruppe tiyhting in 
Upper Silesia. 26 The local urtsgruppe yrew fairly rapidly and 
was particularly strong in the Ernst-Moritz-Arndt-Gymnaslurn were 
Ewald Weisemann was a senior teacher, and in the Hindenbury-Schule. 
The Schutz- und Trutzbund Ortsyruppe Remscheid was by and large a 
middle-class organisation with relatively tew workers. Its head-
quarters, which also housed a library for members, was at Baustr. 
,ti, and the group used to meet once a month at the very respectable 
public house and restaurant Zur Borse. lhe youth group met once a 
month but on a different night at the same address.a Ihe 
Schutz- und Trutzbund also had a brass band, led by Wilhelm Gosslny 
with between ~O and 4U musicians. Ihe Remscheid Ortsgruppe appears 
to have been quite active; apart trom monthly political meetings at 
the ~orse they organised patriotic events like the Hindenburgteier 
on 2nd October l!nUltl or 'German evenings' like the one held on 
21st January 1~212~ at the "Concordia", tickets price b marks. 
Festivals commeulOrating the founding of the I:.mpire were also orga-
nised'by the local group. The importance ot the Remscheid organisa-
tion can be seen from the fact that it was the host for the last 
regional conterence held on 1st and 2nd July 1~22, Shortly before 
the Schutz- und Irutzbund was disbanded. Ihe regional conference 
was the biggest function ever staged by the SChutz- und lrutzbund 
1n Remscheid and, in terms of visitors, proved quite success-
ful. 30 A few months earlier, in January, the local group had 
.. 
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held a '~erman evening' at the "Concordia" at which Jurgen von 
I{amin, Bismarck's grandson, spoke. Apart trom the sinying ot patrlo-
ti~ songs and poetry recitals - otten given by Halbach - there were 
sometimes satyrical sketches like the one written by Ewald ~chnautz 
1, 
enti tl ed Uber den Parteien, ei ~ Stinununysbi Id aus der Ge~enwart 
(Above parties, an impression ot our times), presented tor the 
amusement of von Ramin and other guests. Uther members who helped 
with the organisation and presentation of cultural and patriotic 
festivals were Dr. Karl Bischott, dramatist, employed by the I{em-
scheid theatre company, and Hichard Mbbius. Ihe Schutz- und Irutz-
bund also held hike,S and excursions, particularly tor the youtn 
group. 
Its more respectable parent organisation the Alldeutscher Verband 
(Pan lierman League) was also quite strong in Hemscheid with over 
:SUU membersJ1, 'led by Studienrat Ur. Ewald Weiselllann, who was 
also chairman of the Gauvorstand (regional committee), Ur. Martln 
Ludecke, honorary chairman of the F I ottenverei n Urtsyruppe l{elO-
scheid, Heinrich Bellingrath, t'ull-time secretary ot the local 
branch of the UVP, and Ur. ~ Iheodor Geilenkirchen who was also 
chairman of the UVP Urtsgruppe Remscheid until Uecember lYl~ when 
he moved to Dusseldort. Unfortunately, no membership list ot the 
local Urtsgruppe ot the Alldeutscher Verband could be located. Tne 
same is true of the Schutz- und Trutzbund, but it would seem that 
both groups strongly appealed to the volkisch orientated middle 
class ot Remscheid with members cOllling trom all the bourgeois 
parties, but primarily trom the UNVP and UVp.Jl Althouyh Anti-
Semltism was an important ingredient in the Alldeutsche and !)chutz-
und 1 rutzbund propaganda, it was on Iy of secondary importance 1 n 
Hemscheid. The ideas which united members and sympathisers ot these 
groups with each other and with other bourgeois parties and groups, 
were a fervent nationalism and a rejection ot democracy comblned 
with a fear of Socialism • 
When the Ueutsch-Vblkischer Schutz- und Irutzbund was banned, its 
members either joined other groups or else continued in the cover 
organisation Roemryke Serge, which existed until IYl5. Some members 
tormed the local group of the NSUAP. 
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However, .there was another right-wing nat10nalist group in Rem-
sCheid which was able to bui Id up a huge fOllowing. This was the 
Jungdeutscher Orden33 , led locally by Gro/.lllleister Ur. Au~ust 
Scholz, a dentist, whose practice was in Allestraj.le not tar 'from 
the group's headquarters "Zum Alten Ratskeller" whiCh was later to 
become the home ot Remscheid' s SA. Uuri ng the ear Iy years ot the 
Weimar Republic it was the Jungdeutscher Urden which became the to-. 
cal pOint of bourgeois opposition in Remscheid. Occasional Iy, hi~h­
spirited youths belonging to the Jungdo became involved 1n skir-
mishes with Communists and groups of workers, and more otten than 
n~t tended to come otf second best. J4 Ideologically, the" Junydo 
was near the UUP ot which Scholz was a leading member, but also 
drew adherents trolll the other Iniddle-class parties,' ~artlculdrly 
the UVP which was the strongest representative ot the local bour-, , 
geoisie. The Junydo retlected a similar SChizophrenic attituae to 
the Weimar Republic as the UVP, on the whole supporting or lIIerely 
tolerating it for the time being, while remaining loyal to the tra-
ditions of the Kaiserreich. Both groups had strong tactions WhlCh 
'were anti-republican and in time these gained the upper hand. The 
Jungdeutscher Orden claimed to be above political parties and to be 
striving for the unification of German society against class ha-
tred. J5 Although the Jungdo in Relllscheid had more working class 
members than the Schu tz- und I ru tzbund, it was s till overwhe I nil nCJ Iy 
middle-class, and as such can be counted alonyside the SChutz- und 
Trutzbund, the bourgeois' parties and attiliated organisations as 
being essentially anti~socialist and anti-conununist. The question 
ot the Jungdeutscher Urden' s I oya I ty to the Repub I i c was never 
firmly resolved. The local group was, founded on Ib.b.!!J~ljb by 
a group of 2U to 25 partiCipants in a rally at llberteld. M~"ber­
ship rose rapidly to approximately JUO, thanks to a sustained re-
cruitment drive duriny the Burgerf'est (citizens' testival) week at 
the end of July.J7 By Uctober over,4UU local members and many 
more sympathisers listened to a speech 91ven by Hochllleister Artur 
Mahraun3~ in the Stadtparkhalle. ,By .April lya, membership in 
Remscheid stood at over 7UU.j~ 
I 
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Ihe local Jungdo councll consisted ott amongst others. chairman 
Georg Krause. who was an engineerj deputy chairman lrwin Arnz trom 
Vieringhausen and Karl Hermann Rbntgen trom Hasten. both manutac-
turers. Other promi nent members ot the Junydeutscher Urden. were: 
Stadtobersekretar Artur Paftrath. who was also chairman ot the 
F I ottenverei n Urtsgruppe Remschei d Hasten; deputy mayor Geory zur 
Hellen. who was a leading figure in the landwehrverein "Aus liebe"j 
Eisenbahnobersekretar Hermann l~rune. who was leader ot the Junydo 
bandj Studi enra t Fritz Karcheri bus weSllllllan AI fred P I a tte, who was 
. secretary and treasurer of the band; manutacturer Hermann Plck, 
chairman of the band; full-time business manager and treasurer ot 
the Junydeutscher Orden Ortsgruppe Remscheid, Artur ~oosteld;sales­
man Erich Block • who later became chairman of the urtsyruppe; ana 
Prokurist Waiter Krollmann. Itle JunydeutsCtle ~chw~sternSCtldtt WdS 
led by a teacllt~r. LUlse Leuuller, trolll Ildsten. 4U Ihe JUllyUO, Ilkc 
the Schutz- und Irutzbund. was an anti-s~lIitic oryanisation41 
which used the volkisch names of m~nths in its correspondence ana 
retained the old colours ot the ~rnpire, black, white and red. Juny-
do members participated every year in the UVP's 'I:.mpire Uay', Hln-
aenbury's birthday celebrations. IHsmarck commemorations and nUllle-' 
rous 'German evenings'. Frolll time to time. Remscheid's Junydos held 
their own tunctions, usually at the most exclusive restaurant in 
town ·lum Weinbery". 
Captain Erhardt's Wikingbund was also represented in Remscheid. 'but 
was a small group,whiCh had little intluence on local pOlltlCs, 
despite the fact that the chairman.ot the landesverband, manutac-
turer Raftlenbeul. lived in Huckeswagen. and the Gauleiter (Chair-
man of the regional organisat10nJ lived in Remscheid - the alrea~y­
,mentioned Karl Rbder. 4l 1n Lennep. there were only six known 
members in 1~l5. 4J ,probably the cl imax ,of the Wiklngbund's 
.' development in the Bergische land was the rally held at ~eyehburg -
between wuppertal. Radevormwald and Lennep - on ~lst March J.!:J'Lb. 
Erhardt44 himself. who. ltappears. was no stranger 'to the ~er­
gische land. took ,the s~lute of the Wikinybund and Wehrwolt tonna-
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tions from Remscheid, Hagen, Harmen, ~ssen, Witten and Lanyen-
drehe. 4!> Erhardt assured somethiny liKe 1,UUU members that they 
were not to think that war was a thing of the past, there haa al-
ways been wars, and there always would be in the tuture. He accused 
all those pacifists who used the slogan "Nie wieder Krieg" l~o more 
war) ot cowardice. 4b The Wikingbund was very probably a stop-
otf for some Nazis during the ban and also a breeding ground tor 
later Nazis. Unfortunately, not very much is known of this para-
military group's activities in the I<emscheid .area. Ihe Heryisclle 
VOlksstinune, which was' forever observant ot' parami I Hary manoeuvres 
held by right-wing groups, fai led to discriminate between ·indivi· 
dual t'ormations and tended to refer to them all as Hakenkreuzler 
. . 
Stahlhelmer or Orgesch. Ihe RGA on the other hand consJJicuouSly 
retrained from any mention of such groups, or else tended to por-
tray them as harmless hiking clubs. 
Ihe Stahlhelm was never strong in I<emscheid. Membership ranged trolll 
about 4U47 to approxiamtely llU in 1~~tl4tl, and a turther ~U 
,members in Lennep. The reason for the relatively weak membershi~ 
was the lack of sympathy amongst local.manutacturers and chi I ser-
v~nts for the aims ot the UNVP, the political parent party ot the 
Stahlhelrn. Uuring the more stable, middle years ot the l<epuOlic, 
the sons of Remscheid middle-class families tound their way lnto 
ostensibly non-paramilitary tormatlons liKe the Junydo, and only 
after the onset of the economic criSis and disintegratlon ot the 
bourgeoi s parti es in the radi ca I i sed po I i ti ca I Cl ima te, did they 
t'ind their way into the Stahlhelm, which nevertheless remained 
small in numbers. Once again there exist no mwnbership lists ot the 
local t'ormations, so we must make dO with theleadershlp, consist-
ing of the ubiquitous Stud1enrat Weisemann; manutacturer Alfred 
Erlinyhagen, who was also Kreist~hrer (district Chairman); Studien-
!!! Ur. Waiter Kupper. chairman at the Jung-Stahlhelm; businessman 
fritz HOker •. who wa~ simultaneously chairman of the Kavallerie-
Verein; senior tax-inspector and former Oberleutnant AIOys Witte; 
Dr. Lippe, who was a lawyer and bUSiness manager ot Stahlhelm 
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affairs in Remscheid and also an acltve member of the ~uryerverein 
. (civic association) Remscheid-Sudi businessman Hans I-rankei and 
Fr~nz Thoma, treasurer. Two shop assistants, Karl I{oaer ana 
Friedrich Huber, ,were the other officials in Remscheid. In ,Lennep, 
the Stahlhelm was led by Wilhelm Schindewolf, the district sur-
veyor. Various police reports point to the inactivity and apathy in 
the Remscheid formation and a widespread attitude of resiynatlon in 
such a strongly communist-dominated town. Ihe youth group organised 
. . 
marches through the woods most weekends and participated in sport-
ing activities on the sportsfield belonging to the Re.insha!;jen 
lurnerbund (gymnastics club).41J The Remscheid ~tanlnelm was 
furthermore weakened by disunity caused by promises ot pos1tl0ns in 
the leadership to officials of the Reichstlagge, should they agree 
to the re-organisation of their f'ormation in the ranks of the 
Stahlhelm. A police report tells of an attempt by former military 
officers in the Stahlhelm trying to induce the elec~ion ot tellow 
officer members of the Relchsflagge onto the local COllullittee, ana 
this attempt beiny foi led by non-otticer members. 5U Ihe disfJute 
escalated into a, walk-out by non-otticers at a meeting held at the 
Iiurgerhaus at the beginning of May l~~H. Post oftice insj.Jector, 
fritz Jansen,. led the walk-out of about HU members who, being by 
far the stronger group, continued to conSider themselves as the 
rightful Ortsgruppe. Ihe dispute ended in the deteat at the much 
stronger non-otficer group, obviously with the blessing ot the ~ 
(reglonal) leadership, as one by one members deserted Jansen. 1n 
order to make the return to the fold more palatable, shoj.J assistdnt 
Karl Rader was made chairman ot the urtsyruppe in preterence to the 
former officer, Grundmann. 
~ollowing repeated reports of secret manoeuvreS in the Rhinelana by 
Stahlhelm units, the Minister for Home Affairs banned the Stahlhelm 
and all Hs afti 11ated organisations on IJth Uctober ln~. Ihe ban 
was valid for the whole ot the Rhineland and Westphalia.~l 
House-searches were caried out simultaneously in Barmen, I:.lberteld, 
Vohwinkel, Velbert, Langenbery, Metnnann, Remscheia, SOlingen, 
Uhligs and Wald. The ban and house-searches Obviously came unexpec-
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tedly, be!=ause a great deal of inaterial was t"ound and contiscd-
ted.!ll At the house of Ur. Kupper, Kreisleiter ot the ~tahl­
~, the police found a manual entitled "Getechtsausbilduny" (pre-
paration for combat) which had been used in connection with mili-
tary manoeuvres in Velbert and Neviyes in the previous months. At 
the houses of all I{emscheid Stahlhelm leaders jJollce confiscated 
various pamphlets, brochures and parts of uniforms. 'but there is no 
mention of any weapons being found. 
In I{emscheid there also existed 'over a dozen' Krieyervereine (ex-
Servicemen's associations) during the Weimar I{epublic~ Ihes~ exist-
ed ostensibly to keep al ive the comradeship of the front and to 
further the welfare of members. Ihe Kriegervereine each had their 
own local pubs and met there on a regular basis. Un ",atriotic occa-
sions they would don their medals and'march through the streets 
carrying their regimental flags. Ihe loyalty ot· the, Krlegervereine 
to the Republic was 'highly questionable; Un the one hand, members 
longed for the wartime discipline and' the glorious clays of the 
Empire, and continued to send the lx-Kaiser birthdaj' telegrauunes, 
whi 1st on the other man~ te It that it Hi ndenburg supportecl the 
Republic it must be acceptable. It would seem that the Kriegerver-
eine were not breeding 'grounds fo~ Nazi Alte Kampter. Instead they 
were much nearer to the conservative Stah I he Im, as. the membershi p 
, 11 st ot the "Ehellla I i"ge Iber-Hacketauer Remscheia" revea I s names 
like Ewald Weisemann, Fritz Buker' ana Waiter Kupper, amongst 
others.!l:i 
l. Ihe Rise ot the NSUAP. 
Remscheid's first Nazis appear to have met in the Ueutsch-Volki-
seher Schutz- und Irutzbuna and then joinea the NSUAI-' atter thlS 
was banned 1n l~ll. Whether - as the Nazi press claimea atter the 
seizure ot power - the Nazis had their own oUicially recognlsea 
urtsgruppe in l~~:i in Remscheid, or whether the Urtsyruppe was not 
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established u~til February l!:l~5, is to all intents and purJ)oses inl-
material. What is certain is that Karl Hulle!>4, who actually 
joined the NSDAP Ortsgruppe Munchen in l!:l~O, Waiter bobert55 
who joined the NSUAP in l~~l, Wi Ihelm Kratz!>b. headmaster ot 
the Neuenkamp Vo I ksschu le, Werner Herberts!>7, a slOa II IIlanutac-
turer trom Hasten, Otto Kupterbery a Sch I osser . (fltter-lIIechan i C) 
whose NSUAP membership nuruber was under !>U~. and businessman I:.rnst 
Schweikart came toyether inl~llll~ in order to organise a local 
group of the.NSUAP. Of these six co-tounders ot the local group. 
Wilhelm Kratz was the oldest, born in 1~7!>. Gobert who, owing to 
hi s aye was ni ck-named Papa Gobert, was born i n 1~~1. I he ·others 
were ~U years younger: Schweikart was born in l~~~. Kupterbery in 
l!:lUl, Hulle in l!:lU4 and Herberts in 1~U5. Allot them were born 1n 
Remscheid with the exception ot Schweikart who came trom Schwaben-
heim, Kreis ~inye~. Kratz, Gobert, Hulle, Kupferbery and Herberts 
were a 11 former members of the Schutz- und I rutzbund Urtsgruppe 
Remscheid. 5!:1 It is likely' that Schweikart was also a former 
member, or at least had sympathised with the aims of that group. Ut 
these six ~t is bobert who seems to have· carried most intluence in 
the beginning, but later both Karl Hulle and Ernst SChwe1kart be-
came the most popular SA leaders amongst the local yrouJ). Kratz 
. . 
probably needed to keep a lower profile because ot his Clv11-
service status; in any case, there is hardly any mention ot h1S 
involvement with the NSOAP in the local press until after l~JJ. 
Schweikart and Kupferbery were brothers-in-law and lived in the 
same house. Both Gobert and Kupterberg were notorious drinkers ana 
were often involved in pub-brawls, which were not always ot a pOli-
tical nature. Kupterberg in particular had a tiery temper and was 
described as a man the townspeople preterred to see leaviny than 
arriving.bU Even Kupterbery's brother-in-law, SChweikart. Con-
'demned his behaviour in front ot an SA-tribunal in 1~J4. uescr1bing 
one of his exploits together with Gobert in the tollowing way: 
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tGbbert und Kupterberg hatten bei einer tastnachts-
veranstaltung eine Schlayerei mit einem gewissen ~rein 
aus Remscheid. Grein hat hierbei yanz erhebliche Ver-
letzungen davongetrayen. Uas Stratvertahren 1st von der 
Staatsanwalt~chatt eingestellt warden, weil zwischen 
dem Verletzten und den Heschuld1gten ein au~ergericht-
11cher Veryleich zustande gekornmen war. Uie I{emscheider 
HUrgerschatt ist und war ausnahmslos sehr emport uber 
die MiBhandlungen, die dem 6rein widerfahren sind. Man 
hat in der hiesigen Burgerschatt uberhaupt kein Verstand-
nis datur, daB die SA-Fuhrer weder stratrechtlich noch 
dlsziplinarisch bestratt wurden. t 
Schweikart went on to tell of another brawl in which Kupt;rbery 
played a major role and whiCh, in reality, was nothiny more than a 
cowardly act of bullying: 
tAuBerdelll waren der Sturlllfuhrer Kupterbery, dt!r Ul>er-
schart"iihrer Uahlhaus, der Sturllltuhrer pieper, der Schar-
fuhrer Butzbach und der SA-Mann L~tthyart in ein Strat-
vertahren Lanye verwlckelt. Auch der Ausyang dleses 
Stratvertahrens hat in der i{emscheider Burgerschatt 
eine gewisse Beunruhigung hervorgerufen. tol 
The incident described by Schweikart happened at the 
Talsperren-restaurant in July 19JJ. tor his· part in the attdir 
Kupferbery was jai led for six months tor causing grievous bOdi Iy 
harmol, ObertUhrer Habenichts, in his report to the SA-group 
Niederrheln, said: . 
tEs war sehrpeinlich horen zu mussen, da~ der Vor-
sitzende und auch der Staatsanwalt das Verhalten des 
UbersturmtUhrers Kupferberg wahrend der Vork~"lIInisse 
als teige bezelchneten. 1:.s lIIuB also wlrklich zugegeDen 
werden, daB Kupferberg sich an d~" betrettenden Abend 
nicht so verhalten hat, W1e es eines SA-tuhrers wurdly 
yewesen ware. tS 1st an d~r latsache nicht vorbelZukolTunen, 
daB Kupterberg den Lanye 1n geradezu tr1voler Weise, als 
dieser ganzlich kampfunfahig war, behandelte. 1:.s ist 
auch wirkllch nicht als geschmackvoll zu bezeichnen,wenn 
man bedenkt, daB Kupferberg den Lanye hochhob und wieder 
hintallen 11eB mit·den Worten: Guckt euch das Schwein 
mal an, wir sollten es durch qen Saal schleiten. toJ 
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Gobert. too. was suspended frolll duty t'or drinking and brawliny but 
in a different incident. 64 ~Ottl liobert and KUjJferber!;j, however 
. ' 
were of great use to the party during the Kampfzeit, in that they 
could always be relied upon to yive a good account of themselves in 
street-fi ghts with the RfB and Rei chsbanner. Both men appear to 
have been admired by their comrades. 
Two further members of t~e first group of Nazis in Remscheid were 
Karl Boker, a dental technician, and-Willi Corts who was a white-
collar worker. Others who belonged to the earliest local group were 
Hermann Hot, Hans Joch, Albert and Berthold Schemann. Hermann Hot, 
born 1n lY04, was a printer by trade; Hans Joch. born in l'YUb, was 
a window-decorator; Albert Schemann. born in lYU~, was a carter , 
later a lorry-driver; and his brother Benno was a butcher. born in 
lYU~. 
Ihe most striking point about the NdZis before the lldn WdS theIr 
age. Very few were older than 20, and the maJority of the known 
members cannot be regarded as factory workers. Unfortunately, we do 
not know how many members the NSUAP-group had in Remscheid betore 
the ban on t~e party which followed the Hitler-Putsch. it coula, 
however, not have been more than lU. It is also not completely 
clear whether the Nazis operated alone or in conJunctlon wlth other 
. right-wing groups like the Stahlhelm, Reichsflagge, Treubuna, !!!:.!!!:.-
~ and Wikingbund. Events which later led to the Schlacht bei 
Oabringhausen (battle ot Oabrinyhausen) would seem to point to co-
operation between the Nazis and other right-wing groups, above al I 
with the Roemryke ~ergeb5. Uuring the period ot French Occupa-
tion in Remscheid the Nazis appear to have continued their JOlnt 
operatlons with other right-wing groups. Iheir.activities includea 
the smuggling of goods into the unoccupied part ot Germany. the 
border ran between LUttr1nghausen and Ronsdort. Un one such occa-
sion a smuggler by the name ot Danneberg was shot dead by ~rench 
soldiers 1n Clarenbach. and this inCident gave the resistance move-
ment a local martyr. bb Other activities at right-wing groups 
during the period Of occupation were sabotage-acts ayainst ShOp-
keepers who traded with ~rench solaiersb7 and punlshlng any 
fraternisation with the enemyb~. 
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According to the local Nazi press after the seizure of power, there 
was close cooperation between the extreme right-wing groups during 
the. period 1!H9 to 1~24. One article refers to the presence in 
Remscheid of the' Organisation Consul, which is credible, as this 
organisation maintained one of its clandestine grout)s· in nearby 
Elberteld. 
Ihe carrying of membership-cards for the purpose of ietentitication, 
particularly on occasions of joint activities with other right-wing 
groups, was potentially dangerous. We are told of one such occaSion 
by a former Alte Karnpfer. On the day of the Schlacht bei Uabriny-
• 
hausen a group of Nazis, on their way from Remscheid, were warneet 
by comrades that groups of COllullunists and British soldiers were in 
the area, and that all NSUAP membership-carets and correst)ondence 
had to be destroyed. The Alte Kampfer proceeded to swallow thelr 
membership-cards, an act which was later to cost sOllle of them the 
right to wear the party-badge in gold, as they were afterwards un-
able to;, give adequate proot at their lony-serving membershlp.bY 
Uuri n9 the peri od at the ban, ~elllscheid Nazi s adopted the practi ce 
. at foundiny cover oganisations, just as the Schutz- und Trutzbund 
members before them had founded the Roernryke Serge. The name of the 
Nazi cover organisation in Remscheid was Bund aer schatfenden 
Stande, but not all members of the NSI.)AP joined this tormation. 
Some of them found thelr way into the ~eichstlagye, Treubund and· 
Wehrwolf. Uurlng the perlodof ~rench occupation some Nazis had to 
tlee trom the occupied zone to avoid arrest. Some lik.e Waiter 
Gobert, went to prison7U , and many had their hOllles searched 
both by French troops and German police. 
At the end at 1~4:!4 or the beginning ot 1~2!> the ban on the NSUAP 
was lifted and old and new members began to join the party again. 
By the beyinning of the SUlTUner, the party was again strong enough 
to hold public meetings. On Saturday, bth June 1~2!:>, Remscheid's SA 
celebrated its Fahnenweihe (inauguration) at the Gaststatte Wirths 
in Elberfelder Stra/3e with Joset Goebbels t'rom nearby t:.lberfeld as 
guest or honour. For the occasion Remscheid's smal I band at Nazis 
,was swelled by groups at SA men from Barlllen, I:.lberteld, Opladen and 
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Wermelskirchen. These packed the room to watch Ptarrer Pitschke 
from Remscheid perform the ceremony and listen to speeches.lhe 
cel,ebration continued late into the night. Afterwards, in keepiny 
with the usua I prac t ice in those days, the groups ot SA-men com 1 ny 
from outside Remscheid marChed home together in formation, taking 
with them ~emscheid comrades who lived along the route, in oraer to 
give them protection. On this occasion both Wuppertdl yroups and' 
the one from Wermelskirchen, together with a tew ~emscheld com-
rades, marched down Bismarckstraf.)e past· the Volkshaus,. and there 
tound themselves taced by a hostile crowd ot Communists. The Nazis 
. 
headed for the rai Iway underpass at the junction of IHsmarckstral)e/ 
Neuenkamper Straf.)e/Haddenbacher Straf.)e where they were to separate. 
At the pedestrian under",ass, however, they were lIIet by dnother 
large group of Rote ~rontkampter and Jungsturm members. Very soon 
tempers bolled over and it came ,to a violent brawl which raged for 
more than halt an hour, duriny which time shots were tired without 
anyone being hit; bicycle chains, walkiny sticks and knives were 
used. Ihe Nazis, number1ny between !)O and bU7l , were outnum-
. bered by over 2 to 1 n. I he fi ght was eventua Ily brought to an 
end by the intervention ot a large contingent ot ~Chupos (pOlice) 
who proceeded to make arrests on both sides. Nno~yst those arrested 
was Goebbels who spent the rest ot the night in a police cell. Ine 
brother of one O,f the Communists claimed that the Nazis had publl-
cal'y boasted. during the weeks preceding the inauguration, that 
they would attack the Volkshaus and hoist their blaCk, white ana 
red flag~7J Whether this claim retlects the true reason tor 
~emscheid's tirst major street battle between Communists and NaZlS, 
or whether the COllununists merely wished to demonstrate their supe-
r10r strength. particularly to Goebbels, we cannot say. Uespite ex-
tenslVe efforts by the police, no charges were brought agalnst the 
oftenders. 
Uuringthe next two or three years the NSUAP Ortsgruppe Remscheld 
seems permanently to have been in danger ot tolding up completely. 
The local group was isolated, plagued by a shortaye ot cash and 
members and by internal disagreement. Ihe leaderShip ot the ·Iocal 
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group appears to have changed hands more than once. in a repori to 
the Regierungsprasident in Uusseldorf on 4/':J1't.5, the police COllllllis-
si~ner notes that bookkeeper, Karl Lamottke, and Inanutacturer, WaI-
ter Gobert, the two leading tunctionaries of the Urtsyruppe had re-
signed and that a manufacturer Albert Rudolf Muller fr~" Remscheld-
Hasten had become chairman of the local group.74 .10 months 
later, however, at another meetiny of the local Urt~gruppe75, 
attended by about 45 members and addressed by Alfred Stra~wey from 
Wermelskirchen, strong dissatisfaction was expressed with the pre-
sent leadership of Ewald Lamm, a bricklayer; Arno ,Jasper, a whlte-
. 
collar worker; Karl Plenye, a fitter-mechanic; and ~rnst Schweikart. 
At this meeting it was decided to dissolve the local group and JOin 
the Ortsgruppe ~armen as a sub-group, once again under the leaaer-
ship of the apparently popular Albert Rudolf MUlier. Unfortunately, 
there, is no mention ot the reasons for this step.7b ~urther­
more, the local leadership succeeded in fighting Off the challen~e 
to its authority and remained in office.]] Ihere was not to be 
any real improvement in the organisation of the Ortsyruppe,however, 
until the senior civil servant, Ernst Kuhlbars, took over in .1~'t.~. 
Kuhlbars, who possessed organisational ability and abundant energy, 
appears to have given the Remscheid Ortsgruppe s~ne direction and 
guidance. 
During the period 1':J2~ to l':Jl':J there were sporadlc bursts fr~n the 
local NSUAP, but most of the time there was very little oryanised 
activity. Various attempts to tound a local branch in Lennep came 
to nothing. On one such occasion the NSUAP held a recruitment 
evening at the Gaststatte Neveling.7tl ,Ihe meeting was attenctea 
by some,thi ng like JUU peop I e and the speaker was Gau I eiter Kar I 
Kaufmann from Elberteld. 7':J He explained the aims of Natlonal 
Socialism as being the destruction of lternational Capitalism. He 
pOinted out that Hitler 'Was particularly concerned tor the well-
being at the German worker.s anCl WOU Id not betray them as the ~PU 
leaders had done after the November revolution. fhe Jews, at 
course, carri ed much ot the blame for Germany' s IlIi sery. Kautmann 
also went on to attack the Locarno treaty. Uuring the ensuiny dis-
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cussion voices were raised against the speaker. I{ailway worker 
Heidepeter, who was a member ot the SPO Ortsyruppe Lennep, saia 
tha.t it., was unthinkable that members of the left-wing parties 
should cooperate with the Nazis. Regardiny the Jews, Heidepeter 
pOinted out that many of them had also died fighting for the father-' 
land during the war. Ihe meeting ended peacefully despite bitter 
. . 
disagreements, perhaps because of the presence of strong troops of 
'SA men on Saalschutz duties from Rernscheid, Langerfeld, Hattin~en 
"\ 
and lia rill en • 
Another attempt to win support for the movement in Lennep took 
place on Sunday Ith Novelllber when the Nazis held a 'Lierllld~ Uay'. 
Uetachments of SA men from I{emscheid, lIberfeld, Mettmann, Hattin-
yen and Wermelskirchen assembled in uniform on the Jahnplatz to 
march in formation to the 'cemetary in order to lay wreathes at the 
memorial. Solellln march lIIusic was provided by the band of the Orts-
gruppe llberfeld, and the occasion was lent an air of great illlpor-
tance by the appearance of Viktor LutzetlU , uauleiter Kautlllann 
and district leader Erich KOChtl1 from wuppertal. Ihe police re-
port of the march to the cemetary notes chants of "Nieder mn der 
Judenrepublik" (down with the Jew Republic) from the Nazis, but 
only one arrest was made. Lutze made a short speech at the cemetary 
in honour of those who had d 1 ed for the father I and. He ca II ed on 
. . 
those present to carry on with the task ot unitying Germany in the 
spirit ot those fallen heroes. Ihe Nazis then marched back throuyh 
the town. Later. a 'German evening' was held at the Liaststatte 
Hogard at Tocksiepen. Ihe guest-speaker, district leader KOch, 
attacked the Profitwi rtschaft der Hanken- und Horsenwe I t before 
going on to explain that- marxism was a system tor deceiving the 
work·ers. This was a favourite theme of Nazi speakers in the lIIarxist 
strongholdS of Remsche 1 d and So I i ngen • where the NSUAP hoped to 
recruit industrial workers who. it was calculated, might be persua-
ded to abandon their allegiance to the KPO. Whilst llberfeld aIJ-
pears to have been something of a stronghold of the 'Ieft-winy' 
Strasser yroup during these mid~le years - Goebbels, Kautmann and 
Koch were already recoynised as being anti-capitalist - it is not 
, 
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clear to what extent they were able to intluence the Hemscheia 10-
calgroup; There seems to be some justitication tor the claim that 
during the period 1925 to 1YJU the Hemscheid SA and N!:)UAP were 
attached ideoloyically to· this group.~2 Uespite the above men-
tioned line of argument the Nazis made no impression on the workers 
of Remscheid, and Lennep was to remain without its own NSUAP Urts-
gruppe until 1Y31. The evening at locksiepen was spent sinying Nazl 
favourites like ~Ich habe mich ergeben" and "Wir sina aas Heer vo~ 
Hakenkreuz" and listeni n9 to military marches played by the Wupper-
tal band. Ihe Urtsgruppe Wermelskirchen presentea a short play and 
there were also poems. The movement,' however, does not' appear to 
have benefi ted very much from thi s etfort; Nazi spea'kers had a 
thankless task at open meetings in I{emscheid, because the majority 
at the audience was hostile. Sometillles, the sIJeakers were not even 
al'lowed to tinish their speech, they were shouted down by strony 
Communist contingents and$PU workers, other tillles jJarticularly 
when the Nazi speaker was not very ,gHted, a KPU speaker wou la take 
over. and try to turn the meeting into a propaganda evening for his 
party. lhe discussion hour. after the speeChes, tended to ena in 
pandemonium with Communists breakiny into the Internationale and 
the Nazis rendering the Horst-Wessel-Lied or other tavourites. Une 
such occasion was an open meetiny of the NSUAP Urtsyruppe Relllscheia 
held on lbth February 1y;a~3. Ihe speaker,~. Stier trom trank': 
furt. aescribed International Capitalism as a secret power whiCh 
controlled politics. He called tor the intrOduction ot interest-
tree money which was equal in value to the goods itwoula buy. 
Uuring the middle of this speech the audience at around ~U was 
doubled by the appearance of a large contingent at Communists. The 
speaker accused all the political parties. with the exception ot 
the NSUAP, of being either unable or unwilling to smash this secret 
power. At this point the Communists began to heckle the speaker 
who. obviously angered by these tactics, launched into' a vehelllent 
attack on the leaders of the KPU whO, he Claimed, were working hand 
in hand with the 'secret power'. Stier wound up his speech with a 
call for ~ national revolution. maintaining that afterwards there 
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would be time to consider the next step. In the discussion ~ernhard 
Bilstlein, editor of the Bergische VolKsstimme, began to criticise 
th~ speaKer and the Nazis, but was also interrupted by hecKlers 
from the other side. Both sides began to shout until in the end no 
one cou I d hear the speaker, whereupon ,the Communi sts marched out at 
the hall singing the Internationale. On thiS occasion the meeting 
ended peacefully, unlike the meeting held the previous August in 
the "Alter Ratskeller"H4. Leaflets which the Nazis had distri-
buted during the previous few days invited Arbeiter der Stirn und 
Faust (worker~ of brain and hand) to listen to district leader Koch 
talk about the Betrug am deutschen Arbeiter, ]b Jahre very~bliCher 
marxistischer Kampf (betrayal of' the German worker, 1b years at 
wasted rnarxist struggle). Ihis'time the local Nazis were streny-
thened by SA groups tram El berfe Id, Ba rmen and So I i nyen. I he aud i -
ence was calculated to be about lbO including the Saalschutz groups 
and the KPD and Reichsbanner. Koch's speech lasted for two hours 
and despite much heckling he was able to finlsh. However, tempers 
were already beginning to get out of hand when the first discussion 
speaker, Rei chsbanner man Pau I K I ei nen, yot onto the stage to 
speak. Hard Iy had he begun to speak when he was dragged from the 
stage by Nazis and beaten up. Chairs and beermugs started flying 
through the roomHb , and fiyhting spi I led out into the street. 
Policemen posted outside the pub finally managed to restore order, 
but not before a number of people on both sides had received head 
wounds which required hospital attention. The police report blallled 
the Nazis for the incident. It noted that the Nazis were an unruly, 
undisciplined mob inclined to use their Knotenstocke a1s Uiskus-
sionsmittel (cosheS as a means of persuasion). Ihe report pointed 
out that the Nazi leaders had triea to keep their supporters 'under 
control but they would not listen. Ihe police arrested a number at 
participants for drunkenness and i nsu I ti ng behavi our. At ter the 
meeting those Nazis who had come froln outside i{elllsctleid needed a 
police escort to the railway station and to the town boundaries, in 
order to prevent an attack by angry Communists and keichsbanner 
men. 
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In the mi.d-20S Remscheid's small band ot Nazis was often called 
upon to send protection squads tO,meetings all ov~r the ~eryische 
Land. As the 1 oca 1 Urtsgruppe possessed no transport of its own, 
the SA would either march to their destination, travel by train or 
e I se rent a lorry. sometimes together with a driver from a sym-
pathetic manufacturer. An article in the N~Atlti describes Hem-
scheid's SA during 'the Kampfzeit as small, but one ot the best 
fighting contingents in the Bergische Land, which made them mUCh 
sought after whenever there was a likelihood of trouble. Elberfela 
and Barmen could be easily reached on foot within two hours, ~olin­
gen would take a little longer depending on the exact dest;nation. 
Wermelskirchen would take about an hour and Nadevormwald and Huckes 
wagen two and a half to three hours. 
In Apri I 192b the Remscheid SA~ toyether with detachments trolll 
Barmen and Uhi..inn, were called u~on to carry out Saalschutz duty at 
an open meetiny organised by the NSDAP Ortsgruppe Wermelskirchen at 
which guest-speaker Hermann £sser was to deliver a speech entitled 
"£nteignet die FUrsten, der Jude braucht ueld" (expro~riate the 
pri~cts , the Jew needs money). The five or six hundred people 
in the audience were disappointed, however, when theY,were intormed 
that Esser would not after ail be speakiny. Inst~ad. an unknown by 
the,name of Lanye. froUl Meschede. made an inarticulate attempt at 
Esser's chosen topiC. and succeeded 1n annoying both Nazis and 
their enemles alike. In the audience there were very strony grou~s 
of RFB men from Relllscheid. Lenne~ and other towns in the drea as 
. ' ' 
well asRFB and Reichsbanner men froUl Werlllelskirchen. Ihe meetin\:j 
got out of hand very quickly with hec~liny. lhe first discussion 
speaker, K,lein. from Remscheid.' began apparently quite convincin~­
Iy, to take apart the speaker's incoherent ideas. whereupon the 
chairman of the meeting sprang to his fee~ and called tor the next 
speaker, and Klein was pushed off the stage. At this pOint the SA 
men who had been standing at the front of the hall climbed onto the 
stage. ostensibly to protect the chairman and other cOlllmittee IlIelll-
bers. but in reality to give cover to more of their cOlllrad~s who 
proceeded to, enter the pub by a window behind the stage. tll A 
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further two or three speakers cha II enged Lange' s arguments before 
he was again called upon to make a few closing comments. At this 
poi nt the 1 eaders of the Werme I sk i rchen RHi jumped uj) and dec I ared 
the meeting closed. The Communists began to sing the Internationale -~""";';;;";;";"';;';';';::"':":"I 
as usual, and the audience was moving to the door, when a beerylass 
was hurled into the middle of the SA men standing on the staye, 
soon chair-legs, chairs, tables and bricks were tlyiny throuyhthe 
hall. 1n the uproar there were casualties on both sioes. finally 
the police were able to'restore order by forCing the I{otfront and 
Reichsbanner men out of the hall.ijij 
Uuring the late-2Us the NSUAP Urtsgruppe I{elllscheid had its head-
quarters on the corner of Scheiderstral)e, but the SA found their 
home at Paula Luttkellleyer's "LulII Alten I{atskeller". After ttle sel-
zure of power, the landlady was regarded as sOlllething ot a heroine 
and the Nazis were fond of relating how she was the only licensee 
in the whole of Relllscheid who would accolllodate them. Pdula LLittke-
meyer, herse I f an ear Iy member of the movementH9 , was rewarded 
after the seizure of power with the sole right to advertise her pub 
as the 'Verkehrslokal der Remscheider SA', (the local pub of the 
Remscheid SA). A sentimental newspaper article in the Bergiscller 
Beobachter told how the small detachment at' SA men used to prepare 
the'party's propaganda in the forlll of leaflets and posters, boil 
glue and mix paint at "lante Paula"'s before slipping out into the 
'night to stick them on walls and lamp posts and paint sloyan's on 
pavements and houses. YU 1 hi s operati on was of course extrelile Iy 
dangerous, particularly in the red districts of Honsberg, Laspert, 
Neuenhaus, ,etc. Very often the Nazis would run into groups of 
Communists also sticking posters, and this would sometimes lead to 
a braw I, more often than not the Nazi s wou I d be hope less Iy ou tnulII-
bered and would have to make their escape. 
3. The Social Composition of the NSDAP before lYJJ. 
An,analysis of Remscheid's Alte Kampferbefore September lYJU shows 
a slight worker bias, with the majority being ski lied or semi-
skilled. Many or even most of these ski) led and semi-skil led worker 
members of the Rernscheid SA were out of work during the years be-
fore the seizure of power. Many of them had served their apprentice-
ship in small factories and workshops during the pre-crisis years, 
and had then been laid off as soon as orders became scarce. SOllle ot 
these were victims of the widespread practice of firing apprentices 
after they had qualified, in order to make way for new apprentices 
who did the same work for a good deal less money. Nany ot these 
Alte Kdmpfer had never had regular work after 4ualltying •• .wu h.HJ 
to be content with temporary I abouri n9 jobs on ,a lia i Iy bas is. ' SOllle 
like Erns t Gi esecke and Hei nz Schllli tz chose to taKe to the road 
• 
doing odd jobs here and there and seeing something of the world at 
the same time. 91 Others stayed at home and tried to exist on 
the pitiful dole allowance, and some tried to relieve their misery 
by theft and petty crime. Theirs was a simi lar situation to workers 
who joi ned the KPO and SPU wi th one si gn1 fi cant difference, they 
were isolated and lacked the security of tradition and solidarity 
which, even in the bitterest poverty, tended to briny at least some 
comfort in working-class districts. 
Undoubtedly, many of Re~scheid's Alte Karnpfer callle from patriotic 
homes, from a milieu which regarded itself as beiny. in social 
terms, superior to the proletariat. Here there is a pattern whiCh 
is repeated quite fre4uently. The'fathers of some Alte Kalllpter had 
achieved a measure of independence, holding a fairly humble yet 
nevertheless respectable position in society. Ihey had been success-
ful and regarded the system under which they had achieved their 
,success favourably. They had clearly profitedt"rom the relative 
security of pre-war society, and weresufticiently successtul to 
purchase their own shops and businesses and in this way achieve a 
rise in social status. Some of them had even been able' to earn 
enough to buy thei r own houses. The war and its aftermath ha I tea 
the progress of these famjlies; their hopes of further success and 
even prosperity, which perhaps the fathers could no lonyer aChieve 
but would be continued by their sons, received a shattering blow. 
In the changed economic climate after the' war slllall businesses 
suffered from a chronic shortage of cash, infrequent orders and a 
shortage of material. Small businesses which had comfortably sup-
ported a family before the war,'were no longer able to offer suffi-
cient income, so that grown up children had to supplement the fallli-
ly earnings. These children, who in different circulllstances would 
have learned the trade in their fathers' shops and bUSinesses, now 
. 
had to look for work in factories and workshops. In social terllls, 
this constituted a falling back or proletarianisation which must 
h~ve caused di sappoi ntment and bitter resentment towards the sys tell' 
which clearly was not bringing them the kind of success the tlllpire 
had brought their fathers. ~urtherlllore, their ettorts to learn a 
trade in many cases proved frustrating and diCl not brin!;j them regu-
lar work. Having been brouyht up to respect bour~eois ideals, dili-
gence, energy, ambi tion and thrift, and unquesti onab Iy accepti ng 
the theory that these qualities shoulCl bring just rewards, they 
began to search for reasons for their 'tai lure'. Their bourgeois 
upbringing, which caused them to regard the proletariat as inferior 
made them reject the socialist doctrine. particularly in Relllscheio 
where the KPU was militantly Moscow-orientated and tended to exag-
gerate soviet achievement, even inventing stories praising ttH~ 
merits of that systelll in its desire to convince fellow workers of 
the superiority of communism. Very often their arguments, which 
extolled the virtues of the Soviet system anCl pOinted to discrepan-
cies within Weimar- society. were-presented in a way whicl) ott ended 
the patriotism of their fellow countrymen and at the sallle time 
failed to convince. because the Soviet Union was often described in 
naively utopian terms, which usually bore not the slightest resem-
blance to reality. The declasse's rejection of Marxist Cloctrine and 
at the same time his own experience and laCk of _SuCCess, made him 
amenable to National Socialist propaganda. Some Alte Kampfer inhe-
rited businesses from their fathers and these .tailed, others like 
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painters and decorators trie~ to gain a measure of independence or 
at least supplement their income by offering their services in 
their spare time, but their plans frequently came to nothiny in an 
ecoriomic climate in which people were afraid to spend what little 
they had for fear of worse to come. Furthermore, the barrage of 
anti -semiti c propaganda di sseminated by many extrerni s t ri ght-wi n9 
groups and even moderate organisattons during and after the war, 
provided an apparantly plausible explanation for the present mis-
fortune of the lower-middle class and their declasse oftshoots. 
Various conspiracy theories linking World Jewry with Interpational 
Sociali~1lI attracted a good deal of· attention in the bourgeois 
press. and found strong support far beyond the bounds of the con-
temporary extreme right. The result was that even -1I10ut:!rdtt:!ly 111-
clined and influential members of ostensibly democratic parties 
like the UVP and the DUP • in Relllschei d fori ns tance people like 
Gustav Herlllann Halbach and Ur. Geilenkirchen9J , in subscribin~ 
to such theories, while rejecting violent solutions, nevertheless 
contributed considerably to the wider appeal ot- Anti-Semitism a~d 
Anti-Socialism and in the end to a repudiation of parlialllentary 
democracy. Thei r parti cu I ar servi ce to the extrellle ri ght was a 
sharing of COIIUllon ground which had the eft'ect of helpin\:! the latter 
to attain a certain amount of reslJectability, eventually pavin!:) the 
way for the rise of the NSUAP. Halbach himself te~tifies to a powe~ 
f~l volkisch base in the Relllscheid midale and lower-middle Classes, 
which was distributed over the whole of the political party slJec-
trum to the right of the SpU.94 
The Alte Kampfer found cOlllradeship and self-respect in the SA. Par-
ticularly as the Remscheid SA was so small, COlllradeship was all the 
more intense. Here they found the kind of solidarity which was evi-
dent in Arbeitersiedlungen (working-class housing districts). ~y 
joining the SA they brought their own isolation to an end ana had 
an attainable aim 1n life once more. Newspaper reports tell of the 
camaraderie amongst the Alte Kampfer. For instance, whenever an SA 
man was charged with an offence and punished with a fine. this 
would be paid by a collection held amonyst the SA yroUiJ. Y5 
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lhose fellow SA men who were temporari Iy employed would buy their 
less fortunate colleagues a round, as did Paul Luttkemeyer90 • 
Later, sympathisers and factory owning members of the SA useo to 
equip their unemployed colleagues with uniforms, and train tares to 
Parteitage~ for instance, were often paid by those who could afford 
them. 91 
An interesting point about the Remscheid SA in the KallljJfzeit is the 
number of brothers, and father and son members, or other fami Iy 
relationships. This sheds light on the way the' movement developed 
-in the early years, and at the same time emphasises just how slllall 
the movement was in Remscheid before 19J2/JJ. lhere were at least 
14 brother or father-son 'relationships in the Remscheid SA before 
19J2, and also several other relationships by IIIdrrid~~. Ih~ knowlI 
family relationships account for over a quarter of the total number 
of SA Alte Kampfer before lY3U/31. 
Uf the 51 Alte KampferYU appearing on the photo with Paula 
Li.ittkemeyer (who also wore the party badye in yold), in another 1<1lA 
article entitled "Nemscheids SA. Treue llefolysmanner hinter fuhrer 
und Fahne" dated 2Y/3Uth January 1938, 21 'were waye-earning wor-
kers, the majority being factory workers. 99 The most COl/Ullon 
occupation represented by the f'actory-worker type is smith, of 
which there were seven. There are four briCklayers, three fitter-
mechani cs and two 9ri nders. The rest of the f'actory workers were 
made up of: one file-maker, one joiner, one printer, one electri-
cian, one carter (later lorry-driver), four unskilled tactory 
hands, one Werkmeister and one whose precise occupation could not 
be established, but was nevertheless identified as beiny a factory 
worker. lOU The genuine proletarians in the ranks of Relll-' 
scheld's Alte Kampfer constituted a relatively small unit whiCh, 
however, performed the dangerous functions of providing protection 
for party meetings, street fighting and selling party literature in 
public places. 1Ul Their value for the NSUAP was primarily as 
brawlers102 during the end phase of the Weimar RepUblic. and 
'as auxi Iliary policemen in, the months immediately tollowiny the 
seizure of power. F~r those who joined the NSUAP and SA for oppor 
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tunistic reasons, the establishment of the Hitler regime provea 
disappointing, as they very quickly found themselves pushea asiae 
in ·the stampede for responsible positions by more capable men who 
joined the party after March 1933. Unfortunately, it is not known 
how many of the proletarian group had tormally been associated with 
sub-organisations of the workers' movement. It is, however, likely 
that some Nazi proletarians had, at some stage in their aevelop-
ment, at least been members of workers' sports clubs, if only telll-
porarily. Only two individuals, Lamm and Wei~gerber, are known to 
have belonyed to the KPU and KJVU respectively. Uwing to t.he lack 
of documentation and the demise of this generation, the reasons 
which induced thelll to leave the workers' movement and join the 
Haz is wi 11 rema in specu I at ive. It is poss i b le tha t Uu=!y t OUlld thclII-
selves isolated ideoloyically in the KPU and were not able to dC-
cept the rigid. discipline imposed by that party. In this case per-
sonal rejection would almost certainly have been a prime motivatiny 
force •. 
Seven members portrayed in the photo were Handwerker (arti-
. sans).103 Of these two were painters and decorators, two were 
independent fitte~mechanics, one was a butcher, one was a gardener 
who also worked as a waiter in a pub at times, ana the last one was 
a motor~mechanic. Ihe remaining 17 persons in the photo were not 
blue-collar workers. They allllost all callle from sholJkeelJer, white-
collar worker104 or Sill a I I family business baCkgrounds or 
else, owing to their education, had succeeded in IlIoviny upwards. 
Nine SA men on the photo belony to the lower-middle class either 
owing to background, as in the cases of fritz !:Sender and AI fred 
Killunel. the forlller's father had his own milk and grocery round, 
whilst the latter's father owned a textile/clothing sholJ in the 
main shopping area. ~oth of these. al so had a business-orientated 
education, and were described in the Kemscheid ad<lress book as 
Kaufmann lbusinesslllan)10b. One was a window-dresser, six 
others probably callle from similar backgrounds to Bender and Kimmel, 
but quite independent of this factor, qualHy for· lower-mid<lle 
cl as's/midd I e c I ass status by vi rtue of educati on, whi ch was in mos t 
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cases business-orientated. Uf these, two were shop assistants, one 
was a student and one an offi ce worker emp I oyed by a lawyer. I hen 
there were CarJ HUlle who, despite his occupation of turner, seems 
to have had a business education of some kind1Ub , and Hans 
Rischko 'who, because of his employment by the post ottice, haa 
civil-service status and irrespective of his backyround would not 
be likely to identify with the workers. The two rellldining SA men 
on the photo are by virtue of background and education middle class 
and as such are exceptions in the early Rernscheid SA; Wi Ihelm 
Kratz. headmaster of the Volksschule Neuenkarnp. and Werner Will-
rneroth. who was sti II a grammar school boy at the time ot JOininy 
the NSUAP and SA. Willmeroth joined against the wishes ot, ana un-
known to his fami Iy which was hi!;lhly respected in /{elllscheid soch:!-
ty. He used to keep hi s uniform at the house of hi s fri ena ~ ritz 
'I:!ender, and wou I d change there after schoo I. After hi S lIIelllbershi p 
in the SA became known, he was expel led from SChool. 1U1 
Apart from the Alte Kampfer appeariny on the above-mentioned photo, 
it was possible to trace a further ~b NSUAP and/or SA m~nbers, or 
at least known sympathisers. prior to the end of lYJ1.lUti 
Many of these clearly should have been included in the photo with 
Paula LUttkemeyer as they belonged to the movement betore Septelllber 
1!:J30. but for various reasons are absent. Some of these had already 
left Remscheid by the time the photo was taken, but nevertheless 
figure in this study of the social c~lIposition. Uf this group, only 
17 can be regarded as factory workers. and of these near Iy a 1I were 
employed in small workshops. Jhis group contains seven skilled or 
semi-ski lied t'itter~mechanics. one of whom - at some staye toyether 
with his father - owned a small workshop in N~delshalbach. the so-
called 'Hitler-Uorf'1U!:J. The business. however. tell victim 
to the economiC crisiS and eventually folded up, roobiny the tallli Iy 
of its independence. There were also three lorry-drivers in this 
yroup, one beiny employed 'by the Kipper brewery.lhere was also a 
9ri nder and another worker who was a co-founder ot the Kemschei a 
. ' 
NSBU in ,1931, but whose precise occupation could not be determined. 
This group of factory workers is completed by three untrained tac-
tory hands. Si x further ear Iy party members. of whom on Iy two wer~ 
definitly members of the SA, were lower-middle class and indepen-
dent. Otto Dowidat is the only one owning a factory of notable 
size, although at that time it was still'quite small compared with 
its size atter the Second World War. Albert Rudolt Mull~r. who was 
chairman of the local party group between lYl!l and lYl1, is des-
cribed in the Remscheid address book as a ,manufacturer, but his 
factory was st111 quite small. The same is' true of Werner Herberts 
fr:om Hasten, who, as we have already seen. was one ot K~lOscheid's 
earliest NaziS. Hans Vogt, a talented speaker, had his own plumbin~ 
business in Hochstra/3e, and August Grimm had a grocery business in 
Scheiderstra/3e. The last member of this group of six independ~nts 
was Karl Tappe who was a publican. lhree lIIor~ luelllOt!rs ot the Kt!III-
scheid NSOAP, two of whom were detinit~ly SA members. haO either 
artisan or service occupations: of these one was a baker and one 
was a barber who, however, was mostly employed in the depr~ssiun 
years,1l0 and the other was a cinema attendant who hact tor-
merly been a policeman. A further HI NSUAP 1II~,"bers ot whom ~iyht 
'definitely belonged to the SA, constitute a yroup which can be 
classified as lower-middle class, either by the type of occupation 
'(in almost all cases salaried employees), emploYlllent in small t'allli-
Iy businesses led by the father, or else by education. which was in 
most cases business-orientated. 11 of these Hi (six ~A members) haa 
jobs varying from salesman ll), bookkeeper ll). Oispatch lIIana~er 
(I), to export manager (l) with the rest describing ttlelllselves as 
merely businessmen (Kaufmann) (7). There were three technicians and 
one dental technician. The remaining five callle from families with 
their own businesses, which were all quite small. One whose father 
owned a shoe-shop in Alleestra/3e111 , and Hans SCharwachter, 
who was also a member of the SA, worked in the family's transport 
and removal business. Two others were almost certainly enyaged in 
'fami Iy ~Ianufacturing businesses in a managerial capacity, but can-
not, however. 'be regarded as belonging'to~the managerial midctle 
class, as the businesses were too small~ The final member of the 
group was a s tuctent of 1 aw whose father owned a sma I1 road con-
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structionfirm. Of the relllalnlng 11, of whom only two were !:lA melll-
bers. one was a Junior School teacher, one a minister ot religion, 
one a student whose father had a sma II workshop, one a po I i celllan 
who left the service to take over. directorship of his ·father-in-
law's business. one a post-office inspector - Ernst Kuhloars who 
was the urtsyruppenleiter and also.an SA member. Une was a phanna-
cist, one a production manager of the Deutsche Spiralbohrer com-
• pany, Kaufmann Alois Krajewski. who was an NSUAP councillor tor the 
duration of the Third Reich. and Dr. WiJhelm Laubach, whom the ad-
dress book describes as a chemist/metallurgist. who owned ~is own 
laboratory. These people constituted the middle-class element 
amongst Hemscheid's Alte Kampfer. It is clear from trlese figures, 
therefore. that the educated lIIid<.tle-class element dlllon\;jst Kt!III-
scheid's Al te Kampfer was very sma 11, a tota I of 13 from 107. Un Iy 
four SA members belonged to this ,class. Finally, the remaininy two 
Alte Kampfer were t'arlllers (father and son) Karl and Paul Kaiser, 
who were both SA men. The fact that there were only two farmers in 
the Remscheid SA suggests how tiny the Remscheid farming community 
was. 
W'i th regard to age1l2• over a quarter of those whose da te at 
birth could be established, were born in 19U4, 19U5 ana 
19U6.113 Half ot' Relllscheid's Alte Kampfer, whose date at 
birth could be detennined. were born between 19U4 and 191U. At the 
time of joining the NSUAP, of bb l14 Alte Kampfer, in whose 
cases data was available, 2ti were married and 31 were not. Ihe gap 
between the married and unmarried was almost certainly greater, as 
many of those'Alte Kamp fer whose marital status could not be de-
termined. were either ~oo young or else constantly unelllployed and 
therefore unlikely to marry under such Circumstances. Nevertheless. 
even if all the remainder were unmarried at the time of JOining the 
NSUAP. we should still have over 25 1. who were settled. Many of 
these already had families. 
In Lennep and LUttringhausen. despite several attempts. the NSUAP 
did not succeed in founding a local group until lYJl.ll!> 
During' the years 1925 and lY31. Lennep and LUttrinyhausen Nazis had 
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to join the Remscheid SA, because they were too few in number to 
warrant the formation and upkeep of local grouj.ls. The man charyed 
wi th the founding of the 1 oca I SA group for Lennep and LUttri n~­
hausen and a local branch of the NSOAP in Lennep, was senior tax 
inspector Rudolf Feick from Wuppertal. He was assisted for a time 
by dentist Or. Rudolf Heukenkamp who had come to Lennep from his 
home town Greifswald. Later, after Feick had returned to wuppertal, 
businessman Fritz Thones ,toOk over leadership of the local Urts-
gruppe, but by that time most of the organisation work had been 
completed. The social composition of the Lennep/L~ttring­
hausen11b NSOAP and SA reveals a significant difference 1n 
comparison with Remscheid. 111 Lennep in particular reveals d 
high percentage of civil servants, j.lrofessions, businessmen and the 
like,'and only few manual workers. Of the salllj.lle of ~~ Nazis ill 
Lennep ~ there were on Iy fi ve who can be termed factory workers. 
There are three tax inspectors, four Kaufleute (businessmen), one 
architect, one dentist, one bank employee, one student, two white-
collar salaried employees (Angestellte), two self-elnj.lloyea bakers, 
'one painter and decorator, who was also selt--employed, two selt-
elrtployea whose line of business could not be determined. Ihe OCCu-
pation of the remaining Nazis likewise could not be establisheCl. ut 
the eight LUttringhausen Nazis, who incidentally were all either 
party members or acti ve syrnpathi sers before 19:3U, three were fac-
tory.workers, two were small factory owners, one was a senior 
salaried employee (Prokurist), and one was a farlller. -Uetails of the 
remaining Nazis were not available. 
The above figures should not be taken as· constituting the total 
membershi p of ei ther the NSUAP or SA Ortsgruppe Lennep/Luttri ng-
hausen. They represent merely those early members for whom data was 
available. On the evidence of election results there is reason to 
believe that the NSUAP was stronger 1n LUttringhausen than in 
Lennep before 1931. 
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In Remscheid the Reichstag election of September l~JU brought the 
• 
same kind of breakthrough for the Nazis as elsewhere in Gerlllany. 
They were able to win 1l,4~~ votes (2::1.2 ~)ll~ and becalne the 
second strongest party behind the KPU, whereas the previous year in 
the council elections they had managed only I,UUU votes. In Lennep, 
the Nazis won 20 % of the votes cast and in LUttringhausen they had 
already become the strongest party with 41.7 % of the electorate 
behind them. Party recrui tment began to be lUore successfu I, yet ttle 
party still remained chronically short of cash. uuring the years 
1930 to 19J2 uniformed SA men became more prominent on the. streets 
of Remschei d, and were seen more often in cafes like the Uti! aue 
Wolke" and in restaurants like the "Salamander", and this gave the 
impression that they were becollling more active. Sellers of the 
Volkischer Beobachter began to appear regularly around the Markt 
opposite the Hesseninsel llY • Other SA men would stand on the 
traffic island or mix with the crowds of unemployed, tryiny to sell 
pictures of the FUhrer or collecting for the combat tund. 1iW 
for the majority of SA men, however, little changed. Their days 
were spent aimlessly standing on street corners or in dole queues, 
playing cardS in the party office or else Sitting in pubs such as 
"Max und Moritz" and the "Alter Ratskeller" where, if they were 
lucky, they might get a drink paid by a financially more fortunate 
sympathiser, or else be given a rouna by the landlady. 
The wives and mothers of Remscheid's SA men also began to organise 
in the years· between 1~JU ~nd lYJ2, although the NS F'rauenschatt 
(women's sectionJ remained a slllall group until after the seizure of 
power. In September 19J1 the group was led by Ur. med. Christ ot 
the Tannenhof clinic in LUttringhausen and had a 1Ilt!lI\berShi~ ot 
J5121. Six months later the group which had cHtracted only a 
further flYe members, was I ed by Erna Kuh I bars, wife of the Urts-
gruppenleiter (local group leader) Ernst· KuhFbars. 122 Ihe 
frauenschaft had an ostensibly social function, mainly involved in 
the organisation and running of the SA soup kitChen in the SA bar-
racks, and keeping the rooms tidy, washing and repairing bed linen, 
towelS, uniforms, etc. Most members, however, sola party literature 
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on a door-to-door basis and agitated on behalf of the party. tjy 
1932 the SA had other barracks in Luttringhausen and ~I iedinyhau-
sen, and the Hitler Youth also had its own head4uarters in Hasten. 
The NS Frauenschaft also helped with the cleaning of these rorn"s, 
as the party could not afford to employ cleaners. 
Remscheid had a small Hitler Youth of 15 in September I~LH, led by 
Werner Herberts. This group had doublea in size by fYlarch lY32 but 
was totally insignificant unti I after March lY33. Likewise, Relll-
scheid's SS contingent, led by Max Luchtenbery. in lYJ1 12J , 
was small, numbering only 12 members. ~y March lYJ2, the group was .. 
. 
led by Richard Wiegand and still had only 20 melnbers. Ihe SA, how-
. ever, began to make steady progress. By 15/3/32, Sturlllbann 11/112 
Remscheid numbered 431 includiny the section frOll1 Ullunn pu IlIen) 
which would not normally be classed as belonging to Remscheid. The 
Sturmbann was divided into the following sections: Remscheid-Mitt~, 
led by Ernst Schweikart (69 men), Remscheid-Hasten, led by Ewala 
Lamm (64 men), Remscheid-~liedinghausen, led by Erich van tjeryen 
(50 men),and the SA reserve led by Waiter (;jobertl17~ men).1~4 
The LenneJ) and Luttri nghausen SA groups, whi ch separated duri ny 
lY31, belonged to Sturmbann 1l1/17l WupJ)ertal-Barmen-Land, and num-
bered 50 (led by Or. Heukenkamp) and b2 (led by Peter Komor) re-
spectively.125 At the time, the SA Ortsgruppe H~lIscheid had 
7bU members and was the second largest group in the ~eryische 
industrial region. 126 
We can be fairjy certain that the Nazis made little impression on 
factory workers before the seiz~re of power. Unti I lY31 any et forts 
to recruit new members for the party or SA were made on persona I 
initiative, and as such were 4uite insignificant. However, in 
19:31127 a group of seven factory workers forllled the Hem-
scheid Nationalsozialistische Betriebszellen Organisation - NSBO 
(Nazi Trade Union) and began to hold meetings on a regular basis. 
Unfortunately we do not have any material pertaining to this group 
apart from a police report dated 19/3/3112H , which, however, 
gives us an insight into the problems of the Remscheid NStjU, not 
least of which were caused by lack of support trom th~ party ana 
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the general hostility to the Nazis of the workers, particularly in 
the larger factories. Ihe meeting in question was called on ~th 
March to discuss the reasons for the NSBO's failure ~o set up an 
effective organisation. Representatives of the NSbU Remscheid c~n­
plained bitterly to the Ortsgruppenleiter that they had so far only 
been supplied with three brochures of instructions reyardin!;,l the 
organisation of factory cells. The conclusion reached by the parti-
cipants was that, for the time being rather than waste their 
efforts on the workers, who were anyway unsympathetic to the Nazis 
and well-organised in free trade unions, they should concentrate on 
bui Iding street cel Is, • in den Stra(3enzellen konne IIIdn Jedoch die 
ueschafts I eute zusallullenfassen; di ese sei en da fur I ei ctlter lU 
. " 
haben·.129 The core of the NStsO lIIembers all lived in ttl~ Sud-
bezi~k, i~ the workiny-class districts of Loborn, ~osenhUyel, Hdna-
weiser, situated behind the BSI, UEW (Ueutsche Edelstahlwerke) an~ 
the main railway station. Leading fig~res of the NSBU were1jU 
Karl Metz, Wilhelm Freitel, Hellllut Meurer, Hans and Paul I{ottyer, 
Gustav Wehner, uustav Busenbecker, Peter Simon, Albert and Benno 
"Schemann. Almost all of these were at the same time members of the 
SA, and all without exception were members of the party. 
Whilst it might well be argued that the aims of everyone of tile 
right-wing groups dealt with in this chapter were not ioentical 
with those of the. NSUAP, it cannot be denied that mdny points in 
their political manifestos were v~ry similar to those of the Nazis. 
Seen in the context of the Reieh as a whole, some of the right-winy 
parties" and groups were reluctant sup~orters of the Weilllar Consti-
tution, some regarded the Republic unfavourably wtlilst pur~orting 
to support or at least tolerate it, others of course were outriyht 
opponents, and on occasions made this,fact known, althouyh the 1II0St 
COllvnon practice was to tolerate the system, ~rovidiny there was no 
"further :power ~hift towards the work 1 n9 ~I asses. In Remsehei d, how-
ever, owing to the strength of the workers' movement, these parties 
and groups combined their strength in an effort to deny the KPU and 
trade unions victory. Experience had tauyht the bourgeoi~ jJarties 
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in Remscheid that in democratically held elections the radicdl 
socialist parties would be most likely to gain a comfortable IIldJO-
rity on the town council. Ihe BUrgerfest of 1~21, oryanised by Wil-
helm Schuy of the Zentrum, marked the beginning.ot joint coopera-
tion with the sole aim of preventing a socialist majority on the 
local town council. Uemocratic parties like the UVP and UUP, ana 
supposedly pro-republican groups like the Junydeutscher Orden were 
only too willing in Remscheid to assist enemies of the Weimar ~e­
public, as long as the workers could be prevented trom winning 
power. A nearly hysterical fear of bolshevism made them ready to 
compromi se with shady elements whose methods and practi ces even 
disgusted them, but were nevertheless preferable to the chaos whiCh 
they were sure would reiyn if the Communists succeeded in creatiny 
a Soviet state. As the democratic bourgeois parties fai led one Dy 
one, their supporters, in the belief that the only Choice left to 
them was either Fascism or COllununislll, chose the tormer. Uoubtless, 
at the local level, there were bourgeois leaders like Ewald Weise~ 
mann and Wilhelm Schuy who thought it WOuld be possible to keep the 
Nazis in check, as did van Papen at the ~eich level. ~uCh people, 
and they were to be found in all the bourgeois parties, lIIade a 
grave mistake and must bear much of the responsibility tur the NdZi 
seizure of power, as it was they who, in some sense, paved the way 
for the Nazis by making them 'respectable'. As will be seen in the 
following chapter, as long as things went well for them personally, 
few of them mourned the pass i ng of democracy and most breathea a 
sigh of relief when the workers' movement was destroyea. 1n this 
respect the right-wing parties and groups constitute an element of 
continuity in the history of Remscheid from 1~14 through to 1~50. 
With regard to the NSDAP in Hemscheid before 1930, and indeed up to 
January 1933, we can say that it was numerically weak in terms at" 
ac tive members. Before September 1930, local Nazis were hardly 
noticeable in a conullunist stronghold like Remscheid. After 193U a 
number of Remscheid manufacturers such as Otto Uowidat, JOhann 
Peter Schmidt of the Hiloga wert; August Dohrmann, who had his own 
bui I di n9 company; We lp, Pi el-lerSberg and ~1 chard Pi ct of LUttri ny-
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hausen, began to support the party by payi n9 for SA un ifo rill s and 
journeys to Parteitage in Nurnberg. It is quite likely that the 
local NSUAP also received gifts of money from local manutacturers 
and industrialists for the combat fund, but there is no documentary 
evidence to support this supposition. Whatever the case,it is clear 
that the Remscheid NSDAP was not financed by big business, but 
rather by sma II manufac,turers and by JIIembers' own efforts .lj1 
As for the active members of the SA before 1930 in Relllscheid, it is 
clear from the above analysis that this organisation was only 
superficially working class, although this categorisation depends 
on the definiton of that class, particularly when cOlllpaMn\;j the 
findings in Hemscheid with those in other parts of liermany. 1t is 
quite possible that owing to the peculiar structure at' I<elllscheid's 
industry, ie. well over half of the establishments employed tewer 
than ten workers/personne I, other his tori dns e I sewtlere wou III 
classify those employed in small firms as being Handwerker ldrti-
sans). The most illlportant fact pertaining to the Nazi employees ot 
sma 11 es tab 11 shments in Remschei d is that so many of them were 
s'killed or semi-skilled. This fact is, however, hardly surprisin\;j 
when one considers the nature of Hemscheid industry, highly skilled 
and highly specialised. ~y the sallle token there are relatively tew 
unski lied workers in the ranks of the SA at the local level, as 
such workers were more likelY,to find employment in the larger fac-
tories like the tlSI, Richard Lindenberg, Alexanderwerk and Mannes-
mann which were firmly controlled by the KPU-dominated free trade 
unions. These workers would therefore be more likely to sympathise 
with, or else join the KPD or SPO, which traditionally enjoyed 
great influence in such establishments. 
Clearly, however, the most important point in detennining the wor-
ker component in the soc i a I compos it i on of the NSOAP and SA is the 
defi niti on of the prob I emati c term 'worker'. The econolilic factor, 
on which Conan Fischer bases his findings, is not suffiCient, as 
this alone plainly Obscures and even ignores more fundamental 
aspects like upbringing, education and values, which are at least 
as important, if not more so than the functional and situdtional 
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economic ones. Research for this project has revealed an inadequacy 
. of terse information, perfunctori Iy registered in official address 
books and NSOAP membership l1sts. Worldny w1th such lists at face 
value, without penetrating background research, fails to take 
account of subjective determi nants needed to form a lIIore COIllP I ete 
and accurate picture. Furthermore, caution is required even in 
interviews when the "researcher is confronted with the interviewee's 
subjective impression of his own social status. lhe case of trnst 
Gieseck~ is a pertinent example of a declass~, raised in a conser-
vative lower-middle class falnily which suffered econ~nic decline in 
the aftermath of the First World War. The fami Iy business was Con-
stantly in difficulties, so that it was no longer able to support 
the fami Iy, as it had done comfortab Iy durl ng tne pre-war years. 
) 
Consequently, the sons, instead of inheriting a healthy retail 
trade, were compelled to seek employment in factories, where ttH~y 
served ~pprenticeships, before once again becoming victillls at eco-
nomic crisis, finding themselves discarded by their employer in 
"favour of cheaper untjualified labour. Hedundancy was followed Dy 
short periods of employment and long periods without steady work. 
The individuals in question did not seek the company of class-con-
scious workers during these years, but continued to maintain longer 
-standing relationships originating from the pre-crisis years: Mem-
bership in a bourgeois sports club and the Jungdeutscher Urden tes-
tify· to this.lhe interviewee provided invaluable intormation on 
the background of several former comrades in the Remscheia SA which 
the author was able to follow up in further research. 1Jl 
The conclusion to be drawn from this information is that whilst 
many Remschei d A"I te Kampfer were engaged in pro I etari an- type OCCu-
pations, they nevertheless regarded themselves as different tram 
the genuine working class, whiCh as we have already seen, was con-
sciously immersed in a collective culture with its own identifiable 
aims. Whilst the author would not deny the presence of some genuine 
proletarians in the local SA and NSDAP, the evidence points to a 
strong lower-middle class and declassi lower-middle class bias. 
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CHAPTEI{ IV 
NUT E S 
1 Alte Kampf"er - Nazis who joined the party before the seizure uf 
power. Those who joined after 1933 were referred to somewhat 
derisively by Alte Kampfer as 'Marzveilchen' (MarCh violets). 
See I{ichard Grunberyer. A Social History of the lhird I<eich, 
London 1911. p. H2. 
2 Membership of the NSOAP and SA is almost identical in Remscheid 
before September 1930. 
3 See l.W. Mason, "Labour in the lhird i<eich 19J3 - 19JY", in: 
Past and Present, 19bo. 
4 Conan Fischer, "The Occupational tlackyrouna of the SA's Kank and 
File during the Depression. Years, 1929 to mid-19J4", in: Peter 
u. Stachura (edit.), 'The Shaping of the Nazi State, Lonaon, 
Croom Helm 19/H. pp. 131-1~9. 
~ For consideration of the declasse, see Peter H. Merkl, Political 
Violence under the Swastika. 5Hl Early Nazis, Princeton 197~, 
pp •. bb-/6. 
6 Richard ~essell, "Militarislllus im innenpolitischen Leben der 
Weimarer Republik: Van den freikorps zur SA", in: Klaus ·Juryen 
Muller and Eckehard Opitz (edit.), Militar und MilitdrisllIus in 
der Weimarer Republik, OUsseldorf 197H, p. 19J-2Jb. 
7 Michael H. Kater, "Ansatze zu einer Soziologie der' SA bis zur 
i<ohm Krise", in Ulrich Engelhardt, Volker Selling and Horst 
• Stucke (edit.), Sozlale ~ewe9uny una politische Verfassuny, 
Festschrift fur Werner Conze, Stuttgart 191b; 
and Michael H. Kater, "Sozialer Wanael in der NSUAP im Zuye der 
nationalsozia11stischen Machteryreifung", in: Wolfyany Schieder 
(edit.), Faschismus als soziale Beweguny - Ueutschland una 
Italien im Vergleich, Hamburg 1970, pp. 2b-b7.· 
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H The author regards the term Mittelstand as a general cate!Jory 
consisting of the middle and lower-middle classes. In a town 
like kemscheid the middle class consisted prilllarily of: manu-
facturers, exporters, doctors, architects, lawyers and senior 
civil ~ervants. The lower-middle class is made up of two 
, " 
groups: the traditional petty bourgeoisie conSisting of shop-
keepers, small savers, publicans and independent artisa~s, and 
"the white-collar class of industrial adlllinistrative personnel. 
junior civil servants and ShOp salesmen and saleswomen. 
See Introduction. 
!:# Undoubtedly the most comprehensive social analysis of NSUAP 
melllbers is Peter H. Merkl's Political Violence under the Swa-
stika •••• Opt cit. This work iS,based on the unique collect1on 
'of essays obtained i,n 1~3Jby Theodor Abel, wtlO himself wrote 
an interesting analySiS. Why Hitler came to Power. New York 
1yjH. A more recent attempt to analyse the social composition 
of the NSUAP on the local level is Lawrence U. Stokes' "Ihe 
Social Composition of the Nazi Party in [utin. In~-J~", 1n: 
International J{eview of Social History, Vol. XUll l!:#/t:i, Part 
1. 
Wilfried Bohnke in Uie NSUAP im Ruhrgebiet 192U - Jj. tsad-
Godesberg lY/4, bases much of his examination on about lUU bio-
graphies of members of the party cadre, the Parteistatistik for 
the ~ Essen, WestfalenNord and Westfalen-Sud, and a report 
of the Regierungsprasident ,from b/l~NU pertaining to the COIII-
position of the NSUAP in parts of Gaue Uusseldorf and Essen. 
Also Conan Fischer. 9p. cit.; 
and J{ichard Bessel. OPe cit •• 
1U This information and a copy of the list was supplied by the 
former DKP secretary tor Remscheid. 
11 See RGA. 2Y/l/3H. 
12 An article in the RGA dated 13/b/33. entitled Uer Siegeslauf 
der NSDAP in Remscheid claims that the local urtsgruppe was 
founded in lY22/23. 
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'Nach dem Verbot des deutsch-volkischen Schutz-
und Trutzbundes enstanden auch hier in Westdeutsch-
land die ersten Ortsyruppen der NSUAP. ~ine (sic.) 
der ersten waren Hemscheid und Elberfeld.' 
However. Wi Ihelm Schlechtriem. fOrlller member of the UeutSCh-
vc) 1 k i scher Schutz- und Trutzbund Ortsyruppe Reruschei d. assured 
the author that despite these claims there was not Ortsyruppe 
Remscheid until after the ban on the NSOAP was lifteo. lechni-
cally. Schlechtriem is correct in so far as NSUAP lIIembers be-
fore 1925 were al I registered as members of the Ortsyruppe 
• 
MUnchen. This. however. does not alter the fact that there was 
a small group of Nazis operatiny in Hemscheid at the eno of 
lY22 or the beginning of l~~J. 
13 See Uwe Lohalm. Volkischer Radikalislllus. Uie lieschichte des 
Ueutsch-volkischen Schutz- und Irutzbundes 1Y19 - In::s, Halllbury 
19/0. 
14 Interview with Wilhelm Schlechtriem. 
15 Ibid. 
·lb Lohalm,op. cit., p. 3/b. 
Remseheid's Ortsgruppe had ca. 350 youth members. 
17 StA Hemscheid, Akte VII H/2/, Rundschreiben Nr. 1. £1/~/lY20. 
IH HStA DUsseldorf. Hey. Uuss. 1~~14. Ireubund. 
See police report 21110/21: 
19 Ibid. 
'Uer Verein Treubund besteht zur Zeit hier noch 
nicht. Es sind jedoch seit einigen Woe hen Bestre-
bungen illl Ganye, einen solchen Bund hier zu yrunden. 
Als Organisator wird Lahnarzt Sehnautz, wohnhaft 
AlleestraBe. genannt~' 
20 ~erlin Document Centre (BUC), NSUAP memoership cara index. 
21 See HStA DUsseldorf, Reg. UUss. 30b41a, police report concern-
ing Stahlhelm in Remscheld, dated ~1/l~/lH. 
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22 Lohalm, 6p. cit., p. 21~. 
At the same time leader of the Organisation Consul in t:.IDer-
feld. 
2j One of the two who attempted to assassinate Philip Scheidellldnn 
in Kassel. 
See E.J. Gumbel, Verschwbrer. Zur Geschichte und Soziologie de~ 
deutsch-nationalen GeheimbUnde 191tl - 1~~4, Heiaelberg lY7Y, 
pp. 45-48. 
24 Was later to become NSOAP Gauleiter and i<eichsstatthalter of 
Hamburg. 
2~ See Lohalm, OPe cit., p. 21~. 
26 The author was assured by Schlechtriem thdt no olle trom lieiu-
scheid tought in Up~er Silesia. 
'l./ See:StA Relllscheid. Akte VII H/V, Ueutsch-volkischer SCllutL-
und Trutzbund, Rundschreiben Nr. I, dateO Helllscheid '~l/U/~U. 
28 Ibid. 
2~ Ibid. 
30 The function beyan on Friday .3Uth June with d rece~tion at the 
"~orse". The next day there was the liauvorstandssitzun~ (reyio-
nal committee meeting) and a speech given by Reyierunysbau':' 
llIeister Carl Wilhelm Schleicher from Uusseldorf entitled "Uer 
jUdische Einflub 1m modernen Kirchenbau" (the Jewish influence 
in modern church' architecture). This was followed by a 'lierlllan 
evening' held at the Stadtpark.halle, Remsctleid's lar\:jest hall. 
On Sunday. 2nd Ju Iy there were speeches in the Stadtparkha 11 e 
by Or. Artur, Dinter who spoke on "Uas Christentulll als heroisch-
arische Religion und Grundlage der· deutschen Erinneruny" 
(Christianity as a heroic-arian religion and basis of' the 
Gernlan memory); by Hermann Esser on "Oer deutsche Arbei ter 1m 
Oeutsch I and der Zukunft" (the German worker in the future 
Germany), - a potent of thi nys to come .. ; by frau Martha Vol3-
Zi etz entitled "Oeutsch 1 and w1 rd aufers tehen" (Germany wi 11 
rise again); and as a climax Alfred Roth's"Kundgebunyen an das 
deutsche Volk und' Weihespruch"(proclamation to the German 
peop I e and conunemorative address). 01 nter, born U /6/1'd/b in 
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Mulhou,se/Alsace, was a writer mainly concerned with volkisCh 
and religious themes, and was a co-founder and chainnan of the 
Schutz- und Trutzbund. Hermann Esser was a co-founder of the 
NSDAP and close companion of Hitler. He rose rapialy in tne 
movement to become editor of the Vblkischer Beobachter. ~sser 
was a talented speaker and particularly noted for his virulent 
attacks on Jews. His scandalous articles in the Vb were ri-
val led only by those of Julius S~reicher for their pornoyraphic 
content. (See Karl-Dietrich Bracher, The German Uictatorship. 
The Origins, Structure and Effect of National Socialislll, Har-
mondsworth 1911, p. 1l1). Alfred Roth, born 't.7/4/1'd7Y; was a 
writer and journalist and a co-founder and chairman of the 
Ueutsch-Vblkischer Schutz- und lrutzbund. 
In the afternoon the many guests made their way to the exclu-
siv~ Sch'lol3 KiJppelste,in, overlooking the wOOdeu valley of the 
Wupper an~ the Munysten Bridge, for coffee, cake and a lecture 
on "Charakter and Wesen des Bergischen Volksstalllllles" (character 
and essence of the Beryische people) delivered by Pastor Her-
mann Backer from Cologne. That evening the guests ayain 
gathered at the "Bbrse" for the farewell address which was to 
prove the last, at least under the name of Schutz- und Irutz-
bund. 
-31 NachlaB Gustav Hermann Halbach, Bericht iiber die Sitzung des 
~ergischen Gauvorstandes vam Allaeutschen Verbanae zu Elberfela 
~n Sonntay, d. 2. Lenzing (March) lY~4". 
32 Ibid., letter of 24/4/23 to Erich Scholz, treasurer of the 
. 
Germanenhort e.V.; 
and interview with Wilhelm Schlechtriem. 
33 For the aims and structure of this organisation, see Klaus 
Hornung, Uer Jungdeutsche Urden, UUsseldorf 1Y~'d. 
34 Interview with Erich Thieler: 'Although the Jungdos were strong 
numerically we did not take them very seriously, they were 
noisy louts, mostly sons of local manufacturers who usea to 
summon up courage in the pub before daring to venture onto the 
streets. ' 
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This impression of the Jungdos was confirmed by Ernst Giesecke 
. who had himself been a member of that oryanisation before join-
ing the NSUAP and SA. In answer to the question 'what did the 
Jungdo members do mos t of the time 7' he reI-> I i eo, 'We were 
silly boys who sat around yettiny drunk and singing songs.' 
35 RGA, 14//122, August Scholz's speech at the Junydo Bruderabend 
held at the NConcordia" following the assassination of Rathenau. 
See also Karl-Uietrich I3racher, Uie Aut"losung der Weilllarer 
Republik: Eine Studie zum Problem des Machtverfalls in der 
Oemokratie, Villingen 1971, p. 126: 
'Mit der Grundung seines Freikorps in Kassel er-
strebte Artur Mdhraun vor allelll eine Fortbllduny 
der "Grabenwerte", die Wirkuny von Personlichkeit 
und Korpsgeist auf das politische Leben und die 
staatliche Gellleinschaft, die politische Verwirk-
lichung des uber Stand, Klasse, Interesse hinweg-
reichenden bundischen Gemeinschaftsgedankens.' 
36 StA Remscheid, Akte VII H/2~, Jungdeutscher Orden. 
37 HStA Olisseldorf, Reg. Oi..iss. 1b446, Wochenbericht, I<emsctleid 
H/g/21. 
3H Artur Mahraun, born in 1HYU, was the founder and leader of the 
Jungdeutscher Orden. 
39 HStA o~sseldorf, Heg. OUss. 1~44b, op.' cit., 13/4/22. 
40 It is clear from the names of members mentioned in newspaper' 
reports etc. that the Junydeutscher Orden was overwhelming Iy 
middle and lower-middle class with very few workers. In Lennep 
an "early melllbership list shows seven cOII~l\ercial apjJrentices, 
two white-collar emjJloyees lkaufmannische Angestellte), two 
schoolboys and one worker. 
See StA Remscheid, Akte VII H/25, OPe cit~ 
Four other members. in Lennep were teacher friedrich Loer, 
businessmen Albert Jacobs and Emi1 Hasselbach, and bank cashier 
Ernst K1uthe. 
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41 Jews, w'ere not accepted as members. . 
The Jungdos regarded themselves as IEin nationales Kraftzentruln 
yeyenjeaes WeltbUryertum llnternationale) ••• Ein lemJ,>el deut-
scher Sitte, deutschen Glaubens und deutscher Treue ••• ·, quoted 
in E.J. Gumbel, Verschwbrer ••• , Ope cit., pp. bb-bl • 
. 42 HStA OUsseldorf, Heg. OUss. 16/41, Wikinger ~una, reJ,>ort con-
cerning activities of the wikingbund Raaevorlllwald, ti/1U/ln!>. 
and statement made by Heinrich Kanter datea ~2/lU/2!>. 
43 HStA UUsseldorf, ibid., report from the landrat in Lennep to 
the Hegierungsprasident in Ousseldorf. 
44 Ibid. 
4~ HStA UUsseldorf, Hey. UUss., ibid., police report 27/J/1no 
concerni ny Versdlllllll ung des Wi k i nybundes una des Wt!hrwo I t dill 
21.3.1Y26in tleyenbury. 
46 Ibid. 
41 HStA Ousseldorf, Reg. Uuss. Ib44b. Wochenbericht, ti/Y/IY21. 
4ti HStA UUsseldorf, Hey. Uuss. JUb41e, police report concerniny 
Stahlhelm, 7/11/192ti; 
and ibid., police report'IU/l/IYJ1. 
Following the lifting of the ban, the Ortsyruppe Hemscheia 'was 
re-founded with HU members, and the Jungstahltlelm had 15. The 
Urtsgruppen Hemscheid and Radevorlllwald (3U melllbers) constituted 
the Kreisforlllation, led by Kreisfuhrer Alfred Erlinghayen. 
49 HStA Uusseldorf, Reg. Uuss., ibid., police report concerniny 
Stahlhelm. 11/~/1929. 
!)U HStA Uusseldorf, Rey. UUss. 3U641a, police report concerniny 
Spaltung im Stahlhelm-Ilund, Urtsyruppe I<emscheid, Elberfeld 
30/!)/2H. 
01 HStA uusseldorf. Reg. DUss. 3Ub41b. see order for ban on Stahl-
helm, Berlin B/1U/29; 
- . 
also Volker R. Berghahn. Uer Stahlhelm, Ilund der Frontsoldaten, 
UUsseldorf 196/. 
52 H~tA UUsseldorf. Heg. Uuss. 30b41b, report concerniny Auflosuny 
des Stahlhelm, Barmen/Elberfeld, 11/10/1929. 
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53 This is the only Kriegerverein membership list the author was 
able to locate. It contains the names of 140 regular members 
and a list of the honorary comlllittee members (42). Ihe majority 
of these were prominent Remscheid citizens. Nowhere in the 
local press could a link be found between Krieyerverein members 
and Nazi Alte Kampfer. 
~4 Carl HUlle is described in the Remscheid address book as a 
turner, but his background is lower-middle class. His father 
Emil was a bookkeeper and hi smother Margarete worked in an 
office. In the 192~ address book, Sebastian-~ach-!:)tral=ie, the 
. hOllle of the Hulle-family, is still given as the official 
information centre for NSUAP business. 
~5 WaIter Gobert is described in the aadr~ss book dS d 
fitter-mechanic, but on account of his independent status he 
sometimes refers to himself as a Fabrikant (lIIdnufacturer) •. 
Gbbert owned his own workshop, Schlosserei, Mascninenbau- und 
Reparaturwerkstatt, at Intzestra~e 17. 
~6 Wilhelm Kratz's membership card shows his date of jOining the 
NSDAP as being 1/4/1~l5, but he a1U1ost certainly joined lony 
before the Verbotszeit. It would seem that his oriyinal 
membership card for which he regularly paid his subscription 
was never returned to him, or else it was probably lost between 
1923 and 192~. Personal files in the ~erlin Uocument Centre are 
full of complaints to the party treasurer in Munich about 
careless mistakes in the collection and reCordiny ot 
subscriptions. From this it appears that such mistakes occurred 
frequently. Much of the correspondence with the party treasurer 
concerns the application for a membership number below Wu,UUU 
by Nazis claiming to have been members before 1~2~. Kratz 
claimed to have joined the NSUAP in 1~21. 
57 Werner Herberts is listed in the Remscheia adaress book as 
Fabri kant (manufacturer J. As we have a I ready seen from the 
structure of Remscheid's industry, the majority of businesses 
were really small workshOps rarely elllp I oyi ng more than ten to 
fifteen workers. This was particularly the case in Hasten. 
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59 Interview with Ernst Giesecke. 
60 See assessment made by Standartenfuhrer Kretschmar on Ilj/l/ 
1935: 
'Sein Henehmen auBerdienstlich. er war meistens 
arbeitslos. soil nicht einwandfrei yewesen seine 
Er hat sich in den Wirtschaften in schwer ange-
trunkenem Zustand lIIi t harmlosen IH.lryern herumye-
schlayen. so dab ihn die Einwohner Remscheids 
lieber gehen wie kon~en sahen. Es haben aufyrund 
seines Henehmens viele. die der Heweyung damals 
schon nahestanden. einen 8eitritt zur NSDAP ab-
ge I ehnt. • 
61 Testimony lIIade by Obersturmflihrer Ernst Schweikart on tl/1U/J4 
in front ,of an SA tribunal. 
b~ Urteil vom 1Y.4.1Y34, Arntsyericht Relllscheid. 
63 Oberfi.ihrer Habenichts' report to th~ SA Gruppe Niederrhein. p. 
17. The verdict in the disciplinary proceedings against Ku~fer­
berg reads:. 
'Uem Stunnf~hrer Otto Ku~ferbery. Gruppe Niederrhein 
die Entlassung aut eigenen Wunsch nahezuleyen. Hei 
Nichtanna~ne wurde beschlQssen. ihn unter Enthebung 
von Dienstgrad und Uienststellung aus der SA zu ent-
lassen', Munchen. lY/tl/19J5. 
64 Testimony given by Truppfuhrer Hems Fey in the disciplinary 
proceedings N~nscheider Vorfalle on 5/10/34. 
6tl See Chapter Ill. 
As already mentioned, "Roelllryke Herge" was the cover-organisa-
tion for the banned Schutz- und Trutzbund in i<elllscheia. Ihe 
group was about 50 strong, the oldest melllbers being about ~tl 
years of age, the majority, however, were younger, between l~ 
and 20. 
Interview with WiJhelm Schlechtrielll 24/7/HU. 
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66 Walter Uannenberg was buried on the spot where he was kil led. 
After 'the seizure of power, wreaths were laid on the grave by 
representatives of the NSUAP and town-council every year. 
67, See Bergischer Beobachter, Weihnachten lYJJ, Helllscheiaer AI te 
Kampfer, Albert Schemann. 
btl Ibid. 
6Y See letter wri ttenby Max Hesse on 4/12/1 Y4lJ in support of 
Herrnann Hof's application for the party badge in gold, l:ierlin 
Uoculllent Centre, Personal File Herlllann Hof. 
10 See, Bergischer Beobachter, Remscheiaer Alte KaIllpfer, Sturlll-
fiihrer Papa Gobert, 4/9/33. 
71 See statement made by Karl Lamottke on 7/b/l':J(.f;) in l{e"lsctleid , 
HStA Uusseldorf, Ger. Rep. 4 J 5~2/~!> .1. Artur Becker UIHJ 
Genossen. 
72 Ibid., statement by W~1ter Gobert on 1/6/1Y2.~ in I{elllscheid. 
73 The Ortsgruppe Hemscheid of the NSUAP numbered only 42. at the 
beginning of lY29. 
See RGA, 29/1/193ti, Relnscheias SA. 
74 HStA ousseldorf, Reg. Ouss. Ibl3ti. 
15 Ibid., repo~t 13/1/2/. 
16 The reconunendation'to dissolve the local group was, however, 
never followed. 
I1 HStA ousseldorf, Reg. uuss. lti/3ti, OPe cit., ~b/~/2.I. 
Itl The meeting was held on 2tl/ll/1Y2.~, see r~port, ibid., 
5/1~/192!>. 
7Y Karl Kaufmann was a leading figure in the left-wing Strasser/ 
. Goebbels group which enjoyed considerable influence within the 
NSDAP in the North-West of Germany. This revolutionary winy was 
fervently anti-capitalist and intent on winniny the support of 
industrial workers. For accounts of this group's activities, 
see Joseph L. Nyomarkay, "factionalislll in the National Socia-
l1st German Workers' Party, lY2~-2b. The Myth and I{eality ot 
the 'Northern faction''', in Henry A. Turner jr. (edit.), Nazism 
and .the Third Reich, OPe cit., pp. 21-45; 
and Reinhard KUhnl, Uie nationalsozialistische Linke lY£5 -
~, Melsenheim am GIan, 1966. 
Kaufmann was later to become Gauleiter of Hamburg. 
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8U ViktorLutze later played an illljJortant role intri~uin':l a':jdinst 
Ernst Rorun in the period immediately precediny the 'niyht of 
,the long knives'. Lutze was rewarded by Hitler for Ilis loyalty 
by being elevated to the rank of Conuuander of the SA, as Rohlll's 
successor. 
See Bernt Engelmann, £in i 9 ge~en Recht und Freiheit. Ueutsches 
Anti-Geschichtsbuch. 2. Teil, Munchen 19/0, pp. 3~U-3jU. 
81 £rich Koch later became l:iauleiter of East Prussia and tne 
Reich C~runissar for the occupied Ukraine, and was executed as a 
war criminal by the Poles in 194/. 
See William L. Shirer. The Rise and Fall of the lhird Reie/I, 
London 1959. p. 118. 
84! Inye Linke-Mdrl3olek in her PhU-dissertation tor the ItH.:hnischl;! 
Universitat Herl1n, Arbeiterbeweyuny in der Nachkrieyszeit 1~4~ 
_ 1948. Eine Studie zur Rekonstruktion von SPu, KPU und 
l:iewerkschaften illl Heryischen Land, Remscheid, Solin';len, 
wupperta I. attri butes the Remschei d Nazi s to the I eft-wi ny ot 
the party without,' however. offeri ny any evi dence to support 
her claim. 
H3 HStA Uusseldorf, Rey. Uuss. 16/38, Ope cit., £b/£/l~£/. 
84 Ibid., police report 1~/8/194!b~ 
85 Report in the ~eryische Vo!ksstillle. 1b/8/1nb. 
86 RGA, 13/6/1933. Uer Siegeslauf der NSUAP in Relllscheia. 
HI See. Beryi scher Beobachter, Relllschei der A 1te Kalllpfer, A I bert 
SCh~lIlann, Weihnachten 19J~. 
70 or 8U Nazi s were ab I e to gain entry unobservea throu':jh the 
window. For an account of the ritualistiC behaviour in lIIeetiny-
hall brawls see, Karl Rohe, Das Reichsbanner Schwarz-Rot-l:iold, 
Uusseldorf 1966, p. 114. 
88 HStA IJUsse'ldorf, Rey. UUss. 16138, Bericht uner die am 
11/4/1926 abends H Uhr, stattyefunde oftentl iChe Versanunluny illl 
Lokale von Hugo Wilms. 
89 Interviews with frnst Giesecke ana Robert Flihrer. Ihe latter 
had no connections with any political yroup. 
9U Beryischer Beobachter, 23/~/1933. 
, 
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91 Int~rview with Ernst Giesecke on 21/7/19~U. 
Gi esec·ke and Schmi tz spent three months in the SUIIUller of lY31 
in Bavaria. 
I 
92· See correspondence of Gustav Hermann Haibach in StA Nemscheid, 
Nachlai3 Gustav Herrnann Halbach, ego letter of 24th Apri i lY2J 
to the treasurer of the liermanenhort e.V., Erich Sctloiz. Ihis 
letter contains an assessment of the political situation in 
Remscheid as well as Halbach's own personal political 
standpoint. With regard to the local ~olitical situation 
Halbach says: 
'Uer Name Bergisch Moskau, den unsere Stadt besond"ers 
seit den blutigen Marztagen von 192U erhalten hat, 
besteht langst nieht rnehr als zu Keeht, aenn so 
grundstUrzend fUr auf der einen Seite irreyeleitete 
Volksyenossen sein wogen, so entschleden vulk1y lvol-
kisch)eingestellt ist andererseits der yrolHe leil 
der ~uryerschaft. Als politische Partei fuhrend ist 
hierselbst die Ueutsche Valkspartei. die bei den 
I etzten Preui3i schen Landtayswah I en etwa 12, UUU Stillllllen 
aufbrachte und zur Zeit rund J,UUU einyescnriebene 
Mitglieder aufweist. Sie halt yute Nachbarschaft lIIit 
der Ueutsehnationalen Volkspartei. Beide Ortsyruppen 
zahlen bisher keine Fremdrassiyen in ihren Helhen. 
unter den jetzigen Leitern ist aueh an die Aufnahl/le 
soleher nieht zu denken ••• • 
Of the Deutsch-volkischer Schutz- und Trutzbund Halbach says: 
'50 deutsch-volkisch ich selbst einyestellt bin, wie 
ich auch Mitglied des aufgelosten Deutsch-volkischen 
Schutz- und Trutzbundes war, so mu6 ich doeh sagen, da~ 
ich mich in dessen Kreisen nicht recht wohlyefuhlt 
habe. In der Mehrzahl bestanden diese Kreise dUS un-
reifen, ubervolkischen und kallerigen Hitzktipfen, die 
aber wahrlich nicht ddS Zeug zur Rettung des Vater-
landes besitzen. Ein stolz zur $chau getrayenes Haken-
kreuz tut es nicht allein. kraft dessen sich sogar 
mancher Trager berechtigt glaubte, einen HUll begeg-
nenden Judenjungliny zu verprugeln. Auch lost lIlan aie 
Judenfrage nicht mit dem Revolver.Uie Tat, einen wehr-
losen Juden wie Rathenau meuchlinys niederzuknallen, 
halte ich nicht fUr heldisch sandern fur feige ••• • 
Halbach's espousal of the Jewish-Marxist conspiracy theory is 
also articulated in this letter: 
'Oer rote, goldene und schwarze Weltring (Inter-
nationale) hat uns diese Weltanschauuny genommen: 
wir sind dem englisch-amerikanisCh-judisch-ka~ita_ 
listischen Weltbund unterlegen. Oadurch kWI~t unser 
Niederyang ••• • 
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93 Ibid. 
94 See RGA, 29/1/38. 
95 Interview with Ernst Giesecke. 
Karl Bre(3ler, Karl Renunel and Karl Schi.irmann were particularly 
. generous to thei r unemployed comrades, but these were by no 
means alone. 
Eg. Ernst Giesecke's father, Otto, paid the fare for his son 
and another SA member to the Parteitag in ~runswick. 
97 There are 52 men on the photo, but only bl have been included 
in the analysis, as frowein, the Standartenfuhrer, was frolll 
Wuppertal and did not figure in Remscheid affairs •. 
98 The majority of these factory workers were employed ; n, or had 
served apprenticeShips in small factories which - as we have 
already seen - were typical for Relllscheid's industry. Very few 
of these worked in factories employing more than ~~ lIIen. 
99 Identified by Ernst Giesecke. 
lUU See Tim Mason, Sozialpolitik im Uritten Keich; upladen 191/, 
p. 74. 
101 See BOC, Akte Otto Kupferberg, SA Disciplinary Court 
"Kemscheider Vorfalle". 
The Sturmbannfi.ihrer'S assessment of willi Butzbach dated 
18/1/3b states: 
'ScharfUher Butzbach ist einer von den vielen SAI1, 
die in der Kampfzeit zu uns gestoben sind, die .lIs 
Schlager sehr gut zu gebrauchen waren, una aufyrund 
dessen sich fi.ir die Beweyung verdient gemacht haben, 
doch als Vorbilder fUr die Beweyung untauglich sind.' 
102 Handwerker - artisan, not necessarily independent. 
103 Angestellter - salaried white-collar employee usually in 
i ndus try. 
104 Kaufmann - person with a business orientated education who 
often but not always had his own business. 
lU5 According to Ernst Giesecke, Carl Hi.ille was a qualified Kaut-
~. The author, however, was unable to fina dny evidence to 
support this statement. 
lU6 Interview with Ernst Giesecke on 28/1/198U. 
lUI N~mes appearing in the local press or police reports. 
- ';jlU -
lOB Frau Giesecke lived in NUdelshalbach which was also referred 
to as the 'Nazi-Dorf' on account of the many NSUAP lIlembers and 
sym~athisers who lived there. 
lO~ Interview with frnst Giesecke on 2B/7/1~BU. 
The person in question is Max Luchtenbery, who did nut oriyi-
nate from Remscheid. a former Ba I ti kumkalllpfer. 'Ich wei b 
nicht, was der Max van Beruf war, iCh habe ihn eigentlich in 
den Jahren nie arbeiten sehen.' 
11U It is not clear whether the person in question was employed by 
his father or not. Accordiny to Ernst Giesecke, Kurt Meyer had 
studied business., It is quite likely that he helpea his 
father telllporarily in the shop. 
111 Age could be established in IU cases. 
III lYU4: I; lYU~ : u; lYUb = b. 
113 Marital status was established in b~ cases. NSUAP index cards 
in the BUC do not always contain this infonnJtion. 
114 See RGA, 13/b/1Y33. 
U~ This information is based on 33 Nazis who were members or 
active sympathisers before the end of 19;jl. 
116 The difference in social composition is, however, tu be 
expected, as Lennep, the former Kreisstadt. had a hi~h percen-
tage of civil servants and better placed professional people. 
Liittringhausen had the highest percentage of farlllers of the 
three towns and also attracted well-situated residents of the 
upper classes. 
III C.U. Tholllpson, OPe cit., p. 40, unpublished essay 19/~. 
UU 'Ihe Hesseninsel was a triangular traffic island on the old 
Mark t where around the turn of the century mi grant workers 
froUl Hessia used to meet on Sunday mornings for aiscussions. 
This practice was continued up to the Nazi seizure of power. 
119 Collecting for the party's combat fund ·or selling J,larty 
literature was, of course,'a dangerous business and required a 
great deal of courage. 
Interview with Robert Fiihrer, June 19BO: 
Ua war einer, der kam von auswarts und wohnte im 
SA-Heim in der FreiheitstraBe. Uer hatte so viel 
Schlage bekomrnen, daf) er hinterher ein ganz ver-
m~tschtes und verblodetes Gesicht hatte. Aber Tag 
fur Tag stand er da alii Markt und verkaut"te den 
Beobachter.' 
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120 HStA'Uusseldorf, Reg. Ouss. 30bb4, Obersicht uber die Ent-
wlcklung der NSDAP lm Regierungsbezlrk Uusselaorf nach aelll 
Stande vom 15/9/31. 
121 HStA UUsseldorf, Reg. Uuss., ibid., Obersicht uber die Ent-
wicklung der· NSUAP im Regierunysbezirk Uusseldurf nach (Jelll 
Stande vom 15/3/32. 
122 Ibid. 
123 Ibid. 
124 I bid. 
Sturmbann 111/171, Wuppertal-Harmen, Land numbered 336 lnen: 
Sturm 21, Lennep bO 
Sturlll 22, Luttrin!;lhausen 52 
Sturlll 2;J, Kddevuflllwdld IU 
Sturlfl 24, wuppertal-Neuenhaus Itl 
Sturm 25, Hahnerbery 16 
Sturrn 26, Werlllelskirchen 50 
Sturlll '1.1, Hi.ickeswayen 30. 
125 The district 'Hergisches lndustrie-Gebiet' consisted ot the 
following groups: 
urtsyruppe Radevorlllwald, led by i::rich Veit. 
Ortsyruppe Dhunn, 1 ed by Eri ch Hdhn 
2bO 
!:I 0 
ortsyruppe Uabringhausen, led by HU!;lo Luhnser Jr. 2U 
Ortsgruppe Werlllelskirchen, led by Max Fautel 2~U 
Ortsgruppe Huckeswagen, led by Karl Lange lUO 
Urtsgruppe Grol.)-Solin\:jen, led by Hermann Hrouwers tlOO 
Urtsyruppe Relllscheid. led by Ernst Kuhlbars IbO 
126 Hergi scher Beobachter, 11/12/1933, Zwei Jahre Kal/lpf UIII 0; e 
Betriebe. 
121 HStA Di.isseldorf. Reg. Oi.iss. 1/2~J, Wuppertal-E1Derfela, 
1~/J/1931. concerning Nazifi.ihrerDesprechung. 
12H Ibid. 
129 Bergischer Beobachter, 11/12/1933, OPe cit. 
130 ef. Henry A. Turner jr. "IH y Hus i ness and the Ri se of Hit I er", 
in: idem. (edit.), Nazism and the Third Reich, OPe cit. 
322 
In this essay Turner argues that there is no conclusive evi-
dence linking substantial big business finance with the NSUAP 
and that figures like Fritz Thyssen, Emil Kirdorff ana 
Friedrich Flick were exceptions rather than the rule. To~ether 
with Horst Matzerath, Turner supports this thesis with an exa-
mination of the Gau Rheinland's financial situation between 
1~30 and 1932, which seems to indicate the non-existence ot 
substantial financial gifts from industry, ana stresses tile 
importance of the party's self-financing fund raisiny activi-
ties. 
See Horst Matzerath and Henry A. Turner jr. "Uie Selbstftndn-
zierung der NSUAP l~JO bis lYJ2", in: Geschichte und Gesell-
schaft, Jg. ~, No. 1, 1~II, p. bY-92. 
At this point it should however be remelllbered that with re~dnl 
to Relllscheid the lack of financial support for the NSUAP trulII 
biy business is hardly surprisiny, owing to the latter's ab-
sence or only limited presence in the town. 
131 Examples of the declasse SA members engaged in proletdrian-
type occupations and hence appearing in party membership lists 
as 'workers' are: Carl Hi.ille, Heinz Schmitz, Karl Schurllldnll, 
Ric~ard Wiegand, Waiter Gobert, Uaniel Schurlllann jr., I{udolf 
Behre, Erich ~raunschweig. Arnold Paffenhoff, Karl Mdrkstelle, 
Wi Ihelm ~udde, August GrillulI and the Giesecke brothers. 
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C H APT E R V 
The R~nscheid Workers' Movement 
and the Economic Crisis 193U to 1933 
The world economi' crisis which dominated the econonlic and social 
development of Germany from 193U to 1933 led to a raJ,lid fall. in in-
dustrial output1 and mass unemployment2 which reaChed propor-
tions hitherto unknown. The depression resu"ltea in the illlpoverish-
ment of Icir~e3 sections of the populatioll, al)ove dll 111<.1 nu a I <.IIIU 
white-collar workers and their families, who found thelllselves COIII-
pelled to absorb the shock of lIIass unemploYlllent wi thout the assu-
rance of continued security in the forlll of stable benefits, as 
these were periodically subject to review and suffered repeatea re-
ductions. It was, however, not only the unemployed who experiencea 
hardship as a result of the unfavourable economic situation. "'hose 
sti 11 fortunate enough to hold down a jOb were forced to accept 
cuts in their real wages as dictated by the central yovernlllent's 
emergency measures. 4 Although it was the manua I workers who bore 
the brunt of the economic crisis, they were by no lIIeans alone. Ihe 
middle classes, too, were strongly affected by the depression, and 
many small and mediulll-sized businesses were forced into li4uida-
tion. House owners who were themselves in difficulty, attempted to 
compensa te thei r losses by demandi n~ hi yher rents wherever pos-
sible.As in 1923, the most vulnerable section of the bour~eoisie 
was the old traditional middle class consisting of slIIall savers. 
pensioners. small investors, Shopkeepers and independent craftslllen. 
Thenew middle class. the expanding arlllY of industrial white-COllar 
workers, was particularly hard hit by the contracted elllployment 
market, so that this section of society appears to tlave suHerea 
more than during the 1923 inflation, a factor whiCh doubtless has a 
bearing on the meteoric rise of the NSOAP.5 In 1932 only approxi 
- 324 -
mately one third of the country's manual and white-collar workers 
were fully employed6 and the majority of these were subdued to 
the extent that they meek ly accepted further extens i ve encroach-
ments on their rights. Wage negotiation laws were gradually under-
mi ned until they were more or 1 ess di scarded under the Papen 
government in September 1932. 7 
1. Effects of the Crisis on Remscheid. 
Remscheid, because it was above all dependent on exports, was so 
ravaged by the effects of the crisis that the town was declared an 
area of extensive deprivation (Notstandsgebiet) by the Prussian 
government on 15/12/32.8 At the hei ght of the cri si s, a thi rd of 
the town's population was calculated to be in receipt of some form 
of security benefit. 9 The protracted length of the depression, 
prolonged high unemployment and the steady increase in the number 
of citizens dependent on the town's welfare office - by the begin-
ning of February 1933,1,23810 individuals together with their 
dependents, in all between 15 and 20 thousand, constituting between 
one fifth and one sixth of the total population - drained the coun-
cil's financial reserves, leaving a budgetary deficit for the year 
193211 of two and three quarter milli on marks, an increased de-
~'ficit over the previous year 1931 of over a million marks. 12 
During the recession of 1926 Remscheid's industry had suffered high 
unemployment, averaging around six and a half thousand. Ihis state 
of affairs, however, only lasted from march to October. 13 In 
the depression of 1930 to 1933 this figure was more than doubled 
for long periods. By October 1932 the local employers' association 
of the iron and steel industry had dismissed 1,24614 workers, 
just under half of its normal workforce (15,402) which constituted 
roughly a quarter of the town's total workforce of circa 
27,50015• During the second half of June 193U the number of 
registered unemployed for the town as a whole, stood at 10,29616 
This figure continued to rise reaching 13,123 by the second half of 
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February lY32. 17 It is not cl.ear whether this number increasea 
further,as no statistics could be traced until the end of the year. 
Whatever the case, the total of ; unemployed did not tall signifi-
cantly for the remainder of lY32, so that by Uecember the local 
employers' association of the iron and steel industry sti 11 SllOwed 
7,042 dismissals compared with the last period of tull employment 
in lY2ij. The overall figures for the second half of Uecember lYJ2 
" 
reveal a tentative improvement with a total of lU,b14 register~a 
unemployed in ~emsche1d.lB The statistics circulated· by the 
employe~s' association of the local iron ana steel industry appear 
. , . 
to substantiate the claim that the peak of unemployment had been' 
passed in the autumn and that from Uecelllber onwdrc.1s there was a 
very gradua I dee I i ne in the nUfIIl>er of reOunddnc i es. 1 y Ihe yene-
raJ employment fiyures would have' been worse but for recourse tu 
short-time workiny. In October lY32, of the B,l~b sti 1I employed Dy 
the association of Remscheid's iron and steel industry, well over d 
quarter (2,206) were working fewer than 3~ hours a week, almost al I 
of them in toolmakiny. Although theintroduetion of short-tillle vre-
. vented the loss of still more jobs, it also entailed great haraship 
for the workers concerned, as this lIIeasure constituted a substan-
tial fall in their earnings. The majority of those now working it 
35-hour week and less had averaged 4B hours in lY29. Ihe transition 
to short-time working was abrupt, so that 1II0St workers had no tjllle 
to readjust to the new situation. As prices generally decreaseo at 
a slower rate and with substantial delays, IlIdny workers could not 
meet thei r' cOllulli tments on current wages. Conse4uent ly. even 
emp I oyed workers began to fall behi nd with payments on turni ture, 
clothing and rent, and in lIIany cases goods were reclaillled ana evic-
tions carried out. 20 
The reduced circulation' of money manifested itself in many ways 
apart from the general fa 11 in the purchase of consumer gooos. 
Pub I i c transport was severely affected by the necessary econollli sa-
tions of so many private households. lhe municipal tram service not 
only lost custom as a result of the many redundancies, but also 
because of a greater re·luctance by those sti II in employment to 
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undertake journeys by public transport unless absolutely necessary. 
~etween 1929 and the end of 1932 the I oca I tram serv1 ce had 
su~fered a reduction of 22.4%21 of passengers, and by the 'end 
of 1932 this had risen further to 44.4 ~22. Uespite lowe-
ringofprices particularly in the .category of weekly tickets t'or 
manua land white-collar workers, the municipal works cOllllllittee was 
compelled to make cuts in services in an effort to minimise losses. 
Local railway services experienced similar difficulties. Accoraing 
to the number of tickets sold at the four. Remscheid stations, the 
railway suffered a comparable loss of custom to that of the tram 
. 
service amounting to a fall of 36.2 % between. 193U and 19n.~j 
There were also significant reductions in ·the units of gas dlla 
electricity used by private households. The town counci I's annual 
report for 1931 noted a 24.b % fall in the consulIIPtion of electri-
city over the previous year, despite the deferlllent of price rises 
which other towns in the area had introduced followiny the increase 
of coal prices. 24 
2. Impoverishment of the Working Class. 
The Ijruning government's answer to the financial crlS1S was d poJ'i-
cy of deflation which envisa~ed a si90ificant reduction in wages' 
and prices and huge savings 1n public e~penditure, particularly in 
tile soci a 1 sector. A I though the centra I government IlIanaged to 
secure modest decreases in the prices of ayricultural and indus-
trial consumer products, it did not have the same success with re-
garo to rents, gas and electricity.2b furthermore, the goverrl-
ment was unable to aChieve simultaneous reductions in wages ana 
prices, so that the latter constantly lagged behind the torlller, 
both in time and degree. 26 These discrepancies cOlllbined with 
the protracted lenyth of the Clepression and perioos of unemployment 
as well as the progressive dismantling of the social security sys-
tem were the essential factors responsible for the impoverishlllent 
of the local working class. 
· - 'J't.7 -
Unfortunately owing to a number of factors. tables 14 and 1~ can 
only give a rough indication of the reduction of wages and prices 
in Remscheid between 1930 and 1933. 27 Ihe tables are includea 
because they revea I genera I trends. 
lable 14 shows the hourly wage rate for A = fully qualHiea lIIaster 
craftsmen. C = semi-skilled workers. and E = orainary labourers, 
apprenti ces and women engaged in the Remschei a iron ana s tee I 
industry at a fixed rate. ie. not piece-work. whiCh differed accor-
ding to the specific tasks and was paid at a higher rate. A COII1~ 
parison between wage rates of the 1/5/29 and 1/1/32 reveals a siy-
nificant decrease in earnings. for example those of a fully yuali-
fied master craftsman over 24. who lost 17.1 % of his wage on a 
4H-hour week. In reality, however, the percentage fall in incolIIl! 
was significantly higher owing to the introduction of short-tiule. 
The same individual working a 28-hour week from the 1st January 
1932 lost 42.b % of his previous earnings, more than three times 
the fall in the cost of living index calculated by the t3er~ische 
Kaufmannschait des Einzelhandels e.V. in Lennep at the end of Octo-
ber 1931. 2H · This survey showed, amongst other things, that 
rents had actually risen between July 1Y29 ana 1931 by 4.4 %. Ihese 
were subsequently decreased by 10 % according to the emergl:!ncy 
decree:of H/12/31. This measure made little difference in Remscheid 
as it was introduced too I ate to prevent unelllp I oyed workers ana 
those on short-time fralll falling into arrears. 
A correlation29 of the information in tables 14 ana 15 is only 
relevant between 1/1/31 and March 1932. From table 14 it can be 
seen that a qual ified master craftsman over 24 years of a~e 
sut'fered a decrease in earnings during the twelve months from 
January 1931, to January 1932 of 15 %. Providing that he sti I I 
worked a full 48-hour week his position woula not be illlpossible be-
cause of the accompanying fall in the cost.of living. If, however. 
the individual spent those twelve m6nth~ workinga· 2H-hour; w~ek 
then his position became exceedingly precarious. Whereas 'on a 
4H-hour week. the master' craftsman wou 1 d have earned 3tl marks 4U 
pfennigs plus bonus per week, his earnings for a ~ti-tlOur week woula 
have fallen to 22 marks 4U pfennigs. In households where this was 
the only income, the family would undoubtedly have been in dire 
straits. The decrease in food prices calculated as a percentage did 
not take into consideration a reduction in the number of hours 
worked. For this reason the burden can be said to have been un-
equally distributed. Itis evident that a 15 ~ reduction in salary 
between January 1931 and January 1932 WQulCl not norlllally have 
harmed the fami ly of a ci vi 1 servant as much as that of a worker 
because the civil servant would have earned much more in the first 
place and he would not have been subject to a reCluction in.working 
hours following the cut in salary. Furthermore, the middle classes, 
be it through lHe-style, contacts, education and other factors had 
been in a more advantageous position to acquire and dccUllluldte re-
sources in pre-crisis years which gave thelll Cl better Chance ot sur-
viving the depression when it arrived. Civil servants always, dnd 
intermediate and senior white-collar workers norllldlly, hdo security 
of tenure, so that they did not face the prospect oflon\;j-terlll un-
employment. Junior white-collar workers on the other hand, like .tne 
bulk of manual workers, did not enjoy such security and tenaea to 
.be early casualties of the criSis, particularly young office 
workers and shop salesmen. 
Not only were wages redu~ed, but also unemployment benefits, which 
were curtailed both in real terlUS and in view of the drastically 
shortened period of entitlement. Moreover, employea workers were 
compelled to pay more in the form of increased subscriptions tor 
significantly reduced security. benefits. A redundant worker with no 
prospects of employment now experienced a reduction in his J,Jeriod 
of entitl ement from 26 weeks to 20 weeks, and, alter the sunllller of 
1932 to six weeks. When his periOd of entitlement ended, he took d , 
further reduction when receiving crisis benefit, which constituted 
an intermediate phase between employment and social welfare paid by 
the local authorities, which was the final stage for over'] ,UOU 
unemployed workers at the end of 1Y32. 3U From this it is clear 
that the local welfare was overburdened and consequently could not 
guarantee adequate aid to those in need. The welfare buaget rOSe 
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from 2.3 million to 4.8 million marks between lY31 and 1Y3~31, 
although the number of claimants had increased more tholl threefold. 
Benefit payments were supplemented by receipts froln winter aio col-
lections, as in October 1931 when 13U,OUU marks accrued. 32 Cast 
-off c10thin!:) was also distributed to needy families and tile shoes 
of schoolchildren were repaired free of charge. Uuriny the winter 
nlonths welfare recipients were granted a free coal allowance at 
three hundredweights per fami ly per month and two hunaredweiyllts 
fqr single persons. 33 
Commenting on the latest rates of unelllployment bent!fit on 1~th June 
1932, the tiV34 complained that these were now effectively halt 
the payments made in ly;a. The paper aryued that whereas an un-
employed worker who hdd e~rned d week.ly Wd\;jC bl.HweclI ltl dllu Ju 
marks in lY2I had received an unelllployment benefit ot 13 marks "U 
pfenniys, he now received only ~ marks 4U pfennigs per week. whi 1st' 
the period of entitlement in 1nl was 2b weeks, and there were 
still prospects of reernployment,·it was now a mere six weeks, after 
which the individual was removed to a lower category with a corres ... 
. pon~lng red~ction in benefit. Th~ unfortunate victim of the depres-
sion was reduced to poverty within a remarkably snort space of time 
and 'could find himself unelllployed for yedrs at a stretch. J5 
Such families suffered extreme hardship and despite the moaest fall 
in food prices were unable to' feed their children adelludtely. Ihe 
BV's report,of a child begyiny in the street in February lYJi3b 
was not an isolated incident, but rather an everyday uccurence as 
shabbily dressed chndren roamed the streets constantly in search 
of extra food. A further indication of the effects of hunyer 'was 
provided in ~ newspaper article which reported the death of an in-
valid who died froUl injuries sustained from a fall down the stairs 
of his home, caused by. an attack of dizziness which doctors 
ascribed to undernourishment. 37 
The depression had an exceptionally adverse effect on the fortunes 
. _. 
of the building and construction industry Which in I{elllscheiu 
accounted for the employment of around 1,4UO workers. in ~ebruary 
1930 nearly 35, % or 48U of these were unemployed38 and a larye 
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percentage of the remainder worked on an irregular oasis. JY 
Uuring the following year - 1931 - only 96 houses were erected in 
Remscheid 'as well as 66 other buildings. Of the 96 houses construc-
ted during 1931,57 were'partly financed by public funds. 4U 'Ihe 
accent continued to be placed on the construction of houses con-
taining small units consisting of either two or three roollls, not 
merely because these flats were traditionally popular, out lIlore iln-
portantly because a conspicuous effect of the crisis was the cla-
mour for smaller, cheaper flats by unemployed falll'i1ies who' could 
not afford the rent of their original dwellings and therefore 
needed to lower their expectations. 41 .The liV in one of" i.ts cus-
tomary attacks on the authorities and representatives of the capi-
talist systelll bitterly criticised the failure to provide ade4udte 
housing and suggested that the revenue frolll the Hduslinssteuer WdS 
not being employed in the way the authorities had prOlllised, nalllely 
to finance new building proJects, but rather to pay the sala~ies of 
bureaucrats, police and Reichswehr lJersonnel. The article dlso 
pOinted to the fact that the proportion of private houses, con-
stru~t~d with the aid of public funds, to council houses and those 
built by cooperatives, had recently rocketed. lhe nWllber of pri': 
vately built houses' in 1931 was 54, ie. over half the total. lhe 
'BV's cOllUllent on the current situation was not altogether inaccu-
rate, despite its polemical style: 
'~ir haben in der letzten Leit mehrfach die Ge1eyenheit . 
gehabt, Einblicke in das ungeheure Wohnungselend in Gro~­
Remscheid zu bekollUllen. Unter diesem Gesichtspunkt gesehen 
ist der vorliegende l$ericht uber die Bautatigkeit illl Jatlre 
1931 das Ei nges tandni s des vo 11 kOllllllenen Bankrotts der ka-' 
pitalistischen Gesellschaft. Ule herrschende Klasse kann 
das Proletariat weder ernahren, noch fur gesunde Wohnun-
gen sorgen,die Voraussetzung fUr die Gesundheit sind.'42 
The housing question was an area of bitter contention between the 
KPD, its local mouthpiece the BV, and the.authorities. The BV aevo-
ted considerable energy to investigating housing conditions in a 
town which never managed to resol ve the problem satisfactori 1y. 
throughout the whole of ~he period covered by this study. Ihe fact 
that the communist press used its lIIaterial for propaganaa purposes 
does not invalidate its findings. 
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Uuring the, summer of 193U the BY carried out an investiyation into 
some of the worst examples of privately owned slum dwellinys situa-
ted in the town~ The investigation revealed appalliny sanitary con-
ditions. houses long fallen into disrepair. for which landlordS 
were imputed to be collecting unfair rents. In many cases the owner 
of the house resided in another town and relied on an appointee for 
the collection of rents. It would also ap~ear that the worst ex-
cesses occurred in properties owned by single small manufacturers, 
small savers and investors and not by the various hOUSing oryanisa-
tions like the GemeinnUtziger Bauverein. 
One flat visited by a BY journalist in Osterbusch was in" one of 
four houses owned by a man who lived in Uusseldorf. 43 The 
houses had open drains which served neighbourhood children as a 
play area. The yard behind the house contained four l~an-to toilets 
situated over a cess-pit and served between bU and tiO residents. 
The stench of excrement was reported to be unbearable, and in the 
summer months swarms of flies provided an extra health hazard. The 
flat itself had damp walls which caused the paper to peel. A flat 
, in the house next44 door cons is ted of two rooms separated by a 
wall constructed out of boards. cardboard and sacking. The roof 
1 ~aked so badly that a tub was used to catch the drojJs of water, 
and the reporter was informed that the kitchen cell i riy had recen t Iy 
collapsed during a storm. The sanitary installations in this flat 
were defective so that excrement was flushed out into tile street. in 
an open drain. The rent for this flat was ~U "~rks per month ana 
the owner was a renowned manufacturer in Hasten. In the front por-
tion of· this particular house dwelt several residents of over 17 
years standing wtlO testified that during that tillle no repairs haa 
ever been undertaken. The house was also reputed to be infested 
with fl eas. cockroaches and other verllli n. 
A house in AlexanderstraBe whiCh was also described 'by the news-
paper as being in a poor state of repair and plagued by rats, mice 
and cockroaches, was the subject of & BV report in SejJtember 1~3U. 
The house had neither washroom nor attic and the walls were dallljJ. 
The owner lived in Barmen and arranged for the rent to be collectea 
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by a janitor who lived in a neighbouring house. The· rent for the 
three-roomed flat in this particular house was 34 marks per 
month. 45 . Similar conditions prevailea in other houses featured 
in the series. In'some cases tenants were evicted after falling 
into arrears with rents. A family living in Honsberyer StraBe con-
sisted of six persons. 46 The father had been' almost uninterrul-l-
tedly unemployed since 1925 (five and a half years), the wife haa 
recently borne her seventh child which, like two others J)reviously, 
had died. Whilst the wife was sent away to a convalescent hOllle, the 
husband was evicted by the landlord and was designated a tWQ-roolllea 
attic flat in Stachelhauser $traBe which had only a small skyligtlt 
window and leaking walls and roof. The plight of this falllily was 
such that a visiting doctor paid for a large 4uafltity ot IIlill.. tur 
the children out of his own pocket on hearillg tlioJt t"~ lucal wel-
fare office had refused their re4uest for~aid. 
The cOllllllunist press consistently exploited such yralJhic lIIaterial tu 
discredit the capitalist system, the bourgeoisie and the SPL> in 
the eyes of the workers. Articles devoted to the injustices of the 
. system invariably concludea with an exhortation to jOin tile KPU ana 
affiliated organisations in order to construct a fairer society. 
Particularly during the crisis years .of 1!;j30 to 1~3~ the~V con-
trived to demonstrate the grossly une4ual distribution of wealtll 
and seized every possible opportunity to expose attempts to enculII-
ber the working class with the costs of the aepression. One such 
instance was the introduction of the Ijuryersteuer (head tax) in 
193U. The ~V reyarded this exaction as the 1II0St odiuus and IItOSt un-
just of all taxes, as the main burden was carriea by the finanCial-
ly weaker sections of society.47 The imposition was paia by 
everyone over the age of 20 at a rate of six marks on dn annual 
income of up to tl,OOO marks. Earnings of between tl,UOU and 2!l,UUU 
marks per annum were taxable at the rate of 1, marks. The progres-
sion was such that those earning l,UUU marks per week contributea 
only 50 marks to the BUrgersteuer. The unellll-lloyed and welfare reci-
pients were not exempted, al though they were not Subject to the 
full rate. Instead they were taxed at a rate at" 3 lIIarks plus 1 IIIdrk 
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50 pfennigs for their wives. From this the IiV calculated that I{elll-
scheid's ten thousand unemployed would toyether raise 40,UUU of the 
150,OOU-mark target set by the town counci 1. FurtllerlllOre, as arouna 
15,OOU citizens were still employed and earning an averaye ot· JO 
marks per week (including those on short-time), these would inevi-
tab ly ra i se the bu 1 k of the rem a i nder, 1 ea vi ng the wea 1 tllY 1 oca I 
manufacturers with a ludicrously disproportionate share to pay. The 
newspaper suggested that it would be fairer if the revenue fr~" the 
BUrgersteuer were supplied by mayor Or. Hartmann whO, it was noted, 
received an annual salary of 22,000 marks, and by the lIlayors of 
Lennep and LUttringhausen' who, after the incorporation of those 
towns into Relllscheid, were still in receipt of their previous 
salaries. This thellle had already been introduced d tt:!w lI'-'ys eurlier 
when the KPU councillors criticised the proposed increase in beer 
tax to help offset the 1.2 million mark deficit in the municipal 
budget.4B The cOllununist councillors reyarded the continuea pay-
ment of full salaries to the redundant mayors as scanadlous and 
called for a general reduction of the highest salaries in the lIluni-
cipal administration. 
So, the impoverishment of the working class and the middle class 
was not only due to unemployment and reduced social benefits, but 
was also a result of their beiny subjected to additional finanCial 
pressure by the imposition of various taxes, so that suicide often 
seellled to offer the only means of escape from econollli c cri si sand 
poverty. The connection between suicide and poverty was suyyested 
by the local' cOllullunist press on several different occasions.4~ 
Depending on the accuracy of local statistics it would seem that 
there'was no significant rise in the number of suicides. in the 
cri si s years (table 16). 5U Several i ntervi ewees, however, 
testify to the resort to suicide by disconsolate workers. 01 
Apparently the Teufelsteich held a lIIorbid attraction for suiciae 
cqndidates who, having consumed large quantities of alcollol J 
attached weights to their clothing before plunyinyinto the water. 
From table 16, however, the theory that hungry and despondent 
workers Chose to escape from thei r respons i bil it i es by WdY of 
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suicide is not corroborated by the evidence available. Conversely. 
resort to suicide may have been an act more readily chosen by mem-
bers of the middle class, particularly businessmen. and manufac-
turers tryi n9 to escape thei r d~btors after bankruptcy, or by 0 I a 
people who were unable to break out of the ri~id behavioural 
patterns whi ch condemned them to lone I i ness after the d~ath of a 
husband or wife. Work'ing-class life did not place th~ sallle kind of 
behavioural constraint on individuals as did bourgeois moral cuues. 
The workers' illunersion in collective forms tended to J.lreClud~ the 
isolation suffered by members of the middle class in certqin cir-
cumstances. The various forllls of solidarity practised daily in 
working-class areas constituted a J,lrotective shield against 'isula-
tion, the f~elin!;j of hopelessness and failure. lJy IIlel-lnS ot puliLi-
cisation, indiviuudl prublellls wer~ dbsorbed by the cullective 
whole, so that the despondent individual was J.lrOVided with an ex-
planation of his pliyht which indicated a shared experience and not 
personal inadequacy.52 
3. Compensatory Action by the Working Class Movement. 
The working class movement developed forllls of collective action 
which obviated SOllle of the worst psychological eftects of the 
crisis so that both the individual and comlllunity were not abanaoned 
to face the crushing force of long J,leriods of unemployment ana in-
activity alone. It was recognised that duriny prolonyed periods of 
unemployment, an individual left to his own resources has enormous 
difficulty coping with boredom, disillusionment dnd the accolllpany-
ing loss of self-esteelll. The collective forms devised to COlllbat 
social fragmentation and apathy operated at two dHferent levels. 
These w~re~ the formal, organised plain where official institutions 
participated to assuage anxieties, to awaken and Channel discon-
tent; and the inforlllal, collective interaction of the working-class 
nei ghbourhood whi ch constantly tended to avert the problems of 
segregation either self-inflicted or otherwise. 
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An equally' important function of the 13V, together with the ,dissemi-
nation of news, was its forming of public opinion and its organi-
sing compensatory collective action. During the ae~ression between 
1Y30 and 1933 its constant attacks on the shortcomings of the ca~i­
talist system had a beneficial side-effect on the working class. 
The newspaper's criticism offered unemployed workers an explanation 
of thei~ situation, which portrayed them as victims of an unjust 
order. Furthermore, the newspaper gave its readers hope for the 
future by offering d solution to their problems, nalllely the over-
throw of capital i srn. Thi s si oe-effect rei nforced the effprts of 
other working class institutions which were constantly trying to 
integrate the unemployed and involve them in social and political 
work. Collections of vdrious kinds like tilt! KPU's willtt!r did Cdlll-
paigns or collections for affiliated organisations gavt! inactive 
and unemployed workers positive aSSignments. 
Another collective response to the prolonged depreSSion was the 
Arbeiterschwimmverei n' s cons tructi on of a swi mill i ng pool dt tile 
Teufelsteich. This project involved a large number of unemployed 
men with creative work for almost two years. This kind of action 
bound the parti cipants ever-closer together • Although the project 
did not bring the workers any financial rewards, it gave them the 
satisfaction of demonstrating their individual and collective 
talents to a hostile bourgeoisie. The construction of the Teufels-
teich; swinuning pool was a further exalllple together with the buil-· 
ding of the meeting house of the Naturfreunde and the Freie Volks-
hochschule (Resch-Hutte) of the Relllscheid workers' initiative and 
ability to, create.trom restricted fundS and Cheap materials. 
Other working class clubS and institutions also catered for the 
unemployed by running seminars and meetings for this section of the 
movement. The KPO constantly tried to involve the unemployed by 
organising them in their own cOllunittee or in the work. of the 
tenants' association. The Arbeitersamariter gave lectures and rdn 
first aid courses on weekday afternoons as did the Arbeiter-Schach-
verein. 
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4. Tensions in Local Industry. 
Th.e protracted length of the depression and the resu 1 tant soci a 1 
and economic pressures caused a heightening of tension in the pro-
duction process. However, the general mood of fear and uncertainty 
which was a consequence of the policies of retrenchulent, and the 
disunity of the trade union movement diminished the li~lihoOd of 
effective and concerted action against the dismantlirig of the 
SOCial security system. For these, reasons, the nature of the con-
flict in the factories was to a large extent subterranean ~o as not 
to provoke punitive reactions from nervous and irascible employers. 
Despite genuine grievances on the part of the majority of worKers, 
they could not create the momentum re4uired tu.resist succeSSfully 
the removal of rights and,of former aChievements in the factories. 
When strike action di~ occur, it tended to be sporadic and· aDove 
all defensive, and was thus easier to contain by the joint coopera-
tion of the employers and the police. The KPU, whiCh ,advocated an 
aggressive strategy against the massive cuts in wages and social 
benefits, had lost a great deal of influence in the factories as a 
result of its sectarian trade union policy and the loss of support 
throuyh redundancy. In place of conununist-dolllinated factory coun-
cils there were now more heteroyeneous COIllIII it tees consistiny ot 
Social Uemocrats, Christians~~irsc.h·Dufll:VrUnionists. Independents and 
substantially fewer Communists. The divergence of aillls and strategy 
among the various unions tended to cause indecision and confusion 
in the rank s of the emp 1 oyed who had trad i ton a lly been un i ted in 
Relnscheid behind either the SPU (pre-l~18) or the KPU-oriented UMV. 
The inability to take effective action led to an acculllulation of 
frustration on the part of the workers,. which in the absence of 
other outlets was released on the streets. 
Conditions and practices in local factories did not escape the 
attention of the local comlllunist press. In August lY3U inforlllation 
supplied by a worker in the firm led to an article exposing alleyed 
malpractices at the important Remscheid factory of KJinyelnbery & 
Sohne. Apparently the company had reduced the worHorce and then 
, . 
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required some workers to work overtime. Furthermore, it was alleyed 
tha t the workers emp 1 oyed by K 1 i nge 1 nbery had been cOIII~e 11 ea to du 
th~ same amount of work in five days as they had previously aone in 
six. The company then proposed the introduction of a four-aay week. 
The article concluded that there were few local firms that tlall 
visibly profited in recent years as much as KJinyelnbery whicn haa 
recently been in a position to buy a second plant in Preyersmuhle. 
which it had initially rented. 
The death of a worker at the BSI prompted the ~V to devote dn 
article to that company.54 The article disclosed a spate ot 
. 
accidents following the latest wage-reductions. The investigation 
revealed that workers were neglectiny time-consUllliny.safety precau-
tions. in their endaavour to make yood the reduction in their piece-
work wages. The article noted a tanyible increase in the work-tem~o 
for which, it was alleged, smile overlookers and mdnayers woula not 
accept responsibility. 
At a factory in Rei nshagen part of the workforce was female and 
engaged in the manufacture of brackets for wi ndows and doors. 00 
The ~v .,remarked that women over tile age of 2U years were already 
too costly for the employer. with the result that all but two of 
the females in the factory were between 1~ and 18 years of age. Toe 
former waye rate in operation for women at the factory had been J!> 
·pfennigs per hour for 15 to 18-year olds. 38 pfenniys per hour for 
1ij to 2U-year aIdS and ~1 pfenniys per hour for 2U to 22-year olds. 
~y producing 4,ijOU brdckets and hinges per day~ the employees coula 
manage to earn 5 marks. There had recently been a bU % reduction in 
the wage r~te so that now girls under ltl years only earned between 
2 marks and 2 marks 5U pfenni gs per day. The art i cl e re~orted We 
case of a 22-year old female worker who had been elllployea in the 
factory for four years. On real izing that her dai Iy earninys no 
longer exceedea 3 llIarks, shedelllanded paYlllent at the old rate ana, 
accordi ng to the BV. was sUllunarily di ~mi ssed. A I thou\:jh her djJ~H~d 1 
before the industrial tri~unal was uphela,· the. employer witlloeld 
her dismissal. notice together with her holiday ~lIoney so that sne 
was.unable to draw unemployment benefit for four weeks. 
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Employers were able to dictate terllls to their own advanta~e, priula-
rily because Of the already huge army of unelllployea waiting to 
seize every opportunity for work wtli ch presented i tse It'. Secondly, 
the employed work force was afraid of di sllli SSd 1, redundancy ana 
shutdo~ns, so that workers were more inclinea to tolerat~ practices 
which they would have rejected in other circumstances. In such a 
cl imate soli darity was apt to break down, as workulates were con-
sciously set against each other to com~ete for the reduced numDer 
of jobs when the next redundancies were announced. Furttlenllore, the 
trade unions were largely impotent in the smaller factories, parti-
cularly during a depression of the current ma\:jnitude. Known COIIIIIIU-' 
nist agitators were candidates for instant dislllisSdl even it they 
were highly skilled and lIIore ditticult to replace than unJill.Jry 
factory hands. 56 In this prevailing clilllate of fear dnd unCer-
tai nty a ttelllpts to organ i se the work-forces of Slllo 11 factori es 
usually ended in failure. In many cases where employees ut" slUall 
firms did join the trade unions and the KPU, they preferred to keep 
a low profile at their work place for the sake of" their own COrl-
'tinued employment and the well-being of their families. 
The cases discussed so far represent fairly COllllllon elllployer prac-
tice in times of economic crisis. During the depression of 193U to 
1933, however, a number of Relllscheid elllployers introduced one, or 
two innovations desiyned to render their workforces more pliant. 1n 
some cases, manufacturers who sYUlpathised with the Nazis or were 
themselves already members began to expect a 'positive attitude' on 
the part of their elllployees to this party.51 The IUloga factory 
own~d by Johann Peter, Schmidt, who was a member of the NSUAP. 
employed around 150 workers. An article in the BV concerning this 
factory informed its readers that the owner had succeeded in pre-
yen t i n9 the opera t i on of a f ac tory counc 11, desp i te the re4u i relllen t 
of the law which provided for a council in all factories em~loyin~ 
more than 20 workers. 5H The article in question, whiCh was en-
titled $chuften flir Hungerlohntl~ (slaving for a pittance), told 
how the owner hdd introduced 'American methods'. ie. a PSyChologi-
cal ruse aimed at diSCiplining the work-force and placating those 
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who were apt to complain about the low wages. EdCh ellljJloyee was 
j.Jrovided with an album which had spaces for b2 pictures, one ot" 
which was collected in the wage packet every week. TrIOse workers 
who collected all 52 pictures and stuck them in their albums re-
ceived a bonus of two m~rks at the end of the year. The j.Jictures 
w~re provided by an imaginary character by the name at" Karl who was 
introduced asa friend and advisor and supplied tips, j.Jroverbs ana 
maxims printed on the picture cards. The intended resul t was gra-
dually to bring about a change in behavioural patterns by loweriny 
the threshhold of ,acceptable practice without evoking cqnflict. 
According to the article, the owner hoped to be able to aplJease 
angry workers whO, after 'slaviny' for 4tl hours j.Jer week, t"ounu 
only U lIIarks bU pfcnni!;ls in thtdr Wd!;je pdckets. (Ile ..article lIe5-
,cribed one of the picture cardS as portraying two faces. one cryiny 
and the other sllli J i ny. The sad face was de 1 eted and sUIJIJOrted by 
Karl's advice, 'AnybOdy can be miserable, but often it takes 
courage to smile!' The communist press condemned ttlis novelty wnich 
it regarded as sheer cynicism and called on the ~iloya workers to 
organise. This factory, which employed a large perCentdye of youny 
workers, developed into a Nazi Show-piece duriny the Third ~eiCIl 
and was awaraed the title of NS MusterbetriebbO lNational 
Socialist exemplary production unit). 
5. Class Conflict uuring the uepression. 
Class conflict which broke out intermittently during the course of 
1931 and 1932, had a different quality from that wllich Remscheid 
had witnessed in 191tl and 1923/~4. Firstly, althouyh it developed 
'along the lines of the three-stage mOdel applied in earlier Chap-
ters, it failed to carry with it the decisive unity of a sUIJpressea 
working class. 61 Secondly, despite the dire preaicament of the 
capita 11 s t sys tern, it was the workers who were forceo onto the 
defensive and had no chance of deploying their 1II0St effective 
weapon, the strike. Thirdly. the internecine quarrel between the 
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KPU and SPU, which absorbed considerable tillle and ener~y, distrac-
ted from the real class conflict. Fourthly, despite claiuls to the 
contrary, the ruling order was able to rely on the intervention ot 
a strong and militant street army of Nazis toengage and disruIJt 
the wor~ing-class movement by means of a terror cdmpaign. Fifthly, 
the conflict revealed a change in the quality of violence witll 
which it was waged. 
From 1930 onwards the divergence of class interestes in Relllscheia 
became i ncreas i ngly more pronouncea. After a bri ef peri od of fu 11 
or nearly full employment and a substantial rise in earnings, the 
workers soon found their social and economic gains under attack by 
the employers' association, the Mittelstandskartell, civic associd-
tions, guildS and ~he political parties representing these inte-
rests. The tiruning government's policy ot deflation with its IIldny 
discre'pancies cOlllbined fre4uently with the local elllployers' own 
offensive against the achievements of the workers, carried out 
against a backyround of soaring unemployment. as we have already 
. shown. plunged the town's manual and white-collar workers into 
haraship and poverty. Simultaneously, large sections at the bour-
geoisie, which still had the bitter lIIemory of inflation in their 
minds, were abandoning their traditional political parties con-
vinced, that cOlllprolllise within the system of parliamentary aemocra-
cy could only lead to similar disaster, and were beginning to seek 
a more radical alternative beyond the constellation of liberal 
capitalism. Social Uemocracy and marxislll'.6~ Increasing numbers 
of small ~lanufacturers63 I ike those that abounded in Relllscheia, 
joined the NSUAP, which they came to reyard as the last bastion 
against conuflunism. These elements in particular felt threatened by 
big business and eventually arriVed at the conclusion that the 
National Socialists would provide the best protection of their 
interests. 
Class hostility was evident most prominently amongst the unelllployeo 
workers and their families. as well as those forced to accept 
short-time working. The complete system at unemploylllent benefit 
down to the welfare appeared to be imbued with an aura of retribu-
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tion for the claimant's lack of self-reliance. In his contact with 
civil servants the reci pi ent was often subJected to arbi trari ness 
an~ lack of sympathy and understandiny. Hours of wai tiny around in 
queues were followed by infuriatingly, pedantic insistence on 
correct procedures and an unwillingness to offer jJrovision for 
those who in any way deviated frolll the norm. Similar experience 
emanating frOlil contact with' other officials, at the jJost office, 
the town hall, railway station or welfare, not to lIIention the 
police station, emphasised the widening gulf between the unelllployea 
worker and authority, in this case in the guise of civil servant. 
In the factories the assault on the workers' standard of liviny and 
the truculent attitude of employers, compounded with the lack of 
respect accorded them by foremen and factory managers, led to an!Jer 
and frustration alllongst the workers who were constantly reminded by 
the cOllununist press of the phenomenal discrejJancy between their 
wages and the salaries of works' directors and senior civil ser-
vants. The comjJulsion of giving up or foregoing legitimate rewards 
. 
through no fault of thei r own, the 1 ack of opportuni ty to iWjJrove 
their situation and ttle inexorable slide into poverty and hunyer, 
because the liberalist/capitalist system had failed, were factors 
which encouraged class hostility alllongst the working class. 
The failure of weimar society to balance more ·e4ual1y the aspira-
tions of different classes was in large measure responsible for 
violence becoming endelilic. 64 A consequence of this fact is that 
whenever conflict arose it waS usually accollljJanied by violence. 
When confl i ct erupted duri ng the I as t two years of the Weimar 
Republ ic in Remscheid, it tended ~o do so, however with' an allllost 
unprecedented (at least in local terms) intensity of v.iolence. The 
class conflict waged during the economic depression Cliffered frolll 
that in the early twenties by the less inhibited use of lethal 
weapons and above all, the greater frequency of clashes evoked by 
increased political activity. as was the caSe in lYj~.65. 
The greater availabil ity of lethal weapons was not tile only impor-
tant factor in their more extensive use. UesjJite an increasea 
readiness to carry and use a pistol, the relativel.¥ slllall number of 
- 342 -
resulting. casualties suggests a lack of intention to kill and 
seriously inJure opponents. The two main reasons for tile restrainea 
use of lethal weapons, which were used rather to warn or intimidate 
opponents, were most likely the high fre4uency of clashes in whiCh 
the antagonists of both sides were personally known to each other, 
together with accountability before the law. 66 
Although members of both sides felt a strong desire to settle 
accounts with their opponents, they still chose to do this by beat-
ing them up or else by attemptiny to make them, look ridicu-
10us.67 However. as soon as outsiders became involved i.n poli-
tical disputes, the inhibitory threshhold for serious injury sank 
conSiderably. Another important factor linkiny the two main reasons 
for the restrained use of lethdl weapons WdS the gredter chanCe ot 
detection and identification in cases where the perpetrator was an 
insider. Accountability before the law was clearly a crucial factor 
inhibiting the use of lethal weapons with the intenion of cdusiny 
serious'injury. Communists had no illusions regarding e4ual ana 
fair treatment before the law68 , and even National Socialists 
. ' 
'who, as a rule, were granted a more sympathetic hearing in the 
courts, could not afford to risk their lives, particularly after 
the verdict in the Potelllpa lIlurder. 69 
Uespite these considerations, however, it is nevertheless evident 
, . ' 
that 1 etha 1 weapons found lUore frequent use, if not prilllari ly wi th 
the intention of causing serious injury; and personal attacks on 
opponents tended to be more brutal duri ng the peri od of economi c 
depression. Furthermore, as a result of prolonged mass unemployment 
there were' now more peop 1 e prepared to take to tile streets and 
release their pent-up aggression in acts of violence ayainst oppo-
nents. Long periodS of unemployment eroded the inhibitory SOCial 
controls of police arrest, disciplinary punishment by elllployers, 
and ostracism. 
The paramilitary formations. particularly the SA and the Kalllpfbund 
gegen den Faschismus, but also the Reichsbanner. were nUlllerically 
stronger than in the middle years of ' the Weimar RejJublic. Conse-
quent Iy. there, were more uniformed young llIen roami ny the narrow 
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streets ot a small town-centre, so that the opportunity for clashes 
multiplied considerably. A further factor which warrants consid~ra­
tion in connection with the intensification of violence is the Cdlll-
"paign of terror waged by the SA and - thouyh less wel I documented -
by the formations of the left. Whereas the SA's !:!L~on (J'etre was 
to wrest control of the streets for the NSUAP by jJhysical violence. 
the RFB and its successor, the KydF, had a more alllbi ~uous under-
standing of terror, and regarded themselves as continuations of the 
pro 1 etari an protecti on formati ons of In3.lU furttlerlllOre. tile 
KPO eventually came to disavow indiviaual terror. 71 The "Reichs-
banner also regarded itself as a protection formation, as the de-
fender of the HejJublic. However, despite their official rejection 
of terror, both 1 eft-wi ng paramil itary groups i ndu I yed in unjJro-
voked acts of intimidation,n which were essential lIallllldrks ot 
SA strategy. In Remscheid, the KgdF and its preaecessor. tile I{F~, 
which continued to exist as a clandestine formation, haa control led 
the streets for the major part of the Weilllar I<e/Jublic almost un-
. challQ.nged, but from the end of lY3U onwards a yrowin!:J local !:lA 
began to encroach on this previously incontestable territory. 
~oth the SA and the RF~/KydF had a stock of firearms at tneir ois-
posa1 and trained members in their use. 73 Firearms experts yave 
instruction in target practice. Access to small arms appears to 
have been easier in the last years of the Hepublic. so that it is 
1 ike ly that a grea t many members of parami I i tary !:Jroups on both 
sides carried revolvers. 74 
The intensification of violence in Helllscheid duriny the final years 
of the Weimar RejJublic was also a conse4uence of the yreater jJoli-
tical activation of unemployed youth. The change of leadershijJ of 
the local KPU in the ulid-,Us was marked by a significant lowering 
of age amongst the leading groujJ. The change which signified a 
swing to the left, resulted from a widespreaa disaffection amongst 
the more active and younger elements in the local jJarty with the 
methods and style of the forlller leaders. 
The removal of lulauf, wolf ana ~ornefeld from tile party in InYjJu 
marks Cl further move to the left and a reinforcement of youn!;jer 
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elements in the local party leadership. The change of leadership 
was accompanied by a change of tactics to more energetic and 
aggressive political action, a fact which was duly noted by the 
local police in their situational reports./~ The younger and 
more radical leadership appealed particularly to the youth who were 
hard hit by the depression. Therefore at a time wtlen the KPU's 
influence in local factories was at its weakest, at least in terms 
of the active determination of workers' policy, the local party had 
already surpass~d its pre-1Y24 numerical strength. 7b This pro-
bably meant that a greater percentaye of unemployed youth was now 
organised in the ranks of the party than at any other tillle, and the 
party's support at the polls was attaininy new heights. 
By the same token the NSUAP' s appea 1 to you th is d I so Wl.! 11 es td-
blished. 71 • In this respect R~nscheid was no exception both 
with regard to the earliest Nazi activists and those ~ho joined tne 
party during the depression./ tl 
If we now consider several specific instances where violent claShes 
broke out, we can identify the individual elements present. Street 
·violence, when it occurred, often had an air of retribution about 
it, where on~side was concerned to puniSh the other for a previous 
act of agyression. As a rule, this new act of aggreSSion, namely 
the punishment of opponents tor a previous one, was then seized 
upon by ttle other side as an excuse to gain its revenye. This dyna-
mism of violence led to a whole concatenation of incidents whereby 
not only were there more clashes, but also the clashes tended to 
intensify in degree, with the result that the series frequently 
ended wi.th calamitous consequences. This chain at" blow and counter-
blciw did not necessarily involve the same partiCipants, althou~h 
this was frequently the case. In such clashes, where the sallle inoi-
viduals were involved, the personal motive of revenge for a direct-
lyconnected injury or insult, was probably UPPt!rlIlOSt in the mindS 
of the perpetrators. A series of clashes developed alon~ these 
lines in i{emscheid during the summer of 1931. Un a nUlllber of occa-
sions, several Nazis living in the working-class district of 
Laspert, had been attacked and beaten up on thei r way hOllle after 
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NSOAP mee~ings.79 At the end of July one of the COlllmunists who 
lived in Laspert and was believed to have been involved in the 
at~acks "on Nazis was involved in a dispute with SA mellloers Hulle. 
Pieper and Seyferth in a cafe. Ouring the dispute, which on this 
occasion did not come to blows, the COlllmunist was alleyed to have 
threatened to kill Pi'elJer's brother who lived in LaslJert.I:W Al-
though this particular incident was settled without resort to vio-
lence, it had a sequel a fews days later in which the same COlllmu-
nist, Scher, together with a handful of his friends. were attaCked 
and beaten by a lar~e contingent of Nazi stormtroopers. tn , In 
the ensuing fight Scher was shot in the back. TIle Nazis· chdr~ed 
with this offence were Werner Tesch, resident of Laspert who hdd 
suffered attacks at the hands of COllununists, Erwin laubach, a noto-
riously violent roughian who excelled in streetfi~hts, as did Utto 
Kupferbery and Ernst Pieper, the brother of Hans Pieper, who WJS 
involved in the initial dispute, and was himself a well-known braw-
ler. In their defence the culprits alluded to the attacks to which 
. they had been subjected. Scher who spent months in hospital in d 
grave condition, could only positively identify Laubdch as one ot' 
his attackers. In his delivery of the verdict the judge maintained 
that this kind of street brawl was beginning to yet out of hand and 
an example had to be made. The defendents were sentenced to prison 
terms of between four and six months. These sentences were I a ter 
annulled after an appeal hearin~ at which the victilll could not 
appearowin~ to illness resulting from his injuries. Three of the 
defenda.nts were under the age of l!> at the time of the incident' 
, . 
Tesch was lB. Pieper, 19 and Laubach 23, Kupferbery was 3u at'the 
time. Most of the workers/Communists involved in tile incident were 
described as 'young'. Uther Nazis involved in the attack were 
Friedrich Strippel, 20 years of a~e; Helmut Hosbach, 21 years; 
~ichard Muhlhoff, 26 years; Hans Pieper, 2tl years; Karl Hulle, l7; 
Hermann FIUs, 40; Alfred Obst. 31; and Karl Metz. 30. 
On the two occasions during the depression when ~elllsctleid COIIIIIIU-
nists and Nazis clashed and from whiCh fatalities resulted, evi-
dence strongly suggests that the perpetrator and victim were not 
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known to each other. This fact might well indicate that the ensuiny 
deaths were not intended, althouyh conversely it may be argued that 
the non-acquaintance factor in a brawl actually facilitated the· 
lowering of inhibi~ions thus enabling the perpetrator to aim to 
kill or at least injure seriously. It may also have been owiny to 
chance that not more fatal injuries. were sustained in claShes 
between the two sides, but considering the countless occasions when 
firearms were used in Remsctleid it woula seem that the intention to 
kill or seriously maim was either totally absent on both sides, or 
else neither side could boast a single accurate marksman •. ' 
. 
Un the first occasion ~hen a victim lost his life, death was due to 
a blow on the head with a pick-axe handle. 82 The incident oc-
curred in October 1!J31 and appears to hdve b~ell d br",wl jJrovokeLl by 
a group of between 15, and 20 Communists wh~ callle from l:iarlllen to 
help Relllscheid KydF colleagues prevent a number of evictions in 
Honsberg and usterbusch. The object of the dispute was a party 
emblem which frequently triggered off violent incidents in perioas 
of extreme tension. Party badges and unHort/ls tended to have a pro-
vocative effect on political opponents and thus made the wearer a 
potential target for abuse and violent attack.~J Accorainy to 
evidence given by one of the Relllscheid suspects, Heinrich Siesenop, 
on thei r arrival the group from l:iarmen had noti ced a youny lIIan 
engaged in road works in front of the main station wearing an NSDAP 
badge. Un the way back, the Communists demanded that the young man, 
who was the son of Albert Muller, owner of a slIIall cOlllpany carryiny 
out the road repairs, shoula remove the badge. A fiyht ensued and 
several of the workmen and Albert Muller ~ent to the aid of the 
latter'S son. One of the workmen wielding an iron bar was alleyedly 
the target for a blow which struck Muller senior on the head as he 
came between the perpetrator and' the .workman. When the po lice 
arrived on the scene, the Barmen Communists had already scattered. 
The case was never successfully concluded a I thouyh several Kelll-
scheid Co~"unists were arrested and questioned but ,later releasee. 
'\ . 
The J'~h which lea to the de,ath of MUller was an isolated incident 
motivated by the wearing of a Nazi party emblem. The attack on 
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Muller'and his workmen, however, appears to have been a compensa-
tory action, because the planned eviction had been cancelled with-
out the 'required' resistance of the KgdF. The group of COHununists 
from Barmen had arived in Remscneid, expecting some kind of conflict 
and i when this did not materialise, it, is likely that they remelll-
bered Muller junior and his party badye outside the railway sta-
tion. In' many other instances where uniforms and pol iticdl party 
emblems were involved, the motivation of the attackers was primari-
ly to diSlJossess the opponent and in this way insult bath the indi-
vi.dual directly, and the party vicariously. SUCh confrolJtations 
'generally ended with little /IIore than a brief strug~le during which 
the badge or ins i gn i a was snatched away from the wearer. Un ttli s 
particular occasion, however, the situation was m,we potelltially 
lIIore danyerOus by the numbers of opponents who were not dC4ua i n ted 
with each other, the frustrated expectations of the COIIUIIUllists from 
tiarmen, and the unexpectedly vioJent reaction, of fvluller ana his 
workmen, who set about defendiny themselves with the tools they 
were using. 
The only other occasion duri n9 the lYJO-33 depress i on when ReJlI-
scheid roughians were involved in a conflict which ended in the 
loss of life was on the day of the preSidential elections in March 
1932.H4 The incident occurred in nearby HLJckeswayen wnen Cl 
strong detachment of Nazi s from Lennep di spatched to he I p thei r 
comrades in the nei ghbouri ng town, was confronted by a 1 aryer con-
. 
tingent of local COllullunists. The clash was tYlJical of those reped-
ted throughout the whole of Gennany on polling days during the year 
1932Hti, and must be seen as a climactic release of tension 
following a build-up of blow I counter-blow which increasea in fre-
quency and intensity as election-day approached. On this particular 
occasion, three COllununists were shotdead~ one of them by a Lennep 
'SA lII;n named willmund. H6 The other two were shot by a Hlickes-
Wagen Nazi named Marx who, it was alleyed, had received threats on 
hi s 1 ife duri n9 the previ ous two years. 87 Apparent \y fvlarx was 
so afraid that a few days prior to the presidential election he 
appJ ied for police protection and was constantly accompaniea Dy a 
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policeman ,whenever he left the house. On the llIorning of the elec-
tion the local SA and SS alleyedly stayed at home to avoid the illl-
pending clash. Three lorries full of SA lIIen from lennep were sent 
as reinforcements. A small group of Lennep SA llIen found themselves 
surrounded by 70 to BO COllulIunists. A fight then broke out in whicll 
coshes, sticks and chains were used. Willmund, who was in the band 
, ' 
of Nazis, possibly panicked in this precarious situation and pulled 
out a pistol,firing several shots, one of which hit an opponent. 
killing him outriyht. Willmund then fled into the nearby house of 
Marx and was pursued,by an insensed band of COlllfllunists who procee-
. 
ded to storm the house. Whilst Willmund escaped throuyh the bdck 
door, Marx shot two of the attackers, one of whom was wel I-known to 
him and who, it was allegj.!d. hdd lIIade repeated thrcJts 011 his lite. 
I n both cases the marksmen found. themse 1 ves in a hazardous pos i-
tion, surrounded by angry adver~arles. It wOuld seem that resort to 
the use of firearms was a result of fear, and the motive was to 
keep the opponents at bay. Whilst the case of l>1arx is relatively 
unproblematic, that of Willmund is not. Willmund already haa a 
. reputation for wielding his pistol, although th~re is no concrete 
evidence to suggest that he had ever aimed it at an opponent prior 
to the incident described abo,ve. What remains unclear are the 
instructions given to an SA marksman like Willmund when finainy 
himself in a precarious situation. 
A further consideration regarding the qualitative escalation ot 
vi 0 I ence co'ncerns the tone in whi ctl e 1 ecti on campaigns were waged. 
Above all, towards the end of the Weilllar Repub 1 i c, these were 
fought with extrelllely venomous slogans and posters deSigned to por-
tray opponents as sinister and inhuman forces who threatened eittter 
ethnic or class values. BH The Nazis in particular employed the 
strategy first developed successfully by the Alldeutschen ana 
various volkisch groups, of depicting COllllJlunists and Socialists as 
foreign sub-humans in the pay of an evil /{ussian-Jewish conslJiracy 
striving to destroy German culture. The Nazis revived the cen-
turies-ol d fear of the 'mongol-hordes' sweepi ny across Europe, 
burning, rap1ny and pi'llaging a superior civilisation. Such elllotio-
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nally-cha~ged speeches and posters implicitly encoura~ed the physi-
cal extermination of this enemy which was not accredited hUllIan 
status. The imagery employed in election posters and speeches was 
designed to invoke feelings of terror, loathin!:! and revulsion, 
whereby the actual object of these sentiments was purposely left 
unana lysed. 1 n all probabil ity, the sugges t i ve cOlllments and sym-
bolism had the desired effect, at least on the less intelliyent 
members of paramilitary organisatons and partie~, and in this way 
contributed substantially to the escalation of violence. The 
Conununists,. too, played their part in poisoniny the atllloslJhere. 
Repeated references to the "braune Mordpest", "Nazioa~diten", 
"ArbeitermHrder", "Nazistrolche"," and "NazijUnglin~e"HY in the 
conulIunist press helped create stereotype images which could be kelJt 
in mind and inst~ll hatred for later confrontations with the'Nazis. 
Heinz Neulllann's slogan "Schlayt die Faschisten wo illlluer ihr sie 
trefft!" (~eat up the fascists wherever you meet thein!) was a 
further example of incitement to, and condonement of, individual 
and organised violence, which did not pass unheeded. The encouraye-
ment of violence against political opponents was by no means re-
stricted to the extreme right and left. Towards the end ot" tne 
Weimar Kepublic more or less all parties participated in this acti-
vity. Even the SPO, which had traditionally rejected violence, yrd-
dually began to succumb. albeit reluctantly, to non-peaceful forllls 
"of agitation. At the same time, however, the SPu emphasised the 
"defensive nature of its tactics. After 1930 the Reichsbanner saw 
itself compelled to submit to the Zeitgeist and beyan to adopt 
practices which were traditionally identified with the political 
right.9U One such practice was the incitement of, and resort 
to. violence on the streets. 
The escalation of violence in the period immediately preceding an 
election was a constant feature of the year 1932 with its five 
differentJt polls. As the first round of the presidential election 
failed to elect an outright winner, the con~test went to a second 
bout a month later. With the memory of the Huckeswayen incident 
still fresh, there was little or no resjJite from violence in tile 
whole area. 
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The build·up to the second round of votiny witnessed countless 
brawls between COl/llllunists and Nazis in Remscheid, as well as acts 
of .individual teror. On the 2Uth April a street battle develo~ea 
outs i de the labour exchange in whi ch around 50 !Jeop I e were i n-
volved. The conflict was sparked off by a woman seiziny a wad of 
election leaflets from the hands of an oPPosing distributor who 
reacted violently. strikiny her in the face. 91 The brawl was 
. broken up by an overworked po 1 i ce·conullando wh i ch ellllJ 1 oyed its 
truncheons with customary brutality. The remainder ot" the day ana 
the whole of the next were spent 'dispersing opposing forc~s. The 
hospital also had extra work settin~ broken limbs and bandayiny 
gashed heads. 92 
The renewed election CaHlpaiyn for the presidellcy W4JS aCCUlllpc:lrllell by 
a further 4ualitative escalation of violence which must be regaraed 
in connection with the HUckeswayen affair. but also dS an attellltlt 
by i<otfront93 fighters to destabLlise local society in an 
attelllpt to create revo 1 uti onary conditions. The method chosen for 
this plan was a bombing campaign against local Nazis and their sYIII-
. pathisers. The pattern of escalation in 1932 was a parallel to that 
of 1923/4 when the deaths of workers was answered with b01ll05. 94 
The first bOlllb was hurled against the house front of a local manu-
facturer who had leased and e4ui pped the SA barracks in Freiheit-
straBe. This attack on 7th Aprtl 95 had been preceded by a rt!ta-
liatory action on the SA barracks on the HHh March, five days 
after the shootings in HUckeswayen. A shot was fired throuyh the 
window, hitting an SA lIIan in the chest. 9o The series of bOIll-
bings was continued in June when an explosive device was detonated 
in front of the villa of BSI director ~I\;jerwhose affinity for the 
NSUAP was not beyond dispute. 97 The next target was the Ri 10ga 
fact~ry Johann Peter Schmidt on the following evening. 9tl The 
series of bOlllbings ended on 21st June with another attack on the SA 
barracks in frei heits trabe. 99 The bombi ngs wlli ch d 11 took ~ I ace 
at night. did not cause any casualties, although the assailants 
could not have ruled out accidental injuries. Nevertheless the I<Fti 
men who carried out the raid seem to have tried to diminish the 
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risk to l·ife by the position of detonation, ie. bombS were thrown 
in front of the houses and not through windows. The devices were 
home-made constructions consisting of, a length of iron ~iping 
stuffed with explosive material and a fuse. It. is apparent from 
Gestapo reports that the I<emscheid I<m and KgdF had amassed a size-
able store of explosives. lUU 
The Gestapo only succeeded in reconstructing the bomb attacks in 
1939, duri ng the course of enqu i ri es into a di ft"erent matter. 1 n 
1933 the police were able to arrest only one man named Hardenbruch, 
at whose home a search revealed two bottles of explosives. The 
. 
squads of five or six men participating in the bOll1Ding raidS were 
anned with pistols and took up positions at various vanta~e ~uints 
whilst the appointed bOlllber thr,ew the explosive device at HIe 
target. The spate of bombings succeeded in alarllling the police who 
were constantly harassed by both sides. 
The police themselVes contributed enormously to the escalation of 
violence during the last two years ot the Republic by their intran-
sigent attitude and insistence on breaking up all left-wing gathe-
rings in the open air with baton charges, frequently injuring inno-
cent by-standers in the process .101 The ·consequence of Such 
tactics was to isolate themselves as a body froUl large sections of 
Remschei d soci ety. Thei r acti on appeareo arbitrary owi n!:l to the 
fact that they, too, as individual citizens, were aHected by tile 
political polarisation which was so evident during this' ~erioo. 
Gradually large sections of the local police began to favour the 
extrellle right1U2 , which they regarded as an ally a~ainst the 
COllulluni s ts, wholll they cons i dered to be the ilia in threa t to 1 aw ana 
order. Ideologically, IIldny /{emscheid policemen identified stron!;jly 
from the very outset with the authoritarian aims of the right, anO 
this trend was augmented by the stationing of several hundred arllled 
security police in the town after the First World War. Considerable 
numbers of these policemen wl:!re recruited from the ranks of the 
BaltikuHlkdlllpfer103 and other free-corps units. The pro-rejJub-
lican "element appears to have been in a mi'nority despite the 
leadership of Social Uemocratic police Chiefs frunyel and later 
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Schrader •. The criminal investlgation department in particular 
appears to have been exceptionally sympathetic to the _ Nazis ana 
willing to turn a blind eye in their direction. When the NSDAP callle 
to ,power in 1933, they apparently saw no reason to purge thi s 
section of the police force as 1t was alr~ady mdnned by friendly 
elements. 
Ordinary policemen were frequently targets for abuse. At the beyin-
ni ny of 1932 they were the object of a communi s t prO~ayanda calll-
paign. A series of leaflets entitled "Roter Schupo Bazillus" (red 
police :bacillus)were distributed 1n Remsche1d and Solinyen1U4 
- . 
Copies were deposited in the letter boxes of policemen or in the 
hallways of their houses. The leaflets, which attellllJted to cause 
unrest and fOIll~nt opposition within the ranks of, t"~ ~ol ice, COII-
tinued to appear throughout the first six months of the year. In 
June, local Comlllunists tried a different ploy. A leaflet threaten-
ing direct action against th~ police manning the Honsbery station 
was slipped' under the door. lU5 The leaflet siyned by 'tll.:: 
Honsberg workers' warned the police to refrain from further bruta-
'lity against the working class. 
On one occasion police were lured into an ambush in.Honsber~ by a 
group of demons trators who then vani shed as the po lice came under 
fire.lUb Although one policeman was hit in the hand, it ap-
pears that the snipers merely intenaed to 'give warning of the 
danger of carrying out raids in Honsberg and did not aim to cause 
serious injury. Such incidents clearly disturbed the police and 
tended to exacerbate their nervousness, so that this was r~flected 
in their clashes with the workers. Police were also intimidated by 
the circulation of the Polizeib~alJlte; Zeitung aer revolutionaren 
Pol izeioeamten Preu[)ens107 (pol ice officer: newsjJaper for the 
revolutionary police oft"icers of Prussia). The April lY3l issue 
carried an article entitled: "What will the COllllllunists do with the 
po 1 ice when they come to power 1" It P rami sed no mercy for those 
who distinguished themselves by their brutality. In '..,ay lYJl, the 
Honsberyer Beobachter108 resumed its circulation ana carried 
an article giving practical tips for guerrilla-tYjJe combat against 
the pol1ce. Ihe art1cle which, according to police research, was 
based on a manual or191natlng trom pre-revolutlOnary KUSSla, recom-
mended sma II groups ot two or thre.e men ana al scussed tile procure-
ment ot weapons. Ihe author urged attacks on single pOlicemen 10 
order to se1ze weapons and on small groups 1n the actot arrest1ny 
workers. 1nstructlon was glVen ln the use ot guns, bombs, petrol-
soaked rags, and nails against police cavalry. the pour1ny ot 
boiling water trom roottops and upper tloors was also suggested as 
a SUltable method ot detence against pollce ottlcers torclny entry. 
Police were also intlmidated by the other side; lt only lndlvHlual-
Iy. Not only dla lndlvlqual pollcemen recelve threats, but were 
also dware ot the N~UAP intelllyence group's actlv1tles wtllcn 
inCluded the collectlon ot aata on all thoseottlcers who eltlh.!r 
sympathlsea wlth the republican· partles or were antayonlst1c 
towards the Nazis. 1UY . 
A turther example ot the qualitatlve escalatlon at vlolence ln the 
depression years was the ~tratexped1tlon lpunit1ve expedltion) 1nto 
working-class districts. IhlS strategy became tUIII practice 1n the 
SA' s campa i gn at terror a II over lie rmany .11U 
Ihe incldent in.Laspert in August lYJl tal Is into th1S category, as 
the motivat10n was. clearly to punish reS1dents tor attaCks on 
NaZ1S. 1n January !YJ~, on two consecutlve evenlngs, large gangs aT 
':lA . men attacked the worl<lny-class district ot ~ lurweg 1n 
Lenneplll. Ihe punitlVe expedlt10n carned out by Kemscheld, 
Lennep and Luttr1nghausen ':lA groups under the leadershlp at dental 
surgeon Ur. Heukenkalllp, were of a retaliatory nature, on behalt or 
two at thel r co II eagues who thelllse I yes were res 1 dents ot Un s 
estate ~Iurweg. Ihe maln attack was planned on the second evenlny 
to COlncide with an NSUAP rally in Luttrlnyhausen, WhlCh was 
·attended by cOllllllunist residents at the workers' estate. Ihe.~A pro-
ceeded to smash wi ndows and shu t ters ot houses ot known COllunun 1 s ts , 
and a number at shots were tired bet ore pollce arrlved on the scene 
to arrest several ot the mlscreants, lncludlny Heukenkamp and W111-
mund. A number ot Plstols, axes, coshes and.a ritle were contlSCd-
ted, but the police retrained tram bringlng charges. 
, 
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Ihe tailure by the authoritles to punlsh Nazi ottenders both 
angered and demoralisedl1l soclallst and communlst workers, 
h 
so that some groups undouAtedly declded to admlnlster 'Justlce' ot 
th~lr own accord. Co~nunlsts, in partlcular, expectea an untavour-
able outcome ot proceedlngs whenever thelr members were suspected 
ot carrY10g tirearms or, as ln the above-mentioned case, were 
actually tound in possession ot lethal weapons. Ut the many 1OC1-
dents involving Hemscheid Nazis, only a small number ot these were 
hau I ed betore the courts. The number ot sentences' passed and uphe I a 
agalnst local NaZls was very tew ana constrasts conspicuously wltll 
those passed against COlllmunlsts. l1J The leniency accor.aea to 
the Nazls by local police ana Judlciary was lnterpreted by the 
Soclallsts and Communlsts as collusion. The maJor conse4uences ot 
pollce and JudlCldl partlallty was on the one SlOe a sense OT 
desperatlon ami dn lncreaswg teellng ot hatred tor the 'Systt!IU', 
ana on the other a contempt tor justlce whiCh was aptly aelllonstrd-
ted when the NaZl s eventua Ily came to power .1l4 I he I dck ot 
contldence ln the authoritles and the blatant disregarator the law 
was undoubtedly an aadltlonal cause ot Vlolence, partlcularly 
towards· the end ot the Welmar Hepubllc. 
lhe cruclal tactors responslble tor the escalatlon at violence 
during the last two years of the"Hepubllc, ln Hemscheld appear to 
have been: increased pOlltlCal actlVlty ana lncitelllent to violence; 
the cons 1 derab Iy increased strength ot I oca I parami 11 tary torma-
tions which tended to attract the young and unemployed ln large 
numbers; the wlderavailablllty ot tlrearms and Hlstructlon ln 
thelr use; the NSUAP's campalgn of destab{lisatlon and lndivlaual 
terror, WhlCh was countered by' simi lar actlVities by the Commu-
nists; and th~ trequently harsh and seemingly arbitrary pOllce 
actlon towardS oHenders, and SOllletlllles innocent Dy-standers allke. 
~ehind these tactors was the wldespread dlssatlstaction with, ana 
resentment against, an economic and polltlcal system Wllich was per-
ceived to be in grave dltticulties. The potentlal tor violence 
Whl Ch ensued trom Welmar soci ety' s manHo I d contradl ctlOns was 
exploited by the partles to turther their own alms, ana thus It was 
accorded a quasl-Iegltimate tunctlon. partlcularly as a protectlve 
measure whenever the partles' lnstltutlons were conSlClered to De 
under threat ot attack.ll~ Ihe vlolenee ~otentlal. whleh had 
been caretully cultivated by political pa~tles and interest groups 
since IYltl. had developed an aura ot normality Dy the tlme the de-
preSSlon set in llb • so that durlng th1s perlod ot extenslve 
unemployment and dlssatlstactlon brutal attacks .by Nazl stormtroo-
pers did not unduly alarm 'respectable' cltizens. especlally It 
these were almed agalnst Communists. lll 
b. Polansatlon retlected in the I{elchstay I:.lectlOn Kesults IY(Ci, 
lYJU and IYJi:!. 
Ihe soclal and polltleal polansatlon ot Kelllscheld SOclety towarllS 
the end ot the Welllldr Republlc 15 manltested 1lI0st Clearly by the 
voting behaviour ot the electorate. 1n order to lllustrate thlS 
. , 
observatlon, there now tollows a detalled analysis ot the Kelchstay 
electlon results ot l~i:!tl. l~jU and IYji:!. 
Ihese election results Iucldly contlnue to retlect the hlgh level 
ot polltlClsation ot Remscheld cltlZens. In these, as lndeed in all 
Heichstag electlons during the Wellllar HepuDl1c, the local turn-out 
tar exceeded the Reich average. l1tl IhlS was a traditlOnal 
phenomenon locally which had its onglns 1n the pre-l"lrst World War 
era.l3roadly speaklng, the Reichstag elect10n results in Kemsche1d 
over th1S perlod tollowed the pattern established 1n the Kelch as a 
whole. ~rom Ints onwardS the traditlonal 1Il1cJdle-class partles UVP 
. . . 
UNVP and UUP began to decl1ne 10 electoral terms, and after lYJU 
. . 
collapsed. as the1r tormer supporters sW1tched the1r alleY1an~e to 
the NSUAP, which rose meteorically trom less than one percent ot 
votes cas t 10 Remsche1 din Intl to become the second s tronges t 
party with :.ib.o l at the peak ot 1tS development dunny the Welfllar 
Republic, in July lY:.ii:!. turthermore. oW1ng to the lncorporatlOn ot 
Lennep and Luttr1nghauSen 1nto Kemsche1d 1n 1~i:!Y, WhlCh resulted 1n 
the creat10n ot a llrojjstadt with a total population 1n eXCess ot 
lUU.UUU, the NSUAP actually became the strongest pdrty 1n the new 
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metropolis in July !~J~, cla1ming ~4,~~4 votes to the ~l,17b pol led 
by the KPU. As elsewhere, the N~UAP was unable to susta1n th1S per-
tormance 10 the He1chstag elect10ns helCl 1n November ot that year, 
as tour and a halt thousand voters l7.J ~ ot votes cast) deserted 
them mai n Iy to the advantage ot the bad Iy dep I eted III 1 dOl e-c I ass 
part1es. A turther sim11arlty with electoral behavlour throuyhout 
the Heich was the steady progress10n ot votes cast 1n tavour ot We 
KPU. Although the broad trend retlected vot1ny patterns 1n the 
He1ch as a whole, the extent ot the KPU's supjJort lIIade Kelllsche1d 
somethlng ot an exception. There were extremely tew towns 1n the 
, 
rest at Germany where the KPU was able continually to emulate 1tS 
pertormance 10 I{emschei d. U~ 
The ~elchstag elect10n on the ~UthMay IY~H was the last parl1amen-
tary poll taught on the baSls at the tormer lIIunlclpal bounoanes 
under whlCh Kernscheld constltuted a sejJarate entlty as dld the 
towns Lennep and Luttrl nghausen. Lt was a I so the I as t Kel chs tag 
election campaiY~ in the We1mar Hepublic Wh1Ch was conducted 1n a 
crisis-tree atmosphere. In Hemscheid the turn-out tell a further 
u.5 ~ "to ~! %.Il:!U 'Ihe correspondlng averayeturn-out tor the 
Heich was 75.b ~.Il:!1 Whereas !5 partles put up candldates tor 
electlon 10 Uecelllper In4, this t11l1e there were l:!U partles. lhe 
major ettect at the emergence ot st111 more 1nterest groups ana 
splint~r partles was the weakening of the traditlonal middle-Class 
part1es ot the, centre and right. la In HeUlscheld, the Clear 
winner ln the IYl:!~ electlon was the KPU Wh1Ch 1ncreased 1ts share 
ot the v'ote trom 1l:!,H!::Il {JI.b~) to 15,4b!::l l.:s5.5 ~). lhe ~PU also 
maae galOs amountlOg to almost ~tUUU votes cla1mwg ~,~5! lll:!.l ~). 
The lIIaln casualtles were the UVP whose share tell tram 1O,54.:s 
l~t>.~ %) to I,t>~b l!7.~ %); the UUP whose vote was reduced trom 
4 ,~UI lW • .:s ~) to ~ ,4t>~ l5. 7 ~); and the UNVP whl Ch dropped troll! 
4,J.U~ (lU.! %) to l,~bY (5.Y %).ll:!.:s Ihe ZentrulII remalned 
stable wlth J,U4b p.u ~). ~ubstantlal galns trolll ~1I ll:!.U 10) to 
J,b4Y l~.4 ~) were made by. the Wlrtschaftspartel. The Volksrecht-
partei ~hlC~ did not stand ·in lY~4 also clalmea a respectable l:!,'JU 
votes l5.4 %). This party was partlcularly successtul 1n Lennep 
where it gained a tormidable LU.5 %. Ihe soclal structure ot the 
• 
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Kre1sstadt Lennep w1th 1ts relatively h1gh percentage ot C1V11 ser-
vants and 'aCadelnlCS l= U.~ Ao ot all househOldS), ana shopkeepers 
and smal I traders l= ~.j Ao ot the town's househOldS), would suygest 
that the Volksrechtparte1 and the w1rtschattsparte1 attracted votes 
above all trom these groups and possibly also troln small manutac-
turers. In Luttr1nghausen WhlCh was a tradlt10nally protestant-
monarch1st stronghold, the UNVP was the strongest party with ~U.~~. 
The splinter part1es and lnterest groups were also strongly repre-
sented in this town, toyehter cla1m1ny ~l.b l.!~4 Here the 
relat1vely h1yh percentages ot sinai I manutacturers l= /j.4 l), shof,J-
keepers and small traders l= 7.J Ao), C1V11 servants and acadellllCs 
l= 7.J l.J and f~rlllers l= b.l Ao), would ajJpear to account tor the 
pertormance ot the UNVP and the various 1nterest yroups at the 
centre and the centre-r1ght. 
W1th regard to votlflg behav10ur 1n l<elllsClleHl lW1tllout lenllef,J dllu 
LuttrinyhausenJ between In/j and 1~J~, as 10 l:hapter 11 Vdrluus 
wards revea 11 ng d1 tterent SOC1 a I structures were eXdllllned 1 n . order 
to correlate the electoral develojJlllent ot the maJor part1es wlth 
class attaChments ot the, inhab1tants. This intormat10n 1S shown 1n 
tabular rorlll i~ tables 17, 1/j and 1~, Ke1chstay elect10ns !Y£/j-Ji:::, 
and 1n append1x 1, show1ng the soc1al composition ot 4U electoral 
wards ot Alt-I<emscheld based on the I<emscheld address Dook !Y~Y. 1n 
all, nine separate wards were chosen accordlng to party pertormance 
and a Wlde variety of class structures. The nallles ot the d1tterent 
wards are not in all cases identlcal w1th those given 1n Chapter 11 
and appendlx 1 owing to chanyes ot venue tor polllny stdtlons. Ihe 
numbers ot the wardS, however, are the same. 
In lY~tl, the KPU's best pertormance 10 the mne wardsexamlned were 
10 the predOmlnantly work1ng-class dlStrlCtS ot HonsDerg J lwara 
lYJ and Intzestra~e (ward 7). In an tiY.~ ~ turn-out 1n Honserg J, 
thl s party attracted btl.~ ~ = 7't."J votes, and wah a turn-out of 
tlJ.5 Ao in Intzestra~e 5b.b Ao = bY~ votes. In Kemscheid proper, tne 
KPU ga10ea the most votes ot any party 1n J1 out at 4U waras, also 
winmng ward lUa wh1Ch was tor hoSpl'tal pat1ents. -Ihe remalnlny ten 
wardS were all won by' the UVP. Ihis party's best result was 
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attained 1n ward £7, ~ch11Ierstra~e, where it galned JU.7 l = 4J~ 
votes. Ih~ UVP also received 4UJ votes = JJ.4 l 1n ward lb, Allee-
stra~e 1n the town centre. fjoth wardS were overwhelollngly rn1ddle 
cl~ssln compos1t10n.Ward ~7 had a h1yh percentaye or C1V11 ser-
vants and academlcs l= £J.ti l or househOldS), whlte-collar workers 
1n ShOpS and lndustry l= 14.7 l or householdS) and proresslOnal 
people l= 14.4 l). Alleestra~e lward lb) had a h1gh percentage or 
shopkeepers l= 17.~ l ot households),'wh1te-collar workers llJ.]l), 
profess i ona I peop I e ll~. 4 l), and. CH11 servants and acadellll cs 
l11.4 l). 
The ~PU's best pertorrnan'ce was also 1n !)ch11lerstral:Se wnere 1t 
attracted £Jti votes = Ib.~ l., Ihe ~oc1a1 Uernocrats cla1111ed l~.J l> = 
IJU votes in Honsbery J (ward 1~) and 11.b l = 14~ votes in Intze-
stra~e (ward 7). 
Ihe UNVP's best result was as usual ach1eved 1n ward !U, tiuryer 
!)tra~e, where 1t tOOK ltil votes = 15.1 l. Th1S ward conta1ned the 
res1dences ot the Mannesrnann raullly and varlOUS other local 1ndus-
triallsts and manuracturers. Ut the n1ne wards exallllned more Close-
ly, the UNVP's hlyhest share ot votes was ,achieved 1n wara Ib, 
Alleestra~e lti.ti l =, lOb votes) and 1n ward a, !)chi llerstraj)e 
(7.4:z. = lU4 votes. Ihe Nat10nallsts also scored an above average 
7.ti :z. lDJ votes) In Hasten 4 lward 4U), a d1Strlct conta1nlny a 
h1gh lti.b l "~nutacturers. 
lhe UUP was 1II0St successtul 1n wardS £7, !)ch11lerstral)e, and ~Y, 
Wi Ihelrnstra~e. In the torlller the Uelllocrats galned 1!>~ votes l1U.tll) 
and in the latter l~J = 1~.1 l. They also claimed Y.l ~ (HU votes) 
1n Alleestrabe lward Ib). 
The wutschattsparte1 d1 d extreme Iy we I1 In a I1 tour waras 1 n Kem-
sCh~ld-Hasten. Its best result was ach1evea 1n ~ara J~, Hasten J, 
, 
where it 'was the second strongest party wlth 1b£ votes = 17.4 l. 
This ward, 11ke Hasten 4, shows a h19h percentage of slllall lIIanutac-
turers, shopkeepers, industrial wh1te-collar workers and shO~ 
assistants. lhis party, Wh1Ch was also reterred to as the M1ttel-
standsparte11~5, likew1se did well 1n ward ~b, Kelnshagen, 
scoring 15] votes llb.~ l). ThlS ward also had a strong contlngent 
of small manutacturers (£U.ti l or the total housenOldS). 
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The Volksrechtparte1 ach1eved a respectable 'd.i l. = !tJ votes 1n 
ward ~7, Schillerstra~e; ~.J I = 75 votes 1n ward 4U. Hasten 4; and 
'd.~ l = lU'd votes in ward t~, Am ~ruch. A likely explanat10n tor 
the success ot both the I as t-named part 1 es 1 n ar~ds wlth a s trony 
m1ddle-class representation would be the 1ncreas1ng d1ssatisfact1on 
with the UVP and UUP's cont1nual and the UNVP's recent 1nvolvelllent 
in the Weimar coalit1on government. 
The Lentrum's best results were as usual in wards U, tJalmstral:Se, 
and l~, ~Iumentalstra~e, taking lb.! l = l'dY votes 1n the tormer 
and Ib.l I = 147 votes 1n the latter. 
With regard to the turn-out, 1n the n1ne wards Wh1Ch were 'exalllineo 
more closely, it is evident that areas conta1ning a h1gh percentage 
ot industrlal workers, part1cularly wards lY, Honsbery J, and I, 
Intzestra~e, reveal a greater wil11ngness to exerClse the rlght to 
vote. lhis .tact strongly underl1nes the degree ot IJOI1tlC1Sdtloll 
alTIon!:}st the Kemsche1d work1ng class even In the relat1vely 4ulet 
and stable years ot the We1mar Kepubl1c. 
The I<eichstag elect10n held on 14th Septemoer l~jU. tOOK IJlact:! 
against a background ot ris1ny unelllployment and wiOespread 01ssat1S-
tacti on W1 th the We111lar system at par 11 amentary democracy. I{osen-
berg speakS at a revolut1onary wave sweep1ny the country, Wh1Ch tile 
Soc1al Uemocrats, as the most une4u1vocal proponents ot the I{epub-
I i c t tal I ed to comprehend. !jeh lnd the grumb I es and comp I ill nts abou t 
the 'system' there was an unm1stakable disllke ot capltal1sm WhlCh 
was explo1ted by the rl9ht-wing Oppos1t10n. ltb ltle lurCh to 
the right 1n the UNVtJ with the appo1n~nen~ ot Huyenberg as clla1r-
man, and the consequent spilt Wh1Ch was brought dbout by the delJar-
ture ot the conserva ti ve group around Trevl ranus. was symptollla tl c 
ot the trend in all three established tn1ddle-class partles. Tne UVtJ 
moved turther to the ri ght 1 n the wake ot Stresemann' s death. as 
did the UUP atter its tusion with the Jungdeutscher Urden 
1 n the Staatspartei It] • I he reterendUlIl 
agalnst the young Plan and the tormat10n at a Nat10nale Uppos1t10n 
wh1Ch JIlay be seen amongst other th1nys as an attellllJt to alII ,dSS 
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popular s~p()Qrt by Hugenberg, had the ettect ot benefltlny the 
NSUAP enormouslYU~, J.larticularly by the consiaerable publl-
city accorded them by his huge press emp1re. Although the reteren-
dum was an unqualitied tailure tor the UNVP, it doubtlessly helped 
to make 'the Naz1s 'respectable'. Whereas luany m1ddle and lower-
middle class groups who had lost fa1th in cap1tal1sm doubtea Hugen-
bery's mot1ves in torming a mO,vement ot national OPJ.I,osltion, many 
began to regard Hitler and his party as a genu1ne alternat1ve to 
restore lierlllany to its tormer positlOn ot yreatness.l~~ 
Having broken into the UNVP's traditional ·reserV01r ot votes, par-
ticularly 1n country areas 1n North lierlllany, Thur1ngla and Eiaden 1n 
the course ot the 1!J~!J provinc1al elect10ns UU , the N!:>UAP 
determined the tone ot the l!JjU ~e1chstay elect1on LJ1 wltll 
unrelenting attackS against the pro-re\JubI1can'\Jartles, the !)PU, 
UUP and Zentrum. The Naz i s made much ot the scanda I s lnVO I vi n:l 
members ot these parti es, suggestlng that the ~arlllat and !:>k I aret< 
atta1rs were proot ot extens1ve corrupt1ve pract1cesot tile ~onzen 
(Ieadlng tunct10naries) in the 'system' parties. lJZ 1n the 
country areas the NSUAP successtully agitated ayalnst the part1es 
of the centre and right to~ their tailure to protect the 'honest 
and hard-working tarlllers' who now taced econOIJIlC rUln throuyh no 
tault ot the1r own. 1n the towns the !na1n thrust wa's allnea at the 
middle and lower-middle classes which had hitherto supported the 
establiShed and 'respectable' lioeral and conservatlve part1es. 
The turn-out in the l~JU ~eichstag election 1n lierlllany was an 
extremely high ~l ~. Slnce l~l~ the number ot ellg1ble voters haa 
r1s'en by 1.7 11111 lion, but over tour lIIil110n more votes were 
registered. LJJ 
The NaZ1S who were contident of. making cons1derable yains were the 
perceptible beneticiaries ot the greatly increased turn-out and 
registered gains tar in excess ot their 1II0St optimistic predlc-
tions. A large proportion ot previous non-voters 1n country areas 
ot the North and a sizeable cont1ngent ot t1rst-tlme voters 1n the 
towns declared the1r support tor this partyLJ4, so that the 
NSUAP's share leapt to le.z % = b.j~ mill10n votes, lIIak1ny It the 
second strongest party 1n the Reichstag. 
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The only other party which succeeded in makiny signit1cant gains 
was the KPU. This party 1ncreased its tally to U • .1 :t or 4.5~ 11111-
lion votes, a rise ot 1.J million. These events clearly underlwe 
the tlracher thesis, that in t111leS ot cris1s desperate elements ot 
the mi dd I e and I ower-mi dd I e c I ass gra vlta te towards t asc 1 sin and 
those ot the worklng class towards the cormnunlst pOle. U5 
With this election result the NSUAP had become the largest 1I11ddle-
, ' 
c I ass party in Germany. 
The turn-out in Hemsche1d on 14th September lYJU was YU.! l wlth 
b,~n more votes registered than 1n lY~~. Ihe nUlllDer ot el1g1ble 
voters had increased over the same periOd by ~,~7~ 1n trle "town ot 
Hemscheid excluding Lennep and Luttringhausen. Ttle number ot par-
ties standing tor election tell back to 15. lhe KPU 1r1CreaSea lts 
share 10 Hemscheld trom 15,4bY = j~.5 l to 17,b57 = J'J.7 70. rhe ~PU 
on the other hand lost Y~4 votes, tallln\;j tram b,~bl = 1~.1 70 to 
4,j~7 = ~.4 l. AllIlost all at the SPU losses went to ttle KPU, as 
well as JUU votes Wh1Ch were cast in tavour ot two spl1nter grou~s, 
Lett-wlng Co~nunists ~ 1Yj (U.4 l) and ASPU = lUti (U.~ l) 1n !~~H. 
~rolll this 'it is theretore clearly evident that the KPU also succet:-
ded 1n seCur1ng the votes ot around a thousand new or prev10us non-
voters. lhe N~UAP which received only J7't. votes = U.~ 70 in !ntl, 
registered ll,4Y~ = 't.J.'t. 70 in SejJtemDer l!:lJU, oust1ny the UVP trolH 
its tradit10nal role as leading representative ot 11l1ddle and lower-
middle class interests. lhe latter was the prlnc1jJal vlct1m ot the 
NSUAP'S rapi d ascendancy, tortel ti n9 we II over 5u'70 or 1 ts sU~I.)Qrt 
in the previous Keichstdg electlons. The UVP saw 1ts share ot the 
votes slashed trom 17.'t. 70 = 7,5~b' votes to b.'t. 70 = j,U~j. The other 
lIlaJor victim in HeUlschelCl, as indeeo elsewhere, was Huyenberg's 
UNVP which received only J.l l =1,5't.b votes. The Staatspartel held 
up remarkably well with 't.,4'JU votes (4.Y l), as ald the 2.entruui· 
. with J'~UYJ votes lb.~ l). lhe Wirtschatts-' or MlttelstandSlJarte.l 
also remained stable with J,UU votes lb.l l). The Volksrechtpartel 
on the other hdnd appears to have lost votes to the NSUAP, slljJIJ1ny 
trom 5.4 70 l't.,J7U votes) to 't..~ 70 ll,Jti5 votes). The total loss at 
the trad1t10nal middle-class parties and 1nterestyroujJs Ilk.e tile 
Vo Iksrechtpartel; however, dO not a lone account tor the mass lVt! 
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increase in the NSUAP vote. Conslder1ny the votes p1cked up by the 
NSUAP i n l!:ll~ and the tota I at votes I os t to the NSUAP i n l~.:SU by 
the UVP, UNVP, M1ttelstandspartei, Volksrechtpartei and VolklSCh-
Nat10naler ~Iock, we arr1ve at a total of 7,5b4. The Christl1c~er 
Volksdienst, standing tor the tirst time in l~JU, achlevea 1.~ ~ or 
!:I~b votes. When ttlese votes are deducted tram the total losses at 
the middle-class part1es and interest groups, we are lett wlth a 
tairly accurate assessment of where Nazi gains were lIlade. b,b.:Sts 
votes t lowed train these parties to the N!:>UAP. This llIeans that the 
Nazis picked up something 1n the region at 4,~UU votes tram young 
or previous non-voters. This observatlon clearly underlifles the 
Uracher thesis with regard to /{emscheid.1..:Sb We can' see thdt 
of the increase at o,~~l votes cast 10 l~JU, at least b,UUU were 
yive~ to the NSUAP and the KPU, ruuyhly 1n th~ ratlu ot 5:i. It w~ 
now turn our attention to the actual voting wards at l{elllsctl(~ld, we 
tind these trends contlrUled in detail. In the KPU stronghold at 
HonsergJ (ward lY), there was a turn-out at YJ.7 ~. Un thlS occa-
sion, at the l,4lb eligible voters, 1,JJ7 went to the polls. Tilt! 
increase in the size of the electorate was ~~5, wtlilst the 1ncrease 
in the number at votes cast over the lY~H Reichstdg election was 
~~o. The KPl) took 07.7 l lHY7 votes), droPl,nny J..1, percentaye 
poi nts but actua Ily ra is 109 its number at votes by 1bH. I he NSUAP 
was the only other party to make gains 10 this ward, llltprovwy Hs 
tally of 0 lu.5o 'i,) in In~ to US lH.l ~). None at the lIIiddle-
class parties, which anyway were weakly representea in thlS ward, 
lost more than a handtul at votes to the Nazls. 1n total around .:SU 
votes. It 1S theretore evident that the maJorlty at the NSUAP's 
votes came train new and tormer non-voters and a 1111 n111la I SwltChlny, 
a mere handtul, trom the KPU to the N!:>UAP. 
This trend 1s also mirrored lnthe results at ward IH, Honsbery ~, 
where the KPll improved its position slightly to the detrllllent at 
the SPU,' and the NSUAP took around OU votes tram the middle-class 
part1es as well as almost al. I the votes. tram the !:lL new or tOrtlter 
non-voters. 1J7 In ward 7, Intzestra~e. the turn-out rose by 
15H votes to YI.Y % with a correspond1ny r1se 'ln those el1Y1Dle to 
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vote at J~. Here the KPU improved its share by its, whi I st the SPU 
lost ~U votes. Ihe NSUAP leapt tram u.~ ~ = j vot~s 1n l~~ts to IJ l 
= 17~ votes. Ihe UVP lost 5J votes in the ma1n ,to the N~UAP, wh11st 
the Staatspartei lost 15, the W1rtschattspartei J.J and ttle UNVP 10. 
Consideriny that the Lentrum gained 1U votes and the VOlksrecht~ar­
tei 4, it 1S clear that' a sllnilar trend is also eVHlent in tillS 
ward. We can say that the NSUAP's net gain tram m1ddle-class par-
ties is about 75, and the rest - roughly IUU votes - were recelvea 
t ram new and non-voters. Unce aga1 n vote switCh1 ny t ram the KPU to 
the Nazis is negligible, probably not alllounting to more than W.' 
In Alleestral)e (ward 1b) the electorate shrank by ';)7, althou!;1h tsts 
more votes were registered. The turn-out was Y~.7 ~. Even inthls 
ward the KIlU succeeded 1n lmproviny its total trom !05 (lJ.7 ~J tu 
a£ (17 ~). a net galn ot 51 votes. ~y the same token ttH,~ ~PU 
slipped trom ~l (7.5 10) to 00 l5.! 10). a net loss ot ~5 votes wlnCII 
most likely switched to the Communists. Ihe N~UAP made a huge net 
gain at ~tsts votes trom ~l (1.7 ~) 1n 1~~ts to JU~ (i::J.7 ~). The IIIdl" 
casualty here was once again the UVP which plumllleted trolll JJ.4 l 
(4UJ) to 11.7 ~ l!!>J). a net loss ot ~5U votes. Ihe VolksrechtlJar-
tei was also a casualty. 'los1ng Jo votes, as was the Zentrum wlth d 
I ass at 17 and the UNVP with cl loss at Y votes. Un the otller hand, 
the Staatspartei actually increased Hs total trolll Y.! ~ (110) to 
1~.1 ~ lI5ts). a gain at 4ts, and the Wirtschattsparte1 yalned 1~. 
!-rom this it can be seen that the NaZ1S gained IIIdlnly at the ex-
pence at the UVP and piCking up a tew votes tr~n the UNVP ana the 
VOlksrechtpartei. Unce againt he Naz1s claimed the bulk at the new 
and tormer non-voters. 
The same trend 1S discernlble in ward ~7. ~chi Ilerstrdl.)e, where the 
NSUAP increased trom U.~ ~ (IJ), to ~J.5 'lo (J!>Y v~tes), a gdln ot 
J4b votes in a YI.7 'lo turn-out. Although here, too, the Slze at the 
electorate diminished by 17, IUb more votes were polled. The NaZl 
galns were again princlpally supplied by the desertion at tOrlller 
Uvpsupporters .Thi s party shrank trom 4J~ votes lJU. 7 ~J to ~jj 
l15.J ~J. a loss of 1YY. The other major casualties were th~ Volks-
rechtpartei which lost 7b votes, the !)taatspartei WhlCh torteited 
U, and the Wirtschattspartei 14.lhe KPU made a net yaln ot ~b 
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votes attracting a total ot lYl (1~.5 ~), and the ~PU added 15 to 
reach ~5J llb.a ~). J-rom this it may be concluded that the NaZ1S 
protited tram the losses at the middle-class parties and interest 
groups and tram the new and tormer non-voters. 
Ward 4U, Hasten 4, quickly developed into a Nazl-stronghold ln 
lYJU. Ihe turn-out rose to ~a.~ ~ :: YYb votes cast. Whereas the 
number at eligible voters increased by 4~ between lYZ~ ana lYjU, 
the total of votes cast went up by 177. Here the Nazis shot up trom 
7 lU.H~) to 41i:! l41.7 ~), whilst the UVP slumped trom lY4 (~4.1 '10) 
to ~Y la ~J. the Volksrechtpartei trom 75 lY.J '10) to jb (j.b '10, the 
wirtschattspartei tram ~Y l11 ~) to 57 lS.H ~), tile UNVp·trom bj 
(7.H~) to 47 l4.H ~), the ~PU trom 7J lY.l~) to 55 (5.5 '10). and 
the ZentrulII tram 41 l5.1 ~) to Jl p.l ~). The Kt'U was the only 
other party apart t rOIll the Naz i s to increase its vote, th1 s t lllle 
trom l~U P!J.Y~) to ~lU l~l.j '10). 1t lS 1Il0st Ilkely that th~ KPU 
took its gains trom the !>PU. This means that the NSUAP took almost 
al I the new and tormer non-voters plus the net losses ot the above-
mentioned parties. 
The radicalisation at the m1ddle class, part1cularly the protestant 
small manutacturers, is most lucidly revealed by the result ln 
Luttrinyhausen. where the UNVP suftered decimation, claimin!;j only 
J.J .~. whilst the NSUAP dominated with 41.7 ~.!jtl 1n Lennep 
the Nazis won i:!U ~ ot the total votes at the expence ot the uvt' ana 
UNVP and with the aid at most ot the new and torlller non-
voters. UY 
1n an analysis at the Reichstay election result ln ~elllscheid the ~V 
arrived at the same conclusion, namely that the NSUAP had succeeaea 
in securing the votes ot small manutacturers, house owners, bUS1-
nessmen and shopkeepers ilia in Iy inwardS s itua ted in the town 
centre. 14U 
'The Reichstay election ot 'jlI1Ij~ at the nat10nal level Wltnessea a 
turther radicalisatlon towards both the right and lett, ana brouyllt 
the Nazis to the peak ot their development during the weilllar Repub-
11C. Ihe NSUAP doubled its percentage total ot lYJU tr~n lH.~ '10 to 
J7.'j~. actually capturing 'jjU,UUU lUore votes over the seCOIICl 
, 
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ballot of the presidential election in Apri I 1~j~.141 Whllst 
the UNVP suffered only slight losses l7 %to 5.Y %), the Dourgeols 
. liberal centre was completely anihilated, the UVP lost /j % ot lts 
1YJU vote, the Staatspartei Tt. %, the Wi rtschattslJartei ~y % ana 
the Christlich-Sozialer Volksdienst 5~ %.14~ Whilst the bour-
ge~is centre forfeited 17.1 % ot its votes, the Nazis yained 1Y ~, 
an observation which otters plain eVldence ot the bourgeolsle's 
apostasy to National Socialism. The Zentrum's gain ot u.7% to 15.7% 
revealS the stability ot the catholic centre. Tne SPU lost around 
bUU,UUU votes mainly to the KPU, particularly 1n 1ndustnal 
centres. Ihe KPU secured a further 7UU,UUU votes bring1ng 1ts totdl 
to 5.j m11110n.14J. 
1n Kemscheld ltown) 15 part1es competed for the votes ot the elec-
tors in an IH.4 %144 turn-out. The electorate haCl tallen by 
4~~ since lyjU, and a total ot 1.~11 tewer votes was recorCl~lI. 
Uespite the fall in vote·s, Remscheid's turn-out was still a lony 
way above the ~4.1 % Keichaverage. 145 In Relllscheld prolJer, 
the KPU just managed to hola on to its preaollllnant positlon, al-
though it was also able to illlprove its tally by 0't.7 to reach 1~,~ti4 
pl.4 %). The NSUAP again secured impressive ya1ns advanciny trom 
11,4Y5 {~J.~ %) to 17,Y~U {Jo.b %), an increase at b,4~5 votes. The 
UVP's vote was more than halved frollt j,U~j lb.~ %) to 1.jU~ l~.7~). 
The Staatspartei completely collapsed, receiv1ny only jY5 votes 
lU.~ %). A silllilar fate betell the W1rtschattsparteiwh1ch was re-
duced trom ::s,U~l lb.! %)' to ::s5u lU.7 %). Ihe VOlksrectrtparte1 also 
pl'ummeted tram !,j~5 l~.~ %) to "u lU.4 %). 'Ihe SPU continuea its 
s,lide trolll 4,j,] l~.7 %) to. j,7UU (1.0%). Ihe Zentrum 11!1prOVea 
slightly, clilllbing to j,4UY 1I %), and the UNVP recovered ~o, votes 
to reach a total of "j~~ l4.Y %). None ot the rema1nlny spllnter 
partles and lnterest groups was able to ach1eve siynltlCant re-
iultS. The existence of these groups only served to weaken the trd-
~itional mlddle-class partles stil I turther. 
The polarisation in I{emscheid SOCiety was now more evldent than 
ever before with 74 % of the registered votes be1ng cast 1n tavour 
of the KPU and NSUAP, and a turhter 4.Y % tor the UNVP WhlCh had 
alSO developed into an extremist party. 
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A brlet ~xalllination at speC1tlC votlng wardS graphlcally lllus-
trates the progressive polarisation in Helllscheid and une4ulvocally 
demonstrates that the bulk at Nazi votes callle tram the 1II1dale and 
lower-middle classes. In a YU.7 ~ turn-out in ward 't.7, Sctliller-
stra(3e, where the number of eligible voters had fallen by 41, 54 
votes tewer were reglstered on thlS occaslon, and the NSUAP was 
able to extend its intluence, wlnnln~ JY.7 ~ l5J~ votes). The UVP's 
total was once again halved, from 't.JJ 115.J l) to !UJ 17 '10). The 
!itaatspartei was also abandoned by most ot its torlller supporters, 
plunging from Y.l ~ llJY) to 't..J l lJJ ·votes). The Wlrtscharts~ar­
tei almost disappeared,pollln9. a Illere b votes, and tile ·same lS 
true ot the Vo I ksrechtpartei Whl ch received Y votes. The UNVJJ 
gained a further HU votes, and ttle Zentrulll 4U. lhe KPU lost J 
votes, and the !iPU yawed 't.. Considering that the N~UAP llIade d net 
galn at ,,4 in this ward and the UVP, Staatspartel, Wlrtschatts~dr­
tei and Volksrechtpartei together lost a total ot J51, by subtrac-
ting the gains of the UNVP and ZentrulII ll't.U votes) we lIlay conclude 
that the Nazi gains were wholly due to a turther raaicallsatlon or 
the middle and lower-middle classes. 
The picture lS repeated in all mlddle and 10wer-IIlHldle class dis-
tricts. Ihe Nazis achieved an absolute maJorlty ot 5b.J l. ln ward 
4U, Hasten 4, benefitlng completely tram the collapse or the 
Staatspartel, wlrtschattspartei and Volksrechtpartel. 
1n ward Ib, Alleestral)e, the Nazis won a turther 't.75, Whllst the 
. !itaatspartel, the Wirtschattspartel, tile Volksrechtpartei and UVP 
together lost 347, and the Zentrum and UNVP together gained JY. 
1n Honsbery J, ward lY, the KPU improved its positlon at the ex-
pense at the SPU, taking 75.'t. l :: Y~U ot the total votes, a net 
gain of HJ. The !iPU lost 4U votes here, and the Nazis gawed a 
turther ,U, whi I st the Staatspartei, Wl rtschattspartei, UVP and 
VOlksrechtpartei al I lost votes. lhe Zentrum vote remained exactly 
the saJlle as in lYjU. 1t is quite conceivable that in thlS ward 
despite making a tew gains at the expense at the mlddle-class par-
tles and splinter groups, the Nazis actually lost voters who haa 
supported them in lY3U and who now sWltched to the KPU. Although 
the NSUAP'S continuing success was primanly due to support trolll 
I 
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the miadle and lower-middle classes, it is also eVldent that they 
were abl~ to attract votes tr~" the worklng class, partlcularly ln 
alstricts 11ke Hasten and Keinshagen which ald not contaln worklng-
class estates, as was the case 1n Honsberg, Neuenhaus, Las~ert and 
Kremenhol I, for instance. ~y comparison, Hasten and Kelnshagen were 
ola manutacturwg districts where the traditlOnally paternallst1c 
employer-employee relat10nsh1p 1n the small tami Iy-owned tactones 
ana workshOps sti II pers1sted. Ihe houses Occul,>led by workers 1n 
these areas were predOmlnantly owned by small manutacturers and 
member,S of the old middle class. 1t has already been established 
that the SPU, USPU and KPU never succeeded 1n signitlcantl~ extena-
ing the1r influence to those workers employed 1n the type ot 
tactory whi ch abounded 1 n Has ten ana Ke1 nstldyen14b , ~rec 1 se Iy 
because ot the close ae~endence ot workers on theIr elll~loyers.llle 
Sdlll(~ 1S true tor IlIdny workers in Luttrill~hausen whIch - like it.lsten 
_ also develo~ea into a Nazi stronghold. Here the NSUAP won every 
Single ward comfortably, rece1v1ng bl.b ~ ot the votes. lhe ~flncl­
pal casualties 1n Luttrlnghausen were, as inaeea everywhere, tile 
interest yroups and splinter parties ot the middle dnd ri~ht. 
1n Lennep the NSUAP was the clear winner with qL.~ ~. The NaZ1 
success in the two recently incorporatea satellite towns were 
sutticient to alter rddically. the c~lIplexion ot the electIon 
results tor Kemsche1d as a whole, so that tor tile tlrst t1rue sInce 
lY14 the lead1ng party ot the local workers taIled to domInate the 
pol1t1cal scene. 147 
The Keichstay election~ held on bth November lYj~ was the tirth 
time auring that year that voters were callea to the polls. Uesplte 
a turther increase 1n the SlZe ot the electorate l1bJ,UUU), 1.,* 
mi II ion votes tewer were recoraed. 14tl The tl,lrn-out sank trolll 
tl4.1 ~ to ~U.b ~, demonstrating dlSi Ilusionment and election wean-
ness. Ihe 1II0St prolllinent'outcollle ot this ~oll was the NSUAP's loss 
of around two million votes, reflectiny a percentpge tal I trolll J7.J 
~ to JJ.l ~. Nazi losses part1cularly benetitea the UNVP Wh1CII, 
atter years .ot dec.line, increased its share trolll 5-t'f ~ to ti.3 "'. 
The UVP was. a I so ab I e to recoup some at its I asses as parts 'ot tile 
, 
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bouryeolsie became alarllled at the extent at !)A terror.14~ Tile 
remainder' at Nazi losses were to the KPU which IIlade adoitlonal 
gains at 7UU,UUU to become the third largest party 10 the I{eichs-
tag. This party now had the support ot 5.Ytl InllllOn voters (1b'Y/~): 
whilst the ~PU lost a turther ll£,UUUto register 7.'t.~ milllon 
(~U.4 ~). The Dulk ot the KPU's additional votes Cdlll!:! tram tonller 
SPU supporters and unemployed youth voting tor the tlrst 
time. 15U 
Ihe electlon result in I{emscheid again retlected the general trend 
in the country as a whole. The turn-out in l{ernsctlelC1 town tell to 
H5.! ~ which was, however, still well above the national averaye. 
Unce again the KPU was able to improve 'its share at the vote, 
pOlllng !Y,J£4 l4U.O ~J. The !)PU relllained constant at J,btl1 votes 
(7.7 ~). The N!)UAP lost J,J4tl votes but stlll COflstltuteu tilt.! 
. 
second stronyest party on the local scene wlth 14,57~ lJU.b ';4.). lilt.! 
UVP and UNVP were able to Wln back votes trom the NSUAP, but there 
were sti II no signs that they 1Il1yht recover the intluence they Ilad 
enjoyed 10 the jJre-1YJU years. Ihe ~tadtsjJartei continued its Sllde 
into obscurity taking only J77 votes lU.tl %). HIe Zentrulll lost d 
tew votes but by and large rerna i ned t lrll1, as indeed It had dOlle 
throughout the crisis years. The KPU was now the only party stlll 
capab I e at eXJ..lans ion in e I ec tora I terms in l{elllschelO. A !;j I anc!:! at 
the nine separate voting wards in tables 17, Itl and 1Y unoerl1nes a 
g~neral trend. From there it can be s~en that the N!)UAP lost more 
heavily 111 middle and lower-middle class areas than 1n worklny-
class districts. Un the other hand the KPU iliad!:! galns everywhere 
even in Lennep and L~ttrlnghausen.15! 
In ward ~1, ~chil lerstra~e, the N~UAP lost ~.j ~ (145 votes) whilst 
the UVP plcked up 7U votes l+ 5 %). and the UNVP galned a turhter 
5~ votes (+ 4.4 ~). In ward 10, Alleestra~e. the N!)UAP vote tell 
tram 5H4 to 405 l- tl.l %) whilst the UVP gainea5b votes risln!;j 
trom b.H ~ to 11.H '10. 1n ward 't.'t.. Alii ~ruch" whlCI\ was also a 
middle-class dlstrict, the NUSAP'S share at the vote tell trolll 5YJ 
to 4H4 l4~.0 ~ to jb.l~). 1n U,bertelder Stral)e (ward Jl) NSUAP 
losses alllounted to l1Y, a f,Jercentage tall tram 47.'L '10 to jH.Y IQ. 
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1n working-class areas NSUAP losses d1<1 not attain the same propor-
tions as in middle-class dlStricts, and as a rule Old not amount 
substantially to KPU gains. In ward 7, Intzestral.)e, tor examj..de, 
the Nazis lost 5U votes whilst the KPU gained 0, the SPU 5 and the 
wirtschaftspartei H. from this result it is evident that the Dulk 
ot NSUAP losses were due, above all, to disillusionment, lack at 
interest or election weariness, particularly alllon!:jst that sectlon 
ot voters which the NaziS had succeeded ln mobllisin!:j tor the tlrst 
time in lYJU. This section of' the electorate was that ot tarrner' 
• 
non-voters, the politically d~sinterested who had been stirred 
. 
momentarily, but now showed signs of slipping back into thelr tor-
mer S ta,te ot inert i cl. The same trend 1 ts vi sib I e 1 n HonsDery j 
{ward lY) where the NSUAP lost 56 votes whilst the COllllllunlsts 
gained lY, the SPU 4 and the UNVP' 7. Ward JJ, Laspert ~. otters 
further evidence of this trend. Here the NSUAP lost I~ votes whllst 
the COOlmunlsts gained 5 and the SPU 1. lhe UVP won a turther ~{1 
votes,' the Zentrum 4 and the UNVP 5. The electorate in this ward 
expanded by only b whilst the number ot registered votes tell by 
J4. lhe gains ot the UVP, UNVP and Zentrum and the lower turn-out 
therefore account totally tor the NSUAP losses. Ward, 5 Neuenhaus/ 
Lenneper Stra/je, proved something ot an exception as the bulk ot 
NSUAP losses tjuite clearly benetited the KPU. In thlS ward the 
electorate increased by J~ whllst the number ot reYlstered vutes 
remained the sallle. Here the Nazis lost 7j votes whilst the KPU 
gained tn, the UNVP 17' and the UVP l~. Thed 1 screpancy between 
voting behaviour in this ward and the maJority ot other warkiny-
class districts lIIay have been due to the changing status at 
worklng-class house owners on the Bokerhohe estate.lo~. 
In Lennep and Luttrignhdusen votlng followed the same general 
pattern with the NSUAP losing votes (in Lennep more than {1UU, and 
in LiJttri nghau.sen J5U) to the UVP t UNVP and KPU, a I though in bOtl\ 
towns the Nazis were still comfortably in the lead. 
Ihe conclusions drawn from these results theretore are: 
_ that the NSUAP was not only unable to sustain as relllarkaDle 
growth-rate over the prece l.:Iin9 ttlree years, but was now witnes-
sing a marked decline of its potential support, particularly tu 
, .. -) 
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the advantage ot the UVP and UNVP, but also in some cases to the· 
COllllllunists. it seems that the tirst groups to desert the Nazls 
were indeed those elements wh.o had been lIIainly responslDle tor 
this party's extraordinary success in the lYJU electlOn, ndlllely 
the tormer non-voters who, be it.through election weariness, d1S-
11 lusionment or lack ot interest, returned to the1r tormer ways. 
- Ihe NSUAP was. turthermore unable to reta1n the support ot that 
sectlon ot the working class which had switched lts alleyiance 1n 
the lYJU and July lYJl elections. Ihe analysis aDove testlt1es 
taHly conclusively to the theory that the Nazis had only a very 
limited appeal to the workers in industrial centres 11ke /{elll-
scheid, and that most at those workers who had wavered 1n lYJU 
and July l!:lJl either returned to the KPU or else stayed at hOllle 
1n Novelllber lYJl. 
_ Ihe ma'ssive backing trom the middle and lower-1I110dle classes WdS 
also beyinning to dlssipate, partl~ularly amongst the trad1tlO-
nally lndependent sections at the Douryeoisle, alarllled at tile 
antics ot SA roughlans, tlle tailure ot the party's leadershllJ to 
curb such practlces and the apparent encourayelllent ot . terror 1n 
the upper echelons at the party hierarChy, both on the national 
clnd local level. t-or many independent middle-class voters desir-
ing a return to an authoritarian natlOnalist style ot government, 
Papen's 'cabinet at ~arons' appeared to otter an acceptaDle al-
, ternative to the 'unpredictable rowdies' grouj.>eo around H1tler, 
many ot whom seemed intent on entorcing a revolutlOn couchea 1n 
hlghly suspiciouS sociallst slogans. 
lhe desertion of voters trom the NSUAP can in no' way be interpreted 
as a move towardS moderatlon, because the position at the UVP and 
UNVP had shltted continually to the right whilst the local work1n~ 
c I ass movement had gone the other way, as more and lIIore abandoned 
the SPU, pinning their hopes on a communist vlctory. Ille KPU, 
despite its increasing support, had tailed to widen .its ajJj.leal to 
non-working class sections ot society and made almost no impact on 
industrial white-collar workers and Shoj.l salesmen. A cOlllparison ot 
election results at the beglnning of the Weimar ~epublic ana at the 
end showS that the j.larties at. the working class were not able to 
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add substantially to the support they enJoyed atter the inceptlon 
at the 'new system. 15 'J Within the scope at the workers' par-
ties, however, there had been a clear radicallsatlOn WhlCh was 
aga in boos ted by the experl ence at depress lOn. The 101 dd I e ~roup 
occupled at the beginning at the LUS by the Zentrum, UUP and parts 
at the UVP was almost tota Ily erased after lY'JU, so that by the end 
ot lYJL, I{ernscheid was firmly split into two radically opposed 
camps. 
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TAtlLE 14 :, Wages l!l the Remscheid Iron anu Sted InJust ry 
10 Pfenoigs per hour. 
1/5/29 1/1/31 
Male, 24 years, A ;: 85 ~1a le, 24 yea r:; , A ::: 80 
24 years, C ::: 78 24 years, C ::; 73 
24 years. E - 69 24 years, E = 65 
20 years, A .. 66 20 Yl:!arti, A ;:: 62 
20 years, C '" 61 20 years, C ;:: 57 
20 years, E :;; 53 20 years. E .. 50 
Apprentice. ht year :;; 22 Apprentice, 1st year .. 
2nd year '" 24 2nd year ::; 
3rd year .. 30 3rd ye.lr 
4th year '" 44 4th year ::; 
Female, 14 years .. 20 Female, 14 years, - 19 
20 years .; 38 20 yeal"S 36 
22 years :;; 51 22 YC.H:; ::; 48 
Wa~es valid for the Be rgi seh Land 
9/11/31 1/1/32 
Mdlc. 24 year:;, A = 73 Male, 24 years, A ;:; 69 
24 years, C = 67 24 years, C ::: 63 
24 years, E ;: 60 24 years, E ;: 57 
20 years, A ;: 67 20 years, A ::: 63 
20 Yl:!ars, C ::: 6:! 20 years, C .. 58 
20 yearo. E '" 54 20 years, E '" 50 
Apprentice, ht year, 1st half ;;: 14 '" 13 
hit year, 2nd ·half .. 17 '" 15 
2nd year ;: 23 ;: 21 
3rd year "" 29 "" 26 
4th year "" 39 '" 35 
Feu.ale, 14 years '" 1 7 ;: 15 
20 years and above .. 45 :::. 41 
Key: 
A ;: fully qualified master craftsman 
21 
23 
28 
41 
C = semi-skilled worker of more than three years experience 
E ;;: ordinary labourer 
Source: HStA Dlisticldorf, Rag. DUs~. 33694 
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TABLE 16: Suicide Figures for Remscheid 
-
year male female total 
1923 4a ) 4 Bb) 
1924 13 4 17 
1925 13 3 16 
1926 13 3 1653 1932 19 
1943 12 
1944 11 
1945 27 
1946 15 
1947 7. 
a) possibly 14, therefore b) possibly lB. 
Source: HStA DUsseldorf. Reg. DUss. 53952, 54132 T, 
and for 1932, ReA, 12/1/33, Leben uno 'rod in 1{('I\lSChl.id 
illl Jahre 1932. 
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CHAPII:.R V 
NUl t:: s 
1 ~etween l~ia/~H and l~j~/Jj total proctuction in lierlllany tell by 
jl ~ and industrial proctuction by 4j ~. 
Hmfundsiebzig Jahre Industrie.yewerkschatt lHYl bis l~bb. Vom 
Ueutsehen Metallarbeiter-Verband zur lndustriegewerkschatt 
Metall. Frankfurt a.M. l~bb. p. ~/l. 
l Ibid. Ijetween February l~~Y and ~ebruary l~jl unelllIJ loyment rose 
in liermany from l.b rni Ilion to b.l mi Ilion. 
47.4 % at the W·W's members were unelllployea in lYJ, dnd 'Y.! 7u 
were on short time. Only lJ.~ % of the UMV's members were fully 
elllp loyed. 
j Klonne. OPe eit. 
4 fUnfundsiebzig Jahre Industriegewerkschaft •••• oIJ. elt.,p. l7ot. 
Employed workers in the U/vIV tor instance suttered. in all, tour 
wage reductions betwe~n November l~JU and Septelllber l~Jl. which 
amounted to more than a l5 % loss of earnings over the l~JU 
figure. 
~ et. Kei nhard KLihn I. Uer deu tsclle t- aschi SIllUS in lJue 11 en una 
Dokulllenten. Koln l~/I. pp. !J-ll;' 
-
and fimothy W. Mason, Sozialpolitik im Uraten Reich •••• op. 
eH •• pp. Iu-n. 
o Klonne. OPe cit •• p. lJl. 
7 Ibid., p. 'J~. 
ij .NGA. l/l/jJ, Dds Jahr l~J, 1n lahlen • 
• 
!:I Ibid. 
lU StA Remscheid, 11 A/J5, Verwaltungsberlcht l~Jl/Jj. 
'u StA Relllscheid, 11 AjJb. Verwa I tungsericht l~jj. 
1, StA Remscheid, 11 A/J~, Ope cit., p. ~. 
1J StA Remscheid. X Ca/1, Geschaftsbericht des Stadtischen Arbeits- , 
amtes vom 1/4/,b bis Jl/j/ll. 
Ihe report contains a comparison of unelllployment figures at ten 
Rhineland towns. Kelllseheid followed by LenneIJ was top of the 
list with the highest unelllIJloyment rate of tH.J per thOuSdno 
inhabitants. 
- ;j7~ -
14 StA Kemscheid, X K/14, Argever Kemscheid (l Nr. 4U), Februar 
lY;j;j~ bulletin ot the employers: association ot iron and steel 
manutacturers. 
15 "This figure is a calculation based on the returns of a 
questionnaire distributed by the local chamber ot commerce 1n 
lY;j5. The census was only aimed at the prOduction sector, ie. 
privately owned industry. Uf the town's large factories only 
the two Mannesmann P I ants ta i I ed to res~ond. TO!jether, these 
two factories had a total work force of around l,UUU. The census 
revealed a total factory worktorce in Kelllscheid, Lennep" ana 
LuttrlOghausen ot around l1, 7UU to whi ch mus t be added the 
" UUU from Mannesmann. P I us the emp I oyees ot the ra i I way. pos t 
office. the council workforce. shop assitants and selt-
employed. in all perhaps between tour and five tIlOUSdIH.i.lhlS 
would give a total of around ,7 to ,~ thousand. 
source: Ijergische Industrie- und Hanaelskallllller WUj.lpertal-
Kemsctleld in wupj.lertal-I:.lberteld. 
Ib IjV. 717(JU. 
17 tlV. ll/;j/;jl. 
1~ KGA. Y/1{JJ. 
1Y StA Kelllscheid. X K/14. Argever Remscheid {l Nr. 4U). 01-'. cit., 
and 1 Nr. 4b, Llecelllber ly:n. 
Ihe statistics show that the reelllployment ot approximately 1bU 
workers between Uecember 1YJl and february lYJJ was balanced by 
an increase of over JUU workers on a less than l~-hour week. 
lU See various articles in the lSV during these months. 
l1 StA Kemscheid. 11 A/J4. Ope cit •• p. J7. 
1 he actua I number of" tram-car passenyers te II between lYlY ana 
1YJl trom ~.l44.n!> to 5.1j~5.UJJ. 
II StA Remscheid. I' A/J5. OPe cit., p. Jb. 
lJ StA Kemscheid. 11 A/J4. OPe cit., p. ll; 
and StA Kelllscheid, 11 A/J';). ibid., p. lYe 
,4 StA Remscheid, 11 A/J4. OPe cit., p. Jb t. 
",,;) Klonne, OPe cit., p. 'Jl. 
lb Preller. OPe cit., p. 41U. 
- 37Y -
27 The major factor preventing an accurate correlation ot the two 
tables is their incompleteness due to the lack of regular and 
reliable statistical material either in the Remscheid or 
Uusseldorf archives. Ihe only wage tables pertaining to the 
Remscheid iron and steel industry for manual workers tor the 
"' 
per,od 1Y~Y to 1Y33, which could be traced, are given in table 
14, and even so the wage rates for Y/ll/jl and 1/1/j~ are those 
valid for the ~ergische Land and not specifically for I<elll-
scheid. It was not possible ~o ascertain whether different 
rates were paid in Remscheid tor this period or whether those 
operating in the ~ergische Land were also binding tor I{elll-
scheid. Whatever the case, it is not assullled that the rates 
between Remschei d and the ~ergi sche . Land as a who I e wuu Id 
di ffer by very OIuch. 
Owing to the lack at statistics Showing prices, recourse had tu 
be taken to p ri ces advert i sed in newspapers. I"hese appeared 
irregularly and were interspersed with speci I offers to attract 
customers. furtherrnore-, different qualities of" .the same pruduct 
were as a rule not indicated, so that it is not clear whether d 
seemingly incongruous price was the result at· a higher quality 
or of a sudaen price increase due to other factors. 
~ecause of the irregularity at price lists in tIle newspalJers 
and the absence at' regular statistical material pertaining to 
other prices suctl as rents, yas, electricity dnd coal, it was 
deci ded to res tri ct the pri ce survey to toad. Even here thert! 
is a lack of continuity in the advertising at specific itellls, 
so that it was not possible to complete the prices table. 
~~ !itA Hemscheid, X C/45. 
The survey presented by the ~ergische KautJllannschatt des· I:.in-
zelhandels e.V. lennep showed an overall decrease in the cost 
of living index between July lY~Y and Uctober lYjl at Ij.~ l. 
~Y Owing to the ditficulties noted in note ~7, an accurate corre-
lation is not pOSSible, so that the tables can unly serve as all 
approximate yuide to the prevai I,ing trend. 
,1 
- JtlU -
, JU StA I<emscheid, Il A/,J5, Ope cit., p. lYe 
:$1 
J~ 
:n 
J4 
j!:l 
The number of unemployed workers dependent on weltare benetit 
rose from 1,YbJ in January 1YJl to 7,lUat the end ot IYJL, 
and 7.~Jtl on February 1st, 1YJJ. 
~V, 4/b/J't.. fruchte des kleineren Ube Is. 
StA Remscheid, 11 A/J4, ,Ope cit., p. a. 
StA kemscheid, 11 A/JI;), OPe cit., p. 't.J. 
~V, Itl/b/J't.. 
See HStA Dusseldorf, liestapo and denazit i cati on t i I es which 
contain intorlllation on employment, earnings and'periods without 
work. 
Jb BV, ll;)/'t./J't., Kinder betteln auf der Stra~e; 
see also Uie Freie Presse, l/l't.O't., Uer grausarne Mensch. 
Ihis article reported the COl/unon practice" ot children and 
mothers at the Ustbahnhot gooas yard in I<emscheid, scrapiny up 
handtu I s of coa I whi ch fe II between rai I way trucks duri n9 
unloading, so that they would have some tuel to burn at home. 
J/ . BV, 't.U/'t./Jl, Infolye Unterernahruny zu lode yesturzt. 
jtl StA Remscheid, X 1</14, Arbeityeberverband der I:.isen- una 
Metallindustrie von kemscheid und Urugebung e.V., Apri I lU, 
lYJU, containing ErwerbslosenzHter 1m alten Stadtkreis 
I<emscheid am 't.4.'t..JU. 
JY The bui Iding industry customari Iy lays ott workers during the 
harsh winter months in kelllscheid so that a hiyher unellllJluYlllent 
rate alllon!;jst building workers would not normally be so 
alarming. Uuring the lYJU-JJ aelJreSSK40n, however, the 
fluctuation was in no way as great as in the pre-crisls years, 
so we can assume that the high uneUllJloyment rate in February 
lYjU was due less to the weather than the crisis. Furthermore, 
the continuing depressed state ot' the housing construction 
market, see ~V 16/J(J't., Oas Wohnunyselend bleibt bestehen, ana 
I<liA, J/l/JJ. lYJl in Lahlen, WOuld tend to ,support this 
argument. 
4U BV, Ib/J/Jl, Uas WOhnun~selend bleibt bestehen. 
41 RliA, J/l/JJ, lYJ't. in lahlen. ' 
4't. BV, Ib/J/Jl, Wo bleiben die Hauszinssteuergelder 1 
- J~l -
4J ~V. ~/7/JO. Eine "BIUte" des Kemscheider Wohnunyselends. 
. . 
44 BV. ~/7/JU. Jeaem Ueutschen eine gesunde WOhnuny: Wie die 
Wirklichkeit direkt aussieht. 
45 BV. JU/YjJU. Katten, Mause und wanzen, und datur lIIussen 34 
Mark monatlich bezahlt werden. Wohnungsskandale in den Stadt-
vierteln Honsbery - Stachelhausen. - Nur Sowjetdeutschlana 
s~hatft andere lustande. 
4b 
41 
4~ 
49 
~V, 
BV. 
BV, 
BV. 
't3/Y/JU, Zustande z die zum Himmel sChreien. 
'tJ/Y/,JU. Besteuerun~ der Arbeitslosen. 
'to/Y/JU. Neue MassenausElunderun~ 2eElant. 
~O/~/JO. Durch Hun~er in den lod ~etrieben. 
'Bel vielen 1st dann der Strick Oder der uashahn der 
letzte Ausweg. lausende von Menschen werfen jahrlich 
ihr Leben. <lurch Hunger und Nut yetrieben, vun sich. 
Uieser Weg ist falsch - dadurch wird an dem kapita-
listischen Mordsystelll nlchts gedndert.' 
And ibid., report about an attempted suicide. 
Ibtd., IjJ~, report about an attempted suicide in Unterholter-
felder Stra/)e. 
~O Furtherlllore. the suicide statistics which dO exist reveal 
little or nothing of the social background of the victillls. ana 
newspaper reports dealing witll this particular tdboo provide 
little in the way of intormation which would enable the re-
searcher to reconstruct a more accurate picture. J-rolll the 
figures available, the only certain conclusion to be drdwn is 
that women 'were significantly less prone to successtul suiciue 
than men. 
~l £rich Thieler recalling a number of suicides during the Weirilar 
period at the leutelsteich espoused the theory that the victillls 
were predominantly workiny class. unemployed, and tathers ot 
large families •. Both Otto Hau and Hannah (,Juaas also related 
cases of suicide which they attributed to despair owing to lony 
periods of unemployment. 
!>~ This is not to deny that workers, in some cases politically 
consc'ious workers, cOllunitted suicide, but it is the author's 
contention that such suicides would tend to be tor other 
reasons. eg. long periods of mental depression or incurdDle 
pathological illness or for political reasons, as was the case 
in 1yjj. 
!>j For purposes ut' cOlJlparison, the number ot' deaths in Remscheia 
in 1932 due to other causes, inter alia Itl (bY), pneulllonia 
(YU), heart disease l1U~), cancer l1~3). bronchitis l~l), 
strokes (tl3), accidents (2b). 
b4 BV, "J/tl/jU. Arbeitermord in der IjSl. 
!>"J BV, ~l/tl/jU, !>U % Akkordabzug fur Arbeiterinnen. 
b6 Cf. HStA Uusseldorf, ~estapo-Akte 2"J"J1tl, Adolt' Sohnyen. 
An example ot employer reaction to KPU agltatlon is turrnSIIl~d 
by the case ot' Adolt Sohngen who was a 4ualitlt:!d lIIetal turn~r 
and locksmith. In addition to these skills, he was also versed 
in severa I other work processes whi ch made him an attracti ve 
prospect for elllployer's. However. owing, to his widely known SYIII-
pathy for the KPU. he spent appr~Xilllately 6 years unemployea 
between 1923 and 1933. In 1931 he was sacked by Vai Ilant. a 
medium-sized Remscheid firm, f'or strike agitation. 
~I BV, 1~/9/jU. Firllla Halbach, eine faschistische Hochbury. 
Ihis article based on intormation received by correspondence 
claimed. 
'Wer in dieselll tletrieb nicht Mitglied des burger-
lichen Turnvereins oder der in diesem tletrieb 
faschistisch verseuchten Feuerwehr ist, hat keine 
NUlTuller und bekommt Arbei ten zuyewi esen, woran er . 
weniger verdient.' 
BV. 16/3/32. Mund UIII die Hastener Nazi-Kaserne. 
The article gave a list of such local firms who openly SYIII-
pathised with the aillls of the NSUAP. Ihe information on which 
thi s report was based was a I1 eyed Iy supp lied by former SA IlIelll-
bers. The author erred with his alleyation that manutacturer 
Fritz Kneipper from Hasten had supp lied furniture for the 
barracks and was ob I i ged to p ri nt an apo I oyy. However, the 
close identification of this firm with the NSUAP was conunon 
knowledge throughout Remscheid. Even after the collapse of the 
Third Reich this company was regarded as a haven tor forlller 
NSUAP members. 
Ihe above-n~ntioned article further alleyed that in return tor 
support. ~he SA had offered to provi de s tri ke-breakers when 
necessary. 
~V. Y/b/~2. Hungerlbhne und langes Schuften. 
The subject of this article was a laundry in Hemscheid. Ihe 
owner was said to be a tirm supporter at the NSUAP. He is 
alleged to have sacked a young messenger boy because' at tlis 
membership of the KJVU. 
Bv. 'd/l/~2 Rote fahne uber ~etrieb Piepersberg - Na_zi-uowi~9_t 
entla[H gesalllte ~ele9schaft. 
Ihe owners of both Luttri nyhausen t actori es were NSUAP IlIellluers 
and al leyedly gave preference to NSUAP sympathisers. 
5'd preller, Ope cit., p. ~~U. 
~y BV. 11/4/~2, Schuften f~r Hungerlohn. 
bU Interview with Artur ~evernick. cf. Beryischer ~eobachter. 
bl Arthur Rosenbery. Ents tehung und ueschi chte der Weilllarer 
Republik. Frankfur a.M. lY~~, p. 4/U. 
"Ihe author detected a 'revolutionary wave' sweeping through the 
country between lY~Y and lYJ~ and conc I uded that ttle workers' 
movement, in particular the SPU and tree trade unions, were un-
able to exploit the popular hatred of the capitalist state ana 
turn it to their own advantage. Instead. the workers' 1Il0yement 
expended too lIIuch time and energy on its own internal disputes • 
. b~ Kldnne, OPe .cit., p. lJo. 
bJ Henry A. Turner jr •• "Big Business and the Rise of Hitler", in: 
idem. (edit.), N'azisfII and the lhird Reich. OPe cit., p. Y'd. 
b4 Eve Rosenhaft, "Gewalt in der Politik: Lum Problem des sozialen 
Militaris/IIUs", in: K.-J. Muller und R. Opitz {edit.), Militar 
und Mi litarisfllus ••• ~ OPe cit. 
b5 Peter H. Merkl, The Making of the Storrntrooper, OPe cit., p. 
YO. 
• 
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Merkl cites the ~erlin police chief Grzesinski who claimeet tnat 
by the autumn ot' 1!:1JU violence between COllullunists and Nazis haet 
escalated to a point that 'knives, blackjacks anet revolvers had 
repfaced political aryument.' 
bb Alan ~ullock, Hitler, A Study in Tyranny, Harlllondsworth l!:l5" 
p. 21tl. 
In August 1Y:Sl the von Papen government, announced the death 
penalty for clashes which resulted in the loss at lite. 
b7 Gustav Flohr, Tagebuch und I:.rinnerungen, (unpublisheet manu-
script), p. 13. 
lhe author relates an incident in which Kelllscheid storllltroolJl:!rs 
were lured into a trap and then overwhelmed by superior oetets. 
Ihe workers then forced the Nazis to remove their clothes 
betore sendlny them hOllle almost naked. 
btl ~V, January l~J.'. 
bY ~ul lock, OPe cit., p. "j-"4. 
1n this particular incident, a communist miner liviny in thl:! 
Si lesian vi Ilage ot' Potempa was attacked by tive stromtroopers 
and kicked to death. The von Papen government, alarllleet by tne 
trequent outbreaks ot violence prior to and duriny the Ju Iy 
elections, was anxious to curb such excesses anet introauceet the 
death penalty (see note bb). Ihe five defendents were sentenceet 
to death, but this, was later commuted to lite illllJrisonment as a 
result of massive pressure trom influential national anet Natlo-
nal Socialist cirCles. 
7U Karl Rohe, Reichsbanner Schwarz-Rot-Gold ••• , OPe cit. , IJ. "4. 
71 Merkl, Ope cit., p. !:Ib; 
and Hosenhatt, OPe cit., p. '~4. 
7, Rohe, OPe cit., p. l2J f. 
73 av, 1b/3/32, Wer sind etle ~uhrer der SA 1 
This article identHied former policeman Altred Ubst as the 
local SA weapons instructor. 
See also HStA Uusseldorf, Gestapo-Akte 1~!:Ij1, Karl Kleinjuny. 
According at a Gestapo report and a statement by Kleinjuny, 
Remscheid COllllllunists held target practice sessions on a col-
league's chicken fann. 
- ::Hi5 
74 HStA Ousseldorf, Ger. ~ep. 5/649, .1. ~chweikart und Genossen. 
I';) 
See police report on SA arsenal dated l~/9/Jl, ~olinyen. 
Accordi ny to the report the mai n procurer ot weapons tor the 
. . 
~emscheid !>A was Adolt" Thiele, an employee ot' the Kheinisctl 
Westfalische Elektrizitatswerke in Lennep. It was turther 
alleged that the director ot the RW~ in Lennep, who was a Nazi 
sympathiser, helped to finance the purchase of weapons. The 
report listed a number ot Nazis who were in possession ot arllls. 
These included the Wi Ilmund brothers of Lennep and the Uingel 
brothers of Kemscheid. lhe Comlllunists also appear to have hC1C1 a 
good stock of pistolS. AccorC1ing to Erich Ihieler the Arbeiter-
schwinullverei n was organi sed in arllled Zehneryruppen duri flY tile 
years 1931 and 193~. Ihere were ten such yroups with around luU 
pistols. The ~r~ and its successor, the Kgdt and Hater Massen-
se I bS tschutz was supp lied with weapons by the s tejJbrottler ot a 
Remscheid Rt~ IlIember who was a gunsmith in Uillenbury. Lt is, 
however, unlikely that this was the only source ot supply. 
See HStA Uusseldorf, Gestapo Akte 1~~~~, trich Wenz. 
Ihe Remscheid Rt~/KgdF also had a cache at U rHles whiCh 
originated from the Kapp-Putsch. Ihe butts of these weapons 
were renewed by joiner Wi Ihelm Eppels. Ihe rit les were numbered 
1 to 13, with nUlllber 13 beiny signHied as the last. 1n l~jJ 
the Nazis gained possession ot ttle rifle nUlllber IJ and hence 
knew ot the existence of the other relllaininy weapons. fhis 
careless indiscretion was to cause the inmates ot the concen-
tration calllp at Kelllna much sufferiny duriny the SUIIUller ot 1~3j, 
as the Nazis tried to discover the whereabouts of ttle relllainin\:J 
weapons. 
Information: Erich Thieler and HStA Uusseldort, Gestapo Akte 
171U4, Wi Ihelm Eeeels. 
HStA uusseldorf. Reg. UUss. 3U043, 11/1/,JU, 11/4/3U and 
11/1 (JU. 
16 ~V, lU/4/'l.9, tiezirksparteitay der KPU Niederrllein. - Ijericht 
der Bezirksleitung. 
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71 Merkl, OPe cit, p. bU. 
The author includes a table showiny the aye distribution in tile 
SPU; KPU and NSUAP. The table reveals that in lYJJ, 4~.7 % ot 
the NSUAPS members were below the aye ot JU years. Untortunate-
Iy, no correspOnding t"lgure for the KPU is yiven, probably 
owiny to the unavai labi lity of statistics tor l~j;::/jj. Instead, 
we are told that in lY27, :H.ti % of the KPU's membership were 
under the age of JU, compared with lti.l % of the SPU's member-
ship for 193U. 
7H See Chapter IV, The Extreme Riyht in Remsctleia. 
7~ H~A, lU/H/31, Uas Freie Wart - Schusse in der Nacht. 
HU HGA, lU/H/Jl, ibid. 
HI HStA DUsseldorf, ~er. Rep. ~/~jH, .1. fesch und Genossen. 
A canti ngent ot flU SA lIIen attackea a yroup ot tour or t 1 ve 
Cal/II11Un is ts i nc I u(J i ng !)cher. 
H2 H!)tA Uusselaorf, uer. Rep. 5/009, .1. Siesenap und uenossen. 
tiJ Rosenhatt, OPe cit., p. ~41. 
H4 HStA Uusseldart, Ger. RejJ. 5/1~UU, .1 .Wi Ilmund una llenossen. 
Ho for simi lar clashes see Wi lliam !)heridan Alien, The Nazi 
Seizure of Power ••• , OPe cit. , pp. H4-1UU. 
Ho see note 74. 
H7 HStA Uusselaorf, Ger. Rep. 5/12UU, OPe cit. 
See evidence collected by the Nazi lawyer !)chroer and handea to 
the public prosecutor in £Ibe~feld. 
Hti Friedrich Arnold {edlt.), Anschlage. Ueutsche Politik an der 
Litta~saule lYUU - lY/1, Ebenhausen, Munchen lY12, PjJ. ~Y, 04, 
67, bH, 72, 14, 1~, 11, I~, til, tio and H7. 
HY Examples of prejorative appellatives for Nazis taken trom the 
tiV during th~ winter and sprin~ ot 1~j2. 
YU kohe, OPe cit., pp. 1'4-1~~. 
Yl RGA, 21/4/32, Unruhige Tage. 
Yl ibid., and HGA, ll/4/jl, Wieaer Politische Schlagereien. 
93 The i{otfrontkampferbund continued to exist as a clandt!stiJle 
yroup atter the ban in May lYlY. Ihe leadiny tigure ot tne 
"Relllscheid R~ti was uustav Flohr. Whilst the K~1j ojJerated under-
ground, the Kalllpfbund gegen den faschislllus and Koter Massen-
selbstschutz functioned more or less overtly. 
- Jti7 -
Y4 See Chapter 11. 
Y~ HStA Uusseldorf, Gestapo-Akte JIJ74, Ernst Holken. 
Yb HStA Uusseldorf, Reg. Uuss. 171YJ, 
WUi->perta I, 21/JfJ2, Beschi ef:~ung ei nes SA-Heims und Ver I etzuny 
des Nationalsozialisten Ernst Kelle in Kemscheid. 
YI I bi d., Remschei d 2ti/lU/JJ, Sprengstotfansch I aye in Relllschei d illl 
Jahre lYJ2. 
Yti Ibid., and R~A. 
YY Ibid. 
IOU Accordiny to the evidence given by Wi Ihelm Paulowski, Cl Kgdl-
member nallled Mdsmer had large quantities' of eXlJlosives wnich he 
kept in a cardboard carton underneath his bed. Also a quantity 
of dynamite left over from work on the leufelsteich swittlllling 
pool was buriea in an iron box together with an assorOllent ot 
ritles and sllldller weapons by I:.rich Ihieler shortly betore 1I1~ 
arres tin tne SUmtlH~r of lYJJ. 
Information from I:.rich lhieler. 
lUl Interview with Robert Fuhrer, 
'Towards the end of the ~eimar Republic the'police 
did not hesitate to use their truncneons. One evening 
1 was in the Stadtpark with a friend when a punch-uJ,> 
started after a Nazi rally. Suddenly a BlaCk Maria 
came screechiny to a halt and out jumped a lot of 
poljCelllen and beyan hitting everybOdy in sigtlt- they 
did not stop to ask whether you were involved or not 
they just got stuck in. My friend and I got the hell' 
out of there as fast as we could. We managed to scra~e 
up a few pfennigs between us so that we could get oft 
the streets and into a pub.' 
Interview with Hannah ~uaas: 
'I was standing on the Hesseninsel (traftic island) 
watching a demonstration. All of a sudaen a lorry full 
of police comes teariny into the middle of the crowd, 
the police jump out and start smashing people over the 
head with their truncheons. 1 could not believe lily eyes, 
here were all these big strong workers running for their 
, lives from a few rabid policemen.' 
- 3~~ -
102 See Otto Buchwltz, "Naziterror in Schlesien", in: Wolt~an~ 
Enllnerich (edit.), Proletarische Lebenslaufe. Autobioyrapni-
sche Uokumente zur Entstehuny der lweiten Kultur in Ueutsch-
land. Band 2, lY14 bis lY4b, Hamburg 19/b, pp. ~H3-~Hb. 
'Ui e Zea der u I ei chscha I tung war yekollllllen. I:.hr-
licherweise muB ich zugeben, da~ die Polizei ja 
unsicher werden mu~te, denn die Regierung Braun-
Severing ging zwar forsch gegen die KOllllllunisten 
vor, ja oftmals auch yegen das Reichsbanner, aOer 
war von unsaybarer Langmut gegen die Nazis.' 
The author argues that the Gleichschaltuny of tile police 
took place long before the Nazis came to power. 
103 Information from Ernst Giesecke (forlller Alter Kalllpter). 
lU4 HStA uusseldorf. Reg. UUss. 171~3. 
Wuppertal, 2//l/3't.,· Verbreitung i Ilegaler kOllllllunistischer 
Uruckschriften~ 
105 HStA Uusseldorf, Reg. Uuss. 17193. 
lUb RGA, 't.1/b/32. 
lU7 HStA Uusse I dorf, Reg. Uuss. 17193, Uer Po I i zei beamte. Apri I 
lY32. 
10H HStA Uusseldorf, Reg. Uuss. 3Ubb2d, H/I/32, Honsberyer Beob-
achter Nr. 20. Mai lY32. 
109 HStA Uusseldorf, Reg. Duss •. 30b03a, Wuppertal 3/,'-/33, NaCh-
richtendienst der NSUAP • 
. 11U Se~ Heinz'Brudigam. Uas Jahr lY33. lerrorisllJus an Cler Macht. 
Eine 'Uokumentation Uber die Errichtuny der tasctlistischen 
Diktatur, Frankfurt a.M. lY/~, p. bY; 
Jan Petersen, Unsere Stra/)e. £ine Chronik. liesctlrieben 1111 
Herzen des faschistischen Ueutschlands lY33/34, Berlin-Ust 
ly03. 
III BV, 21/1/32. Nazis uberfal len Arbeiterviertel; 
BV, 23/1/32, Uer Naziubertal I am Flurweg. 
112 ef ~ Artur Rosenberg, "Uer F aschi smus a I s Massenbeweyuny". in: 
Wolf"gan!J Abendroth (edit.), Faschismus und Kapitalislllus. 
lheorien Uber die sozialen Ursprt!nge und die tunktion des 
Faschlslllus, Edition 2UOl, Kleine Bibliothek des Wissens und 
des fortschritts, Band 3, Frankfurt a.M. lYb7, pp. Ij~-lJY. 
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113 The author was able to find only one instance when a Kelllscheid 
Nazi was actually conaemned and served a prison sentence. Her-
mann Willmund was convicted of a violent crime, manslaughter, 
for which he received a prison term of three and a halt years, 
of which he actually served less than one year, being yranted 
an amnesty when the Nazis seized power (see HStA Uusselaort, 
Ger. Rep. 5/1~U1). 
A number of other Nazis stood trial and were sentencea in the 
first instance for violent crime or for beiny found in posses-
sion or firearms (see HStA I)usseldorf, tier. Kep. 51y'3'd .:..L:.. 
Tesch, Kupferberg, Laubach und Pieper; HStA Uusseldorf, Ger. 
Rep. ~Yb49 .1. Schweikart und Genossen) and were subsequently 
acquitted before a court of appeal. Un another occasion,~ey. 
against Karl HulJe (see ~V, '3U/1/3~, Uu machst in vier Wochen 
l'iekanntsctlatt ilia der Schippe; and !:iV, "/l/j~, I:.rncut l.h.!-
wattneter Nazi treigesprochen), the court did not see it 
necessary to sentence the Sturrnfuhrer tor bei ny caught ill 
possession of a pistol, despite conclusive evidence. Hulle's 
testimony to the ettect that at the tillle of his arrest he was 
merely taking the weapon hOllle atter having dispossessed a lIIelll-
ber of his own SA troop, was considered sufficient IJroot at 
his lack of intention to use the firearm. In June 1Y32 SA lIian 
Werner Tesch who had been one of the defendants in the Laspert 
. incident when a young worker was shot in the back, was a~ain 
.involved in a violent dispute. On this occdsion he shot a wor-
ker in the chest. After the arrival of the police, residents 
living nearby jumped into the police vehicle and beat up the 
culprit before they could be restrdined. Ihe ley~1 outcollle at 
thiS inCident is unclear owin~ to the fact that no newspapers 
exist in the local archives for the perio<l July to Uecelllber 
193~. 
See BV, ·(.'J/b/3~, I)ie l'ioxheimer Uokulllente in Laspert verwirk-
11 cht. 
In March 1Y3~ a young worker named Uswa I d tioyer was Shot 
whilst he and some of his colleagues congregated outside the 
SA headquarters in Alleestra()e. According to tile ~v ref.lort, 
- ;jYU -
12/;j/;j2, Junyarbeiter von Nazis niederyeschossen, when the 
police 'arrived on the scene, they first proceedea to search 
the furious workers outside, some of whom were then arrestea, 
before carrying out a search of the premises f'rolll which the 
shot was fired. Predictably, the search revealed no firearllls. 
On other occasions Nazi roughians were let off with a warning 
by the police. In June lYJ~, three notorious SA toughs, Weib-
gerber, Pieper and Heger attacked a Communist as he passed by 
the SA pub in Alleestra/je. The assai lants ran away when 
passers-by stepped into prevent more dalllaye to· the a I ready 
. 
injured victim. Uespite abundant witnesses the pol ice took no 
action against the perpetrators. See ~V, 11/6/~~. 
A t'ew days prior to this incident,· the most feared and hated 
of Remschei d' s SA leaders, Kupferbery t attacked a worker wHtl 
a walking stick. Ihe victim suttered a badly gashed face and a 
broken nose. Although witnesses were at' hand, the police de-
clined to arrest the Nazi. See I:SV, %/~£, liellleiner ubertall 
aut einen Arbeiter durch den SA Fuhrer Kupterberg. 
This familiar pattern was repeatea on many occasions. In con-
trast to the leniency extended to Nazi offenders by the police 
and judiciary was the harsh justice meted out to cOlllmunist de-
linquents. In Apri I lY;j£, tor instance, a COllllllunist fired tour 
shots at a group of Nazis who, he claimed, were pursuing him~ 
. 
police were able to arrest the Communist who was sentenced to 
two months, I ater two years, illlpri sonment, a I though the prose-
cutor had lIIerely demanded eight months. See RLiA, tl/4/J't., POli-
tischer Ubertall, and ~V, 4/0j'j't., £in Schreckensurteil. £ 
Jahre Liefanynis fur einen SChreckensschu~ zur Abwehr von 
Naziprovokateuren. 
On 17th July lYJ~ following an NSUAP rally in Remscheid, a 
lorry carrying SA men back to Wuppertal passea by the COIlIIIIU-
nist youth building. According to the testimony of a policelllan 
on duty in the immediate vicinity, several shots were tirea 
from the passing vehicle and these were returned from insiae 
the bui Idin\;j. Another pol iceman in chi I ian clothes Observed 
the incident and saw one of the COlllfllunists open fire, where-
- JYl 
upon he dispossessed the man and was about to arr~st hinl when 
a group of young Communists cauyht siyht of ttle policeman 
holding the pistol.· lhe Co~nunists allegedly mistook the 
pol iceman for a Nazi and beat him up. One of the assai lants. 
Uehnert. was later identified and arrested. He was sentenced 
to one month imprisonment tor conullitting yrievous bodi Iy harlll. 
See HStA Uiisseldorf, Ger. Rep. 5/~4U •• 1. Adolt Uetmert • 
. In January 1~3l a Nazi was arrested in Kelllscheid-Vierinytlausen 
for distributing leatlets which contained defamatory state-
ments ayainst the state. In the ensuing proceeain!:js. the 
author of the leaflet. frnst Kuhlbars. was sentenced to one 
month impri sonment, and three aecomp I ices to three weeks, in 
the first instance. A court of appeal later overruled the sen-
tences. Two of the accused, both distributors, were acquitted, 
whi 1st the auUlOr and printer were fined 4U marks each. See 
HStA Uiisse/dorf, Ger. Rep. ~Y/~Ub and 'l..Y/~UI .1. Wie~ana, 
Thobe, Kuh/bars und Pieper. 
114 Cf. Franz Neumann, l3ehemoth. Struktur und Praxis des Ndtio-
na/sozia/ismus lY33 - lY44, Kbln, frankfurt a.M. 1~77, p. 44t. 
For a further contemporary discussion concerniny the impartia-
lity of German judiciary, see frich Frolllm, Arbeiter una Anye-
ste/lte am Vorabena des Uritten Reiches. tine sozia/psycholo-
~ische Untersuchung, Munchen lYtiU, pp. 1U'I..-1U4. 
In answer to the question "What do you think of the lierllldn 
judiciary"", '37 :t ot SPU supporters, ob ':b ot Lett-winy Socia-
list supporters, 74 % of KPU supporters and ~ti ~ of Nazi sup-
porters. to whom this question was addressed, were of tile 
opinioi that Genuan judges were on the whole politically pre-
judiced. 
On yet another occasion in RelJlscheid, two workers were prose-
. cuted for pasting propaganaa posters. Ihe state j.)rosecutor 
recoinmended a' sentence of six months irnpri sonlllent in order to 
set an example. The judge eventually reduced this terlll to tour 
months imprisonment. See I3V, Vor dem I.lericht ist jeder y/eich. 
wie sieht die Praxis aus ? 
- In -
11~ Rosenhaft, OPe cit., p. 2J~. 
11b Jarnes M. Uiehl, Paramilitary Politics in Weilllar Germany, tjloo-
minyton and London 1~71, p. 22. 
117 Ct. wol t'gany J. MOlIIlIIsen, "1YJJ: Uie f lucht in den ruhrerstaat", 
in: Carola Stern und Heinrich A. Winkler ledit.), wendepunkte 
deutscher Geschichte IH4H-IY4~, frankfurt a.M. lY/Y, ~. lIH. 
llH See C.U. Thompson, Opt cit.; " 
and Lucas, Opt cit., pp. l3J and 24~. 
119 See Chapter 11. 
12U Ihe result of the Reichstay election on 1/12/24 in Relllscheia 
were as follows: 
KPU 
SPU 
USPU 
UVP 
UNVP 
lentrum 
OUP 
Aufwartspartei 
Wirtschattspartei 
Volkisch-sozialer Block 
121 Lucas, Opt ,cit., p. IJ~. 
ll,HYl ;; ::H.b ~ 
J, :WH;; H.l ~ 
Ib~;; U.4 ~ 
lU, ~43 ;; l~.H % 
4,lU2 = 10.1 % 
:i.1Uts = ti.l % 
4,2UI = 10.3 % 
1,121 = 2.H '10 
H11 = 2.U ~ 
24H = U.b % 
ll2 See Milatz, Opt cit., p. 122. 
1iJ C.U. Thompson, OPe cit., p. 31. 
124 Ibid., p. 3~. 
12~ See RGA, 2l/~/2H, Reichstagswahlergebnisse. 
12b Arthur Rosenbery, £ntstehuny und Geschichte der Weilllarer 
Republik, Frankfurt a.M. 19~~, p. 4/U. 
'Nur wei I die Sozialisten nicht fahig waren, sich 
an die Spitze der verzweitelten massen zu stellen, 
konnte die Geyenrevolution diese Beweyuny ausnutzen.' 
127 Milatz, OPe cit., pp. 12/-1Jl. 
12H Ibid., pp. 12J-12~. 
12Y Cf. Rosenber9, OPe cit., p. 4/1. 
13U See ~ul lock, OPe cit., p. l~U. 
1Jl Mi latz, Opt cit., p. 12b. 
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U2 for a shorter account of these scandals see Waiter lorlllin 
(edit.), Die Weimarer Republik, Hannover lY/J, p. Itll. 
133 Milatz. Ope cit., p. 12/. 
134 Ibid •• p. 130. 
Cf. also Erich Eyck, Geschichte der Weilllarer I<epublik, vOlume 
2, trlenbach-Zurich lYob, p. JoU. 
lJ!> Karl-Dietrich 13racher, UieAuflbsung der Weimarer Kepublik, 
Vii lingen 1Yo!>, p. 103. 
136 See note 134. 
137 Cf. RliA. 21/0/2~, Reichstagswahl 1Y2~; 
and I<GA. 1!>/Y/JO. Keichstayswahl 1YJU. 
IJ/j C.U. Thompson, OPe cit •• p. 41. 
1JY Ibid •• p. 41. 
140 . I3V, 2b/Y/,JO, Wo koollnen die NSUAP-Stinullen her 'f 
141 Mi latz. OPe cit., p. 142. 
142 Ibid. 
143 Ibid., p. 14J. 
144 C.D. Tholllpson, OPe cit., p. 41. 
145 See Lucas. Ope cit., p. 240. 
The discrepancy between Lucas' turn-out tor Kemscheid (tlY.1 %) 
and that ot the author (/j/.4 %) presumably resu I ts from tIle 
fact that the former has indicated the turn-out tor Greater 
Remscheid, ie. including Lennep and Luttrinytlausen, whereas 
the latter has restricted himself to Kemscheid (town). 
146' See Introduction and Chapter I. 
147 The only exception was the Lanc:ttag election earl ier in. the 
year when the Nazis polled 1/,oU1 votes to the KPU's 16,040 in 
Alt-I<emscheid (in greater Kelllscheic:t 24,410 to 1Y,263). See 
RliA, 2!>/4/32, Landtagswahl Kemscheic:t. 
14/j Milatz, Ope cit., p. 145. 
14Y Hitler's refusal to accept -the vice-chancellorship for hilllself 
and relatively minor government posts f-or his party Clearly 
revealed his intention not to allow his movement to becollle 
harnessed by the representatives of the Junker and the Rei CtlS-
wehr. The President's rejection of Hitler's aemanas ana the 
.. 
campaign of SA terror of which the Potempa lIIurder was a much 
, 
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pUblicised example, were all factors which combined to alarm 
cert~in sectors of the bourgeoisie. 
Cf. wolfyang J. Mornmsen, op.cit., pp. 12U-124. 
I~U Ibid., p. 14/. 
1~1 For Lennep and Luttringhausen see ~GA,7/11/J2, tryebnisse der 
Reichstayswahl vom b. Nov. lYJ2 aus Grolj-~elllscheid. 
1~2 Ihe estate was bui I t between 1nl and 192Y by ttle owners 
organised in a cooperative society. 
See bU Jahre Bokerhbhe lYH2. Remscheids erste Stadtrandsied-
lung einst und jetzt. I-estschrift anldblich des bUJahriyen 
Bestehens der Bbkerhbhe, Remscheid lYH2 • 
. l~J See election results in Chapter 11. By the end.ot lYJ2 there 
were signs 1n other parts of Germany that the KPU was beyin-
ning to break out of its tradjtional industrial working-class 
base by. securi n9 the votes in SOllle areas ot dyri cu I tu fa I 
labourers and a modest number of white-col Jar workers. Whether 
this develo~"ent would have. continued had the Nazis not been 
handed power is impossible to predict. 
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C H APT ER VI 
ReHlscheid in the Third Reich 
Local studies focusiny on the Third Reich j,lresent tile researcher 
with additional problems to those he faces when investigatiny 
periods like the Weimar Republic for example. in which public 
opinion was formed by open discussion. readily accessible il1torllla-
tlon. and criticism which found coverage in a pluralistiC lIIellia. 
Furthermore. democra ti c sys tellls li ke that of Weilllar cOllllllend records 
to posterity which considerably facilitate the 'historian'S work. 
Research into the Third Reich is infinitely more ditticult. parti-
cularly at the local level. because of the tlleichsctldltuny ot the 
media and, virtually the whole of public life. toyether with dn ex-
trelllely efficient lIIonitoring system which pervadeo society trolll tile 
,hiyhest echelons down to the 'individual. thus lilllitiny tile dlJped-
rance of reliable doculllentation. The totalitarian system estab-
lished by the NaziS,j.lenetrated every level of \Jublic dnd IJrivdte 
life. allowiny no refuye from which opposition lIIiyht torm and ex-
pand. In addition to the lIIeasures which j,lrevented tile oj,lell debate 
of contemporary political. social and economic problellls. tile Nazis 
systematically destroyed as much documentary material as pOSSible 
as the allied arlllies converged on the cruUlbliny Reich. 1 The stuck 
of ar~hive material p~rtaining to the Third Reich was also depletea 
by the effects of bombing raids on tlerman cities. $ince so much 
material relevant to the local level was destroyeCl. microstuClies. 
'in particular. tend to suffer from a scarcity of doculllentary evi-
dence.2 The dearth of documentation which survived the Third 
Relct! and the Second World War necessarily restricts the local 
historian'S choice of topiCS. In this particular study the' author 
was able to supplement his written material by information suplJliea 
in a number of interviews with Relflscheid citizens WilD kinaly 
related their experiences duriny the years of Nazi rule. J 
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1. Keaction to the Seizure of Power by the Nazis in Kemscheid. 
The apjJointment of Adolf Hitler as Keich Chancellor on JUtll JanuCiry 
1933 was yet another exalllple of how political events at the nat10-. 
nal level overtook the course of events in Kemscheid. l:iut for the 
intervention of external forces, it would seem that, left to th~ir 
own devices, local. Nazis lIIiyht never have .attained iJower in this 
communist stronyhold. Uespite their. illlj.Jressive electoral success 
over the preceding four years, Kemscheid Nazis wert~ sti 1I a very 
lony way from gaininy the upper hand. Even allowin!:,l for the !:,lrowtrl 
of' the party and the SA at the local level, by January i!:l3J the 
party membership in Greater Kemscheid probably sti 11. fell far short 
of 1,!>UU, the streets ano factories remaineo flrlllly unOer tht: 
control of the workers' lIIovement. As has alrt:aoy been delllonstrdted, 
attempts to form an effective National ~ocialist Irade union ill We 
town had proven unsuccessful, despite the active sUjJjJort of several 
local ellliJloyers. [here can be little doubt that the liIajority ot 
local workers were hostile to the NSUAP. It is no surprise there-
fore, that Hitler's aiJPointlllent as Chancellor caught tile ·.IOCdl . 
party group totally unprepared for their elevation to power. As was 
the. case. in lIIany towns ana cities all over Germany, the 1 OCd I SA 
and Stahlhelm hasti Iy oryanised a torchlight parade throu!:lh the 
streets of J{elllscheid. The improvised demonstration which owiny to 
lack of tillle, for once could not be aUYlllented by outside units,' ran 
into difficulties in tlislllarckstra/Je, as opponents beyan to iJelt the 
marchers with· stones. Furthermore, a nUlllber of shots were fired 
without anyone being tlit. The procession WdS unly able to contillue 
alter a police escort arrived on the scene. 4 four oays later the 
NaziS and Stahlhelm oryanised a more impressive parade with arouna 
six hundred participants through the working-class district ot 
Laspert. un this occas,ion, they were extendea a strony police 
escort from the outset. ,This precaution, however, did not aeter 
resident workers frolll aelllonstratiny their ojJjJosition, dnd Idr':,Je 
yroups of COllllllunists had to be dispersed by the jJulice. in Nurd-
stral.:>e, a number of gas .lamps were extinyuishea, and the Nazis 
found the roadway barricaoeo with tree trunks, iron rai Is ana 
td.(8 f4r'" rvl",,') 
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It is not known whether the Communists intended to ambush the IJro-
cession or wtlether they were content merely to imlJede tile pro!:jress 
of the march, yet the erection of barriers in a narrow, dark street 
wou I d seem to i ndi cate the former intention, whi cll tor SOllle reason, 
perhaps the unexpectedly stron~ police escort, had to be aborted.!) 
The Nazis held yet another torchliyht parade two aays later to liIark 
the firs t anni versary of. the openi ng of the SA barracks in Has ten. 
Although this district was not recognised as a predominantly 
working-class area, like Honsberg ana Laspert, the·streets surruun-
ding the Lindenoerg steelworks were populated prilllari Iy by lIIetal-
workers. The Nazis who were anxious to demonstrate ttleir ·suprellldcy 
in Hasten, were reinforced by ~!)u to 3UU SA men frolll Wuppertal. b 
The route chosen by the Nazis along Hallullesberger Strdbe, past tile 
steelworkS, was regarded by worker residents as d deliberdte jJro\lo-
cation. The IIIdrchers were again pelteu witll stoneS, dnO d tunous 
brawl ensued, in which hundredS of political aaversdries particilJa-
ted. A number of· shots were fi red frolll nearby houses, and tllese 
were returned by the Nazis without anyone bein~ Ilit. Ihe jJolice 
escorting the parade succeeded in parting the belligerents witnout 
seriouS injuries being sustained by either side) Jlle Nazis con-
tinueaontheir way to the Gaststdtte Sauer, their local pub, where 
they held a recruitment evening. Ihe SA contingent frolll Wuppertdl 
again callle under fire on the return march, this tillle sufferin~ two 
light casualties. tl Frolll these examples it is clear that We 
pattern of violent confrontation had sti I1 not unaeryone dny IlIaJor '. 
transforlllation, despite the rapidly changing political situi:ttioll •. 
Loca I COlllllluni s ts were s ti 11 prepared to engage the Naz is, accorai ng . 
to the code of unwritten rules which had been established over the 
previous four or five years. Uespite the SA's o~streperuus Oelllons-. 
tration of its sudaen ascenaancy, boosted by the knowledge that ttle 
police were now ooliyed to assist the NSUAP, the COllullunists sti I1 
remained confident of ttle workers' ability to combat the lIIenace.· 
The Nazi's reluctance to venture into Honsbery, ~osenhu~el, Uster-
busch and Kremenholl seellled to strenythen the belief ttldt, at least 
. in t{emscheid, the political situation was sti I1 tdr frulII beill~ 
beyond retri eva I, despite the ban illllJOsed on KPU delllons tra t i {JIISY , 
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and the ,ransacking of the BV's printiny works. lU Ihe KPu haa 
suffered temporary set-backs of" th i s ty~e before t alld had sub-
seyuent Iy managed to recover. Furthermore, the JJarty haG Deen 
reckoning with the possibility of a ban over the previous two years 
and had lIIade plans for this continyency. High' hopes were also 
pinned on the proclamation of a general strike if all else failed, 
and there were doubt less Iy many workers who be I i eved that reason 
woula eventually triumph, and the Ked ana Iron Fronts would unite 
to prevent. a Nazi take-over, as the conso I i dated forces ot tt1e 
world ny-c I ass movement had ha I ted the progress at" !tie reacti onary 
Kapp-governlllent in the spriny of 192U. After all, despite·the in-
tense rivalry between the KPU and SPU leadership, at the base there 
was a willingness to forget their differences anO fight the 
Nazis)l Un a number of occasions during the previous tour 
years,. Rottront and Rei chsoanner had fought side by s hIe on the 
streets of I{elllscheia ayainst the common enelllY. Local workers were 
secure in the knowledge that negotiations between the parties and 
the AU(;i~ were ill progress, and that the word wou 1 d eventua Ily De 
. given for joint action. The fact that the KPU and SPU-colltrolleo 
newspapers continued to abuse each other with· custolllary trencllancy 
_ articles decrying the policies of "Kozis" and "Sozialf"aschisten" 
still found preferential treatment.in the ~V and Freie Presse - dio 
nothi ng to suyges t yrounds for op t imi 5111. The workers' 1II0velllent in 
Germany was by now so tlOpe less Iy sp I it between the SPU, KPI) and the 
trade unions that a united front, which lIIight have succeedea in 
halting the Nazis, was no longer a realistic proposition. Ihe SPu's 
policy of tolerating the 'lesser evil' and strict adlll:rence to the 
constitution haa rendered its organisations inert. Itle SPu sti 11 
appeart!d to be /IIore alarllled by cOllllllunist election gains and ttle 
danger of losing influence in the working class to the KPU than Dy 
the illulledi ate threat posed. by the NSUAP. The Soe id I UelllOcra ts 
therefore adopted a waiting stance and rejected offers of d unit~d 
front by the KPU, tht! last of which was made on the 3Uth January, 
in a call for a general strike. In the liyht of their experience 
over the previous five years, the SPU hdd grounas to Delieve thdt 
the latest KPD oHer was another attempt to seize tile leadershi~ ot 
the lierman workers' movement from them. Uespite their SUs~lclons 
the SPU could st1l1 at this late staye have entered into an alli-
ance with the COflllllunists and proclaillled a yeneral strike, which as' 
the ~erlin transport workers' strike in the autumn ot l~j~, had dl-
ready demonstrated, was not necessari Jy doomed to tai lure. in rea-
1ity, however, the SPU leadership was incapable of envisaging any 
kind of Joint action with the KPul~, and allowed the o~portuni­
ty to slip away. After Hitler's dissolution of the Reictistag and 
announcement of a new election, the SPU alJpears to nave pinned its 
hopes on gains' at the polls. Ihe AU(i1j sill1i larly eschewea Juint 
. 
action. with the COllllllunists, in the hope ot at least bein~ able to 
preserve the workers' trade unions,. even in a fascist state. Ihe 
eftect of the SPU's and AUG~'s attitude at the IOCdl level was d 
furUler demoralisation of the workers' movelllent which may in IJdrt 
account tor tile fact that during thelhird Heich in kemsclleid tnere 
was alUlost no ~PU·led ,resistance, althouyh Social Uelllocrats <11U 
participate in KPU-organised yroups. Un the ottier hdnd, it must be 
remembered that in Hemscheid the SPU was in any case much ttle 
junior party of the workers' movement and enjoyed on Iy I illli teu 
influence in the local working class, so that in nUlllerical terms, 
willingness to take up arllls woula not have strenytneneo workers' 
resistance signifIcantly. Against this must be held considerations 
at the effect on the working class as a whole, it the SPU ana AU~ti 
. 
had in any way been inclined to enter a united tront with the KPU. 
It remains essentially speculative as to whettler a jOint effort 
would have induced an upsurge of resistance si»lilar to thdt experi-
enced in the Kapp Putsch. The Couuflunists tor their part had consis-
tently proposed a united front at the grass-roots level~ Ihe KPU 
was not int~restea in concerted action with the SPD berore the Nazi 
seizure of power, as this.party was reyarded as the IlIdin buttress 
of the capitalist system. Instead, the Comlllunists aimed their pleas 
for joint action at individual SPU members and unorganised wurKers 
in the hope of persuading these to abandon their party ana/or Juin 
the KPu.l J lhe 'Social fascist tlleory' which WiiS later dcknu~v· 
ledged as a disastrous lIlistake14 , and the constant reterences 
to the tlruning and Papen governments as oj.len fascist dictatorShips 
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tolerated, by the SPD and trade unions, served to isolate the KPU 
from all other parties and groups which wanted to prevent the Nazis 
from cOllliny to power. 
As the SPU and AUGlj15 leadership searched for ways of intt!~rat-
iny,themselves telllporari Iy in the Nazi state, the burtlen of resis 
tance fell first and foremost on the COIIUllunists who were lIIore imme-
diately threatened by the Nazi seizure of power. KPU intolerance ot 
diveryent opinion must also share the responsibility for the ae-
bacle which was now taking place. Even in a strongholu like Kelll-
scheid the local party's williny subservience to Moscow had succee-
ded in alienating particularly able sections of its own sup·porters. 
The local party's expeditious ejection of capable dissenters witl} 
proven oryanisational ability and popularity, llIen like JdkuD Wolt. 
frnst Zulauf, Albert tiornefeld Clnd Willi GrLitz, had the calalllltous 
consequence, that these elements and many of their su~porters were 
so disillusioned with their own party, that they took no turttter 
significant part in political events. At a tillle when the pdrty 
could wel I have profited from their enormous experience ana IJOpUla-
rity, these former leaders were branded as traitors, ana their ser-
vices were neither requested nor offered. with its monolithic 
structure the KPU unwittingly contributed to the later success of 
the NSUAP. The establishlllent ana maintenance of a mass lIIovelllent 
1 ike the one in Kelllscheid which ruthless Iy suppressed independent 
thought withi nits own ranks, doubt less Iy he 1 pea to prepare tile 
ground for the Nazi totalitarian society. Although there appears to 
be' no evidence of substantial conversions to National Socialisol 
froUl wi'thin the ranks of active (';ollullunists in Kelllsctleia, it woula 
seem that large nUlllbers of former KPU voters eventually settlea 
down to at least passively accept the National Socialist state, and 
some who had formerly felt secure in !tIe lIIass organisations of tile 
socialist parties, were comfortably able to llIake the transition to 
those of the Nazis. Particularly the inactive elements of tile 
working class, who indeed constituted the maJority, at the very 
least, tolerated the new state, despite the nUlllerous disa<lVdntd~es 
which accompanied it. The dictation of pol iCy trolll above and tl11:! 
incessant demands for sacrifices by the KPU, haa now been rejJldct!o 
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by another monolithic structure. which was un4uestionably 1Il0re bru-
ta I in Hs methods of suppress i ng di ssent. but whi ch never the less 
bore points of siluilarity. Just as lIIany inaiviouals IldO learneu tu 
pay lip service to the COllllllunists. they now superficially aelllOns-
trated their willinyness to support the Nazis. whilst noting this 
phenomenon. it ~ust! be stressed that the transition only occurrea 
very gradually and. as will be shown below. was closely connectea 
'with the effects of· the Nazi campaiyn of terror and the ensuiny 
atolllisation of society. 
Whi 1st the workers for the time being remained loyal to the KPU ana 
. 
SPU in Remscheid. the middle and lower middle classes enthusiastic-
dlly yreeted the ddv!:!nt of the Itlira /{eich. Ihe weekly pdraues 
earned it jubilant response trolll ttle residents ot lIIi(.Jule-clJss ttis 
tricts like Hindenburystra/:~e a,nd Alleestral)e. where black. white 
and red swastika flays were huny from the lIIajority ot lIouses, Mid 
townstolk gathered on the pavement to cheer the lIIarcl1iny colulllrts ot 
Nazis and Stahltlellll.whiCh enjoyed a minor if only transient revival. 
In the weeks following the March elections, the 111000 swellea allllost 
palpably to coincide with the warmer weather. Relllscheid's citizens 
were transported by a festive spirit and a teeling ot reliet that 
the Nazi s haO de I i vered thelll from the hands of the COllllllun i s ts. I he 
weekend preCeding the "Uay of Potsdam" which was tleralded in the 
local press as the "KeDirth of the lierlilan Nation"16, reselllblea 
a holiday period. as the bouryeoisie celebrated the unconvinciny 
election victory and looked forward to a Iflore secure future. 
Restaurateurs whose prelllises were situated in the town centre, 
advertised their weekend lIIenus and dance evenings in the local 
papers. The "Max una Moritz", for example. announced SunadY lunches 
in tour difterent price cateyories. 17 ror 1 Iflark 10 pfenni~s 
there was a three course lunch consisting of lIIinestrone soujJ, 
slIIoked ham in burgundy sauce with noodles, followed by pineajJple 
beignets in a wine crealll sauce. for l,lIIark 30 pfenniys, veal wittl 
salad or compot or chicken ana rice. ~or 1 IIldri<· tlU ptenniys, 
asparayus and ham, and at 1 lIlark tsU pt'ennigs tournedos Helyoland 
with potatoes and slivered almondS. Ihe "thiryertlaus" advertised Cl 
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'(ierlOan e.vening' with military march music and llerlllan dances 1tl , 
whi 1st the "Restaurant zur Fi liale" in Hasten1!:J ~ave notice ot 
the appearance of the Ijoshof Ijrothers, bi II ed as pOjJu I ar entl:!r-
tainers ana supported by the well known local cOlllllleaian Herman Vos-
hammer. This establistllllent promised a programllle of entertainlllent 
for the whole falllily. Ihe ~alalllanaer~U announced a Sunaay con-
cert provided by its new ja-zzband and promised an elltertaininy 
dance evening, admission free. for more serious tastes, the tlly·· 
Ney':trio presented their third concert for the local lSrahllls festi-
val in the Realgymnasiulll21 , tickets priced at 1 mark. 
. 
lhe prices of these kinds of entertainment firmly precluaed ttle 
participation of workin!;! class falllilies, ana the venues were in dllY 
case by tradition those which catered solely tor the IlIiddle dnll 
lower-middle classes. Such establistunents, by rules ot cress, 
strict adherence to middle-class etiquette and restrictive prices, 
placed themsel ves vol untari Iy beyond the reach ot those w{Jrkers, 
who lIIight otherwise nave been inclined to take advantaye uf bou~ 
geois entertainment. lhe majority of local workers, however, as we 
ha ve a I ready delllons trated, preferred thei r own I oca I jJubs and the 
Volkshaus and never contelllplated visiting the more exclusive estaD- . 
lishments like the "Weinberg", "Cafe Industrie" and "Hotel Leyer", 
so that at the level of social entertainlllent, there was a pro-
nounced class segregation. 
On Sunday l!:Jth March, however, ttil:! National,Socialist·Youth ur~anl 
sation of Kemscheid stayed a recruitment evenin!;! at the Stadtpark 
halle to Doost its still relatively mediocre melllbership perforlllance, 
which prior to ·the seizure of power had consisted ot it mere hand-
ful. The event was preceded by a IIldrch of the NS Youth Urganisatioll 
sub-group Ijeryisch Industrial Area, to which Kelllsclleid together 
with Solinyen, Wuppertal and several other towns belonyed.~~ 
The gues t speaker for the recru itmen t even i ny was Ha rtlllann Lau ter-
bacher, area leader for westj)halia and the lower Khine ot . tile 
Hitler Youth, and (ierd Ijennewitz, Hitler youth leader frolll Uussel-
dorf. The event which was advertised in the I{(iA, was interspersed 
with entertaimnent spots of a Qidactic nature, and lIIusic was per·-
formed by the NS band from Luttri nyhausen. I he ~ress anllouncelllent 
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of the eV,ent stipulated that 'lierlllan J,larents lsic.) at Kemscheid 
boys anCl girls were' eSjJecially invited to atteno'. Aomission was ~U 
pf~nniys, and 2U pfenniys for the unemployed and youthS under It) 
years of age. 
The festivities continued beyond the weekend ana reacheO a clillldx 
on the 'uay of Potsdalll'. The streets of the town centre were drdpeo 
with flays, ,and loudspeakers were erected on the I<athausplatz, 
shortly to be renamed AClolf Hitler Platz, so that local townstolk 
could participate,albeit passively, in the rebirth or their nation. 
In the morning there was a one and a half hour broadcast describing 
. 
the procession to the Potsdam uarrison ChurCh, ana a live translllis-
sion of.. the speeches made by Hindenburg and Hitler. In the atter-
noon, I<elllscheid citizens were ayain called to ttle town hall square, 
to listen to an hour lony broadca'st of the ojJening ot the Keictlstd~ 
in the Kro IIUpera House in ~er I in. 'I he eveni ny witnessea a huge 
torchlight parade trom the Stadtparkhalle via Hindenbur\;jstrdl)e, 
Alleestra0e, Elberfelder StraBe to the town hal I s4uare. Ihe jJaraae 
which was watched by thousanos of cheering spectaturs, containell 
all the various NSUAP formations, the Stahlhellll led by Fritz ~oker, 
the combined veterans' association heaoed by 1~lajor I3rall<lt, the 
Kemscheid Committee for Physical Kecreation led by Ur. Ijergllldnn, 
the lierlllan Chora I Sac i ety I ed by Herlllann SchUlllacher, the wes t 
German Association of Narchiny I5dnds unOer tile leadership ot L 
pickardt, and the lierlllan uymnastics Or\;janisation. Itle eveniny was 
. terllli nated by a lIIass- ra Ily addre~sed by mayor Uartllldnn and N~l.,)AP 
local group leader Vogt, and was brouyht to a close by the sin~iny 
of the national anthem and the Horst-Wessel-song. 
The to II owiny eveni ny it was the turn of the NSUAP' Urtsgruppe 
Hasten to provide' yet another spectacular lIIarch and rally in COII-
junction with a nUlllber of nationalist organisations and the 10Cdl 
fire service brass band.,;j· Pfarrer Schlllie/jiny who was an early 
sympathiser of the NSUAP, held a conullellloration service, and NSUAP 
local group leader l{lchard WieYdnd inforllled ttle cheering crowus 
that the national revolution was now on the marCh. 
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2. Gleichschaltuny. 
The Nazi seizure of power had in I<emscheid cOIll~leted the unifica-
tion of the bourgeois parties, the employers' organisations, the 
various nationalist organisations, civic associations and guilas-
a process which had begun with the tlUrgerfest (citizens' festival) 
in l~n ana continued by way of local governlllent coalitions ailllea 
at preventing a COIIIJllunist and socialist majority on the town coun-
cil. The procedure was rounded off by the policy of GleiChsCtlaltuny 
which was already underway, with some organisations like the Kalllpf 
bund des yewerblichen Mittelstandes (Association of Middle-Class 
~usinessl/len24) which voluntarily adopted the swastika sYlllbol 
and Nazi policy, even before it was officially re4uired ot 
thelll.2t> .In this respect with regard to' the bourgeoisie it is 
4uestioflable to whdt extent one can consider GleiclIsctlaltulI';j as 
being the result of coercion. Particularly - but not only - at tne 
local level, National !)ocialist economic ana political policies 
revealed many points of broad agreement with those at the 1II1ddle-
class parties and pressure groups, and offerea an acceptable solu-
tion to the workers' question{Arbeitert'raye)):~b It was preCise 
Iy the inabi lity of the miadle crass parties and interest groups to 
consolidate their power, and nowhere is this more noticeable than 
at the local level, whiCh induced first the voters and then the 
active lIIelllbers to switch alle!:jiance to the NSUAP, which seellled to 
offer a large measure or continuity,and - most illlportantly - ttle 
means to put their' policies into operation)~1 Ihis is, ot 
course,'not to suggest that local leaders of bourgeois pdrties dnu 
interest groups necessarily identified with the NSUAP's brutal 
methoas of suppress i on; it IIIUS t be remembered that the majori ty ot 
beatings and ransacking of houses' took place in workillg-class ois· 
tricts and in the uestapo head4uarters, out of' siyht of the maJori 
ty of the middle classes.~~ With the exceptions ot protests in 
Lennep, the majority of the Kemscheid bouryeoisie did not concern 
itself with Nazl excesses. Many felt that the.Collllllunists, whO wert~ 
now on the receiviny end, were thernselvE:!s to blallle for the tlarsli 
treatment which was beiny meted out to them. A common sayiny auriny 
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the spriny and SUlllmer of lY33 - "Wo gehobelt wira, fallen SlJdne" 
(approximately, "You can't make an ol~etteWithout breakin!;! e!;!!;js"), 
helped to appease consciences. 
The dissolution of .the Hemscheid urtsgruppe of the UVP, announced 
on 2tith Apri I, a I so seems to have been induced rather by a!;!reelllent 
than force. 29 The OVP town councillor Karl ~ecker took the 
opportunity to inform his former colleagues of his defection to the 
NSUAP. He was tol lowed 'by other prominent members like Ur. Bor-
chardt and bank director Schilling.:W The Hemscheia local group 
decided not to wait for instructions from the reyional cOlluuittee 
Ousseldorf-Ust, and made it known that they would dissolve· whether 
the regional cOlllmittee recommended disbanding or nut.:n Ihis 
trend was continued severa I days later when the W; rtschaftspartei 
region~1 committee for Uusseldorf-Ust disbanded with the reCOllllllen' 
dation that its supporters should seek memberShip in tile NSUAP. Ihe 
local chairman of the Remscheid group, Christian luck, haa already 
aefected to the Nazis and the Kampfbuna aes yewerbl ichen rvli ttel-
standes, and he (Jersonally appealled to all members to tOllow 
him. 32 
. Un the same day the I<llA announced that ~o l ot I<emscnei d 's ci v; I 
servants were already organised in the National Socialist Civil 
servant~' Association - NS~A.33 The Relllsctleid Canoin!;! Club also 
declared its. assimilation, at the sallle tillle pOintin!;! out that it 
had in any case always been a nationalist organisation. 34 
lhe flood of apJ)lications for party membership elicited a warning 
against opportunists from Urtsyruppenleiter liocal J)arty leaaer) 
Voyt and Kreisleiter (district party leader) Strabwey at cl politi-
cal meeting held at the "Weinberg" in June. 30 Voyt ref'errea to 
the 'mountain of applications' which he had received aurin!;! the 
previous months, and indicated that those who had been acceJ)tea 
depended on the satisfactory completion ot a trial tJeriod. wittlOut 
elu'cidating the critera for successful aJ)J)lication, the SI.H!dker 
informed listeners that a large number of applicants had been re-
jected outright. Somewhat ambiguously Voyt told the yattlering, that 
the practice of enclosiny a one-hundrea-mark note toyether with d 
request for membership aid not enhance the inaividudl's chances ot 
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success, however gifts of money for the ~arty would be dCCelJted and 
indeed were expected. 'Jb S tral3wey, tak i ny ulJ the s allle theme, was 
more explicit when he lamDasted the business J.lractices ot Kelllsclleid 
manu f acturers, traders and shopkeepers who had former Iy sUJ.llJorted 
the Wirtschaftspartei. Hinting at the favourite Nazi slo~an Gemeill 
nutz vor £iyennutz (J.lUblic before private ~ood), the speaker Warned 
businessmen not to revert to their former selfisl11y liberal alld· 
materialist ways.J7 !)tral:~weg went on to eXlJouna the concelJt ot 
the volksyerneinschaft (collullunlty· of Cl classless nation)Jti, in 
which each class was supposed to complement the others, so that the 
. 
German nation would presulllably converge in a united collective 
consciousness. Hie district leader's attack on the Dour~eois selt-
interest which also included a swipe at ..:ertain f1l'wsjJJpers wllicli 
practised "acrobatic ideological leaps' ... at which apart trom ttH! 
Nazi controlled press only one other existed in KelflscheiCl~ nalllely 
the l{(iA, brouyllt a prompt reply from that directiun, asSeVerdtlll'::j 
the paper's lony standiny sU~lJort for the National !)ocialistsj,~ 
The declaration alluded to the superfluous measure ot llleichscllal-
~ in this case, as the newspaper had already regarded itself as 
a proponent of the movement long before this step was taken. 
The process of Gleichschaltuny also ap~ears to have been accelJtea 
without reservation in· the local protestant churcll. Ptarrer 
Schmiefjiny, who was the chairman of the !:vanyeliscller tlund Hew 
·scheid (Union of Protestant Churches), addressed a lIIeetin'::l in ~,ay 
'with a lecture entitled "Kevolution in the ChurCh ', .. lht! speaker 
praised Hitler for dispelling the danyer of bolshevislll and jJled~el.l 
his support for·National Socialist policies for unitiny tile lienuall 
people.40 Referriny directly to the procedure ot lileichschal-
tun~, Schlllie{jiny was of the opinion that Church ana state wert! 
essentially different institutions, and that tile relationshijJ woula 
be clarified by a treaty however, providing the n~w state was aDI~ 
to prevail"after this a radical solution would be necessary. Ih~ 
speaker assured the audience that talks with the Ueutscht! Christef"!. 
(German Christians) were proyressin~ satisfactorily, ana he was 
confident thdt the desired aim,"£in Volk - ein Keich - eine KirChe" 
(one· lJeolJle one efl\jJire one ctiurCh) would De acnit!vell. 
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Schmief)iny also pointed out that the church woula be tlrepareo to 
carry the political and vbll<isch revolution to the peo'ple. 
The German Christian movement under the local leaaership ot Willi 
Holstein was a sub-oryanisation of the NSUAP in the tlrotestdnt 
chu rch and was s tri vi n9 for un lty between the chu rch and the 
'people' (in reality the party). The sUIJIJorters ot thiS rnovelllent 
claimed that this unity had been lost, particularly aurillY the 
Weimar l{ejJublic, as thousands of Protestants became contaminatea by 
Marxist ideoloyy.41 At a rally held in June, the Lanaeslelter 
(state leader) Ur. KrulTllllbacher of the Gerlllan Ctlri~tians tola tne 
Remscheid audience, that the movement - like National Sodalism -
was the wi II of God, and that the wi II of lioa exc I uaea Jews t rOllt 
the li~rlllcln COllullunity.4~ This 1II0velllent becallle illl intluential 
force in Helllscheid duriny the early years of the Ihird Heiet! dnll 
attracted the support of lIlany leadiny local figures. 
In contrast to the numerous examples of voluntary lileichSctldltuny 
in I{emschei d there were many cases of enforcea ass ll1li I at 1 on, tile 
removal of Social Uelllocratic civi1 servants, compulsory li4uidation 
of oryanisations, and aestruction of projJerty belonyiny to the 
workers' movement. This policy operated from the first tlours ot the 
Th i rd I<ei Ch and was close Iy connected wi th We Naz i call1pa i yn ot 
terror, the ferocity of which even surprised the COIIIIIIUllists. Uurill!:l 
the early hours of :nst January, the local SA forcea entry to tile 
premises of the ~eryische Volksstilllrne, ransackin~ the of'fices ana 
relllov i ny f'i I es • 
In contrast to bouryeois parties and ClubS, the lileichschaltuny of 
working-class institutions was positively coercive. the re/llOv~1 ot 
Soc i a I Uernocra tic and COllunun is t C iv i 1 servan ts and town courte i I 
employees was elfected on the basis of the reintrOduction of tile 
o I d PNssicut law defi ni ny the e I i 9i bi I i ty of emp I oylllent ins ta te 
and local yovernment service (Gesetz zur wieaertterstelluny des 
~erufs'Oeallltentums) passed on 7th Apri 143. Even before the IdW 
became vali'd, the Nazis began to suspend leading IOCdl yovernlllellt 
officials like44 ur. Aschenheim4~, the city IHedlcal inspee 
tor; dejJuty mayor Ludwiy Lemmer; the director ot the city aOllllllis 
tration. Will; and Rudolf Bijhler. Un the 2nd May the KI.lA4b yave 
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notice of. the dismissal of 11 emlJloyees of the Helllscheict ellljJloYlllent 
office. lhe discarded employees were mostly Social Uemocrats ana 
included the chairman of the local party oryanisatiun, SChulidtj the 
son of the SPU deputy mayor IserlOti, to~ether with his wire; I:.wala 
Peterlllann and the office manager, Paul Weidiy. The article alsu 
informed readers that the NSUAP had entrusted Erwin Laubach41 
with the pos i ti on of commi ssari a I di rector of ttle ernp I 0Ylllent ex-
change. 'd"urtherlllore, the article listed names of six elllployees of 
the sickness insurance office dismissed by the new boss, fYlax Hesse. 
The pensions of some older employees forced into early re.tirelllent 
were reduced by ~!> '10. Un the sallle day as this article alJpearect, tIle 
Nazis occupied the offices of the UMV and the LentrdlverDdnd Cler 
Angestellten, and alJjJointect an official of the I'lSUU. ~rordth • ..1S 
business manager of We local branch of the trade union cuunei I 
AUGl). Ihe volkshaus which had alreaay experienced several visitd 
tions by tIle SA and SS, was also Occul .. >ied, and the sWdstikd tlay 
was raised above the building. 4tl The followin~ ctdy it was tile 
Reichsverband fUr KrieysDeschactiyte (ASSOCiation of War WidowS and 
Disabled) and We lnternationaler Bund der Krieysopfer. Ihe politi u 
cal police confiscated records, melllberShilJ lists and various files, 
and sealed the oHices.4~ Un the lUth May the offices of the 
5PU and the volkszeitun~!>U were searched to~ether with the 
houses of leadiny SPU otficiali. 51 uuring the course .of this 
operation, Max t>lank, the leading local fi~ure in the party, was 
arrested and taken into protective custOdy. lhe SPU finance tund, 
confiscated by the Nazis, totallea only one mark and ten jJfenniys, 
and all financial recordS had been destroyed.5~ Ihe sallle issue 
of the RGA also told of the confiscation by ttle Nazis of the 
Teufelsteich swimming pool, which, it will be recallea, had been 
built and financed solely by lIIembers of the Arbeiter Schwillllllvereill 
over the previous two years. ln fdCt, work on this project haa unly 
been comp 1 eted in the sumlller of 1 Y32, so that the swinllllers were nuw 
prevented from recouping We costs incurred in the pool's construe 
tion.t>:3 
The next workers' institution to underyo the process of Gleicll· 
schaltung was the local cooperative SOCiety "t::iniykeit", whiCh, 
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contrary.to NSUAP policY"was not forced into liquidation but COIl-
tinued to operate under the control of the NS~U ofticial Hdns 
Uh.lmann.~4 Tile Konsum enjoyed such wide support even beyond the 
,_~orking class that the NSUAP would have made itself unpo~ular with 
large sections of the lower-middle class; had it closed down this 
organisation, as it had indeed prolllised. 
fhe removal of civil servants and council white-collar employees 
continued unabated through June and July with further oislllissals at 
the employment exchange, the sickness insurance office and the 
savings bank.~~ However, it was not only civi I servants ana 
counci I· elllployees who were ejected by the Nazis for belo'nyiny to 
left wing parties. There now followed a purge in the majority ot 
local private factories and workshops, to remove COIIIOlunists cHlCl 
Social Uemocrats and replace these by hitherto unelllployed SA anti ~~ 
men.~b The prospect of losing jObS doubtlessly .. , induced SOllll~ 
workers to join NSUAP organisations, and at least outwardly aeclar~ 
their allegiance to the new regime. 
In July the SA began to confiscate bicycles ana motor cycles belon-
giny to COlJllllunists and cOllullunist sympathisers'. Ihese were then ois-
tributed amonyst various SA ~roulJs ana the SS lIIotor cycle 
corps.~7 
The SA also indulged in senseless wholesale destructiun, de~enainy 
on. the 1I1olllentary 1II0od and the alllount of a I cotlo I consuliled IJri or to 
specific operations. ~oth, the Naturfreunde hostel an der 
Beekb~ and the new workers' sports club house at Struck~Y 
- . 
were burned down in acts of revenge. 
3. The SA'S Campaign of Terror in I<elflscheia. 
\ 
The campaiyn of terror unleashea by the NSUAP was carrieo out prin-
cipally by the SA, which were accorded, the ,status of auxil idry 
police. The local SA, aided by ~he police, began to arrest leaainy 
Communists during the first weeks of the Hitler government. IlIe 
systematic round up of COllununists was initiated, however, folloWlflY 
the Reichstag fire and ttle IJresidential decree tur the protectioll 
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of people, and state issued on 2t$th February.GO Ihis decree en· 
abled ttle police and the SA to cOlrunit persons re\:jarded as a risk to 
the new regime to Schutzhaft lprotective custody). 
The SA's campaign of terror which was in full sway during March ana 
April, lasted throu\:jhout the summer and was responsible for a nUlII-
ber of murders, suicides, and viciously brutal beat-in~s, sOllle ot 
which were in large measure the major cause of premature deaths at 
the victims. uuring the spring and su"~er of'lYJJ, SA excesses fur 
the most part went unchecked by the police and jUdiciary who, for 
various reasons,and to differing degrees, willingly abettt;d their 
eayer new comrades in the hunt for enemies of the state. AI thouyll 
ordinary policemen participated in arrests and the ransackiny of 
flats, on the whole they hdu no pdrt in the bedti/l~s wtlieli o.lCLUIJl~'" 
nied these measures.' Un many occasions they were able 'to prevellt 
excesses by personal initiative whilst victillls were in their telllpo-
rary custody, but had no influence on the treatlllent ot prisoners 
once these were handed over to the lies tapo. Nor' can it be c I a illlea 
that at i SA lIlen behaved incorrect'ly. Ihere were, however, those -
most prObably small in number - who had old scores to settle with 
the Communists and who now seized the opportunity in the kllowleo\:je 
that they were more or less unencumbered by leyal restrairits. Ihe 
mood of the local middle classes' enthusiasm for the new reyillle, a 
feeling of relief at their aeliverance frolll the Communists, also 
carried' undertones of desired retribution tor the years of fear and 
hardship which many haa undergone. Clearly, some individual IlIembers 
of the lIIiddle classes had suHered attacks by COllllllunists dirt!ctly 
or had received threats in one way or another, the majority, how-
ever. had I itt I e or no contac t with COlrunun is ts and recei ved 1II0S t or 
nearly all their information from newspapers. radio and heresay. 
The regime's propayanda and direct or, more usually indirect, ex· 
perience of cOlfununist agi tation, and the by now intrinsic bel iet 
that these e 1 elllents were the agents of an evi I conspi racy enya\:jed 
in the destruction of their country, cOlllbined to create an atmo-
sph'ere in which excesses were 'quietly condoned. particularly it 
they occurred out of siyht, at the police stations, in prisons dna' 
in concentration camps. The general feeling al-lpearea to be, thdt 
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the COlluTlunists deserved the fate which they were now sutteriny, dna 
this posture was justified by sjJeculations on the, treatlllent We 
middle classes would have had to endure had the situation been 
reversed. Uf course,· very few citizens were witnesses to the actual 
torture and hUlllan deyradation to which enemies ot' the state were 
subjected. Middle-class trust in the infal lability at authority was 
also a safeguard on the occasions when rUlllours of torture ana 
deaths in police custody leaked out to the public. A CUllllllon redC-
ti on to such rumours was a shrug of the shou I der and a woae ot 
reasoning that they could not possibly contain any truth. Ihere is 
evidence of only one instance wtlen uninvolvea citizens ·actually 
intervened to demonstrate their disajJiJroval at the lIlaltredtlllent ot 
prisoners.b1 Ihis occurred at some· tilUe during the sprin~ or 
early sUllllller at, lYJJ, when residents of tile streets surrounainy ttll~ 
NSUAP rey i ana I headl.juarters in Lennep. the Herllldnn liori ny Haus, 
gathered outside the police station to cOlllplain dbout the SA's 
handling at susiJects. These residents had becollle alarlllea by tile 
screams of tortured pri~oners· over a periOd of days tollowin~ a 
round up of suspects. Photoyraphs of one of the maltreated suspects 
were taken on his release and were eventually iJresented as eviaence 
in the trial of three local SA,men after the war. It is not 
known whether the pol ice took any steps to curtai I suct! practices 
in Lennep,· and there were rumours'that sOllle of the residents them-
selves received threats of imprisonment, if they continued to pur-
sue the lIIatter • 
The Gestapo headquarter~ in Remscheid were situated in Uhlandstra~e, 
a middle-class residential area. Throuyhout the year suspects were 
hauled in for· interroyation and many had to endure weeks at tor-
ture. As the Gestapo ottices were part of' ttle laryer cOlllplex at the 
iocal police headl.juarters, and there was much crn~iny and goiny in 
the buildiny, it is extremely unlikely that the liestdj)o was able to 
conceal their maltreatlllent of' prisoners from ttle public, alttwuytl 
the lIlajority of interrogations took place duriny the niynt. O( 
Un the other hand, rumours spreaa alllony the townstulk IlIade an. 1111-
portant psycholoyical contribution in establishiny il lIIood ot uncer-
tainty and tear, ferti le ground trom· which tne autlwrities were 
ab I e to ~ounteract tee I i ngs of so I i darity with ovponents at ttle 
regime. In the light of these considerations, it is likely that the 
Nazis actually encouraged speculation about the treatlllent of priso~ 
ne~s without actual Iy ~upplyin~ detai Is. Constant threats at int~rn 
ment in concentration camps testify to the validity at this argu-
ment, and it may be SUPIJosed that the majority of I<elflsctleid peoiJle 
knew of their existence, at least by the end of l~jj or We beyin-
ning of 1~J4.oJ 
following the Reichstag fire the SA, SS and police began to arrest 
comlllunist officials in Remscheid. A newsIJaIJer article 011 1st 
Aprilb4 reported that between Ibth and Jlst March 't..7 tu"nctiona-
ries and sympathisers of the KPU haa been taken into protective 
custody. House searches had uncovered a total ot six ritles, six 
machine guns, five pistols and two hand granades. Uuring the course 
ot a surprise raid on the headquarters ot the Konsulllyenossenschatt 
"Einiykeit" in AI-'ril, l't..u llIembers were arrested, only three ot wholll 
were subselluently remanded in custody.o5 Iwo weeks later a rdiu 
on the working-class district ot Usterbusch revealed a small a rills 
cache, and a total of IH KPU officials were arrested and taken into 
protective custody.ob A more detailed cornmuni4ue issued by the 
new police commissioner in Remscheid, Ur. Schubert, ,1ntorllled the 
publiC that COllullunists were sti,ll at wurk in the town, and that Cl 
total of 1~4 KPU officials were at that time bein9 hela in custo-
dy.ol Schubert claimed that a large stock at weajJullS had beell 
unearthed by the po lice iHld that these were Cl II w~ II oi I ea and i 1\ 
good workiny condition. Whilst it is undeniable ttldt Relllscheid 
Communists had indeed collected a store of wealJons over the J,Jre-
vious years, there is no conclusive evidence to suggest that these 
presented a serious threat to the new regillle. lJespite the oai Iy 
announcelllents of the confiscation of large arsenals, newsJJdjJer 
articles themselves usually' contradicted the illlIJression createa by 
the head lines. Une is therefore I ed to the cone I us ion tha t the 
reports of arms caches were above all important for their propagan-
da value, nalllely to create hysteria amongst tile townstolk dnd 
justify the ruttlless suppression of the KPU. Lists ot contiscateu 
weapons reported in newspaper arti c I es revea I 11105 t Iy anci en t 
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weapons, and by far the majority of these were pistols. ~urttlerll1ure, 
severa I i ntervi eweesbti assured the au thor that d nUlllber ot . a rillS 
in· the possession ot the KPU oriyinated from the ~irst Worla Wdr 
and the Kapp-Putsch, and had been burri ed in wooaen boxes in tile 
yround for many years. Consequently, the maJority ot rit les dna 
inachine-guns which were anyway very tew in nUlllber, were rusty and 
no lonyer of any use, in ettect posing a yreater thredt to the 
marksman than the target. In addition to this evidence~ throughout 
the Weilllar years, excludiny the lightiny duriny the KafJp·Putsch, 
there is no mention in either police reports or newspaper~ ot tile 
use of rifles and lIIachine yuns in and around Kemscheid. 1n lIiew ot 
these considerations one is at a loss to illlayine how tile 'illllllinent 
uiJrisiny' was to be ettected, at least in /{elll!)chelJ. Un tll~ utllt!f' 
hand it is likely ttidt local Nazis COIlII-lIetely oller-estlllldtell tile 
tiyhting strength at the KPU. Ihe tact that HonSberlj WdS yillen d 
wide births during the tirst months of Nazi rule wuuld seem to lellll 
weight to tnis sUPiJosition. When the Nazis did lIentur~ intu tillS 
particular working class district, it was ill cOllsiJerdole 
strength.b~ A massive raid was carried out in Auyust Dy one 
thousand lIIen, belonging to the SA (tiUU trolll Relllscheiu and WUjJper-
tal), SS (tiU), and nearly two tlUndred policelllen, led by-the newly 
apfJointed Polizeiprasident Willi Veller frolll Wuppertal. IU Ihe 
raid which was caried out at 4 a.lIl. unearthed three revolllers, une 
hunting rifle, two grenades, three rifles and ~5UU rounos ot allUilU· 
nHion, ana a nUlllber of knives, as well as diverse oDJects like rell 
flags, KPO collection boxes, a large alllount ot lIIarxist literature 
and printing IIwterials. A total ot jti suspects were arrested inClu-
ding ten wOlllen. 7l 
Uuriny the SUlllmer months Kelllscheiu and Wuppertal IJrisons coula nu 
longer accolllodate the hundreds of Communists being Ilelo in protec-
tiv~ custodY,as increasinyly more cells were required to hold the 
steady stream at resistance lIIembers now falliny into the hdnds ut 
the Gestapo. Veller therefore authorised the settin~ u~ of a con-
centration Call1fJ in a disused factory at Kelllna nedrwup~ertal. Iht! 
camp whiCh came under the control at the Wuppertal ~A, was the 
scene of sOllle of the wors t excesses seen anywhere in the Coun try 
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j1,.t 
during the first year of ;(Hitler regime.7, Ihe concentration 
camp Kemna appears to be an exception in that instead ot drawin~ 
personnel from different areas, all of the yuards - as members ot 
the wupperta I SA - knew many of the pri soners . J.)ersona Ily and IIldny 
others by nallle and reputation. lJuriny the nine lIIonths fJrior to its 
closure in 1934, the Kemna concentration camp handled a tOtal ot 
4,bUU internees, 'primari Iy from ttle .immediate vicinity.7:$ ftlany 
of the camp guards Chosen for duty at the calllp took advantage ot 
the complete lack of legal restraints to settle scort:s with help-
less pri soners. Some obvi ous Iy enjoyed thei r ro I es ot tormentors 
. 
and spurred thei r co II eagues on to devi se ori 9i na I methods ot tor-
ture, one of which· was the "Kemna sandwich" which consisted ot over 
-salted herrings caked with maChine grease or excrement. Ihese were 
then forced fed to prisoners who had first been severely beaten dnd 
then locked in a tiny cupboard for a number of days without water. 
The cupboard a I so had ti ny apertures throu!;jh whi cn ci yarette SllIoke 
was blown. When the prisoner vomitted, he was then torced to aevour 
hi sown di syorgements. Soute pri soners were made to ari nk IJetro I eUIII 
and urine.74 Internees were constantly beaten and kicked to un-
consciousness and then revived by cold water. Ihe torture was so 
-unbearable that several prisoners coulffiitted' suicide either by 
si ashi ng thei r wri s ts or e I se by throwi ng themse Ives t rom the 
second floor ot the factory building onto the concreted yara below. 
Although technically no actual murders were cOlllmittea in the call1J.l, 
the court which tried members ot the Kenlrld guard in 194tl dcceJ.)ted 
that several inmates died prelllaturely.in the years following their 
release,as a direct consequence of injuries sustained during inter-
rogations. Whilst no Remscheid SA personnel were actually involvea 
in the ma'l treatment of i nterJlees at Kemna, Ulany (\IUS t have been 
aware of the pfevai ling conditions, as they cooperated closely with 
i 
thei r Wupperta I co 11 eagues, ana reyu I ar Iy de I i verea pri soners to 
the camp. On the occasion of Prince Auyust Wilhellll's visit in the 
late SUllllller of 1933, the latter was accollljJanied by I:.waldLallulI on 
hi s tour of. the call1p.15 
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During the summer and auturnn)rumours about the conditions in Kelllna 
had proliferated to such an extent that the Nazis saw themselves 
compelled to close the camp. As we shall see presently, a /{elllscheia 
resistance group played a major role in the circulation of intorllla-
tion wnich led directly to the call1~'s closure. l-urtherJllore, a aoc-
tor at a Wuppertal clinic alerted the public prosecutor, atter 
having examined several of the camp's inmates, and the latter Deyan 
proceedings against tne Kornrnandant Hilger and his staff of yuaras. 
Although the prosecution's case was 4u«shed on the orders ot hitler 
bet ore proceedings reached the trial staye,a cOj,Jious amount ot 
. 
evidence,had already been ami·assed and was subseque/ltly ~Iaced out 
of reach of the Nazis. PuDlic prosecutor Winckler who survived an 
a ttelllpt on hi s life by Wupperta I SA men, was n na Ily trailS terre(J to 
Kassel. After the war, on his reinstatement, he again took uj,J j,Jro' 
ceedings against the camp guards, who stood trial in lY4ti. Ihe calllp 
Kommandant Hi Iyer was sentenced to death, and a large nwoDer ot 
guards were· yiven lite sentences.7o At least tiy I<elllsctleid 
. Communi s ts were interned at Kemna, and many of those who survi ved 
were able to give evidence at the trial. 71 
4. The I<eichstag Election on bth March lYJ3. 
The election in l"1arch lYJJ was instigated by Hitler's dissolution 
of the /{eichstag. The NSUAP, which now enjoyea cOlUplete control at 
the state propaganda aj,Jparatus, noped by calling new elections to 
gain an overall majority, which would enable them to dissolve 
parliament permanently and estaDlish a dictatorSHip. Ihe prospect 
of another election gave rise to hopes of stopjJiny the Nazis by 
legal means, notably in the SPU and trade unions, Dut also in tne 
liberal parties. Ihe result ot· this act ot selt deceptlUn was to 
further weaken the resolve of Social Uemocrats to prevent the con-
solidation ot power Dy the Nazis by extra-parliamentary means. 
Whilst Social Uemocrats in Kemscheid had no grounds tor OptilllislIl 
regarding a turn in their party's tortunes at the j,Jol Is, the I-reie 
Presse of Wuppertal plunged into the election cdlllpaign with 
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remarkabl~ gusto, claiming that at this late hour the tiae would De 
turned by the realisation on the part of the electorate that this 
was. the last chance to prevent a Nazi aictatorslti~.7tl Ihe treie 
Presse stil I appeared to believe in the SPU and tiserne t-ront~liron 
front) abi IHy to somehow reverse the situation, even when it saw 
the Social Uemocratic election campaign severely shaCKled by a ban 
on demonstrations, and a further decree issuea by the Nazis which 
I imited the freedolll of the press. Rudo I t Hi I ferdi ny, who was due to 
address a mass-rally in Elberteld on lJrd february, was informea at 
short notice that he would not be allowed to take the rostruln. His 
speech was finally delivered by a colleague, with Hi Iterdiny pre-
sent at the lIleeting, but unable to take an active ~art.1!:i lhe 
SPU newspaper aweal ed yet again to members at tile I:iserne .. ront 
not to allow themselves to be provoked into /Jrelllature action 
against the Nazis.~U lhe Freie Presse ceased its activities 
with a pathetic reminder that n·either Hismarck nor Wi Ihelm 11 hac 
succeeded in destroying the SPU, and that the ~arty would once 
again prevail. tl1 
The KPU and SPU campaigns were severely hamstrun~, so that tile 
March election can in no way be described as t·air. t-urthermore, on 
polling day uniformed SA and SS men .were in close attendance at 
polling stations. in I<emscheid town, the Nazis gained a hollow vic-
tory in a hi yh ~J '10 turnout, secu ri ng on Iy 41.4 % l~1.tlU7) ot the 
total vote. Iheir allies, the Kampffront Schwarz-Wei~-Kot (UNVP dna 
Stahlhelm) gained b.J % (2,7~4), ~ith the result tnat .the coalition 
sti II fell tar short ot the intended majority. The KPU lIIanaged to 
win a total at Ib wards, polling in al I ltl,U7l votes (J4.J %), and 
the SPU picked up ti.4 % p,J(7). the only other party to piCk ulJ a 
signiticant amount of votes was the lentrulII withJ,5~5 (b.ts %). "11le 
UVP gained J.U % (1,5bJ), the Christlich Sozialer V61ksaienst 1.1 ~ 
(b~2), and' the StaatslJartei U.7 % P78). COlllpariny these results 
with those of the November Reictlstag election in l!jJ(, which .. it 
will be remembered - prOducea a lower turn-out ltl5.1 ';b) ana in 
which 17 parties put up candidates (March lYJJ = lU), one is able 
to draw the followiny conclusions: 
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In the absence of significant changes re~arding votiny eligibility 
(+~bj), the N~UAP increased its total of votes frolll 14,~14::: lJU.b ~) 
to~l,tiU7 (41.4 %), a net gain of 7,~j!:>. and j,titi7 lUore than in the 
July election of lyj~. We lIIay firstly assullle therefore, that the 
Nazis succeeded in remobilising those voters who cast their votes 
.in favour of the N~UAP in July lY32, but who did not ~artici~ate in 
the November election. Furthermore, the UVP's share of votes fell 
frolll ~.U4b to 1,bb3, a loss of 4ti3. Neither the l'1ittelstanas- nor 
the Volksrechtpartei nominated candidates for election in March 
1YJJ, as both grou~s were already in a state of dissolution. ln 
November 1Y3~. these parties won 433 and 3ti7 votes res~ectively. lt 
may safe Iy be assullled that a Imos tall of these votes IJ I us thuse 
lost by the UVP and by the Schwarz-Wei/j-I{ot l-UJ), dnd those ot 
the I{adikaler Mittelstand, which also aid notcalll~aiyn in (vldrcll 
(-3tl) were switched to the NSUAP, .equalliny a net gain ot 1,4!>4. 
The KPU lost 1,2~3.votes which can only have been to the benefit of 
the Nazis. As the other parties remained fairly constant - the SPU 
lost 314, and the LentrulII gained 3~U - it would seem that vote-
switching to the Nazis was minimal. here, it aplJears ttlat" even 
attributing all the new votes to the Nazis l+2bJ), the latter 
managed to persuade near Iy a thousand former non -voters to turn 
out. over and above those in this category who had exercisea their 
vote in favour of ttle NSUAP in July lYj~. Whilst it is evident thdt 
in March lYJj the NSUAP succeeded. in lIIaking in-rudds into trle 
working class votes. and for the first time signiticantly into ttle 
. KPU vote, this did not amount to a lIlajor shltt of alleyidnce. Con-
sidering the external pressures on the working class lIIovelllent. ana 
the almost unlimited benefit of executive power, the Nazis failell 
utterly to harness the workers' vote. Once again the NSUAP's share 
of the vote was primari Iy augmented by non-catholic middle - class 
converts and the indiUerent 'non-political' sections ot society. 
In Luttrinyhausen which - it will be recalled - was alreaay all 
NSUAP stronghold in uno, the Nazis gained b4.3 % p,b~J) in Cl hi~tl 
turn out of Y4.J ~. lhe KPU was the second strongest faction, but 
with on Iy 14.4 % (o~U). I he SctlwClrz·Weirj~Rot secured a further lU 
votes (j~J), ana the Lentrum 17 (~7!:». whilst ttle ~PU lost 4j 
(~lb). Comparing the results of the three Keichstay elections" 
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March 1YJ3, November 19J1 and July 1Y3l - it is evident that vote-
switching between the KPU and NSUAP was much more ~ronouncea than 
in Remscheid with at least lUU votes, eyualliny rouyhly lU ~ at the 
KPU total in November 19J1, being cast in March 1933 in favour ot 
the ·Nazis. lhis considerable discrepancy can 1II0St likl:!ly bl:! ex-
plained by the intense pressure on the KPU ina Nazi stronyhola 
like LiJttri nghausen, the I ack of security aftorded by work i n9· c I ass 
districts like those in Hemscheid (in LiJttrin~hausen COllllllunists 
were becoming increasingly isolated and hence were subject to a 
higher degree of demoralisation), and lastly the absence at a 
strong radical len wing tradition. 
1n Lennep the NSUAP polled 45.U % (4.U04) on a y~.U 'Iu turn-out. 
Ihis total marked an increase of !:loU votes 'over their pertorllldnce 
in July 193~. fhe KPU vote held ul-l remarkably wel I on this bdllot, 
althougtl as in I{elllscheid and Luttringhausen, there is evidence at 
realignment, in percentage terms however considerably less than in 
the latter, at the most 10 % of the party's Novelllber total. Ine KPU 
polled 1,YlO votes (ll.l %). Ihe Zentrulll improved sliglltly, gainin~ 
1,aY votes (13.0 %), as did the KalllpHront Schwarz-Weijj-Hot, CS~Y 
votes (9.~ %). Ihe SPU on the other hand lost a handtul at votes, 
attracting a total of '!:>oo (b.3 %). 1f we now examine individual 
wards in I{emsche.io, this should give us a clearer picture ot the 
extent of locality of r,ealiynlllent. In tionsbery 3, the KPU increasea 
its total of votes by 1 to l,UUU (74.0 %) on a Y4.' "k tur'n out. lhe 
NSUAP more than recouped the losses sustained in Novelllber lyj~, 
gaining 107 votes (1~.3 %). Ihe SPU lost 3U votl:!S, tallin~ to bu 
(4.Y %), and the Lentrum iml-lroved by tne saUle margin to csu (5.Y l). 
From thiS it is evident that NSUAP gains can be largely ascribed to 
new and former non voters, wi th the bares t IlIi nirnurll of 1II0Velllent away 
from the KPU. In ward 7, Struck, on a turn out of 91.4 '10 with re 
duced voting eligibility (-49), the KPU took 57.l % (lo~ votes), 
and the NSUAP 2U.~ % (27~). Ihe results of the other ~arties varled 
only marginally. In the 193U election in this ward, there had I..leen 
a ~l.Y% turn out and the KPU had attracted 77U votes (!:l~.,/ /0), 
whilst the NSUAP had managed 179 = U% (in July l~j~ ~1~ vutes ;; 
10.1 %). Unce wore sugyests that in March 1933 the Nazis protited 
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from the return of desert.ers to the KPU and apathetic sections at 
the electorate in November 1~32. Ihe Reichstay elections at l~~ti 
. and lY3U set the stable KPU vote in Struck between b~2 and 77U, so 
that the gains made thereafter must be considered as fluctuatiny -
between !lU and bU votes - which in the radically altered circUlII-
stances the KPU could not hold. In ward I, Bislllarckstrabe I, cun-
taining Remscheid's second most importantshoppiny street, ttle 
Nazis had taken over f"rolll the UVP as the strongest fJarty in l~~b 
and managed to consolidate theii position in subsequent elections. 
In lYJ~. with expanded votin\;l eliyibi IHy l+31) ana an lllcrt:!dSel.l 
turn out of !:I2.~ ~ (l!l2 more vO.ters than in November 1~3~: alia ~5 
more than in lY3U), the NSDAP increased its numberot votes to b~7 
(bU.b ~), a gain of W5 over November lY32 and at 115 over July ot 
that year. Ihe KPU collected J~l votes (25.Yl), only b fewer thdn 
in Novelllber lY~2 and 2~ lIlore than in the July election. lhe vutes 
of all the other parties vary negligibly. so that the conclusiun to 
be drawn here is Ulat the NSUAP gains were again due .to tile relllobl-
lisation of former. non-voters who had deserted owin\:j tu lacl< ot 
interest in November lY32, new voters and the handful at votes trulII 
the parties whictl had been eliminated. Again the KPU vote tleld ulJ 
extremely well and there is little evidence of aesertion by /fIore 
than a tiny number. Ward 4, Eichenstrabe, was a lUore IlIar\:jinal area 
whictl the Nazis capturea from the KPU in July 1~32 and lost a\:jain 
three months later. In 1~33 there was a Y2.!:> ~ turn out in an un-
changed electorate. The NSUAP received bUJ votes (41.7 ~), 215 nlore 
than in Nuvernber,and lJ2 more than in July 1~32. Ihe KPU remaillea 
very stable with 4U5 votes {2H.U ~), which constituted a loss ut 
only 34 since November and of 10 since July 1~3~. the SPU secureo 
llH (H.2 ~) •. 4 votes more than in November and l~ more than in July 
. lY32. lhe Zentrulll also picked up a few more votes reaching a total 
of ltW ll~.5 ~), 'J7 more than in November and lY more than in July 
lY32. The remaininy parties lost votes;the UVP lost 35, the Staats-
partei 7 I and the Schwarz- Weijj-Hot lUNVP and Starll he 1111) b. ~ r01l1 
this it wil I be seen that NSUAP gains in this wara were also Que to 
the. increased turn-out which was conSiderably rll!;lller than in any 
previouS election {Ub more votes were cast than in July l~j~. tile 
- 4~U-
highest turn out prior to 1~33). Ihe Nazis had cl~arly succeeaed in 
mobilising sections of the electorate which had never votea betore, 
had taken back votes lost to the KPU in November l~Jj::!, and had har-
nessed the non-catholic middle classes. 
In Ward 1b, AljeestraBe, the NSUAP won an overall majority at 5~.;t'k 
(btl5 votes) in a ~3.tl % turn-out. The size at" the electorate had 
increased by only ~ since November 1~3j::!. /he Nazi !;jains were ~~U 
votes over November, and 101 over Ju Iy 1 !:J3l. I he KPU won 13.7 '10 
lltlU), a decrease of 3tl vQtes.since November ana at JU since July 
1!:J3l. The UNVP (schwarz-weiB-Rot) on the other hana adaea a further 
. 
1b votes to reach a total of Ibl (U~.3 %), and tile .Staatspartei 
also !;jained 1b to score 32. (~.4 19). The SPU lost l!> vot~s dnd trte 
Lentru/ll l, winning bU (4.b %) and tl5 (b.5 %) respectively. Ille 
maj or ca sua I ty after an ephelllera I recovery WdS the UV P wh i ch 105 t 
b3, drOpping to 7~ (b.U %l. Yet again it is eviaent that the NSUAP 
tJrofited first and foremost from the mobilisation ot politically 
'indifferents' who turned out in yreater nUlllber ttlan ever betore. 
There was a I so a I arge degree of rea I i gnlllent ot KPU voters than in 
any of the other Hemscheid wardS analysed so tar, Out even hE:re it 
remains relatively insignificant. The UVP's col latJ se 1II0St certainly 
benefited the NaziS, but also the Kamptfront Sctlwarz·weib-Rot. ana 
perhaps also the Staatspartei's total, albeit only J~, is interes-
ting, as it signals either a slight realignment ot SPU vot~rs 
(pOSSibly younger Jews) or of a. few former UVP' voters (a!:lain 
possibly Jews). The Kalllpffront's gains may be int~rpreted dS Cl· 
desire by. a sectio'n at the middle-class electorate wnlch was in 
broad agreement with the aims of the new governlllent but coula not 
identHy with the Nazis, to strengthen the junior partner in the 
coalition. Although the NSUAP won an overall lIlaJority in ward lb, 
given the circumstances, the victory IIlUSt be reyaraeo as relatively 
un impres s ive. 
ward 27, schillerstra~e, populatea 
white-collar employees and members of 
laryely by civi I servants, 
the profeSSions can alsu not 
be regarded as a bastion of National Socialism in the s.dllle sense as 
LUttrinyhausen. Here the Nazis failed to attain an overal I lIIaJorlty 
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securing 4~.j '10 llll) in a slightly eXlJanded electorate (+n) dlla 
in a high turn out of ~J.b '10. "Ihe second stronyest party was the 
Kampftront. lol (1b.J '10); followed by the KPU, lU1 (ll.~ 10); ttle 
SPU, 14b lY.l '10); and the UVP. lJ~ (~.4 '10). laken toyettler, ot 
course. the voters in this ward were broadly sYlnpatnetic to the new 
regime, but as in Alleestraue. there is eviaence at a aesire to 
boast the junior coalition partner. As it would aJ,JJ,Jear to be the 
case everywhere, We NSUAP attracted a large nUlllber ot 'inditte-
rents' and IIIOSt of the new voters. 1t would also seelllS ttldt the 
Nazis ,took votes from both, the KPU and SPU, althouljh tne extent 
. 
relllains unclear. owinlj to the fairly wioe distributioll of votes 
over the wtwle lJarty sJ,Jectrum. Ihe SPU was the hedviest casualty" 
losiny tll votes since November. dlld lU!:I trullI its tutdl in July 
1 YJl. 1 t inay safe Iy be assumed that sOllle at these votes SIll t tt'd to 
the KPU. which actually increased its total by' 1. All the other 
parties, with the exception of the ZentrulIl (+J), lost votes. HOw-
ever. the fact tllat 114 votes more were cast in Marctl 1YJj than in 
July 1YJl, and that the corresponding gain by the NSUAP was +144, 
, would appear to lIIini/llalise the flow of votes forlll Hie KPu to tile 
NSUAP. SOllle UVP votes clearly returned to the Nazis, arlo the IllaJo-
rity of We Vo I ksrechtpartei I s share of lY in NovelllDer 1 YJ~ went 
the S~llIe way. Nevertheless. the SPU losses are diff'icult to account 
for, and it IIIUSt e assullled that a certain nUlllber ot Social Uelllocra-
tic voters Il'ad become so disillUSioned, ttlat they did not vote ill 
M"rch lYjJ. Likewise. a handful of tormer KPU voters III ay ,also have 
abstained' owing either to their aetainment in police custody or 
else their absence in hiding. 
Ihe NSUAP strongholdS in Kelllscheid were: waros ~b, Heinsha'::jen 
(bU.U '10); ::stl. Hasten l, l5b.~ 'k); Hasten 3, (5Y.b ';.(.); ana 4U, 
Hasten 4 l5~.tl '10); all of them areas it will be reealleo ~o~u­
latedbya larye percentaye ot slllall fIIanufacturers. it will be fur 
ther reca II ed. that the I oca I workers I movelllent hdd never IIldndyed 
, to lIIake a notab I e impact on tnese areas, where the sty I e at IIldlld'::je" 
lIIent in the factories and workshops remained essentially J-laterna 
listic. tioth Reinshayen and hasten were traditionally nationalist, 
and toyether played host to the majority of Kelllscheid's ex-Service-
men's ana veterans' associations. lhe results at elections between 
l~JU ana 1~33 testify conclusively to the fact that more than dny 
other section of local society, it was the slIIall manufacturers dna 
artisans, who 'embraced National SocialisllI lIlost enthusiastically. 
In Meinshayen, ~ard lb, where the Nazis aChievea their best percen-
tage vote, there was a %.3% turn out. The electorate haa incredseu 
by only ,4 since November 1~3l, but was ~ fewer than in July lYJi::. 
In July l~Jl the NSUAP had already attainea an overall majority of 
!:>~.U % (!:>3tl votes). In the sallle election the KPU was the only seri-
'ous challenger with 2b.7 % (252). In March lY3J, the Nazis beneti-
ted from the extremely high turn out to improve its Share,. and the 
KPU held steady at 22.tl % (242), a loss of only lU votes. None ot 
the other parties IIldde an illlpact whdtsoever in ttle elections be-
tween July lY3l and March 1933. In November 1Y3l ttw KPU hJO t,il'-l~1l 
some votes from the NSUAP to reach a total of 't.7J l't.tl.l %). ,in 
March 1~J3 al I the converts returned to the Nazis. Yet again it is 
apparent that tile NSUAP managed to persuaae a IlIIos t cl II the . i IH.11t-
ferents' (consistently high turn out fiyures would sUY\:lest that 
there were anyway extremely few in this ward) to exercise their 
vote. Htis pattern is repeated in all the Hasten wardS, so that in 
conclusion we can saf'ely say, that the Nazis benefited in every 
kelllschei a wara frolll the return of aeserters in the Novelllber e I ec-
tion of lYJl, the disappearance of the Mittelstanas/Wirtschdfts and 
Volksrecht parties,the IIlobi lisation of still lIIore tormer non-voters 
as well as most of the new electors and aeserters trolll the relllain-
ing middle-class parties. The NSUAP took very few votes frolll tile 
KPU, prObably less than bUU to 6UO. lhis calculation is unaerlined 
by the fact that the Communi s ts poll ed on Iy JUti votes fewer in 
March 1 Y33 than in Ju Iy 1 Y3l, and the SPU I os t on Iy 345 over the 
same period.These figures conclusively disprove the theory at larye 
-scale cOllullunist realignment in I{elllscheid following the Nazi tdke~ 
over. The NSUAP success in th is town was unelju hoca Ily Clue to tile 
radicalisation of the middle and lowt!r-lIIiddle classes who had lIt:ver 
warmly embraced j.>arlialllentary delllocracy. AuttlOritaridn attituues, 
deeply rooted in the Memscheid bourgeoiSie, were reintorced by tile 
traumatic experience of the lostwdr, hYj.>er-intlation,the Versa; II~ 
treaty and the worla economic depression. The presence at a well' 
organised radical workers 'movelllent which enjoyea lIlass sUj.>lJort, 
posed a constant threat to the interests of local IIIdllufacturers. 
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5. kesistance ayainst the National Socialists in J<elUsclleid lYJJ-45. 
Resistance in kemscheid took on Illany different forllls and was 
carried out by individuals and groups from al I classes. However, as 
one might illlayine in a town with such a strony and etfective 
workers' movement, the bulk of active opposition Cclllle trolll trllS 
quarter, both with regard to organised and unorYdnised resistance.· 
Uryanised resistance appears to have been clllllost exclusively the 
domain of the workers, > with the. COllllllunists jJlayiny the leaain'::j 
role, supj.Jorted by Social Uemocrats, trade unionists, members at 
the workers' sports clubS, Naturfreunde, freidenker, an·d other 
workers who were not organised in any parties, ClUbS and oryanisa . 
tions belonging to the workers' movement. Unoryanisea resistance 
which excluded sporaClic and isolateCl delllollstrations ot. frustrdl"iull 
and anger, also aj.Jpears to have COllie laryely trolll tile workers, /..Jut 
also frolll Christians, particularly JVlethoClists, JehOVd'S witnesses, 
lIIembers,ot the ~ekennende Kirche, several protestant and catholic 
clergymen, and a number ot non-aligned individuals. 
Ihe author. subscribes to a broad definition ot tile terlll 'resis-
tance', which is neittler· dependent on ultimate ettectivity anll 
achievement, nor on the social and geographical extent of conspira-
torial activity. In his choice of criteria, the auttlOr findS hilll-
self in broad agreement with Hans Joset ~teinber~I:l~, whO ex-
cludes politically apathetiC elements, who - throuyh lack of 
interest - remained totally passive and therefort;! did /lot actively 
and consistently support We Nazis; notorious yrulIIDlers who were 
wont to cOlllplain out of reasons of personal dissatisfaction duriny 
the years of the "'hird Keich, as indeed duriny tile weil/lar Ke(Jublic; 
arlll chair ~oliticians in pubS ltliertischpolitiker) ~llIose couraYl! 
and interest increased in proportion to the alllount of alcotlOl tlley 
consullled, ana those who under ttle inf luence ot drink wt!rt! yraspell 
by a momentary Upsurye of courage inducing them to Shout "Hei I 
Moskau" or "Rot Front". The essential tactors re~drdiny resistance 
to the Nazis are the interaction with oUler indiviuudls or ~ruujJ~ 
(not merely family lIlelllbers), either in a personal capacity, for 
eXdwple by the spread of prOlJayanda by word of lIlouth, tile cullec-
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tion of party dues or the payment of these, the purctlase ot tJro-
scribed literature, the extension ot retu~e to tuyitives and diu to 
prisoners of war and ~ussian and Polish slave workers (Ustarbeiter). 
or by the preparation ana distribution of oppositional literaturi:!. 
A further important factor involved in resistance is the aesire, 
not out of lIIotives ot personal gain, to underllline dnd eventudlly 
topple the National Socialist State, in the knowled~e trlat in !tIe 
event of discovery severe penalties WOUld be exacted. 
~esistance can be subdivided into two cate~ories, or~anised ana Ull-
organised activities. The tormer concerns the interaction ot iudi-
viduals and yroups forminy a network spread over several Oistricts 
(Stadttelle) with connections with other towns auo areas. dnll 
steered either wholly or partly by a central oryanisdtion. lite orll_y 
obvious exalllple of organised resistance in Hemsctleid knowrI to tilt:: 
author is that ot COllllllunist yroups. Unoryanisea res1stdllce lS tlll.Il 
which is carriea out by individuals and/or slIIall isuldted ~roul-ls 
working on their own initiative with no external help. 
Material used for this study was tak.en frOl1l neWSl-ldtJer articles, 
l:iestapo files~J and denazification -questionnaires locdtea ill 
_ the Landeshauptstaatsarchiv in UUsseldort, persondl ti les belonyin~ 
to the ~erlin uoculllent Centre collection, dnd frollt inturllldtiou 
supplied by interviewees. 
~esistance in ~elltsctleid falls Droadly into three phdses: trow Jallu-
ary to May lY3J, trolll May lYJJ to lYJb, and the war years. Ijetween 
lYJ!> and lYLll oppositional activity was on the whole stJoradic dlld 
isolated, alttlOugh by no weans restricted to individuals. t.:olluilunist 
groups, tor exawple,. were sti 1I active in the town, even tnOLJ\;j1l 
links wi th We reyi ona I tleadquarters had been severed and were 
only loosely and telllporarily reestaDlished.~4 Uuriny tllis 
peri od t however, 11105 t oppos it i ona I activity was ot an unor!:jani sea 
nature, (Jrilllari Iy consistiny of the yatheriny ot inturllldtion trolll 
foreign radio stations and disselllinatin~ propayanud Dy WOfll ut 
mouth in SlIIal I circles. 
Ille first phase of resistance which warks the transition to i IIt:Yd-
I,ity, for which the KPU claillled to have been J.lrelJdrea, was J.lerlJetrd-
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ted i niti ally in the hope that a united front of the workers' lIIove-
lIIent would oe established, and that the Natiollal !:lucialist state 
would soon be toppled. This optimistic view is amply reflectea in 
the many examples of dariny and careless operdtions carriea out by 
the working-class organisations. [he workers' lIIovement suttered 
serious:set backs during the first JIlunths as a result ot tile arrest 
ana internment of' the majority of its leaders and a large section 
of its functionaries. Whil~t the KPU had theoretically preparea its 
melubers for the transition to clandestine operations, it is eviaent 
that this preparation was inadequate and in lIIany cases ineffective. 
furtherlllore, the savagery wi th which repression~~~rsued, 'seellls to 
have taken even experienced cOllullunist functionaries by surlJrise. 
uespite the general confusion of the first weeks ut Nazl rule, 
whiCh could have been eXlJloited to conceal weapons in sate lIiuillY 
places, a yreat lIIany oUicials were caught red Ildlldea ill tllt!lr own 
homes with pistols and allununition duriny police ana SA raias. Ihe 
first phase ended with the decimation of the local party caare ana 
left enorlllous gaps which had to be fi lied witll youny ana illexperi 
enced melllbers. 
The second phase, like the first, was signifiea by nUlllerous ana di-
verse activitieS, concerning the rebuilding of ~arty oryanisdtion, 
. tile establishment of links with different gruujJs, the jJrocurelllent 
of Of-lPOSitiOfldl literature, the designing, jJrintiny ana aistriou-
tion of leaflets and stickers, the collection of party subscrip-
tions and gifts for tile talllilies of COlllriHles Ileld in protective 
custody, the provision of telllporary asylum for tuyitives trolll tne 
authori ties and the es tab I i shlflent of escatJe routes across HIe bor-
der to Holland, ~elyiulII and the $aar. uuriny this ptlase there were 
three main groupS at work in Kelllscheid, and all of these lIIaintainea 
linkS with grout-ls throuyhout the ~er';lisChe Land, the Lower. Klllne 
and the Kuhr. This phase was terminatea by the llestatJ0's systellldtic 
and relentless pursuit of local opposition, based on the torturillY 
of suspects and the wide use of inforlllers and stJies, sOflle ot whicll 
were recrui ted either by coercion or threats from tile rankS ot tile 
resistanCe movement. 
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The third. identltiable phase coincided with tne turniny point ot 
the war. The war itself offered abundant scope for illeyal oPPosi-
tional activity, but this was offset by the fre4uent illlplementation 
of vicious penalties which increasinyly included the deattl sefltt:rlce 
for comparati ve ly mi nor offences. The set- backs sus ta i ned by ttle 
German armies, the personal sufferin!:! owin~ to the effects of bOIOD-
iny raias, the increased work tempo and lon!:!er workiny hours delllan-
ded for the war effort, tne close proximity of natural opponents of 
the systelll in the forlll of slave workers and prisoners ot war, and 
the steady 'encroachment of allied armies on the f<eictl, were all 
. 
factors which encourayed resistance which, as' the war progressed, 
beyan to seem. less futi le than in the middle years of the Nazi 
dictatorship. Until the final months of the war. how0ver, inter,le 
tive opposition was still Chiefly conducted by the workers. I lie 
majority of inhaDitaritS at least outwardly appeared to osci Ilate 
between fanaticism and supreme confiaence in the FLihrer on tile one 
hand, and numbness and letharyy on the other. Tne extent of resis-
tance in J{elllscheid, particularly in the later stayes of the war, 
. may never be known, as on ly those cases discovered Dy the Naz is 
have been documented. Activities such as the sabotaye of weajJolls 
and lfIunit ions. and cOlllpass ionate support for forei ~n workers were 
documented only seldom before the survivors returfled home to 
their own countries after the war. 
The. first phase of resistance began illllllediately in the workill!;l-
class movement and may be regarded as a continuation of the class 
conflict which was being waged duriny the final years of the Weimdr 
Hepublic. The fact that initial resistance was spearlleadea by the 
KPD is not surprising, as this jJarty waS the first candidate for 
destruction by the Nazis •. The naivety with which cOllullunist resis-
tance was carried out" duriny the first 1Il0nths i~ exellljJlified by the 
case of two workers who were caught in the centre of Lennep in 
broad daylight distributing leaflets uryiny llerlllan workers tu unitt: 
to bring down the Nazi state. tltl This kind of action underlines 
the continuity of a pattern of operation established in the Weilllar 
Republic, and testifies to the failure to appreciate the nature ot 
National socialism in power.The KPU itself must bear res\Jonsibility 
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for the lI!i sawreci ati on of the chanyed ci rcullls tances. a llIi stake 
which had been cOllllllitted earlier. with misconstrued J,JrolJayanaa lJer-
taining to "~rLininy Fasctlislllus"~ "Papen Faschislllus" and "SOZidj-
faschismus". labels which confused'the J,Jarty's own sUJ,JlJorters. IlIe 
consequence of previous mistakes was that lIIelllbers aid not know wlldt 
to expect frolll real fa:cislll when it was elevated to power. 
Another exalllp I e of na i ve . bravado on the J,Jart of I oed I COlllllluni sts 
occurred on the day of the election (March bth). Rea tlays haa been 
hoisted on the top of trees in a copse in KrementlOll. When a troolJ 
of SA lIIen arrri ved on the scene to relllove the ot fendi ny Ddllllers. 
they callle under fire frolll a yroup of COllllllunists Iyiny in" alllbush. 
Evidence !Joints to a continuation of tactics CUlIlIlIOllly ellljJ)oyed au 
ring the latter years of" the Weilllar RelJuDlic. viz. pranks desl-Jlw<l 
to cornprollli se the SA in such a way as to make them d. I'duytll rly 
stock. Although the Jlllbushers had alllple time to select· d taryet 
(there were severdl storllltruOlJers present dnd stdnuilly in a yroulJ), 
no one was hit. I:.ventually the beleayuered SA men ~~ere relievell by 
a detacnlllent ot policemen nurryiny to their aia.llle ruse now DdCk-
fired as the J,Jolice and SA sealea off the neiyhDourtlOoa and syste-
matically cOlllbed the area .. A flUlllber of residents who haa witllessell 
the exchange of shots informed ttle pol ice as to the whereabouts ot 
the dlllbushers, and J,Jolicelllen and storllltrooJ,Jers were able to capturt:! 
two of the COllllllunists involvea in the operation. Une of these was 
badly wounded in the oelly and thigh by Shots sustained in tile 
shoot out. A subse4uent search of the houses, in wlliclI the COIIIIIIU-
nists .had taken refuye. revealed several Ruttrullt uniforllls. bO 
The accused were each sentenced to tive years hard laDuur in Q 
correction centre and were deprivea at their civi I riY/'lts tor the 
sallle !Jeriod. This kind at' action was repeated on several occasiuns 
duriny the spring of 1~33~ and each time lea to arrests ana convic-
tions without any tangible achievenlents.~7 Ttie counter IJroauc' 
tive siae of such exploits can be yaul:jed by the reaction in tl)~ 
press to one such alllbush later in the year in which Cl storllltruujJer, 
wi II i Hofflllann, was hit in the arlll on his way nUlIle. Itle Nazi IJres~ 
called for a merciless caulpaiyn ayainst all 'Marxist crilllinals'. 
Striking a pathetiC note typical of the l:Seryischer lJeODacnter01::i 
the article described the event in the tollowiny way: 
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•••• und nun dieser Uberfall! Ein SA' Kalllerad kOllllllt aus 
dem Kino. Er hat sich mit seinern ::>turlll unseren Fi 1111 VOIII 
SA Mann ~rand angesehen. Noch ist der £inaruck des herr-
-lichen Films nicht verfloyen, da trifft ihn aut a~" Nach-
hauseweg die Kugel eines komlllunistischen Verrdters ••• 
Es ist wohl klar, da/:> sich die SA Leituny in Kelllsclleid die 
Oberfalle des roten Gesindels nicht lIIehr yefallen laJjt. 
Mit der so lange geUbten Ihicksichtnahllle ist es jetzt vor-
uber. Uie SA wird die Anweisung erhalten, bei uberfallen 
rUcksichtslos zur Selbsthilfe zu schreiten ••• ' 
Such incidents were used to perpetuate the fear of the communist 
threat in Kemscheid and to isolate the opposition. 
Further examples of the actual unpreparedness of KPU funct40naries 
and members alike for the initial impact of Nazi terror are to De 
seen in the larye nUlllber of house sedrctles which uncovered incriuli--
rlatinyevidence. IlIe newspapers rejJorteu SUCI\ IllHh dui Iy rrulII 
March onwards. HY 
Uf the lIIany diUerent leaflets distributed in /{elllscheiu auriny tile 
first monthS followiny tile Nazi takeover, tile lIIain themes dl-'I-'t::!dr 
to have been appeals for a united front and a yenerdl strik.e. III 
February ana March one particular leaflet appealed to We SPU wor-
kers to abandon thei r 1 eaders and j oi n the KPU in order to over-
throw the regime. A report sent to the police COllllllissioner in Keck-
ling_hausenYO (Sonderkollullissar des Ministers des Inneren) tola 
of the Solinyen Keichsbanner lIIelllbers' decision to eXjJel their lea-
ders and yo over to the Comlllunists. There was no Illention of siUlilar 
moves in Hemscheid althouyh it is known that some local Reichsoan-
ner men did work in KPO-Ied resistance yroups.!;!l Another leat--
let circulated in the town. which appears to have been written ana 
printed in Kemscheid appealed to SA workers to Join the KPU it tlley 
were really interested in overthrowiny the cajJitalist systelll~~: 
'Klassenyenossen in der SA und SS, warulII aenullziert ihr 
unschuldiye Arbeiter und Areiterfalllilien, warulII veranlal)t 
ihr Haussuchunyen und Verhaftunyen. WarulII verursacht inr 
neben den wirtschaftlichen Sorgen aer Arbeiterfalllilien 
noch lIIehr Unheil. Trefft ihr aalllit den KaJ-litalisten '/ 
Schafft ihr dalllit eine neue Kul tur 1 Schaft"t Hlr dalllit 
neue Freunde fur Hitler 7 Nein. Eure Tatiykeit aient niCllt 
der nationalen £iniyuny und Befreiuny. Sie dient zur tr-
haltung des Kapitalislllus und aes Elends aes Krieyes una 
der Not. Uu kdlllpfst an falscrler Front. Wir rufen dir zu: 
Auyen auf, Schluf:S damit, los von Hitler.' 
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The first,phase of resistance ended with the round up of the wor-
kers' leaders and a large section of the lIlost experienced ana aC-
tive functionaries. These had been listed by the NSUAP lon~ before 
the party came to power. The lists were cOlllpleted by police fi les, 
so that very few party activists were able to escape detection. 
Some wanted COllulIunists did manaye to evade capture in the first 
weeks and spent periodS in hiding. It is claimed that buth Ernst 
Thallllann and Max Holz found temporary refuge in I<elllsctlt:!id duriny 
the first weeks of February. They spent several' days in hiding in 
allotlllents in Lobach before continuing on their way; lhlillllann 
returned to Berlin for the secret KPU conference, and MdX Halz pre-
sumably to safety across the border. ~3 
The second phase of resistance began witll the rebuildin~ of ttJ~ 
local KPU apparatus after recovering frolll the 'initial snack. lids 
process was completed fairly rapidly by the reddines's of younger 
COllllllunists, particularly single WOlllen but also the wives of de-
tainees and minor functionaries, who had either been overlookea or 
somehow escaped detection, or else had been released by the liestapo 
. . , 
after interrogation had failed to establish grounas for prosecution 
Une of the first measures to be undertaken was to secure the cul-
lection of subscriptions and financial support for ttle fami lies ot 
internel:!s. Although the majority of district (Stadtteil) collectors 
had been seized by the Nazis, the network had not Deen completely 
paralysed, as in sOllle cases pr~vision had been IIIdOe for various 
contingencies like illness or imprisonment. Une youn~ woman, for 
instance, had accolllpanied her father as a young girl on his rounds 
in the Neuenhof district.~ After his arrest by the police she 
took over collections for the Rote HiHe as she was well knuwn to 
the majority of residents in that particular area. uespite this ad-
vantage~ however, the transition did not dl~ays function Sllloothly. 
Fear of detection cOlllbined with widespread demoralisation and frus-
tration, which in many cases was directed against the workers lIIove-
ment and in particular against the KPU, made the collector's task 
inflnitely more dHficult. The payment of subscriptions was no 
longer an automatic COHunitment for many households. Collectors 
sometimes experienced difficulties in households wtlere tIle husbdnd 
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had been taken into custOdy. Un one such oeeas i on the wife of a 
party member who was awaiti ng tri a 1 in J,lri son threatened to i ntorm 
the Gestapo when the-collector called for subscriptions. This ex-
perience together with a narrow escape in the summer, when a meet-
ing of the workers' Esperanto club in her flat in Neuenhaus was 
denounced and subse4uently raided by the Gestap0 95, friyhtened 
this young woman to such an extent that she discontinued collec-
tions, and restricted her activities to a small and trusted cir~le 
of friends. 
Following the first waves of arrests, highpdority was \:jiven to 
expressions of solidarity with the prisoners and their families. Un 
Sunday mornings groups of young people belonging to th~ Natur-
freunde and COllllllunlst Youth would stand outside the Court House 
jail sinying sonys. When the police moved them on, they stationed 
themselves outside the pal ice head4uarters, where other workers 
were held, and repeated the exercise there. Y6 
Uuring the summer of 1933 there were two I arye res is tance yroulJs 
operating in Helllscheid. It is not clear whether they were aware at" 
each other's existence, although the Hans-Salz-group, basea J,lrillla-
rily in Lennep and Relllscheid-South, distributed leaflets which had 
been produced by the other, the Andreas-PfIUger-yroup91 basea 
in Hemscheid town. 
The Andreas-Pfli.iger-yroup was the larger or\:janisation consistin\:j 
mainly of KPL) members, and was politically far more experiencea 
than the Sa 1 z-group based in Lennep •. The ~emsche id oryan i sa t i 011 
which consisted of at least 12U JIIerubers 9U was established at 
the behest of the KPL) ~ezirksleitung Niederrhein (regional organi-
sation)in UUsseldorf. A man under the pseudonYl1I 'Gustav' was dis-
patched to Reruscheid to contact Karl ZUlch, a KPU official who had 
so far escaped detection by the Nazis. ZUlch was asked to provide a 
meeting place and an address for the collation and distribution of 
leaflets.~Y ZUlch enlisted the aid of minor KPU official Helmut 
'1rornmelschHiger whO had a small grocery store and who agreed to pro-
vlde a small roolll behind the stlOp for illegal meetings. A IlIeeting 
was arranged to discuss the organisation of a local resistallce 
movement which in the initial stage woula be supplied with lIIateridl 
directly from the KPU regional headquarters. Tllis meeting Wd$ 
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attended by 'uustav', ZLilch, Tronunelschlayer, Karl wellershaus - a 
KPU official and lIIelllOer of ttle workers' swillllllin~ club - eHlU ~rdlll 
Leyk from the Rotfrontkampferbund. The di spatch of materi cl I from 
D~sseldorf was announced by coded instructions sent to Lulcn who in 
turn passed these on to Trommelschlayer. It was collected by Edel-
bert Schumacher, a KPU official, who picked it up at the ~~Iuen­
werth railway station and deposited it at lrommelschlayer's shojJ. 
The leaflets were then collected Oy a group of district oryanisers 
who in turn handed the material to a staff of distributors in their 
particular dis~rict. Leaflets were jJassed down the line to subordi-
nate distributors whO sold them for 1U pfennigsper coJ.lY. 1he jJro-
ceeds flowed in the olJPosite direction back to Ziilch who handea 
them on to '.uustav'. The oryanisation, whiCh reselllbled Hie struc-
ture of a pyralllid , functioned alony the lines of the Ureiersystelll 
(groups of three), in which each individual knew only the iaentity 
of the person from wholfl he recei vea the materi a I and the jJerson 
whom he supjJlied. AS the oryanisation had a nUlllber of duplicatiny 
machines and typewriters at its disposal, it soon oeyall to proauce 
its own leaflets and brochures. In order to make detection 1II0rt: 
difficult, these apparatuses were constantly circulated alllonyst 
Relllscheid families,sO that no one particular householu would COllie 
under suspicion. Une of the houses used by the gruujJ for the pur-
• poses of typing material was situated opposite the uestdpo Ilt::ad-
quarters in Uhlanostra(.)e. Ellllni Leyenaecker1UU typed leaflets 
at the house of Pau I and liertha u 1 as101 • When the young wOlllan 
was arrested by the liestapo she was able to shiela her hosts Oy 
claiming that these had allowed her to use a room to practise type-
writing in oraer to improve her chances of emjJloyment. The tenants 
denied all knowledge of the real nature of Leyendecker's work, ana 
despite reservations, the uestapo had to accejJt this version in tile 
absence of corrobora t i ve ev i dence. Emmi Leyendecker also lIIaae her 
room above her parents' newsagent's shOp available to the yroutJ, 
and together with Luise Paul 1U2 typed a nUlllber of leatlets 
there. The Pfli.iyer-group also devised an elaoorate systelll' tor the 
collection of party subscriptions which ran parallel to the distrl-
bution of illeyal literature. In addition to these activities, this 
, 
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organi sati on provi ded refuge for party functi onari es on the run 
from the' police. 103 The political instructor of the Kelllscheid 
group was Artur Uorf who was simultaneously one of the KPU resis-
tance leaders in the Lower ~hineland regional headquarters. He also 
found refuge in R~nscheid and was able to evade capture.Tne bestapo 
achieved an il/lportant breakthrough on 9th Au~ust when a policellldll 
arrested PflUger, who WdS on his way to work with a number of leaf-
lets in his bag. uespite the rapid speed with which the liestapo 
moved, severa I important members of the group were able to escape. 
Ludwig Sti llger, for instance, jumped through the window of his 
flat as liestapo officials were forcing entry at tne .aoor. 1U4 
He then spent the night in a garden shed before collecting one or 
two,belongings and making his getaway across the border to Hol land. 
The second major resistance organisation in I<elllscheid was lell lly 
Hans ~a I z whO was Cl melllber of the work.ers' sports IIlovelll~lIt.lu~ 
I 
This group had over 60 melllbers, rnostly belonyiny to the KPU ur 
'affiliated organisations. Whereas the PflUge~group coula draw un d 
considerable alllount of experience, the Lennep groujJ consisteo t-tri 
mari ly of young men and women who had not yet held posi tions ot 
responsibility within the movement. The inexperience .and youttltul 
enthusiasm with which they went about their tasks on a number ot 
occasions alsmost led to their downfall. Uespite this oisaovdntd!:je 
the Salz-group was able to remain undetected for nearly two years. 
Salz and his colleagues formed part of a network whiCh stretcheo 
over the whole of the Ijergisch' inaustrial region and coojJeratea 
closely with communist and Social Uelllocratic groups in Wuppertal. 
Several of the group'S lIIembers began their subterranedn activities 
during the first phase of resistance. It was above all auriny the 
first few weeks that the Salz-group made mistakes which might wel I 
have had catds troptli c consequences. On one OCCdS i on lirt-:te 
Salz10b, on her· own initiative, wrote sloyans on newspapers 
and magazines in a dentist's surgery 'in Lennep. She haa barely left 
the premises after receiviny treatmentJwhen tney were discovt:!red Dy 
the next patient. The liestapo were summoned and were able to ascer-
tain that only two people had received tr~atlllent so fdr ttlat IlIur 
ning. The youny woman was arrested the followiny day anll Cl graptlo 
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logist as~isted the police during the interrogation session. urete 
Salz managed to disguise her handwriting to such an extent that the 
expert was not able to establish her guilt. Uther IlIelllDersof the 
group helped to exonerate her by writing the same slogans in other 
surgeries and tele~hone kiosks all over the town. Un another occa-
sion urete Salz admonished Hans Salz and Karl f:.nyels tor their 
failure to distribute leaflets on schedule. The following day the 
two men, still ashamed at their attack of nerves, painted sloyans 
on a wall opposite the police station in broad daylight and after-
wards threw a wad of. pamjJhlets over a, factory wall.l U1 The 
members of the group, however, learned from their mistakes· and in 
future refrained from illlpulsive actions of the kind described aDuve 
Perhaps their most successful operation was the cdlllpaiyn ayainst 
the concentration camp at Kemna.lUtlApart from sllluyyliny 
first aid equipment and cigarettes into the call1~, tlley also 
gathered information about prevailing conditions and the brutal 
treatment of detainees by the SA guards. This information was 
distributed throughout the region in the form of pamphlets ana 
stickers which came to the notice of foreign press corresjJonaents 
with the result that a vociferous campaign was wagea in newspapers 
abroad.10~ Furthermore, the families of camp irunates were 
encouraged to gather on the slopes above th'e camp on Sunday after-
noons. an act whi ch provok~d warni ng shots from tile guards, bu t 
which drew the attention of increasing numbers of inhabitants of 
the region to the exploits of the SA guards. The closure of the 
camp was due in no small measure to the work of this conspiratorial 
groull· 
The Lenne~ resistance organisation producea a large number of leaf-
lets, brochures and stickers which were distributea' in the I{elll-
sc'heid and Wuppertal area. llU Furthermore, they sllluggled ,i 1-
legal literature into the MannesllIann factory in Which a communist 
cell was active. Like the ~emscheid group they collected sUDscrip' 
tions for the KPU and gifts for the falllilies of internees. Tile 
Sa I z-group was sUPllosedly betrayed by a KPl) functi unary who had 
been arrested in the 
matter.lll Hans Salz 
course of in4uiries into a different 
was intercepted' by uestapo aljents in 
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Uusseldorf in Uecelllber 1934 whilst tryiny to make contact with 
other KPU officials. 59 members of the yroup stood trial between 
11th and 1bth November 1935 in Wuppertal. Of these, 0' were convic-
ted and sentenced to a tota 1 of 153 years illlpri sonlflent. for. tli s 
part in the conspiracy Hans Salz received a ten-year sentence wit" 
hard labour. In comparison with the sentences passed 011 tne lIIelllDers 
of the Pfl uger- group, only 12 months earl i er, the pena 1 ti es on the 
Lennep yroup were extremely severe ana reflect the proyressive 
intensification of punishment demanded by the authorities. Uurin~ 
the trial of Hans Salz and his companions, the public· prosecutor 
regretted that Salz had not been arrested a month later, be~ause as 
a result of further legislation he could have rleaded for the 
death penalty.112 
At about the sallle tillle the kelllscheid liestapo discovered another 
local organisation under the leadership of Kdrl ~ieDertz. lhis 
organisation was based in kemscheid and consisted primari Iy ot 
former members of the comlllunist youth lIIovement (KJVU). Siebertz WdS 
Charged with the task of rebuilding this organisation for the 
infiltration of the local SA, Hitler Youth and ~erman ~irls' Lea~ue 
lBUM).1l3 Siebertz had been approached by Hans Hofmann, who 
until1~33 had been a KPU town councillor and a forlller local COIIIIIlU-
nist youth leader. At the tillle of the meetiny Hofmann was in hidin~ 
and about to make his escape from Hemscheid. In the sUlluner of l~jt> 
Siebertz undertook a series of hikes wittl several youny people in 
the sur'rounding area of the town. It transpired tllat the IUdJority 
of his cOIIIPdnions had forJllerly belon!:Jed to the KJVU and dcceptea 
Siebertz' plans to rebuild the oryanisation enttlusiastically. Un 
subsequent hikes this group made the acquaintance of ottler hiking 
groups from Solingen and Ronsdorf and these were recruited for the 
resistance organisation. The /{onsdorf hikers were then instructea 
to make contact with 'young people in Wuppertal-tlannen with a view 
to founding a local group in that town. Subscriptions were paid at 
the rate of 20 pfennigs per melllber per week and were collecteo in 
Helllscheid by Karl Weber dnd Kurt I>eryerhoff. file leJlIer of tllc 
Remscheid brancn was Karl Hufschlllied and the district leader for 
Honsbery was Willi Helpensteller. Siebertz coordinated the work of 
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the various groups in the ~ergisch industrial re~ion and functioneo 
as an instructor. It is not known how far the plan to infiltrate 
Nazi oryanisations had lIIatured, when members of the ~olinyen yruup 
were arrested. The connections with Remscheid were soon discovered 
and the Gestapo was able to capture all the leadiny lIIelllbers witll 
the exception of" Hufschrnied and Siebertz. These made their way to 
France but were arrested by police and yiven the choice of either 
joining the Forei~n Legion or leaving the country. They elected to 
return to G~nany and were seized by the Gestapo on their arrival in 
Remscheid. 2Y group members stood trial and 14 of these were sen-
tenced to pri son sentences rangi ny from three months to tllree 
years. 
,The des truc t i on of the three oryan i sa t ions SUlflllla r: i sed dbove end ea 
the seconc:1 jJhase of resistance in Remscheid. At this /Joint it seelllS 
appropriate to take stock of the situati~ in the local workers' /'. . 
movelllent and i Cl the· work i n9 class duri n~ the fi rs t years of Ndl i 
rule. Firstly, it. is clear that the local workers' 1II0velllent 
suffered a defeat in 1YJ3, which was due above all tu events else-
where, but also in Remscheid. Uespite the KPU's impressive tally of 
,votes in the March election, plus those votes secured by'the SPU, 
these were not sufficient to legally prevent the NdZi consolidation 
of power, and this - it 1I1USt be remembered - was the situdtiun ill d 
stronghold of the German workers' movelllent. Even in a town wllicn 
boasted a strong.and active lIIilitant movement, the communist and 
Social Uelllocratic base was not wide enou\:jh to succeed. In addition 
to this fact the two working class parties were hopelessly sjJlit 
. and failed to find a broad enough consensus frolll whictl to challen\:je 
the NSUAP effectively. ~oth parties had been surprisea by the switt 
and savage reaction of ttle·.I'Iazis. althouytl the ~PU haa tillle to 
witness the destruction of its rival before itself falling victll1l 
to the same kind of brutal suppression. The campaign of terror dnd 
• Gleichschaltung followinglnthe wake of the electoral defeat, lea to 
demoralisation on a large scale. The destruction or the assililila-
tion of the working class movement's institutions, internlllellt ana 
in some cases murder or suicide of its leadershi p114 plunyed 
the movement into disarray.' These initial set backs IlIdY have been 
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surmounted, in a delllocracy, but under the Nazi dictatorship they hao 
calamitous conse4uences. The Nazis did not allow the workers' move-
ment to recover from these blows, but instead perfected tlleir tech-
niques of suppression by the establishment of a substantial netwOrk 
of spies and the encouragement of denunciationsll~. offeriny 
the opportunity for neighbours to settle scores which were not al-
ways politically motivated. llb The constant hounding of o~~o­
nents and continued surveil lance after release froUl IJrison or pro-
tective custody made renewed political activity an exceeoinyly 
hazardous business. The destruction of workers' institutions •. in 
particular their youth organisations which under normal circ·ulllstan, 
ces ensured a ready supply of new blOOd, effectively interrUlJtt!ll 
the process of rejuvination. In addition to these measures. the 
ideoloyical education of boys and girls in the Hitler Youth. lierhldn 
llirls' League and at school often outweiyhed jJarental influt!lIce, 
particularly in families where the fathers were absent for lony 
periodS of time, either due to imprisonment or later military 
service. and where working mothers had too little tillle to provia(~ 
an effective counter-balance. Furthermore. atolllisation ojJerated not 
only between falllilY units and the outside world. but also. within 
the home. Parents were forced to restrict discussions to non-poli-
tical issues whenever younger children were present for fear at' 
unintentional- denunciation in front of eayer schoulUlasters, HJ 
section leaders and neighbours. In this cl imate of fear, eneryy was 
increasingly devoted to everyday problems of a lIIaterialist nature 
by many working-class families. The hOllle ba:arne a refuye frolll the 
everyday pressures of the Third Reich ll/ ; the increased work-
rate (particularly after the onset of the rearlllaments boom in lY3~) 
longer hours. mandatory works' /IIeetinys which lenythenea the 
working day •. the constant urgings by party officials, to join 
affiliated oryanisations and the never endiny collections. COlllpli-
mentary to the atomisation of society were the eftects of Nationdl 
Socialist propaganda. claiming the erection of a classless society 
_, the much quoted folk community (Volksyemeinschaft) -- ana 'Socia 
lislO of deedS' (Sozial isrnus der Tat) and the elevatioll of consullle· 
rist values were designed to distract attention from politicdl 
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issues and encourage prestige thinking thus eroding traditional 
working-class relationships and undermining solidarity. In the 
main it was former functionaries' of the workers' lIIovement who 
proved most resistant to both, protJaganda and palliatives in the 
form of 'strength through joy' (Kraft durch Freuae) mass tourislll, 
'pay as you earn' Volkswagencars, government aided housing con-
structi on schemes carri ed out by owners themselves. ana househo I a 
furniture and appliances. Even if the majority of the population 
did not a.ctually participate in the consumption of such articles, a 
great deal more interest was apportioned to their future ~cquisi­
tion. It has already been noted that in the pre-war years of the 
Third Reich satisfaction was linked more closely with expectations 
than" actua I perforJJlancell~, an attitude of approva I whi Cll WdS 
due above all to the achievements of Nazi propaganda. 
The NSUAP, enjoying monotJo1y control of the IIledia, succeedea in 
creatiny the illusion of embryonic prosperity whiCh was reinforced 
by the steady reduction of unemployment and the imposiny construc-
tion progranunes which were started duriny the first year. In return 
for jobS the workers were forced to accept the loss of trade union 
rights of association and collective baryaining. In addition, tile 
suppress i on of the workers' movement encouraged the confi aence of 
industry and business, thus inducing expansion. A combination of 
coercion, rhetoric, abundant energy ,and modest success, wtllCll were 
in part fortuitously assisted by the already noticeable if sti 11 
hesitant, upswing of the trade cycle when the Nazis took 
power1l9, gradUally I eft thei r mark on' those e 1 ewents of the 
working class WllO had formerly not been politically active.Further-
more, it may be suppbsed that even the majority of convicted func-
ti onari es on thei r re I ease from pri son and protecti ve custOdy for 
obvious reasons refrained from continued oppositional activity, al-
though this is not to suggest that they became convincea followers 
of National Socialism. Their enforced resignation, however, widenea 
the gulf between one time activists and nominal lIIelllbers of tile 
working class movement who had become grudgingly reconciled to tne 
prevailing situation. The result of this was that under the circUIII" 
stances former nominal members tended to concentrate lIIure on their 
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own indiv.idual problems. These factors taken toyether undermined 
the cohes i on of the workers' movement and severely I imi ted the 
numbers of potential resistance members. 
Mason has posed the qu~stion o~ the quality of political conscious-
ness in the workers' movement prior to 1~3J as a possible indicator 
of the defeat of 1933, the submission of large s~ctions of ttle 
working class and even willingness to supjJort a regime whiCh any 
well-schooled party or trade union activist could il1llllediately ioen-
tHy as' capita lis t 12U with aims runni ng contrary to those of 
the workers. Whilst we have already demonstrated the awareness and 
resolve of the officials and indeed a considerable nUlllber· of rank 
and file members of the workers' movement in Relllscheid, we stil I 00 
not know enough about the majori ty of nOllli nd I members and KPLJ dlh! 
SPD voters. As long as the workers' institutions were able to func-
tion normally, the question of quality of political consciousness' 
was subordinated to that of quantity in the search for new members. 
Whilst the March 1933 election result indicates continuing llIass 
support for the KPU. it is apparen t tha t over years of Naz i ru le. 
this was undermined and eroded. Clearly, large numbers' of workers 
were confused by seemingly contradictory elements of National 
Socialist policy; on the one hand police terror, on the other flat-
teri ng overtures to workers of hand (Arbei ter der Faus t) exemp I i-
fied by Hitler's acknowledgelllent of only one nObility, nalllely that 
of labour. 121 Mason· also points to the illlpaired V1Slon of 
. sections of the working class which undoubtealy contained forlller 
KPU and SPU votes. The inabil ity to identify connections between 
separate elements of policy and political events enhanced confusion 
resulting in the acceptance of some political offerings and rejec-
tion of others. 122 The consequence of the search for positive 
elements, for example Hitler as opposed to Hillulller, 'strenytn 
through joy' but not the German Workers' Front (UAF), the \JaYlllent 
of children's benefits, but not the wage freeze, led to the crea-
tion of illusions which funct.ioning workers' institutions woula 
have been able to dispel. The necessity of relyiny on one's own 
judgement whilst the masses demonstrated, or appeared to delllo.ns-
trate. their approbation, must at tillles ttave unsettled even the 
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most poli~ically educated workers and induced reapprai'sals of per-
ception. It is evident that much more research into the qualitative 
aspect of the workers' movement's political education policies is 
required before a comprehensive understanding of the movement's 
defeat and subsequent decline can be obtained. 
If we now turn our attention to some of the elelllents ot Nationdl 
Socialist social and economic policy, this may help to identify 
reasons for. the wider acceptance of the regime duriny the middle 
years of the Third Reich.l 23 Whereas the system of terror was 
designed to physically neutralise workers' opposition, sOllle of the 
regime's social and economic poli'cies were devised to after' 
material concessions with the aim of integratiny workers in the 
state. It was the combination of these strategies which proved so 
effective in the prevention of lar~e-scale unrest.l~4 
6. Social and Econrnnic Policies as Integrative Factors. 
When the NaziS came to power, the most pressiny prOblem with which 
they were faced was that of mass unemployment which had to be 
solved rapidly if the regime was to retain its credibility. Itle 
social, economic and political preconditons for ttle solution of 
this problem were not altogether. unpropitious. Whilst external 
~conomic factors, ego Germany's weak financial . positionl~tl, 
foreiyn ,:import tariffs and reluctance to invest in the country, 
tended to militate against the new governlllent, although by no means 
as forcefully as in previous years, internal ones were much lIlore 
favourable. As already demonstrated, the Nazis enjoyed the support 
of a large section of the middle classes, the workers' lIlovement was 
disunited and the demoralisiny experience of long-terlll mass unelll-
ployment, were all factors which worked tottle advantage of the new 
regime. The sinudtaneous destruction of the workers' movement, alld 
the widely publicised Arbeitsschlacht (battle for JObS), whicn 
during the first three years brought about mainly cosllletic illllJrove-
ments, served to consolidate the Nazi's power. 
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Considering the vital nature of the employment J.lroblem, it is all 
the more astounding to observe the rather conservative approach to 
actual job creation, Wh,ilst the National Soc~alist ~ress vocife-
rously proclaimed the government's generous fundiny of sueh 
sChemes.l26 ~y invoking the sloyans of the Volksgellleinscnaft, 
"lleme innutz vor Eigennutz" and "Sozial iSlllus der Tat" the regime 
actually succeeded in levying a proportion of the required capital 
for the creation of jobs from the workersthemselves.l 27 The 
exaction of regular contributions for the Nationalsozialistische 
Volkswohlfahrt (NS welfare) as well as other organisations, and tile 
, . 
incessant door.to·door and street collections for the ~interhi Its-
werk (winter aid call1paigns) became a permanent feature of thelhiro 
- ' 
keich,' and an illlJ.lortant source of funds which siynlficdlltly rt!Ouct!u 
pressure on the government. Contributions, a1thou~h described as 
voluntary, were in redlity extorted by threJts. 12ti Lists ot 
contributions were recorded in the loedl district offices, dnd 
Ortsgruppenleiter would issue warnings t~ those whose contributions 
were deemed unsatisfactory .l29 
The 'battle for jobS', as Mason has demonstrated, was only effec-
tive in so far as it removed workers from the dole 4ueues and tile 
welfare re!:jister, often only temporarily, thus creating the illu-
sion of a miraculous victory over the spectre of unellljJloyment.lhe 
main beneficiary of the various reI ief work schellles were the Std-
, 
tistics; in terllls of effective aid to the economy, these measures 
brought extremely modes t returns .130 When Ul'e Nazi s came to 
power, they introduced changes in the calculation of unemployment 
statistics. which tended to exaggerate ,the ,governlllent's success. 
Frolll 1~33 onwardS young auxiliary workers in agriculture and young 
people employed in labour service camps (Arbeitsdienstlager) were 
no longer registered as unemployed although they received only 
pocket money and board in return for their labour. In addition to 
these youngsters, those engaged in relief ,work schellles also dis-
appeared from the total of unemployed. despite the fact that their 
jOb'S were only of a temporary nature and their remuneration 
remain'ed on a par wi th unemployment benefit. 131 
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In 1935 the director of the employment office reviewed the effects 
of governillent policy on the area'served by his office. Mennellutl 
reported astonishing improvements with a reduction from 14,4UU at 
the beginning of 1933, to 9,~9 on 1st January 1934, ana to 5,710 on 
1st Uecember 1934.132 Mennenoh elaborated on these totals 
with specific figures for the metal-working and textile industries. 
The metal-working industry,which had suffered the hi~hest unemploy-
ment in Remscheid, witnessed a reduction in unemployed in lY:l4 
from 3,235 to 1,439, and over the same period the spinning branCh 
of the textile industry showed a fall in unemploYlllent frolll 4":J1 to 
253. These overall successes were mainly attributed to the redirec-
tion of welfare recipients into auxiliary work in agriculture, the 
voluntary forfeiture of jobs by young single workers in favour ot 
older married /lien, a policy which apparently wet witll eonsiderdDle 
opposition frolll local manufacturers, and the ,local authority's Vd-
rious relief work schemes. Mennenuh's report also referred tu till! 
continuing lack of export orders whiCh - it will be reeal led - were 
traditionally the life blood of local industry. This picture waS 
confirmed in the council administration report for 1934, whicll sta" 
ted that the total of exports was less than in 1933,and only rou~h­
ly one third of the 1929 figure.1 33 In the light of these 
considerations, the rapid reduction in unemployment in the lIIetal-
working and texti le industries in Kemscheid indicates a stron~ 
suspicion of engagement by local firllls in the rearmament prugrdlllllle, 
which for obviOUS reasons could not be p~licised.134 /I 
The most ralJid reduction in unemployment figures, however, was 
noted in the building industry which benefited from lIlodest ~overn­
ment loans to finance relief work' schemes and house repairs. In 
1933, for instance, the council authorised the construction of Cl 
number of public conveniences in the town, the building of a aiet 
kitchen at the hospital, and major repairs to lU19 council own~d 
flats as well as a number of road repairs and the laying of sewa~e 
pi pes .135 ,Under the central government loan scheme to IJri vdte 
house owners, a total of 4,b63 applications were received in I{elll" 
scheid by the ena of Uecember 1933, and btl4,lb2 marks were grantea. 
Ily the end of February 1934, the number of alJPlicdtions had in-
- 442 -
creased tq ~,836, and the authorised grants rose to 963,434 marKS. 
It was noted that this scheme was particularly beneficial to arti-
sans (Handwerker). 
The direction of welfare recipients into 'the Voluntary Auxiliary 
Labour Service (Freiwi 11 iger Ar~itSdienst) was secured by various 
, A 
methods of coercion, so that in 1933 the welfare office was able to 
report a reduction of 10U male recipients under the a~e of 2~ years 
who joined of their own accord, and a further 417 who were COIII-
pelled to enter labour service call1ps.136 The report noted a 
more positive attitude amongst welfare recipients, who were now 
beginning to shake off their former 'lethargy' and were evidently 
seeking employment on their own initiative. 
The following year, a total of 1,051 reCipients of unelllj.Jloyment dna 
welfare benefits (~44 IIIdles. 201 felnales) were induced to Join the 
Auxiliary Labour Service on pain of forfeitin~ their allow-
ance.l 37 
Uuring the course of 1933 a total of 2Ub recipients of unemj.JloYlllent 
benefit under the age of 2b years were placed in ayriculture, iJre-
sumably as Landhel fer. Uf these, 9.:i were sent to eastern reyions 
and received a small contribution of bU ~ of travel costs and wor-
king clothes from the welfare office.13~ This kind of schellle 
constituted a particularly disadvantageous exchange for the parti-' 
cipant who was as a rule shamefully exploited in badly paid tiara 
labour. The government, however. calculated that this kind of expe-
rience would be ideal preparation for future soldiers. 139 
Another side of the regime's 'battle for jobs' was the much publi-
cised investigation into undeClared income, whiCti was alleyealy 
accorded considerable effort on the part of the ellljJloYlllent office 
and the police. In September 1933 the tlergischer lleobachter repor-
ted, the case of a recipient of unelllployment benefi t who had Deen 
emp I oyed in a Lennep factory and haa earned a total of tlUU marks, 
of which he had declared only 7U.14U The police deCided to 
1V11l.~~ an example by COllunitting this /IIan to a concentrdtion calllp as 
an enemy of the state. The report echoea the employment o'ffice's 
ominous warning: 
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' ••• sich jeder iryendwie gearteten form der Sctlwarz-
arbeit zu enthalten, da andernfallsunweigerlich die 
Verhaftuny und Einlieferung in ein Konzentrationslayer 
durchgefuhrt wird.'141 . 
It 1s not clear whether such warnings sufficed to deter from this 
practice or whether the problem of Schwarzarbeit was grossly exag-
gerated by the authorities for propaganoa purposes. Ues~ite spot-
checks on hundreds of local factories and workshops,' the police 
were able to detect only 2U offenders in 1Y33, the majority of whom 
were released with a warning. 142 The police action ayainst 
illicit work continued the following year, during the course ot 
which 24U firms were required to present their books for exalllina-
tion. This time only 16 offenders were discovered, a handful of 
whom were finally prosecuted. 143 The conclusion of .the coun-
c11 administration's report was that illicit work had been signiti-
cantly reduced in ~emscheid, but in the light of dvailable evidence 
this claim appears spurious. Whilst the practice of illicit work 
undoubtedly existed, it was rather of a casual and temporary nature 
than a deliberately calculated attempt to defrauo tne state. In any 
case, the Nazis were able to exploit the situation fully without 
issuing the available statistical data. which - as shown above -
rather suggests a make-believe problem. 
Several social policies aimed specifically at wOlllen were also 
linked to the creation of jobs for men. In accordance with Nationdl 
Socialist ideology, women· were encouraged to discontinue their 
employment, particularly in industry, in order to l/laKe way for un-
employed males. They were now expected to revert to the traditional 
role of wives and mothers and either remain at home or else seek 
employment as domestiC s~rvants.The German home was bestowed with a 
quasi. sacred status. and a whole range of maudlin epithets and 
'mock heroic verbiage' were coined to make the transition· to the 
kitchen sink more palatable. Gertrud Scholtz-Klink's vision of bat-
talions of German women arllled with soup ladles marked a peak in 
what was for many an extremely dull career144 t and was sur-
passed only by the award of the mother's cross of honour which bore 
the inscription"Oer schonste Nam' illl Erdenrund 1st Mutt~r"14~ 
(The most wonderful name in all the world is lIIoth~r). 
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There were, of course, thousands of youny wrnnen who did aspire to 
the role of wife and mother, and who gladly seized one of the more 
popular opportunities provided by the new state. This was the 
scheme begun in June 1933 to offer loans on generous terms to youn\;j 
couples who wished to marry and set up their own hOllles. rhe KliA ran 
a series of articles in that month to publicise the scheme. The 
first article, penned in patronising style, explained the terms to 
, '0' 0 " the junger Mann and hlS Frauleln ~raut.14b The loans were 
offered to young men whose wives had been employed for at least'six 
months on condition that wives agreed not to seek reellllJloyment 
after the wedding. A later article pointed out that political OlJpO-
nents of the NSIJAP and those suffering from genetically translllittea 
infirmities were precluded from the scheme.l 41 Tile loans were 
repayable at an interest of one percent. and a 4uarter of the totdl 
was 'waived on the birth of each newly born infant. The scheme was 
f1 nanced by, revenues from a supp 1 elllentary tax imposed on unlllarri ed 
persons. levied at the rate of two percent on incomes up to l!:>u 
marks per month. three percent up to 3UO IlIarks, four percent up to 
5UU markS ana at five percent over bUU marks per lIIonttl. 14ti 
The RGA even researched curren,t furniture prices and calculatea 
,that 400 marks would purchase a crnnplete bedro~n suite including a 
bed. and o that a kitchen could be bought for 3UU. PI Deneticial 
corollary of this policy was a boolll in furniture IlIilkiny and house-
hold appliances. whiCh were two of the few consumer sectors to 
actually flourish in the Third Keich.l4~ Although Kelllscheia 
had no furniture industry. a nUlllber of local firms, in lJarticular 
the Alexanderwerk. produced a whole range of househola aplJliances, 
and thus benefited directly from the scheme. Local f'urniture retail 
shOps were also guaranteed a consiaerable increase in turn over. 
Between June and the end of lY33, a total of 6/U applications for 
loans were received at the registry office, ana dtleast ~40,UOU 
marks were paid out.15U The scheme continued to attract con-
siderable interest. In 1937,482 applications were lIIade tan inc'rease 
of 12 % over the previous year} ,and loans of 375,4uU mdrks were 
approved.151 l3y this titne, however, inaustry WdS facinlj a 
shortage of labour, so that the clause prevelltlJl\;j d return to work 
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by wives was jettisoned against repayment at three percent interest, 
There were also further benefi ts in the forlll of tax re 1 i ef for 
young newly-weds, if they agreed to employ a domestic servant after 
setting up home. In January 1934 it was calculateo that of the 
roughly 20,000 households in Remscheid, between three and five 
thousand were in a position to take on an unemployeo female sChool-
leaver.152 The district leader of the Women's League regarded 
the fact that,only l,UbO girls had been ellljJloyed by kemscheid fami-
lies, as extremely vexatious and callea for ~ greater show of gooo 
will. In order to ensure serious consideration, the women'~ League 
dispatched lIIembers to every household in town to eXlJlain the aovan-
tage.s accruing from the employment of houselllaios. Frl. Ur. Christ 
concluded her speech with the appeal: 
'Oeutsche Hausfrauen, offnet diesen Werberinnen die 
Tore! tletrachtet sie nicht als ~ittstellerin, sondern 
als Fordernde. Tragt lIlit dazu bei, dal) der Wi lIe oer Hitler-~egierung Wirklichkeit werde.'l~3 
It has already been noted that. the Nazis successfully persuadea 
Germans that vast improvements in the country's economi c fortunes 
had been achieved during the first two or three years, and Whilst 
by far the majority of wO,rkers were, sti 11 in no position to afford 
more than the very basic necessities of life, many held out hOIJe 
for th-e future. Interest in luxury consumer yooos was encouragea 
even if they were not yet available. Volkswagen cars, for instance. 
were exhibited to enthusiastic townsfolk who then' returned hOllle to 
dream of the day when they would acquire their own lill1ou-
sines. 154 The volkswagen beetle was priced at 99~ marks and 
could be purchased by paying a weekly instalment of five marks. 
with the owner ,taking possession only on completion of the total 
payments. Private motorisation did not increase very slJectacularly 
in Remscheid during the years of the Third Heich. A rej.>ort in the 
RllA on 1st January 1933155 estimated a total of ~~9 motor 
cars in the town on 31st July 193U. This figure fell to 641 on JUUI 
December 1932. ~y the end of 1937, the total number of motor cars 
, Rernscheid was 2,OtlH.156 Any misconceptions reyarain ll the 
. 1 n ;, 
accessibility of motor car ownership for workers will be disIJel I~J 
by reference to the following table. 
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TA~LE 20: Hourly rates of pay in the Remscheid metal workiny 
industry, 1933 and 19313.* 
1933 1 YJB 
skilled worker lU,B /u, tl 
semi sk ill ed b I, tl b 7 , tl 
unskilled male 59,7 ~ 9, 7 
unskilled female 44,B. 
* in.pfennigs per hour 
Source: Statistisches Jahrbuch fUr das Oeutsche ~eich lY3~, ~erlin 
19313, p. 340. 
Radios were another item, which, however. were placed within ttll' 
reach of 1II0St families, so that official propayanda could reach d 
maxilllum number of hOllles. In August 1933, the l3ergischer ~eobacllter 
published a survey of radio sets in a number of lar~er towns and 
cities in the Reich, which revealed that Remscheid was well down 
.the list with only 9.B".k of households in possession of one~~/ 
The corresponding figures were: Leipzig 15.5 A., ,Hamburg l~ 10, 
Berlin 14.B A., ~Iagdeburg 13.13 A., Frankfurt a.M. 13 "Io, UUsseldort 
12.13 %, Hagen ll.Y 'ot, Munchen 11.2 "Io, Wuppertal 11.1 %, Koln and 
Stuttgart 11 "Io, solingen 10.7 X, Uortlllund B.b 10 and Gelsenkirchen 
5.7 %. Once more loans were made available to families who wislleu 
to purchase a standard Volksempfanger, a set which for obvious 
reasons,had only a limited range of stations. In 193b, ~59 loans 
were approved which amounted to 13 fewer than tilt! previous 
year.1!:iB 
Possibly the 1II0St significant luxury item made available to the 
working population were Kraft durch Freude (strenyttl through joy) 
holidays. The Nazis offered the employed a concession which hau 
never b~:en attained by the free trade unions, ndlllely paiG annual 
leave for all workers.1 59 Al though this a\;jreelllent was never 
made legally binding16U , 1II0St of Germany's workers were ~rdn­
ted paid leave, many for the first time. in their work.ing lives. 
Strength through Joy which was the most illlportant sub-organisation 
.. 
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of the lleutsche Arbeitsfront(DAF), rapidly developed into Germany's 
most powerful mass tourist operator, offeriny holidays and excur-
sions at incredibly low prices.1 61 Special trains and olllni-
buses were provided for weekend excursions, and participants were 
accomodated in the company's own hostels, and later hotels, which 
were constructed at ~altic seaside resorts and on Lake Constdnce. 
Uespite "the under- representati on of workers parti ci pati ny in lonyer 
KdF 'holidays 162 the llIere existence of such opportunities cajJ-
tured the imagi nati on of rnos t. The majori ty of those who actud Ily . 
did take part returned impressed and supported Strength throu~11 Joy 
propaganda Dy relating their experiences to envious colleagues. ~y 
far the most spectacular holidays were the sea cruises to Norway 
and Madeira in the organisation's own ships. Six citizens frolll 
Remschei d accompan i ed the cru i se to Madei ra in 1930 and rejJorted 
tlighlights of the journey in the local press.lbJ Perhaps it 
was the bad weather and rough seas which induced one of the local 
holiday makers to conclude his report in the following way: 
'Moge lIIan auch den sonnigen Suden uber alles preisen, 
mdge man ruhig Madeira die glUckliche Insel nennen, wir 
haben herausgefunden, da0 nichts, aber auch nichts uber 
Ueutschland yeht. Wir danken dem Fuhrer fur das, was er 
fUr Ueutschland getan hat. Wir danken ihm fur adS ErleD-
nis, das er uns mit dieser Fahrt in die Fremde schenkte. 
Dieses Erlebnis hat uns die Augen geoffnet und uns er-
kennen gelehrt, wie g1Ucklich wir in Deutschland leben 
und wie stolz wir auf unser Vaterland sein konnen.'lb4 
Strength through Joy also provided cheajJ tiCkets t'or cultural 
events, for instance theatre productions, which endbled 'workers or 
hand' to sit next to 'workers of brain'165, and Vlslts to 
lIIuseullls and art ga 11 eri es - 'hall s of Gerlllan art' - were organi sea 
for groups of factory workers. Lectures at the municijJaleveninl:j 
institutes, sports clubS and diverse other recreational facilities 
were also taken over by the KaF, so that this organisation penetra-
ted the lives of millions ofGerll~ans and thereby played an impor-
tant role in the integration of workers. 
From this short survey which examines only a 1 illli ted nUluber of 
social and economic poliCies, it can be seen that the Nazis were 
able to win the approval of many German workers and at least pld . 
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cate others. It is, however, inconceivable, that on the strength of 
these policies alone, the Nazis could have gained and held the 
support of Remscheid workers, or even have persuaded thelll to tole· 
rate the Hitler dictatorship. Despite the introduction of new 
values and aims, which to some extent replaced those of the socia-
list workers' movement, 'the Nazis relied heavily on the severe 
repression of all potential opponents, the creation of an atlllo-
sphere of insecurity, fe It even by those who oi 0 not ojJen ly of.ljJose 
the state, and the all pervading influence of a powerful propaganda 
machine. 
7. Remscheid Workers during the Second World War lYJ~ 1lJ4~. 
The third phase of resistance in Remscheid began after the outbredk 
of war and consisted of both, organised and unorganised ojJjJosition. 
Uespite growing discontent in the years prior to lyjylbb 
there appears to have been little activity· against the Nd· 
zis 167 , althouyh remnants of communist groups still continued 
to meet and discuss the cufrent political situation. loU Such 
meetings were held in private homes, but owing to the awareness of 
Gestapo surveillance tactics, these were usually lilllite.d to a slllall 
number of trusted friends. The 1Il0st cOllunon practice at theSe 
gatherings was to listen to foreign radio stations and discuss the 
bulletins. Inforlllation and· ideas gleaned in this way, however, 
remained 'private' or for a limited Circle, as attellljJts to oredK 
out of this isolation would almost certainly have been detecteLl 
immediately.l69 The size of Remscheio factories - only a mere 
handful elllployed more than ~5U workers - militated strongly against 
appositional activity under the prevailing circumstances; this was 
a lesson which active COllllllunists hdd presullldbly learned from their 
experience between l~33 and lY35. The only evidence of apPOSitional 
activity in local industry after lY3~ cOllies from laryer factories 
and was in the majority of cases carried out by individuals lusudl~ 
ly former activists), slllall groups of disgruntled workers without 
connections to the KPD led resistance movement, forlller lIlelllbers ot 
-449-
the workers I movement whO had managed to escape detecti on in the 
years 1933-1935. and an unknown number of cOIIUllunlst cells in the 
~Sli UEW and Mannesmann works. which operated largely on their own 
inltiative.l 10 
Most of the relatively few documented acts of opposition in the war 
years involved cooperation between German workers and prisoners of 
war ot Kussian and Polish workers. In the UEW a small group of 
workers supp 1 emented the mi serab le rati ons of Us tarbeiter and 
French prisoners of war, an act' which ensured the survival of sOllle 
of the Russians. 1ll A group of Kemscheid workers dt the Uowl 
dat factory also supplied French prisoners with extra rations until 
the contact was discovered in 1942. Unfortunately. the outcollle of 
proceedings is not known. 112 
At the Remscheid factory Raab & Schafer two COllllllunists. one of whom 
was a former section leader of the Rotfrontkalllpferbulld alld who tldO 
already spent some time in protective custody. were ilrrestea by the 
Gestapo in April 1943 on information ,supplied by one of tl1eir 
ayents., The two workers had he 1 ped a French pri suner of war to 
escape,' supplyiny him with maps. money, food and clothes. tsoth lIIen 
were sentenced to death and executed' on 16th Uctober 1!:143.l /J 
A number of workers at the !jSl factory were involveo in acts of 
sabotage. Wheel bearings, for instance, were assembled without 
being cleaned and a turning lathe was wi1lfully Cldllldgeo wittl the 
result that the machine had to be scrapped. The six weeks re4uireo 
for the delivery of a new lathe constituted a considerable loss of 
production. 174 
Considering that almost all the documented evi,dence durin~ the war 
years results frolll cases which came to the notice of the liestajJu. 
it is likely that undetected acts of sabotaye of the war effort 
were more numerous than is sugges tea by the short summary yi ven 
above. Much more research is required on this subject before an 
adequate understanding of the scope ana magnitUde of this' kino of 
opposition can be obtained. 
Remscheid again played a vital role in the country's Wdr produc 
tion. The 1351 175 , for instance, supplied the army with wea-
pons, including tankS, and various kinds of castinys and tlttinys 
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for enyineering corps. In February 1~3 the company had a totdl 
workforce of 2,7btl, comprised of l,btl2 uerman males, tsU lierman 
females, 4ts prisoners of war, bbti Ustarneiter (slave workers frolll 
Eastern Europe), male and female, and 28U other. forei~n workers. 
The total value of the company's de I iveri es to the uerlllan arlllY 
increased frolll nearly 1!l million marks in 19;j9 to almost JU million 
markS in 1943. Production was severely impeded after the heavy bOIll-
bing raid carried out by the Hoyal Air Force in July of l!:14J, in 
which the liSI factory suffered heavy losses. The Ueutsche tdel-
stahlwerk's workforce was ~,316 in June 1943, consisting Qf l,jti~ 
German males, 70 German females, 3~ts prisoners of war, lib slave 
workers and 331 other foreigners. The corresponding figures tor the 
Mannesllldnn fdctory in June 194J were a totdl worklurce ot 1,~UI 
consisting of 714 Germdn males, 57 lierllldn felllales, OJ jJrisoners ot 
war, 172 slave workers and 2Ub other foreigners. In Uecelllber 1~4 
the Alexanderwerk had a total work force of 679, consisting of Jl~ 
uerman males, lU? German females, ts5 slave workers, llJ prisoners 
of war, and 4b other foreigners. All of these factories, as indeed 
the majority of local firms, were involved in war protluction. 
The bombing raids on 30th/31st July 1943 totally destroyed 1!:14 
(~ts %) industrial plants and heavily damaged a4 others 
(32~).176 Of the 2,b95 export firms, shops and offices situa-
ted in Helllscheid, 1,764 (66 %) were either totally <.Iestroyed or 
severely dalllaged. 11,29b flats (31 1.) were totally destroyed, ~,/U~ 
(16 %) were very badly damaged, and 3,/b2 (lU %) were badly ddlllayed 
(mittelschwer beschadigt). The raid which lasted roughly one and ~ 
half hours, claimed the lives of I,U63 inhabitants 11l , at 
these 210 were foreigners, nearly all Polistl ana Kussian slave 
workers.l7B The total loss of life due to the effects of bOIll-
bing on Remscheid during the war amounted to 1,346, and b,4tsl were 
injured in 73 separate raids.l 79 The loss of lives would un-
doubtedly have been much higher had the authorities not taken the 
precaution of evacuating around 15,UOO people, mainly women and 
children, at some time prior to the attaCk in July lY43.l 8U 
The bOlllbing raids on Remscheid hit the workers particularly hard, 
many of the casualties in the July raid in 1~3 were working the 
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night shift in factories. Working-class districts adjoininy the 
larger factories were heavily hit and the level of destruction was 
exceedingly high. This fact had serious reperCUSSions on the recru-
descent workers' movement after 194~. in that long-stanain~ rela-
tionships in working-class neighbourhoods were physically destroyed 
when survi vors were resettl ed in di fferent parts of" the town to·· 
.. 
gether with the considerable nUlllbers of refugees frolll areas to the 
, 
east of the Elbe. The restructuring of the town worked to thl:! 
detriment of the workers' movement with the influx of nearly ten 
thous'and Silesians. East Prussians and Sudeten Gerllldns.l tH 
The physical destruction was followed by the partial break-up of 
'red neighbourhOOdS' resulting from greater geoyralJhical mobility, 
which was pronlpted by the regime's social poliCies duriny the Thir~ 
Reich.1H2 The destruction ahd continued sUPlJression of 
working-class institutions for a period of 13'years disrupted the 
rejuvination process. which had hitherto ensured the continuity of 
the movement. The loss of a 1 arge number of the KPU cadre. ei tIler 
by murder. suicide •. premature deaths. due to the injuries sustained 
in interrogations and the long years of sufferiny in prison"s and 
concentration camps. plus the casualties on the battle field 
• 
severely weakened the radical workers' movement in Kemscheia. In 
addition to these factors the widespread disillusionment witll 
polities which was,revealed particularly after the inception of the 
federal Kepublic. the well publicised crimes cOlllmitted in the 
soviet. Union under Stalin. the emergence of Titoism as an alterna-
tive. which fo~nd acceptance in the late forties and early fifties. 
and obstruction tdctics by the allied forces. all cOUlbined to lIIili· 
. tate a~ainst a resurgence of the traditional radicalism of Kelll-
scheid'S workers.' Uespite a transient revival between lY45 ana 
19491H3 • in which the KPL) again. emerged as the single strony-
est partY. and fora tillle supplied the town'~ mayor. the 1Il0mentUlII 
could not be sustained for the reason that the lIlovement did not 
possess sufficient substance and was swelled only telllporari ly by 
hungry and deprived citizens. who deserted when the situation illl 
pr~ved. The 1 eadersh i p of the locid workers was ~su rped by, the SPU 
in the fifties. but by then the movement had long ceasea to exist 
in its previous form. 
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CHAPTER VI 
NOT E S 
1 The town archives in /{emscheid contain very little material 
relating to the years 1933-45~ A large alllCiilt of files wert! 
either destroyed in the bombing raids or lost in the course at' 
transportation after the cessation of hostilities. It is dlso 
unclear whether the allies returned documents which they.confis-
cated in order to cOlllpile lists of Nazis for dt!ndzificdtion 
purposes. 
The forlller deputy ortsgruppenleiter of L~nnep, liUstdll JesillyhJus 
i nforllled the author that he personally superlli sea the des true 
tion of all papers and files from the NSUAP district headquar· 
ters,situated in Lennep,during the days preceding tile occupation 
of J{emscheid by American forces in Apri I 1 Y4~. 
2 Regional and national stUdies do not ail to anything like the 
same extent, as they are able to draw on much wioer resources of 
material deposited in central archives which the Ndzis were not 
able to obliterate in time. 
3 Oral information for this chapter was supplied by, inter dlia: 
Erich Thieler, Utto Rau, Han~ah ~uaas, Fritz Knapper, UI9a Juny, 
Hobert Fiihrer, Millie Hilbert, Karl Enyels, Paul van der l)ury, 
Hertha Glas, Emllli Leyendecker, Willi Krell, Utto and Linnle 
Alders, Grethe Salz, Uora Salz, Alexander VO!;lel. HUOi. Lucllten-
bery. 
4 BV,' 1'0/2/33, Nazi Fiihrer Voyt dankt dem SPU Polizeirat SChrdder; 
and Beryische Morgenpost,' 29/1/~3, In "Ber~isch Moskau" kalll 
Wechsel von "Hot" nach "Braun" nicht Ubernacht. 
5 RGA, 4/2/2J, NSUAP Fackelzug durch die Stadt. 
6 RGA, 6/2/23, Aufmarsch Cler NSUAP anlablich einjahrigen Bestehens 
Cler SA in Hasten. 
7 uie Freie Presse, 6/2/23, Zusamlllensto!) in Cler Hallllllesberyer 
Stralje aus Anlar) eines Nazi Ulllzuyes. 
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This r~port blamed the Nazis for t~e incident: 
'Oa den Herrschaften jetzt seitens der Polizei jeder 
Schutz gewahrt wird, konnte der lug auch durch die 
Hanvnesberger StraBe ziehen, wo in den grauen Hdusern 
der hohen Mietskas~rnen nur politisCh Linksorientierte 
. ' 
vorwiegend K~ru"Unlsten, wohnen. Ua die Nazis wie UDlich 
gerade in solchen Vierteln, wenn sie den notiyen Polizei 
schutz haben, ihre herausfordernden Lieder singen und 
Ausrufe hbrbar werden lassen, entstand eine furchtbare 
Erregung unter den Anwohnern, oi e um so sch 1 illlJllere formen 
annehmen mu/3te, weil linksgerichteten Urganisationen 
Demonstrationen erschwert und zumcTeil vullig unter 
bunden sind. Hinzu kOlfunt, daB die aufdrinyliche Ver-
herrlichung der SA durch den deutschen ~undfunk, wi~ 
es gestern wieder geschah, jene Kreise, die siCh mit 
Recht von der SA bedroht fuh 1 en, in illlmer s tarkere Ver-
bitterung treiben llIussen.' 
~ RGA, o/~/33, ibid. 
Y Ibid., the bdn WdS proclaimed on ~nd ~ebrudry and dppliell to 
open air demonstrations. 
1U ~eryische Moryenpost, ~Y/1/tl3, Ope cit. 
11 Interviewswith willi Krell, Paul Schneider, Utto Hau and Karl 
Engels. 
All four claimed that cOlllmunist, Social Ut!mocrat, sOllle catholic 
and many non-aligned workers were ready to fiyht ana were wait-
ing for a signal from the parties and trade uni~ns for concerted 
action to begin. 
12 For an account of the development of the united front question, 
see Georg FUrbeth/Jurgen Harrer, Uie deutsclle Sozialdemokratie 
1H90 - 1933, Uannstadt and Neuwied 19/4, pp. ~~/-~3H. 
The authors particularly stress SPU fears of losing the leader-
ship of the lierUlan workers I movement to the KPU as a prime 
factor in the failure to establish a united front. The KPU's 
tactics of appealling to Social Delllocratic workers to join et 
"grass. roots united front" wit~ the explicit exclusion of tht!ir 
leaders is likewise held responsible for the ultimate laCk of 
cooperation between the two parties. 
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Cf. also Nicos Poulantzas, Fascism and Uictatorship. The Thira 
Intern~tional and the Problem of fascism .. London 1919. ~p. 
177-188. 
The author highlights the extent of disagreement within the SPu 
and trade unions on the nature of their opposition to tne Nazis. 
Considering the massive potential support enjoyed Dy tile SPU. 
trade unions and their affiliated oryanisations and the lack ot 
deCisive co~niunent to lead the mass of workers in any kino of 
positive action against the Nazis, Poulantzas concludes that the 
greatest share of responsibility for the Nazis' cOlllin~ to jJower 
is borne Dy the SPO. 
13 uetlev Peukert, Uie KPU im Widerstand. Verfolyuny uno· Unter-
grundarbeit an Rhei n und Ruhr 1933 Di s 194~, Wupperta I 1 ytlu. ~p. 
40-41. 
14 See ~ilhelm Pieck's assess~ent of the ~russels Conference of the 
KPU in 1935: 
'ADer die Mehrheit aer deutschen Arbeiterklasse 
leistete der Sozialdemokratie liefolyschaft und setzte 
ihre Hoffnungen auf die buryerliche Uelllokratie. auf 
die Koalitionspolitik derSozialdemokratie. Uie 
faschistische Bewegung sChwol1 indessen machtiy an 
und bedrohte alle Kechte und freiheiten der Aroeiter-
klasse. Uas hatte uns zur Anderung der Kichtung unseres 
Hauptstobes veranlassen mussen. Uas AnwaChsen der 
faschistischen liefahr wurde jedoch von uns unter-
seha tz t ••• 
••• Es fehlte die Linie auf ein Herantreten an aie 
sozialdelllokratisehen Organisationen, es iJDerwoy lIIehr 
aer Versuch zur liewinnuny aer sozialdelllokratischen 
Arbeiter fur diePartei. Vor allelll verhinderte aber 
das in der Partei tief eingewurzelte SektierertulII ein 
wirklich ernstes Herangehen an die sozialdelllokratische 
Arbeiterschaft, urn die Einheitsfront zustande zu bringen 
oder weniystens Verstandnis bei ihnen fur die Losungen 
una die Politik der Partei zu erwirken ••• ' 
quoted in KIHnne, OPe cit., p. 27Uf. 
IS The AUGS for instance. had been exploring the possibility ot a 
coalition with left wing Nazis under the leadership of lireyor 
Strasser. 
The SPU and AUG~ sanction of a joint 1st May delllonstration witll 
the NaziS is a further example of an attelllptea integration. Th~ 
SPU's subsequent secession from the Socialist International ana 
its hesitant acceptance of Hitler's foreiyn policy are to D~ 
viewed in a similar liyht. 
• 
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16 See RGA, 20/3/33, Uer Tag von Potsdam. Weihe und 6edenkstunae 
an die Wiederyeburt der deutschen Nation. 
17 RGA, IH/3/33, Max und Moritz - Elberfelder Strabe. Mittayskarte 
fUr Sonntag. 
IH Ibid. 
19 Ibid. 
20 Ibid. 
~l Ibid. 
22 Ibid. 
23 RGA, 21/3/33, Die nationale Revolution marschiert. 
~4 See eye HGA, 25/3/33, Kampfbund des gewerblichen Mittel~tandes, 
Untergruppe der NSUAP, Mittelstandsversallllnluny. 
25 The second Gleichschaltung law was passed all Ith J\pril l!Jjj.· 
See wolfgany Huye and wolfgany Schulllann (edit.), UokUluente lur 
Ueutscnen Geschichte 1~33-193ti, berlin Ust 191/, p. 4~. 
25 Cf. Mason, Ope cit., pp. 17-/H. 
'Die Aussichten, daB die NSUAP die wirtschaftliche 
soziale und politische Machtstellung des Bi.iryertulII~ 
Init allen Mitteln behaupten werae, sCheint besonders 
auf lokaler Ebene ihren Aufstieg ausschlayyebend ge-
fordert zu haben. Auf nationaler Ebene vennochte sich 
die Partei in steiyendenl Mafje Cler Sympathie der Grob-
industrie zu versichern, denn Cliese begann, sie als 
ein brauchbares Instrument einzuschatzen, ClurCh das 
aie politische und wirtschaftliche Macht der Arbeite~ 
klasse entscheidend yeschwdcht werden konnte. Uas Un-
vermogen aller anderen konservdtiven Parteien und 
Gruppen, diese Aufgabe zu vollbringen, bildete ~ine 
der wesentlichen Vorbedingunyen fUr den Aufstiey des 
Na t i ona 1 soz i a 1 i SUIUS. I 
Also for complicity of middlt! class ·with the NSUAP, see Kunlll 
op. c it., p. 399f. 
27 Ibid., 
. 
'Diese faktoren vermogen (iuch zu erklaren, warUlII 
zwischen Marz und November 1933 das nationalistische 
bUrgerliche Ueutschland sich yeschlossen hinter aas 
neue Regime stellte. Uenn in dieser Hinsicht war die 
Konsolidieruny der nationalsozialistischen Machtposi-
tion nicht in erster Linie die Folge von £inschuchte-
rung und Manipulation. Sie hing vielmehr aalllit zu 
salfunen, dab es dem Hegillle gelungen war, die eigene 
spezifische Version jenes allgellleinen Zielprograllunes 
durchzusetzen, zu dem sich all diese 6ruppen bekannten. 
KPU, SPU und Gewerkschaften existierten nicht mehr. ' 
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Cf. aI, so F~ank 1 in. Kopi tsch, "Uer Weg zur Machter!:!rei fung. V 0111 
SChei'tern einer Demokratie", in: lngke tirodersen (edit.), 1933. 
Wie die Ueutschen Hitler zur Macht verhalfen. tin Leseouch tur 
Uemok ra ten, Harnbu rg 19t13, p. 32u. 
2~ bn one occasion residents of a rather well-to-ao area near the 
Herlllann-Gori ng -Haus in Lennep comp la i ned to the po 1 ice dbOU t 
the treatment of pri soners who were he Id in the 1 oca 1 party 
headquarters. Alarmed by the screams of tortured prisoners, a 
large crowd of townsfolk assembled outside the Hennann-Gbrin!:!-
Haus to protest. 
See Freies Volk, 2617/49, Kein Engel ist wie so rein.' • 
2~ RGA, 2~/4/33, Auflbsung der Remscheider UVP. 
30 RGA, 2/5/33, Zur NSUAP ubergetreten. 
31 RGA, 2~/4/33, Auflosung ••• , Ope cit., , , " ~ 
'Schon seit langerer leit hat innerhalb der Urtsgruppe 
Remscheid der Ueutschen Volkspartei ein Lu!:! zur NSUAP 
eingesetzt, der in letzter Zeit illllller starkere Forlllen 
angenollllllen hat. Jetzt hat auch der Stadtverordnete 
Karl ~ecker den Ubertritt zur NSUAP vollzoyen. U;e 
Abwanderung der volksparteilichen Mit!:!lieder hat, wie 
wir welter erfahren, einen·derartigen Umfang ange-
nommen, daB die Ortsgruppe Remscheid in den nachsten 
. Tagen aufgelost werden wird. Als Termin hierfLir ist, 
wie verlautet, der Mittwoch nachster Woche vor!:!esehen. 
Morgen findet eine Sitzung innerhalb des Wahlkreises 
uusseldorf Ost statt, in der man sich vor allem lII;t 
diesen Fragen befassen wird. So11ta lIIan dort noch n1cht 
zu einelll AuflosungsbeschluB kOllllllen, so wira ullabhanyi!:l 
davon in der Relllscheider Ortsgruppe die Auflbsung vor-
genommen werden. ' 
32 RGA, 4/5/33, Obertritt zur NSUAP, 
'In seiner· letzten Sitzun!:i beschlo13 der Gesallltvorstand 
des Wahlkreises ULisseldorf Ost der Reichspartei des 
deutschen Mittelstandes (Wirtschaftsparteij yelllaB der 
Anregung des Herrn Reg. Rat Grobke, FLihrer der frLiheren 
wirtschaftsparteilichen Landtagsfraktion, die Urgani-
sation des Wahlkreises UUsselaorf Ust der Wirtschafts-
partei aufzulosen ~nd.den Ortsgruppen anzuraten, ihren 
Mityliedern den tleltntt zur NSUAP zu ellliJtehlen. 
Uer fruhere Stadtverordnete und Vorsitzende Qer Urts-
gruppe der wirtschaftspartei, Christian Luck, .ist be-
reits zur NSDAP und zum Kalllpfbund fUr den yewerblichen 
. Mittelstand Uberyetreten. Er fordert alle fr~heren 
Mitglieder der Wirt5chaft5partei auf, 5ich restlo5 
der NSUAP anzuschlie~en.' . 
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33 RGA, 4/5/33, ~ % der ~eamten in der NS~A. 
34 NGA, 6/5/33, Im Kanuklub. 
35 NGA, 1U/6/33, Wer 1st Nationalsozialist ? fine Mahnu n9 an die 
Neuen. 
36 Ibid., 
'Auch rnit einem Hundertmarkschein kann lIlan seine 
Mitgliedschaft nicht abkaufen. Wer aDer ehrlichen ' 
Herzens zu uns geko"~en ist und eine freiwil liye 
Spende bieten kann, der ist veracntenswert, wenn 
er es nicht tut, denn er zeigt, da~ er kein Ver-
standnis hat fur aie zah1reichen ErwerDslasen in 
den Reihen unserer tapferen SA Leute.· 
37 Ibid., 
• ••• Uenn der Geist dieser Kreise wurzelt noch yanz 
in der a1ten 1iberalist1schen und materialistiscnen 
Uenkweise. Sie begreifen unsere Weltdnschduuny nicht. 
Handlerisch einyestellt, wie sie sind, ha ben sie duch 
jetzt als Mityliea der Partei KonJunkturllllj,)brducll ye-
trieben, und 1n diesem schweren t<inyen unseres Volkes 
ihre eigenen Vorteile gesucht ••• ' 
38 For an analysis of the discrepancy between the concept of the 
Volksgemeinschaft and reality during the Thira t<eich, see 
Richard Grunberger, A Social History of the Thira Neich, 01->. 
cit. , pp. 67 8U; 
and Mason, Ope cit., pp. 27f, 113f, 13U, 1H2 IHH. 
39 RGA, 10/6/33, Und die Zeituny. 
, ••• Nur Utn Verwechs] ungen zu verlllei den, betonen 
wir, dd~ der t<GA zu diesen tllattern nicht yehbrt. 
W1r kbnnen mit Stalz daraut hinweisen, da~ der 
IORemscheider Generalanzeiyer lO 'auch nach dern Novel/I-
berurnsturzt 1918 - und darin machte er, so durfen 
wir sayen, im weiten Ulllkreis seines Verbreitungs 
yebietes eine rU~lIliche Ausnahme - seine nationale 
, Haltung nicht verleugnete und sie niernals verleuynet 
hat! Uas gibt uns auch ein Recht, ein inneres una 
auBeres Recht, uns heute freudig zur Nationalsozia-
listischen ~ewegung, wie sie in Adolt Hitler inren 
hbchsten Ausdruck f1ndet, zu bekennen. wobei wir 
(zu wiederholten Malen) darauf aufmerksdllllllactlen' 
durfen, daB dieses ~ekennertulII nicht erst sea aen 
Tayen der IOGleichschaltung lO in Erscheinung yetreten 
ist. Akrobat1sche Gesinnunyssprunge brauchten w1r 
nicht zu rnachen.' 
, 
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See also StA Remscheid, GHW/14 Zie., Die Gestaltun~ des RGA und 
sein Kalllpf illl politischen Zeit!;leschehen, Relllscheid 1935. 
This pamphlet. published by Ur. Hans Zieyler in 1Y3!l was an 
attempt to review the newspaper's political stance during the 
Weimar peri od in the 11 ght of present dHfi cu It i es with ttle 
local NSOAP leadership. With the aid of numerous "luutes trom 
various issues, the publisher attempted to prove his paper's 
close identification with the aims of the NSUAP throughout the 
Weimar years. Une quote, for exalllple, from the RGA lO/llnj 
calls for a dictatorship and a rejection of parliamentary delllO' 
cracy. A few months later the RGA reported the trial o-f Hitler 
and Ludendorff in favourable terms for the accused lNGA,~/4/~4) 
Ijy 193U,according to the publisher, the RliA already sympathised 
stron~ly with the N~UAP, 
'~ei der Reichstagswahl vom 14.9.19JU hat der "I<elll· 
scheider Generalanzeiger" sich sehr fUr die National· 
sozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei ein~esetzt. £r 
hat nicht nur Uber alle Wahlversalrunlungen eingehend 
berichtet, stellte vielmehr auch in den letzten Monaten 
vor der Wahl seinen Textteil unter der Rubrik "Freies 
wort"in gro/3ern Umfange den Nationalsozialisten zur 
VerfUgung. Es erschienen viele Aufsatze der National 
sozialisten' 
The RGA's cooperation with local Nazis is described in the 
following terms, 
Mit dem damaligen UrtsyruppenfUhrer der NSOAP, Kuhlbars 
. , 
bestand dauernde Verblndung. Uer "RliA" hat zahlreiche 
Artikel auch aus dessen Feder,aufgenomlllen ••• • 
The RGA's support for, and cooperation wittl the Nazis 
generated criticism frolll the middle classes. Une letter in 
particular is cited to' illustrate the feeliny in leaainy local 
business circles that the Nazi' success was in large measure 
attributable to the RGA's support for the ~arty: 
'Mit grol3em Interesse habe ich lhre geschatzten Zeilen 
gelesen und gebe Ihnen gern zu, da/3 auch ien zu den 
Jenigen Leuten geh0re, die der Ansicht sind, dau der 
"RGA" in den letzten Monaten illl nationalsozialistischen 
Fahrwasser sich bewegt. Uab ieh un~ meine ndheren He-
kannten nicht alleine dieses gefunden haben, lIluye lhnen 
daraus klar werden, da13 einer unserer prolllinentesten 
• 
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und anyesehensten Hurger, den ieh nieht nennen kann, 
weil die AuBeruny im privaten Kreise fiel, yesayt hat 
dal) die NSUAP in Hemseheid einen yrol)en Tei 1 ihres " 
:Erfolges am 14. September der Stellungnahme des "KGA" 
zu verdanken habe. Uieselbe Ansieht horte ieh in 
Industrie ,Handels und Beamtenkreisen ••• 
••• Ferner wurde van verschiedenen Seiten Ihnen s.Zt. 
der Artikel "Heil Hitler" sehr verubelt. Ieh person-
lich habe jhn nur als Sti~nungsbild aufgefal)t, doeh 
ist es Faktum, daB er vom Gras des Publikullls als Ver':" 
herrlichuny der Hichtuny bewertet wurde ••• • 
Ziegler expressed agreement with this interpretation of the 
paper's policy and the resultant consequences, in the followiny 
way: 
'Uieser ~rie~ besagt genug u~er die dalJlaliye Hdltuny, 
des "H~nschelder Generalanzelgers", insbesondere seine 
positive Einstellung zur Hitleroeweyuny. Ein weiterer 
KOllunentar ist iiberfliissiy.' 
In all, the pamphlet contains ~2 pages of quotes ana eXjJlana-
tions of the RGA's affinity with the NSUAP. 'In fairness it must be 
remembered that this pamphlet was written as a tactical measure in 
an attempt to smooth over current aifficulties with the Nazis. 
Nevertheless, the document is clearly a damning indictment of the 
KGA's role in preparing the way for the Nazi seizure of power at 
the local level. The RGA was the unchallenged IIIOutllpiece of the 
Remscheid bourgeoisie during the Weimar Republic and the Third 
Reich, and by this token wielded great influence in these circles. 
The pamphlet _reveals remarkable consistancy throughout ana under-
pins the continuity of local' bourgeois thought from the days of the 
Empire through to the Third Reich. When one considers the fact that 
such a powerful local institution as the t{GA not only heljJed form 
opinions and encourage ideas in the minds of its read~rs, but also 
mirrored the current trends in t{emscheia middle-class circles, the 
above.mentioned pamphlet constitutes a chronical at" the lIlovement by 
the' local middle classes away from their traditional liberal 
parties towards the National Socialists, which in the Reichstag 
elections of 1!-J3U usurped the position of leading midale-class 
party both in Remscheid and in the rest ot" Germany. 
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40 RGA, 4/5/33, Revolution in der Kirche ? 
'Adolf Hitler hat das Verdienst, die Gefahr des' 
~olschewismus beseitigt zu haben, das wird auch in 
der Kirche restlos anerkannt. Uer Staat verlanyt 
Mitarbeit gegen alle zersetzenden Erscheinunyen, und 
die Kirche wird sie gern leisten, ohne nach dell\ Preis 
zu fragen. Von nicht geringerer ~edeutung ist aie 
Schaffung der Reichseinheit. ~leibt diese Einheit 
erhalten, dann sind die Upfer seit 1Y14 nicht ulIIsonst 
gewesen. In disem neuen einheitlichen Staat lebt nun 
die evangelische Kirche~ Uann kann auch ihre Vielye-
staltiykeit nicht bleiben, sie konnte unter Umstanden 
zu einer Gefahr fur die tinheit werden.'Uer Ueichs-
etnheit muB die Reichskirche folyen, auch UIII der Kirctie 
selbst willen ••• • 
41 RGA, 14/ti/33, Glaubensbeweyuny deutscher Ctlristen. Kirchliclle 
Erneuerung. 
42 Ibid. 
'Millionen deutsche Volksyenossen aus den eVdnye-
lischen Kreisen, die sahen, daB auch das Keli~iose 
im bisheriyen Staat Unsinn yewesen war, stellten 
Fragen an die Kirche, die die Kirche nicht beant-
worten konnte, weil weiteste Teile in ihr die yro~e 
deutsche Freiheitsbewegung nicht verstanaen hdben. 
Oa ha ben wir gesayt, wir mUssen der Kirche Manner 
und Frauen yeben, die ihre Oienste illl stnne aes 
Evangeliums leisten konnen. Aber wir stie~en zuerst 
auf HaB, Aolehnung, Verfolyung una Verachtung. Oas 
waren vor allen uingen die Gruppen. die im Christ-
lichen Volksdienstsa/)en ••• Es kam die grol~e Wende alII 
30. Januar 1~33. Kein Nationalsoiialist hat dcunals 
das getan, was lIIan in der lIIarxistischen Presse vor-
her gel esen ha tte: "Jetzt kOllunt di e Nacht Oer 1 angen 
Messer." Keine Ausschreitungen, nur Friede und Ver-
bundenheit, eine Revolution der Liebe~ der Treue und 
der Uisziplin.' 
'Mit der Glaubensbeweyuny deutscher Christen ist es 
genau wie mit dem Nationalsozialismus: sie ist keine 
menschliche Erfinduny, sondern von Gatt yewol1t. Uas 
wort van der Volksgellleinschaft, 'wie es der National-
sozialismus will. ist ein Gotteswort, und was Gatt 
zusa~nengefUyt hat. das so11 der Mensch nicht durch 
Klassenkalllpf und Standesdtinkel sCheiden. Wir bejdhen 
das EvangeliulII restlos und ungeteilt. wir nellmen es 
so wie wir es bekollllllen haben. Was die Judenfra~e 
aniangt. so ist es.Gottes Befehl, auch den Juden ddS 
Wart Gottes zu predigen. Un jtidisch yetdufter Mensctl 
. kann aber nicht in die deutsche Volksyellleinschaft 
au fyenollllllen werden ••• ' 
• 
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43 Ruge und Schumann. uokumente ••• , Ope cit., p. 41. 
44 RGA. 23/3/33. Zwangsbeurlaubt. ' 
45 It is not known whether Ur. Aschenheim was if member of. the SPU. 
He was nevertheless regarded as a sympathi ser and haCl cons tant-
ly made himself unpopular,with National Socialists in Remschei~ 
on account of his outspoken ,criticism of central and local 
government health policy. 
46 RGA. 2/5/33, Entlassunyen am Arbeitsamt. 11 Leute versChwunClen. 
41 See Chapters IV and V. 
4~ RGA. 3/5/33, Uie Aktion gegen die freien liewerkschiiften. Uie 
Remscheider Suros ebenfal1s besetzt. 
49 RliA. 4/5/33, Geschlossene Suros. Einyreifen der politischen 
polizei. 
5U VO~ kszeitung was the' name of the 1 Qca 1 issue of the t rei e 
Presse which was based in Wuppertal. 
51 HGA. 11/5/33. Haussuchungen bei Remscheider Sozialuemokrdten. 
52 IWA, 15/5/33, Die Kasse der SPU. liewerKschaftssekretar Max 
Blank verhaftet. 
53 InforHiation from Erich Thieler who together witn his brother 
Ferdinand played a leading role in the oryanisatin of tile 
Teufelsteich project. The pool had been opened to the public 
briefly in the previouS SUITlIller, and the workers' swinlluin!;j Club 
was look i n!;j forward to the fi rs t fu 11 season in the sunuuer at 
1933. Many of the members were to spend the followin!;j months in 
the concentration camp at Kemna. 
54 . RGA. ~U/5/33. Konsumgenos~enschaft Einigkeit van der NSbU 
besetzt. 
55 RGA.10/6/3J. Die zwangsbeurlaubten Be~lIten und Anyestellten. 
RGA. 12/6/33, Die Ruckkehr ZUIII Berufsbeallltentulll. 
RliA. 30/6/33. Weitere Entlassunyen bel der Urtskrankenkasse; 
Entlassungen auch beim Arbeitsalllt. 
bb Bergischer 13eobachter. (BB). '1/7/33, NSBU Stellenverlllittluny • 
• wir haben dafur zu sorgen. da~ diejeniyen, welche 
sich mit dem neuen Deutschland noch nicht abfillden 
kbnnen und wallen, restlas beseitiyt werden. Uieses 
kann nur iiber den Weg der Stellenbesetzuny in den 
. Betrieben geschehen. Alle unwurdiyen Elemente, die 
da versuchen. den Betrieb van innen heraus morsch zu 
machen, sind zu entfernen ••• • 
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57 HStA uusseldorf. Reg. Ouss. 1021/46. 
5~ 60 Jahre Touristenverein "Uie Naturfreunde" Urtsgruppe 
Remscheid; 
and information fr~n Gerd Friele. Hannah Quaas and Utto Rau. 
59 See 50 Jahre Spi e herei oi gung Struck. Remschei d 1 ~b!:l. 
60 Ruge and Schumann. Ookumente •••• OPe cit •• p. 3U. 
b1 Freies Volk. 26/1/49. Kein £nyel ist wie so rein. o~. cit. 
62 Information from Emmi Leyendecker and Otto Alders. 
Interrogations were conducted by the uestapo with the aid of 
local SA men who supplied the strong-arm tactics in order to 
loosen the suspect's tongue. Women were extended tl'le sallle 
trea~nent as men. 
Enuni Leyendecker founel hersel f surrounded by SA JIIen when she 
was interroyated by the Relllscheid uestapo. Whenever the answer 
she gave was considered to, be insufficient. blows and kicks 
rained in from all sieles. 
Another variation employed in the questioniny of suspects in 
the UhlandstraBe headquarters was the simulated execution. Here 
the interrogating officer woulel ~oint the barrel 'of his pistol 
in the suspect's mouth and threaten to pull the trigyer if he 
did not supply the necessary information. These and similar 
practices callle to liyht in 194~ duriny the trial of uestapo 
official Lendermann. who was sentenced to f6ur years i"l~rison­
ment for his role in the maltreatlllent of prisoners. 
See freiheit. 7/9/4'd. Es waren keine Menschen lIIehr. 
63 for' a discussion of the aims and mechanics of terror under a 
totalitarian reyillle. see Euyen Kogon. Uer SS Staat. Uas Systelll 
der deutschen Konzentrationslager. Munchen 19/4. p. 11. 
Apart from individual threats. towns,folk learned of the exis-
tence of concentration camps in the Nazi press. In addition to 
this'. rumours about the maltreatment of prisoners at the nearby 
concentration camp at Kelllna circulated in all the tieryische 
towns. 
64 RGA. 1/4/33. Chronik des Tayes. KOllllllunistische watfenlayer. 
65 RGA. 12/4/33. 120 Personen verhaftet. Ourchsuchuny der "Einiy-
keit" und des Volkshauses. 
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66 RGA,29/4/33, Kommunistische waffenlal)er in Usterbusch. 
67 RC:.iA, 8/0/33, Krieg im Uunkeln. Regierungsrat Ur. SChubert uber 
die Wuhlarbeit der KO/llfllunisten. 
68 Interviews with Erich Thieler, Ludwig Stillger, Millie Hiloert. 
69 Honsberg still proved to be dangerous terri tory for Nazi s who 
ventured in unaccompanied by arlOed contingents. Un one "occasion 
an SA man in uni form was informed by a group of workers that 
Nazi insignia was not to be worn in Honsberg, and in order to 
underline this point, they proceeded to beat hilll up. 
70 Willi Veller, a notorious roughian whose drunken explotts were 
we 11 known throuyhout the Bergi sche Land and indeed further 
afield. 
Cf. Karl lbach, Kelllna. wuppertdler Konzentrdtiollsl..I~jer IlJjJ 
~, Wuppertal 19B1" p. ~6f, o~f. 
Freie Presse, 10/11/32, lJas ist der FLihrer der wuppertdler 
NSOAP. Veller in Altona verhaftetl 
And ibid., 12/11/32, Die Affar'e Veller. Von St. Paul; ins 
C:.iefangnis • 
Veller, who was already a Reichstay deputy in lY32, was'arres-
t'ed by police in St. Pauli in Hamburg in a state of inhebria· 
tion. Apparently carried away by the llIerriment at the Hippodrolll 
he had drawn his pistol and proceeded in wila-w~st fashion to 
shoot out a number of windows. 
Veller's reputation eventuallyltldde him untenaole tor Ule Nazis 
and' he was dismissed from his post of Police President and 
transferred,to East Prussia ~here he was subseyuently muraered 
by the SS. 
Erich Stockhorst, FLinftausend Kbpfe. Wer war was illl uritten 
Reich, Velbert 1961. 
Remscheid SA Sturmbannfi.ihrer Hugo Neuhoff who also led the raia 
on Honsberg together with his friend Veller was a co-founder of 
the wupperta 1 group of the NSUAP. Li ke Ve 11 er, Neuhoff was a 
notoriouS bully and had a police record of over 3U convictions, 
of which only a handful were of a political nature. In lY4L as 
a non-colllmissioned officer in the 19th lnfantery Uivision, ne 
was convicted of theft and sentenced to a perioo of three years 
, 
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illlpri sonrnent, demoted and ejected from the NSUAP. Uespi te hi s 
many previous convictions, it is clear that Neutioff had lIlana~eCl 
to conceal his record (almost certainly with the collusion of 
some of his superi ors - he wore the party eHlb 1 em in go Id, NSuAP 
membership number 25346), so that he was usually able to escape 
puni shmentor else benefited from vari ous amnes ties proc I a illled 
by Hitler. He was also pardoned for the theft in 1~2, but 
there is no record of his being reinstated in the party. He was 
killed in action in Uecember 1944. 
See ~UC, Personal file, Hugo Neuhoff, born 20/6 1~4; 
and ibid., SA Strafliste 1943-45. 
71 lierg i scher lieobach ter, 26/8/33, Kommune Honsberg au sgerilUctlert. 
72 Cf. Rudolf uiels, Luzifer ante portas, p. 262f; 
and Kart Schab~od, ~W~i~de~r~s~t~a~n~d~a~n~~Kh~e~i~n~~un~d~~K~u~h~r~l~Y~J~j~-4~~, 
Uusseldorf lY6Y, p. 12f. 
13 Ibid. 
74 Cf. Ibach, Ope cit., p. 117f. 
71j Information from Erich Thieler who was hilTlself a prisoner in 
Kemna, and who in earl i er years had been a fri ena of Lall"n 's. 
76 lbach, Ope cit. 
77 See VVN list of Kemscheid internees (no date), and statements 
made by witnesses, supplied by Ibach in the first eaition of 
his book, OPe cit., 1948. 
78 Cf, ego Freie Presse, 15/2/33, ulanzender Wahlauftakt oer SPU. 
Freiheit oder Knechtschaft. 
79 freie Presse, 24/2/33, Ur. Hilferding durfte nicht reden. 
80 Ibid., An die Mitglieder der Eisernen Front! Lal.~t euch nicllt 
.E rovoz i eren. 
81 1 bi d., 
'Mit all diesen Verboten schlayt /lIan keine Iaee 
tot! Die sozialde/llok~atie hat den Verfolyunyen ~is­
marcks und den l3eschll11pfunyen Wilhelllls Il. yetrotzt 
und ist Sieger geblieben. Sie wird auch jetzt Sieger 
bleiben. Trotz alledem! ••• ' . 
The newspaper was then banned and duly ceased to exist. It was 
the last left winy newspaper to survive in the WUlJpertdl/Kelil-
scheid area. 
- 465-
H2 Cf. Hans Josef Steinberg, Widerstand und Verfolyuny in Essen 
1 Y33-45. Hannover 1 % 9, p. 1!:>f. 
See also Kurt Klotzbach, Gegen den Nationalsozialislllus. wider 
stand unaVerfolgung in Dortmund 193U-1945, Hannover 1YbY,p.l!:>. 
83 The author examined around 30U Gestapo files pertainin!;j to 
Communist resistance in Remscheid and Lennep, and aJ.l~rOxillldtely 
50 files concerning individual oJ.lponents frolll christian and 
Social UeOlocratic circles. This study by no means exhausts the 
complete collection of Gestapo files relating to resistance in 
Remscheid. Lack of time precluded the examination of files of 
Remscheid Communists involved in resistance in other towns, 
resi'stance in Luttringhausen, includiny the currection centre 
(Zuchthaus), resistcHlCe in concentration ccuups, tiles pertdlll-
ing to Ustarbeiter and prisoners ot war, and to IIldny unalignea 
individuals who also opposed the Nazis. Frum this it is cledr 
that the present study cannot do justice to the cOIIIJ.llex problt!1I1 
of resistance in Remscheid, and has to be contt:!nt witlt a fairly 
superficial survey. Much more research is needeo betore a 
comprehens i ve study can be undertaken. For tll is reason the, 
, a'uthor together with the two Remscheid historians Wolfgdng Fey 
and Hans Gerd Selbach is engaged in the foundin!;j of a history, 
workshop, which it is hoped will aid research into this ana 
other topics which as yet have been completely ignored at the 
local level. 
With regard to the evaluation of Gestapo files cdution is 
required as statt!lIIents contained in these were made unaer' 
duress, and suspects were anxi ous to deny or III it i gate thei r own 
roles in illegal activities. As the individuals concerned 
endeavoured to obscure their own complicity, the degree of 
truth is not readily apparent. 
H4 Hanni Schafer informed the author that party subscriptions were 
paid regularly in Relllscheid until 1Y3H, and Otto Alders claimea 
that his gr~up continued to pay dues until the end of the war. 
H5 RGA, 1/4/33, SLinden des Alltays. Sitzuny des I<emscheid 
$choffengerichts. Vorbereituny zum Hochverrat. 
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tl6 RGA, 2/6/33, Die Schiel3erei aln 5. Marz. 
Also HStA uusseldorf, Gestapo Akte 4~U~U, Alfred Hies. 
HStA uusseldorf. Gestapo Akte 2tlU70, Paul ~eCker. 
HStA uusseldorf, liestapo Akte 30957, t:::rich NeUlnann. 
tl7 See also RGA. 22/6/33. Wieder Schusse in Hemscheid. Erhohte 
Ak t i v ita t der KOllllllun is ten. 
It is of course easy to criticise such actions with the bene-
fit of tlindsight. It lIlust, however, be remembered that the 
perpetrators at the time coula not foresee the course of future 
developments. Such acts were most likely intended to encourage 
further resistance by example. In reality, however. the use ot 
weapons played into the Nazis' hands. as they were able to 
exploit such incidents for their propaganda value to spread 
fear and insecurity amongst local citizens ana Justify their 
brutal suppression of opposition. 
~8 1313, 19/7/33, Keinerlei Rucksichtnahme mehr: bellleiner Feuer· 
Liberfa 11 auf unseren Kameraden Wi 11 i Hoffmann - ui e SA Leitun~ 
warnt •. 
~y See ey, KGA, 5/5/j3, Waffenfunde in Mungsten, 
RGA, 1l/!>/33, Gegen KomOJunistisehe Wuhlarbeit: Verteilun~ 
illegaler kOllununistiseher urucksehriften. 
HStA ousseldorf. Rey. Uuss. 30662d, lllegale KOllllllunistische 
uruckschriften des Pressedi enstes der ~ezi rks I eitung der KPU. 
Bezirk Niederrhein, Ma; 1933. 
~ HStA uusseldorf, Reg. Uuss. 30649d, E;nheitsfrulltbestreDun~el\ 
zwischen SPU und KPO. 
91 Information from Willi Krell and Herlllann Hbhri!;l. 
92 HStA Uusse 1 aorf, Reg. ULiss. JU6b2a. Rlis tet zum 1. Ma i. lJer 
We lIfei ertay des Pro 1 etari ats illl lei chen des Kampfes ge';len 
kapitalistiSChe wirtschaftsbarbarei und faschistische Illut 
diktatur. 
93 See Berg i sche Moryenpos t. 29/1 /tl3, 1 n "Ilery i seh Mask au" kalil der 
Wechsel van "Rot" nach "Ilraun" nicht ubernacht. 
ThiS article which is a report of reminiscences by Remsclleia 
workers on the eve of the 50th anni versary of the Nazi sei zure 
of power, repeats the claim made in various otller drticles 
• 
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that both Thalmann and Halz were concealeo in Kelllsctleio. 
Furthermore. only a few trusted functionaries knew of the 
whereabouts of their illustnous 'guests'. Un the occasion of a 
lecture given by the author in the Volkshochschule in Kelllscheia 
in May 1~J this point was confirmeCl by a number of former KPU 
members who were present. Whilst frnst Thallllann was arresteu on 
March Jrd. Max Halz was able to escape to the Soviet Union. 
94 Interview with Hannah Quaas. 
95 On this particular occasion members of the Esperanto Club were 
gathered in her flat. Some one tapped on the window and 
informed them. that he had overheard a telephone conversation 
in the pub. A resident of the estate had phoneCl the police to 
tell them of the meeting. Hannah l,Juaas quicKly set the table 
and made coffee wh i 1st one or two peop I e si i pJJeo ou t of the 
flat. When the tlestdJJo arrived. they found a lIIere hcHldtul ot 
visitors sitting around the table drinking coffee. Although the 
po I i celllen excu sed thelllse Ives. it was ev i Clen t tna t tile f I at 
would now be observed more closely. so that frdu lJuaas hdO no 
alternative but to cease her activities. 
96 Information from Otto ,and Linnie Alders. 
97 The group based in Alt ~emscheid was nallled after Andreas 
Pfl Uger. not because he was the 1 eader but because with his 
arrest the Gestapo was able to roll up the whole group. 
98 In the course of their inquiries. the Gestapo interrogated ~l 
persons. but could only bf'iny a case against b~. Uther members 
of the group escaped detection or were able to go 'underground' 
and eventually flee froUl Kemscheio. 
9Y HStA uussel~orf. Gestapo Akte 271bH. Andreas Pfluyer. 
100 Emmi Leyendecker appears in the Gestapo files under her IIldiaen 
name Kubatz. 
101 Intervi ews with Hertha GI as and Enulli Leyenoecker. ~oth Hertha 
Glas and Emmi Leyendecker came from lower ntioale class families 
ana had been introduced to the work.ers' movement by the Freie 
Volkshoctlschule. 
102 Information frolll Luise Paul. 
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103 Fritz vol1erthum, a senior KPU official frolll Uplaaen, s~ent 
severa"1 months at the home of Otto Alders and assisted in the 
compilation of illegal literature. 
See HStA UUsseldorf. Gestapo Akte 27b1B, Andreas Hluyer, 
op.cit., and information from Utto Alders. 
VollerthulII was able to evade capture yet again before the 
Gestapo were able to complete their inquiries. 
104 Information from Ludwig Stillger. Stillger wade his way to 
Amsterdam where he found help at the Hote Hilte nead4uarters. 
In 1936 he and a number of colleagues from Rel1lscheid joined 
the International Brigade" and fought in the Spanish Ci~il War. 
His wife was given the choice of either divorce or extradition 
by the authorities in Rel1lscheid. Ludwiy Stillger's experiences 
were the subject of a f 1110 made for the German te 1 evi si on 
company ZOF by Johann Feindt. Karl $iebig and Klaus Volkenborn 
under the title. Unversohnliche frinnerungen, 1Y7~/8U. 
105 See Unsere Zeit (UZ) No. 23, June 1965. finer van Tausenden. 
fin Rel1lscheider Arbeiter berichtet uber den wiaerstand ge~en 
Hitler." 
lab Interview with Grete Salz. At the time she was still sin!jle 
(maidt:n name MUller). After the LennejJ oryanisation WdS 
smashed. Grete Salz was able to evade capture and with the aid 
of party officials made her way to Moscow where she spent over 
a year attending a course at the Lenin Academy. Uuriny tnis 
peri od she lIIet and marri ed will i Seng who was 1 a ter to jJ 1 ay a 
major role in the reorganisation of cOllununist resistance in 
the J{uhr. Sengfell into Gestapo handS in lY4J and was exe~ 
cuted the following year. After the war, Grete married Hans 
Salz. For an account of Grete Salz's work as a courier and 
instructor between Amsterdam and the Huhr. see frnst SClllllidt, 
Lichter in der Finsternis: Widerstdna undVerfolyung in tssen 
1~33~1945. Frankfurt a.M. l~l~, pp. 216-2JU. 
107 Interview with Grete Salz and Karl Enyels. 
108 UZ. No. 23, June lYb~. Ope cit. 
109 RudOlf Uiels, Luzifer •••• Ope cit. 
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110 See Karl Schabrod. Widerstand •••• OPe cit •• pp. IbU-174. 
Also UZ, June 1~65. Ope cit.; 
and HStA Dusseldorf. Gestapo Akte 2937~, Johannes SaIz; and 
Gestapo Akte 6526, Emil Schmidt. 
Some of the leaflets and stickers circulatea by the Salz yroup 
were produced with the aid of children's printing outfits. 
111 Int'orlnation from Grete Salz. 
112 UZ, No. 23, June 1%5, Ope cit. 
113 HStA Uusseldorf, Gestapo Akte 17~4, Karl Siebertz. 
114 For instance Karl Giersiepen who cOlnmittedsuicide during in-
terrogation by the liestapo in ULisseldort' on 5/3/'J4. See Klotz~ 
bach, liegen den Nationalsozialismus •••• OPe cit •• p. 2b7. 
And Fritz Schiffler who together 'with his wHe COllullittell 
suicide in Uctober 1933. See tltl. 27/1U/3J, Uas fnae des 
KOllllllun is tenyenera 1 s • 
And August Halllpe who died in a concentration CdlllP in !YjJ ur 
1~34. See illegal leaflet. Uie Liste des lirduens, copy in ~tf\ 
Kemscheid. 
Ewald Funke and Robert Stalllm were both executea in 1Y:J/. See 
Schabrod, Widerstand •••• Ope cit •• pp. e6-etl. 
115 Cf. Richard Grunberger. Ope cit •• p. 146. 
116 For example the case of He.rmann Uberberg and his wife in Kelll-
scheid, who were de,nounced by a neighbour whO clailllea that he 
had heard them sing the cOllununist song "Auf, auf zum Kampf". 
After a thorough investiyation the liestapo discovered that the 
two families had quarrelled, and this was an attempt by the 
neighbourS to settle with the Uberbergs. From the statements 
and information contained in the file. it is quite possiule 
that the accusations were accurate, but the motive for the 
denunciation was private. 
See HStA DLisse)dorf. liestapo Akte 5Y17U. Hennann Uberbery. 
Uther examples of denunciation wnich were of a political 
nature are: the case brought against Auyuste SChluter. st:!e 
HStA uusseldorf. lier. Rep. 92/<)2 193e. SchlLiter was denounced 
by neighbourS to whom she had disclosed information concernilly 
her work at the BSI which entailed the assembliny of bombs dnll 
117 
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gre.nades. These weapons were then d i spa tched to Spa i nand 
Japan. 
The son of Max Weidig's landlord penned a letter to Heinrich 
Himmler which contained detailed accusations of alleged ille~ 
gal political activities. Gestapo inquiries revealed that the 
accusations pertained to the early years of the weimar perioa. 
A ease could not be brought against the accused. See HStA 
Dusseldorf, uestapo Akte 1801, Max Weidig. 
On another oeeas i on a family was denounced by the d lvorced 
wife of the son, Kurt Tuttlies. His divorced wife tola the 
Gestapo of political meetings in the Tuttlies fl~t with 
friends and neighbours who together listenea to foreiyn radio 
stations and then discussed the news. Un this evidence, the 
parents, the son and a friend were sentenced tQ two years 
imprisonment. See HStA Uusseldorf, Gestapo Akte 4!1b6H, frdflz 
Tuttlies. 
Paul liecker, see HStA ULisseldorf, Gestapo AKte £tlU1U, Pdul 
liecker, was denounced by a neighbour of his father- in-law. In 
the ensuing Gestapo inquiry, his wife and father-in-law also 
made incriminating stateme~~s against him •. Uespite the accusa-
tions and supporting statelllents, Beeker was acquitted. 
Tim Mason, "Die Bandigung der Arbeiterklasse im nationalsozia-
listischen 'Ueutschland", in: Carola Sachse, Ti11a Sieye1, 
HassO Spode and Wo lfgang Spohn, Anyst, Bel ohnung, Zucht una 
Urdnung. Herrschaftsmechanislllen iru Nati ana 1 sozia 1 i SIIIUS I 
upladen 19H2, p. 42. 
Cf. Grunberger, Ope cit., p. 202. 
See also'Erhard Lucas, Vom Seheitern aer deutschen Aroeiter-
beweyung. Gedanken und Oberleyungen zur subjektiven Seite 
ihrer Gesehichte, Frankfurt a.M., 19~3. 
The cover of this book shows a Volkswayen beetle which SYIII-
bolises the decline of the workers' lIIovement. The author, tlow-
ever, does not take up the thellle of consumer.ism in this work. 
119 Ibid., p. 240. 
12U Cf. Mason, "Die Bandiguny der Arbeiterklasse ••• ", OPe cit. pp. 
35-37. 
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of reliable statistics and the presumably intended opa4ue 
presentation of material which has survivied the Third Meich 
precludes a thorough examination of National Socialist econo-
mic and social policy at the local level in a dissertation of 
this kind. 
124 Cf. Mason, "Die B~ndigung der Arbeiterklasse ••• ", Ope cit., p. 
1H. 
125 Ma~on, Sozialpolitik im Uritten Reich ••• , OPe cit., p." I~H. 
126 Ibid., p. 146f. 
127 See BB, 26/8/33. Arbei tsbescha ffungsproyrallllll du rchberaten. 
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ly, the article does not indicate whether the collections were 
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and Herlllann Uohrmann who were enyayea in rOdd repa i rs in 
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12H Cf. urunberger, Ope cit., pp. lUY-ll1. 
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StA Remscheid, Verwaltungsbericht Re~scheid 1934, p. 1. 
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134 The author was not able to uncover any documentdry evidence to 
support this supposition. althouyh a number of interviewees 
maintained that local industry's participation in rearmalllent 
was an open secret from mid-19J3. This is not necessdri ly to 
sugyest that weapons were being produced at this early staye, 
although this should not be discountea. tiut as Remscheia's 
role in the first World War showed. local inaustry was also a 
major supplier of tools and maintenance equiplllent for the 
135 
136 
137 
13H 
139 
140 
141 
142 
. construction of aeroplanes and military vehicles as well as 
producers of munitions. 
Workers employed in the rearlllalOent programme were of course 
sworn to secrecy. and stiff penalties were imposea on those 
who failed to observe the code. Cf. HStA UUsselaorf. Ger. Her. 
92/92 •• 1. Auguste Schlu~er wegen landesverrats. 1Y3H. 
In this case an employee of the HSI engayed in the production 
of incendiary bombs bound for Spain and JaIJan was accusea of 
treason for having casually informed a neiyhbour dbout the 
nature of her work. Although the case ayain~t her appeared 
mot i ve for h~£:i~~l!dellleanour eou 1 d 
StA I<emscheid, Verwaltungsbericht 
1\ 
Ibid •• p. 41._ '/ 
,In }'" 
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47. 
StA Nemscheid~ Verwaltungsbericht 
I' 
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I bi d. 
RGA, 135, Vertrauen 
BB, Y/9/33, Gewissenlose 
Ibid. li ti /))'" 
und Hoffnung, ov. cit. 
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'Wenn auctl unsere Waffe nur der Kochloffel ist. so solI seine 
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Gertrud Scholh·Klink was the leader of the ~ationalsozialis­
tische frauenschaft (National Socialist Wrnnen's Leayue). 
145 Ibid. 
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162 Ibid., pp. 3U3 3Uo. 
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1 he overa II survey revea I ed an average ot on Iy two Inarks jJer 
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O.!:> % of the annual income, a sum which was less than that 
spent on soap powder, for instance. The conclusion drawn frolll 
these figures is that despite very equitable prices,.Kdt" holi-
days remained an unattainable luxury for the majority ot the 
. working population. 
Furtherlllore, as many OAF and NS Hayo (ColHmercial and Irddin!:J 
Organisation) officials received free tickets, and SA and ~S 
personnel travelled at half price, whilst Alte Kdlllpter were 
rewarded for their loyalty with holidays free of charye, Kar, 
although unintentionally, increasingly developed into a travel 
oryanisation for party cOlllrades. 
1b3 Rheinische Landeszeituny, 2/4/36, Maoeira - ein richtiyes 
Paradies. Unsere Madeirafahrer kehrten heim. 
Untortunately we were not lllturlllt!u how IIIdllY ul thl.! jJdrLll.1 
pants were workers. 
104 Ibid. 
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165 I{(jA, 2~/1/34, Erwin Hosfeld, liauwart des KtlF, Uussehlort, 
Gemeinschaft "Kraft durch Freude". Gau UUsseldort verwirklicht 
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166 Cf. Sopade reports, especially from 1937 onwards. 
Ibl See, for instance, HStA Uusseldorf, liestapo Akte 3YOY{j, 
Wi Ihelmine POllunerin. 
In 1937 the liestapo smashed a KPU escape orgdnisation whiCh 
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Schuc~nilski, whose husband was currently detaineo in prutec-
tive custody. She had harboured several KPu otficials wllo were 
wanted by the Gestapo. Mathilde SChuchlllilski received a prison 
sentence of one year and nine months. 
IbB Information. from Utto Alders, who chi/lied that· the KPU Con-
tinued to exist in Remscheid throughout the Ihird Reich. Suo-
scriptions were collected up to the end of the war. 
1b9 Cf. Tim Mason, "The Workers' Opposition in Nazi Gerllldny" , in: 
History Workshop, Spring 19~1, pp. 1~U-lJ7. 
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170 Uuri~g the course of his research the author was unable to 
find any evidence of cOlllmunist cells opercltin~ in I<elllscheia 
. factories during the war. Fritz l:ieinersdorf informed the 
au thor of one ce II i nvo I ved in ac ts of sabota~e in the Ueu t 
sche Edelstahlwerke, which helped a number of prisoners ot war 
to escape. l$einersdorf's father who was a KPU activist. be-
longed to this group. 
Shortly before the completi.on of this dissertation ttle author 
learned of the existence of the local resistance yroutJ led by 
Hugo Paul which had close ties with the reorganised KPu 
organisation of the Lower I{hineland region via Wil li s~ny, the 
husband of Grete Salz. This attempt to rebui It the COllllllunist 
resistance movement duriny the war appears to have been short-
lived. and the local group was rounded ul1 ill 1~~/4J. Huyo 
Paul, who had already spent ten years in prisons and concen-
tration caml1s was able to conceal his own illl(Jortant role in 
the movement. unfortunately, lack of tilllt~ prevented the author 
from investigating the activities of this resistance grouIJ. It 
is therefore still not clear whether the cells in tile larger 
Remscheid factories were in close contact with this group. 
171 Interview with Paul von der !jurg. November 1tlth, 1!:1/tl. See 
Appendix ll. 
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IV. University Press Amsterdam, Amsterdam l!:l/U. 
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p. JU!:If. 
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17Y Ibid. 
1~U Ibid. 
UH Statistisches Amt Remscheid, Heilllatvertriebene una Lugewan-
derte aus der Sowjetischen ~esatzunyszone und ~erlin "a Ch Qelll 
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The tota I number of refugees absorbed by Kelllsctlei d was' ~. Jlj 
which equalled approximately eiyht percentot the'town's jJUjJU-
lation. They were distributed in the following way: 
Remscheid town 5,b7Y 
Lennep 
Luttringhausen 
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1,3V. 
1~~ Mason, "Die ~andigung der Arbeiterklasse.~.", OPe cit., p. Jl. 
1~j Freiheit, 22/4/1947, Landtagswahleryebnis l(emscheidlKreis 5U). 
KPU 
sru 
CUU 
FuP 
ZentrUlII 
DRP 
In the 
was 
KPU 
SPU 
WU 
fUP 
ZentrulII 
RSF 
IJ,lYl 
12,1~b 
11,337 
"',7Yl 
2,b37 
1,U~ 
council elections held 
10,~bb = 7 seats 
12, nu = ~ seats 
10 ,2b7 = b seats 
10,325 = 6 seats 
2,26 !J - U seats 
3,724 = 2 seats 
the following year, the 
See freiheit, 1~/lU/4~, Uas Eryebnis der Gellleindewahlen. 
result 
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CON C L U S ION 
The Remscheid workers' movement was already established as a radical 
force in local society by the beginning of the period which this dis-
sertation exaulines. Prevailin £ conditions in this, one of Germany's 
oldest industrial regions, had compelled the workers to organise in 
order to safeguard their interests, at a time when large parts of 
the Ruhr were still covered by grassy meadows and grazing cattle. 
After a long and hard struggle to maintain their independent status, 
highly skilled master craft,smen, in particular file-makl,rs and grin-
ders, were driven out of business and forced to seek employment in 
the factorie~. Their experience of exploitation by capitalist entre-
preneurs revealed the necessity of organisation, as the ,mly mc'lIls 
of defending' their cCllllomic interests. It W;)H thl'se hi~l,hlY-l'ikill('d 
and disciplined craftsmen who directed the local workl'rg~ llIovenll'nt 
into the twentieth century, and imprinte~ their character on the 
tradition. The organisation of a trade union to further their eco-
nomic inte'rests was followed by the establishment of a local branch 
of the Social Democratic Party to argue their political case, and 
by numerous clubs and societies which catered for the'ir social 
needs. These three types of institutions were coordinated and an-
chored in the working-class districts of the town to form a cohe-
sive alternative system, segregated from and lililitantly opposed to 
the prevailing ideological ethos. The high dcgrel! of inlo:.>nnarriage 
between the families of political activists was an important factor 
which ensured solidarity. Conscious of their growing strength and 
confident of their ultin~te triumph, local workerti were nevertheless 
unimpressed by th~,revisionist theory of gradual transition to pOwer 
by the undermining of capitalism from within. Any illusions whicll 
remained were dispelled by the outbreak of war in 1914. 
Institutions founded in the first d~cade of this century, like the 
yolkshaus, the local SPD newspaper, and the consumer cooperative 
"Einigkeit" were both a mark of the movement's strength and impor-
tant factors determining its continuing d~velopment. 
- 478 :.. 
The decision by the central party leadership to approve the waI" credits 
opened up a' rift between the party and the local movelll\.'nt, which WdS 
to determine the course of political developments in Remscheid through-
out the period under scrutiny. The 'betrayal' by remote party depu-
ties and'the trade union bureaucracy was a traumatic shock for local 
workers and their leaders, who played a leading role in till! format iUll 
of the opposition movement in Germany. The accusation of betrayal by 
the Social Democratic Party was to be made repeatedly in Remscheid 
thereafter. 
The experience of war, characterised by the grossly unequal distri-
bution of burdens; on the one hand years of sacrifice, hunger~ ex-
ploitation and continual repression, on the other lmnll:!nSe profits, 
incessant denwnds for ever-greater efforts on the part of the workers 
and the rapacious appetite of local uunu[acturers [or new colonies, 
resullcd in an escalation of hostility to Lhe point of OjlVll cL..Is::; 
conflict. The local workers' movement waS in the forefront of the 
revolution and inilie organisation of the council system, both on a 
regional and national scale. The attempt to carry through their ob-
jective of establishing a dictatorship of the proletariat was under-
mined by external forces, but this did not weaken the morale and 
determination of the local movement. Spurred on by the success of 
Russian workers, they were still supremely confident of attaining 
their goal in the near future. 
Whilst the Remscheid movement was compelled to accept the principle 
of parliamentary democracy against its will, the considerable degree 
of political awareness of the local workers, den~nstrat~J in every 
election by higher-than-Reich-averagc turn-outs, which at least en-
sured their party of the largest share of votes, added a further 
dimension to the struggle for power, which in the early years of 
the Republic did not appear to halt their progress at tilt.' local 
level. 
The severe discrepancy between aims, which workers felt to be legi-
tin~te, and their actual social and economic situation, which dete-
riorated rapidly in 1923, after a short period of increased expec-
tation, and the assault by employers on th~ modest achievl~ments of 
" 1', 
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the revolution were the causes of conflict which broke out in the 
autuiIUl of 1923. The defeat of that year did not lead to a reunifi-
cation of the workers' movement; on the contrary, the gulf between 
various factions widened. Remscheid workers again chose to support 
the proponents of revolution. Frustrated expectations and the inm~­
diate ramifications of defeat precipitated a change of leadership 
and policy whi~h reflected a hardening of attitudes within the move-
ment. Former leaders, regarded by many as too ready to compromise 
and therefore partly responsible for the debacle, were ousted by 
young hard-liners who set abou~ implementing the KPD's policy of bol-
shevisation. 
The KPD attempted to shift the emphasis of attack to the factories 
by the establishment of conulIunist cells. At the same tillle they bl'g:llI 
a camrair,n in worldng-cl:1HS Iwighhourhoods to widl'n till' ;]l,tivl' h;I~;., 
of the movement. Despite their efforts, how('ver. thl' COllllllllniHtH' 
strategy fell short of expectations. On various occasions they wvr0 
able to mobilise substantial numbers of workers. but lllL' 1IIl1llll'IItUIII 
could not be sustained indefinitely. Dem.1nds for rieid disciplil1(~ 
and their intolerance of dissent which was frequently answered by 
castigation in the local pr~ss and expUlsion from the party, alie-
nated sections of the working class, who clearly had other needs 
which the party neglected. The Stalinist methods, which r<.ln contrary 
to the tradition of the German workers' movement allowed no criti-
cism of party policy and ignored alternative propositions, so that 
insufficient impulses from the working class penetrated the thinking 
of cadre members. The result of this style of leadership was not inm~-
diately apparent. 
There was no evidence of marked decline in support for the KPD during 
elections, and after the onset of the economic crisis and ensuing de-
pression, the party's share of votes began to increase dranwtically. 
Mass support, however, remained essentially passive and qualitatively 
suspect. The KPD, whilst consistently maintaining a strong and ener-
getic corps of officials in Ren~cheid and controlling the majority 
of institutions of the workers' movement, was nevertheless guilty of 
self-deception. In their desire to extend the base of active 
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support, local, Conullunists clearly neglected the important qual iLlt ive [, 
aspects of political consciousness. A consequence of this failure was ! 
the high rate of fluctuation in party mcniliership, which was boost~d 
temporarily by recruitment and subscription campaigns, but was not 
sufficiently consolidated before the introduction of new drives. Po-
litical meetings with audiences of a thousand workers cheering the 
speaker whilst not daring to question policy and tactics for fear of 
reprisals, also encouraged delusion on the part of the local leader-
ship. 
In electoral terms, the extreme right was weak in Remscheid until tlw 
end of 1930, when the NSDAP experienced a meteoric rise to become the 
largest middle-class party, and unite the majority of organisations 
and interest groups which had formed the bourgeois coalition from 
1921 onwards. The process of progressiv{' polariH:ltion wir-hill lnc:lI 
society drove the manufacturers and civil servants furthl:!r to the 
right until the protestant middle-class partie~finally collapsed. 
The pre-1933 NSDAP was overwhelmingly lower-middle class with a strong 
declass~ element and relatively few genuine proletarians. The SA was 
also mainly lower-middle class, but the young and unemployed w~rking 
cl~ss were present in a slightly higher ratio than in the local party. 
Here again the percentage of declasses was very high, but it must be 
remembered that the "local SA numbered no more than 500 before the 
seizure of power. 
The period of depression was one of intense class hostility punctuated 
by intermittent outbreaks of class conflict wh~ch, however, were quan-
titativelY and qualitatively weaker than in the years 1918 to 1923. 
Class conflict between 1929 and 1933 did not carry the support of a 
united working class,al~hough substantial numbers of workers were 
involved. 
Particularly during the depression, street violence in Remscheid de-
veloped t~pical patterns. Considering that pistols were used with 
alarming regularity, and clashes occurred almost daily, the IllOSt 
striking point about local street fights is, that only two ended 
with fatalities. The low ratio of deaths to violent clashes appears 
to result from a coniliination of inhibitory factors, suell as acquain-
tances and fear of prosecution. After March 1933, both factors dis~ 
appeared or were significantly weakened, in that Nazis no longer 
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needed to fear legal reprisals, and that outsiders were used more 
frequently in the round-up and punishment of opponents. In Remscheid. 
for instance, it was above all SA troops from Wuppertal under the 
command of chief of police Veller, who conducted the arrests of 
local Communists. The changed situation, with the Nazis now repre-
senting legality, encouraged acts of revenge, but ev~n th~se stopp0d 
shor:t of cold-blooded murder, when those carrying out arrests and 
their prisoners were personally acquainted. In cases wh~re Remscheid 
Conununists lost their lives, this always happened ell>cwhcre, in situa-
tions where they were not personally known to their interrogators. 
The situation was yet again resolved by external events in 1933. and 
the "election results in March of that year show that till! 1lI':ljority of 
workers remaint!d loyal to the KPD. The National Socialists owed their 
dectoral 'victory' above all to the support of the llIidJIl' cl"assl's, 
large numbers of young and unen~loyed voters and 'unpolitical' cl~­
ments, whose participation was presumably induced by the exception;d 
circumstances of the depre~sion and the beguiling style of the Nazi 
campaign. A consequence of the extreme polarisation in Remscheid to-
wards the end of the Weimar Republic was that the process of Cleich-
s~haltung had effectively been carried through in many bourgeois or-
ganisations before the policy was officially implemented. 
Despite the merciless repression which neutralised the workers' le.:Jders 
and the co~nunist party cadre, younger members dnd women stepped into 
the breach to continue resistance. The con~ination of police terror, 
concessions and the encouragement of consumerist values, disseminated 
by the omnipotent Nazi propaganda machine. isolated the activists of 
the workers' movement. The destruction of workers' institutions and 
the Gleichschaltung of all public life separated the movement from 
" the working class and interrupted the regeneration process. 
Although the workers' movement experienced a short-lived yet turbu-
lent revival between 1945 and 1950, it was unable to recover from 
the damage inflicted during the years of Nazi rule, and declined 
rapidly during the fifties. 
This dissertation does not claim to present a cou~lete history of 
the Remscheid workers' movement during the period 19 tt. to 1945. but 
it does provide a basis for comparisC'n with other towns. There still 
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remains considerable scope for further research on the local movement 
, 
and a number of important questions require fuller treatment. The 
problem of the quality of political consciousness of the rank and 
file members in the years after 1924 clearly needs further examina-
tion. Likewise the relationship between the movement and the working 
class as a whole might be researched with particular regard to the 
effects of the emergent mass media. It is still unclear, what impact 
radio, cinen~, trivial literature and newspapers had on their audience 
and readership. The reading habits of workers and their participation 
in the culture of mass media are questions which require thorough in-
vestigation, both on a global and local scale, before an asseSsment 
of their negative influence on the workers' movement can be made. 
Another important aspect of this problem is thl.! 1Il0vellll'ul' ~ Own ex-
ploitatioll of the n~ss. media. Whilst the Kulturkartel1 ill l{c/Ilschldd 
did try to make use of films, and the lit!rgi::H.:lie VolksstillUlIl~ IlIainl.:.Iillt.'J 
a bookshop in the town, we are not yet able to gauge the level uf ::;Ul:'-
cess of these veutures, though tht! introduction uf fi till rest iv~d::; l"v -
veals an awareness of the significance of nwss media, the lev,,;l of 
priority given to the exploitation of new forms of expression remains 
uncertain. 
The undermining tendency of consumerism also requires further investi-
gation, particularly with regard to the Weimar period. Although th<.~ 
Nazis positively encouraged constimerist values, they certainly did not 
discover them. What still needs to be ascertained is, how far con-
sumerist values had spread before the Nazis cam\;! to power, and to 
what extent were institutions of the workers' movement themselves 
unwittingly responsible. 
The role of women has largely been neglected, not out of lack of 
interest, but because the author did not feel competent to furnish 
it with the attention it obviously warrants. Human wen~ often in th~~ 
forefront in clashes with authority and at tillles offered sterner and 
more determined resistance than their menfolk. It is still not clear, 
to what extent their resolutene.was a result of double oppression, 
not only by bourgeoi~ society but also by their own husbands. Pre-
dominant attitudes in the local workers' movement towards women need 
careful analysis. There appears to be little evidence of positive 
encouragement and help for women. Was the neglect of women an in-
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trinsic weakness of the local workers' movement and did it constitute 
a lost opportunity to improve the quality of political consciousness 
and sim ultaneously widen the base? 
This dissertation is to be regarded as a contribution to the study of 
the local workers' movement, and it is hoped that it will help to 
stimulate further research in this field. 
Ward 1 : 
. 
A 
B 
C 
D 
E 
El 
F 
G 
H 
62.5 i. 
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A P PEN D I X I 
The Social Composition of 40 Electoral Ward.s .of. 
Alt-Remscheid, based on the Remscheid Address 
Book 1929.* 
Stad t /Markt /Bismar~.~.s.~~~~.':._ 
219 = 37.5 % 393 53.5 
115 :: 19.7 % 95 :;: . 14.4 
25 :: 4.3 % 15 = 2.3 
43 = 7.4 % 35 = 5.3 
96 :0 16.4 % 68 :: 10.3 
0 :: 0.0 % 0 = 0.0 
73 = 12.5 % 81 = 12.3 
12 :;: 2.0 i. 11 ;; 1.6 
1 :: 0.2 % 2 = 0.3 
llun-III;lllu;ll workers 
% 
% 
% 
% 
% 
% 
% 
Z 
% 
Ward 3: lIaddenbacher StraBe/ 
----- ---Oor f~lUhfe"" --- _.----_. . WaE!!~T ~...c~~_tl·~)_I_~_~~_h_~!!l!ohl'nh;tg"n / 
. N~u(!nkaI~E._ , . 
A 423 " = 54.4 % 306 :;: 50.6 % 
B 103 :: 13.2 % 78 = 12.9 % 
C 26 :: 3.4 % 12 = 2.0 % 
D 44 :: 5.7 % 94 = 15.5 % 
E 47 = 6.1 % 21 :;: 3.5 % 
El 0 = 0.0 % 9 1.5 i-
F 91 = 11. 7 % 66 = 10.9 % 
G 38 = 4.9 % 15 :;: 2.5 % 
H 5 :: 0.6 % 4 :;: 0.6 % 
45.6 % non-manual workers 49.4 % non-uunual workers 
A 485 ::; 69.0 % 481 :: 66.4 % 
B 73 = 10.4 % 54 = 7.5 % 
C 17 .- 2.6 % 23 = 3.2 % 
D 22 :: 3.1 % 26 = 3.6 % 
E 20 :: 2.8 % 33 :: 4.6 % 
El 13 :: 1.8 % 8 = 1.1 % 
F 65 :: 9-.2 % 77 :: 10.6 % 
G 8 :: 1.1.% 18 = 2.5 Z 
H 0 :: 0.0 % 4 = 0.5 i. 
31.0 % non-manual workers 33.6 % non-manual workers 
* For categorisation sce ,chapter 11, note 164 
Ward 7 : IntzestraBe/Struck 
A 
B 
C 
D 
E 
El 
F 
G 
H 
466 ;;: 
52 ;;: 
10 ;;: 
8 ;;: 
20 ;;: 
3 
87 ;;: 
12 ;;: 
o 
70.8 i. 
7.9 i. 
1. 5 i. 
1.2 % 
3.1 % 
0.5 i. 
13.2 % 
1.8 % 
0.0 i. 
29.2 % non-n~nual workers 
Ward 9 : Bliedinghausen 
A 441 ;;: 67.2 i. 
B 50 ;;: 7.6 % 
C 15 = 2.1 % 
0 22 = 3.3 % 
E J2 - 4.9 % 
El 6 = 0.9 % 
F. 74 = 11.4 % 
G 16 = 2.4 % 
H 0 ;;: 0.0 i. 
32.8 % non-manual workers 
• 
• 
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Ward 11 : Ro~!!~s~ll~~rge.r:_ 
- .-------- StraBe 
A 376 56.5 i. 
B 70 ;;:, 10.5 i. 
C 32 ;;: 4.8 % 
.0 36 ;;: 5.4 i. 
E 37 = 5.6 % 
El 0 ;;: 0.0 i. 
F 63 ;;: 9.5 i. 
G 51 ;;: 7.7 % 
H 0 = 0.0 % 
43.5 % non-manual workers 
427 
78 
33 
37 
46 
3 
86 
41 
o 
;;: 
;;: 
;;: 
;;: 
;;: 
;;: 
56.9 % 
10.4 % 
4.4 % 
4.9 % 
6.1 % 
0.3 % 
11.5 % 
5.5 % 
0.0 % 
43.1 i. non-manual workers 
319 ;;: 50.4 i-
69 = 10.9 % 
')0 7.C) 1. 
40 = h.) Z 
4) ( •• H "I lu 
0 = 0.0 % 
67 = 10.6 % 
45 7. 1 % 
0 = 0.0 % 
49.6 % nOn-1II3 nU:ll work"'r~ 
Ward 12 . ~~r_e~)berB(I~()senhi.ige 1 . 
386 :: 64.9 % 
58 ;;: 9.7 % 
7 = 1.2 i. 
13 = 2.2 i. 
38 = 6.4 i. 
2 ;;: 0.3 % 
73 = . 12.3 i. 
18 = 3.0 % 
0 ;;: 0.0 % 
35.1 % non-manual worker:; 
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Ward 13 : Blul\lenstra13e/PalmstraBe Ward 14 : Osterbusch 
A 294 = 39.8 % 402 = 68.6 % 
B 109 = 14.8 % 39 = 6.7 % 
C 45 = 6.1 % 14 = 2.4 i-
D 61 = 8.3 % 12 = 2.0 % 
E 103 :: 13.9 i- 31 = 5.3 % 
El 0 = 0.0 % 0 = 0.0 7. 
F 87 = 11.8 % 67 = 11.4 % 
G 34 = 4.6 % 18 = 3. 1 7. 
H 5 = 0.7 % 3 = 0.5 % 
60.2 % non-manual workers 31.4 % non-manual workers 
Ward 15 · Lobusch Ward 16 Stadt/AlleestraBe 
· 
... -_._' - -.- ._'. 
A 325 '" 60.9 % 197 = 26.5 % 
n 56 '" 10.5 % 102 = 13.7 i. 
C 17 = 3.2 % 92 = 12.4 % 
1) 19 = J.6 % tl5 I 1.4 Z .. 
E 31 = 5.8 i. 128 = 17.2 % 
El 1 = 0.2 % 0 = 0.0 % 
F 64 = 12.0 % 95 12.8 % 
G 19 = 3.6 % 38 = 5. 1 % 
H 1 = 0.2 i- 7 = 0.9 % 
39. 1 % non-manual workers 73.5 % non-manual workers 
Ward 17 · Honsberg I WaEd 18_._i_l:!9~1~b.~rg II 
· --.------... -.-.. ~ .... 
A 356 = 68.5 % 324 
:: 75.5 i. 
B 29 = 5.6 % 22 
:: 5. 1 % 
C 5 = 0.9 % 6 = 1 .4 % 
D 20 = 3.8 % 2 :: 0.5 % 
E 28 '" 5.4 % 15 
:; 3.5 i. 
El 0 :; 0.0 % 2 = 0.5 i-
F 63 = 12. 1 % 49 = 11 .4 % 
G 16 '" 3. 1 i- 6 = 1.4 i-
n 3 ::: 0.6 % 3 
:: 0.7 i-
31.5 % non-manual workers 24.5 % non-manual workers 
Ward 19 : Bonsberg III 
------.-.~ -.~ ............ ' .... . 
A 
B 
C 
D 
E 
El 
F 
G 
H 
434 
31 = 
3 = 
13 = 
7 = 
o = 
53 = 
3 = 
5 = 
79.1 % 
5.6 % 
0.5 % 
2.4 % 
1. 3 % 
0.0 % 
9.7 % 
0.5 % 
0.9 % 
20.9 % non-manual workers 
Ward 21 : Kippdorf 
.' --_ .. __ ._-------_ ..... - --.".>_._. --
A 
B 
C 
U 
E 
, El 
f 
G 
H 
383 = 
58 :; 
5 = 
15 
19 = 
1 = 
Cl 1 :; 
10 = 
6 = 
68.6 % 
10.4 % 
0.9 % 
'2..7 % 
3.4 % 
0.2 i. 
10.9 % 
1. 8 i-
1. 1 % 
31.4 % non-manual workers 
Ward 23 : SchUttendelle 
.-----------_ ... -.. " .... _--
A 
B 
C 
D 
E 
El 
F 
G 
H 
363 = 
43 = 
21 = 
27 ;::; 
42 :; 
2 :; 
69 = 
41 :; 
1 :; 
59.7 % 
7. 1 % 
3.4 % 
4.4 % 
6.9 % 
0.3 % 
11.3 % 
6.7 % 
0.2 % 
40.3 % non-manual workers 
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Ward 20 : Kremenholl 
.. --_.- .- .... 
367 
61 
15 = 
b 
36 
4 = 
58 = 
15 = 
6 = 
64.6 % 
10.7 % 
2.6 % 
1.1 % 
6.4 % 
0.7 % 
10.2 % 
2.6 % 
1 • 1 % 
35.4 % non-manual workers 
_~~_rd_~_2--,-_B~rU_d_c:!._s. ~!~.f}el Amt sger ie hi 
Am Bruch 
is") = 38.1 % 
108 = 14.5 % 
35 :; 4.7 % 
5) 7.1/~ 
71 = 9.0 % 
o :; U.O Z 
In 15.2 % 
72 9.7 % 
8 1 • 1 % 
61.9 % non-u~nual workers 
320 ;;:: 51.9 % 
62 = 10.0 % 
25 = 4.0 % 
30 4.9 % 
47 = 7.6 % 
3 = 0.5 % 
51 = 8.3 % 
78 = 12.6 % 
1 = 0.2 % 
48.1 % non-manual workers 
Ward 25 :.GUldenwerth 
A 
B 
C 
D 
E 
El 
F 
G 
H 
340 = 
73 = 
19 = 
27 = 
47 = 
5 :: 
75 = 
97 :: 
6 :;; 
49.3 % 
10.6 % 
2.8 % 
3.9 % 
6.8 % 
0.7 % 
10.9 % 
14.1 % 
0.9 % 
50.7 % non-manual workers 
Ward 27 : polizeirr~sidium/ 
--------- -----LindenstraBe -- ----
A 
B 
C 
D 
E 
El 
F 
C 
H 
_ 173 
121 
119 
1% 
= 21.0 % 
= 
= 
= 
40 = 
o ::;; 
Y6 
74 
5 
= 
= 
= 
I lj.7 % 
14.4 % 
23.8 % 
4.9 % 
0.0 % 
11.6 % 
9.0 % 
0.6 % 
79.0 % non-n~nual workers 
Ward 29 : WilhelrnstraBe 
. ---.-.------.--~ .. ~-.---.--- ------ .-----
A 
B 
C 
D 
E 
El 
F 
C 
H 
199 = 
134 :: 
67 = 
77 = 
48 "" 
o = 
100 = 
54 = 
6 :: 
29.1 % 
19.6 % 
9.8 % 
11. 2 % 
7.0 % 
0.0 % 
14.6 % 
7.9 % 
0.8 % 
70.9 % non-nwnual workers 
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215 = 45.2 % 
31 = 6.5 % 
10 = 2.1 % 
17 = 3.6 % 
32 :;; 6.7 % 
15 '" 3.1 % 
57 12.0 % 
99 = 20.8 % 
-0 = 0.0 % 
54.8 % non-n~nual workers 
_~ard 2J3 __ ; __ l:Iindenburgstra.B~ 
237 = 
11') 
66 = 
1 ') ') 
66 = 
o = 
87 
20 
5 = 
J2.1 % 
lR.1 Z 
H.9 % 
Ih.6 Z 
8.9 i. 
0.0 % 
11.8% 
2.7 % 
0.7 % 
67.9 % non-manual workers 
Ward 30 : SchUtz~nstraBe 
-------- -.- - -~ ... _._--
234 :: 
108 ::;; 
56-
80 ::;; 
66 = 
0- = 
88 = 
48 = 
4 = 
34.2 i. 
15.8 % 
8.2 % 
11. 7 % 
9.6 7-
0.0 i. 
12.9 7-
7.0 % 
0.6 i. 
65.8 % non-manual workers 
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Ward 31 : Elberfelder StraBe/ 
"------. -ij{iTens'traBe 
-.~--.~~ - .. --.------ -.~-
A 
B 
C 
D 
E 
El 
G 
H 
289 = 
132 == 
69 == 
72 = 
78 = 
o = 
96 == 
54 == 
2 == 
36.5 % 
16.7 % 
8.7 % 
9.1 % 
9.8 % 
0.0 % 
12. 1 % 
6.8 % 
0.3 ,% 
63.5 % non-n~nual workers 
Ward 33 : Laspert II{~_~lems,t.r_~: 
-' ~~----. --_.- ~ _. -.-. 
A 336 ;;:: 57.0 % 
B 48 ;;: 8.2 % 
C 13 == 2.2 % 
D Lt 2 == 7. t % 
I:: 47 = 8.0 % 
El 1 == 0.2 % 
F 58 = 9.8 % 
G 43 = 7.3 %' 
H 1 = 0.2 % 
43 % non-manual workers 
Ward 35 Heidhof . 
. ------------.---~.-- -~ -
A 279 == 44.7 % 
B 63 == to.l % 
C 43 == 6.9 % 
D 71 == 11.4 % 
E 34 == 5.4 % 
El 1 == 0.2 % 
F 74 == 11.9 % 
G 59 == 9.4 % 
H 0 = 0.0 % 
55.3 % non-manual workers 
Ward 32 Laspert I 
320 = 
60 == 
6 == 
22 == 
39 = 
o 
62 = 
15 = 
3 
60.7 % 
11.4 % 
1.1 % 
4.2 % 
7.4 % 
0.0 % 
11.8 % 
2.8 % 
0.6 % 
39.3 % non-manual workers 
3ti5 - b4. J % 
55 = q ') % .-
3 == O.S % 
22 = 3.7 % 
36 = 6.0 % 
t == 0.2 % 
69 == 11.5 % 
26 = 4.3 % 
2 == 0.3 % 
35.7 % non-manual workers 
Ward 36 . Haddenbach . 
360 == 55.0 i. 
66 == 10. 1 % 
16 = 2.4 % 
24 == 3.7 % 
32 = 4.9 i. 
4 == 0.6 % 
62 = 9.5 % 
89 == 13.6 % 
::; 0.2 % 
45 % non-manual workers 
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Ward 37 BUchel/Uasten I 
-----'-'-
.~a rd ~_.~~o(;kJI.!r s t ral3e/ Konig-
stra(3e/Hasten II 
.' 
A 350 ::: 52.0 % 336 = 51.0 % 
B 53 ::: 7.9 % 55 8.3 i. 
C 19 ::: 2.8 % 34 ::: 5.2 % 
D 25 ::: 3.7 i. 26 3.9 i. 
E 68 ::: 10. 1 % 39 
::: 5.9 i. 
El 0 0.0 % 3 0.5 i. ::: o . = 
F 74 11.0 % 70 10.6 i. 
G 84 = 12.5 % 96 = 14.6 i. 
H 0 ::: 0.0 % 0 = 0.0 % 
48 % non-manual workers 49 % non-manual lJe)rkers 
Ward 39 . Hasten III Ward 40 
. Hasten IV 
. 
. 
-_ ... ,-- _._------ ~ - .. - ....... _. __ ... -
------.- -- .-.----. _ ..• , .' 
A 298 ::: 49.8 % 249 = tl C,.3 i. 
50 &.3 C' 40 7.4 % L ;,', I. = 
C lY 3.2 % 
2~ - 4.h Z 
I) 9 ::: 1.5 "' 21 ::: '3. q % I. 
E 42 ::: 7.0 % 38 = 7. 1 i. 
El 2 ::: 0.3 % 0 0.0 i. 
F 78 ::: 13.0 % 63 = 11.7 % 
G 101 ::: 16.9 % 100 = 18.6 % 
H 0 ::: 0.0 % 2 = 0.4 % 
50.2 % non-manual workers 53.7 % non-manual workers 
... -=-
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A P PEN D I X 11 
HUckeswagen, le 3 Mai 1945 
Noue tenons A aigculer l'aide que nous avons toujoura trouvee 
aupr~s de Moneieur oaul VAN DER nunG, et particuli~rement d l'occll.oior, \ 
d' une eVb.siond tun camarade, p:riaonn1er de guerre auquel 11 u tou"rtJi 
v~te~ents civile et b111eto de vhemin de fer, 
, 
I 
, , 
, 
.-
y 
I 
\ 
-, 
De par uu condui te 11 'u toujours montre ses aelJtirnentu unti-
Mou1:ice HEDDE, Sergent, Priaonnier de guerr~ 
Fruncruio • 
• 
Jet~ GUIGOUNET, Mar'chal deo 10g1a, Prisonnier 
de guerre Fru.ncruiu. 
-JtHlll UEUBAUER, Homme de confiunce de", Civi10 
Frun'1 u1a • 
.. , ,.. 
'~'T - 'l "I~t1')n: . 
--. - --.--~- i';~ -~hould like t·o point out, that v¥a have .lw"y~ 
found help ., Paul von dtr Dur~. '_:Hc1nl1~' 
at th- ooc.~lon of • oomr-d,'Q ~,c.~', • rr1~on~r 
of wMr, to whom h. g~v. oivil ~ult~ .nd r{-11~~y­
ticket •• 
B~' hi. b_hrv1our h. h'li! "'t tv.rl' t,lrre .;llo',n 1 .. 
• nti-nllzl .en .. a. 
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7~)'Q~~~ ~ .-r.;-
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3auuoel"(~ ~£~70i#..t~; 
3. Co.;(~HUlG ~<Ui~ /c. #~...u.<,4..-" .;;;; .. ~~r~lJc,,~ 
.~ ~~,/b 
tJ-. JI'¥'OC ~~ ,0. CkJlUuA-I/ H-". /Ca...u~4..~.~ 
~ 
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NEWSPAPERS 
Bergischer Beobachter (Rheinische Landeszeitung) 
Bergische Volksstiu~e 
Remscheider Arbeiterzeitung 
Remscheider Generalanzeiger 
Remscheider Zeitung 
Lenneper Kreisblatt 
LUttringhauser Taglicher Anzeiger 
Freie Presse, Wuppertal 
Freiheit, DUsseldorf 
Freies Yolk 
Bergische Arbeiterstin~e, Solingen 
Unsure luit, UUssuldurf, 
Die Rote FaiHlL' , Bl.!rlin 
Die Neue, Berlin 
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OFFICIAL FILES 
Stadtarchiv Remscheid 
.. ___ .w._----·- .--.. -.... - ..... -, .,.~ --. . _. 
I B/21-27b, I 8/29-35, I C/4-11, I R/65-78, I H/84-94, 1 Ha/38,39, 
I J/5,6; 
11 A/29-42, 11 A/81-86, 11 A/120-122, 11 A/125-132, 11 Ja/l,2, 11 T/18,19 
III A/75,76; 
IV L / 2, 5, 8, 14, I V M/3; 
VI B/I-13 ; 
VII F/5, VII G/7-43, VII H/7-28, VII K/4-7, VII ~1/1-30; 
X B/46-48, X C/~4-34, X C/45, X Ca/l, X 1/1, 2, X ~/14, X R/14; 
XI D/27-71; 
Xll K/7-38; 
W 1/1-10, W 11/2-20, W Ila/10, 42, 52, W VIII/3-5; 
NK 1/1-10, NK 11/4, NK 111/1-3, NK IV/42-43; 
CHW/14. 
Address Books of the City of Remscheid 
gestapo F~:!.~"':'" 
RW 295, 526, 682, 1801, 1994, 2894, 5453, 5636, 6518, 6526, 6820, 
7338, 8212, ~762, 9828, 10039, 10851, 11192, 11407. 1 1 6 66 ',' 1 1 76 7 , 
12076, 15048, 15253, 15485, 15579, 15908, 15931, 15973, 16104, 
16148, 17049, 17050, 17704, 17904, 18030, 18296, 18552, 19736, 
19850, 20172 , 21108, 21110, 21515, 22114, 22420, 24389, 24522, 
24820, 25518, 26044, 26216, 26512, 26~'74 , 27168, 27356, 28070. 
29055, 29242, 29344, 29345, 29375, 30006, 30053, 30662, 30957, 
31126, 31197, 31374, 31583, 31895, 32613, 32971, 33951, 34815, 
34970, 35409, 35260, 35425, 35817, 38282, 38578, 38984, 39078, 
39134, 39463, 39529, 39698, 40053, 40646, 42737, 43275, 43450, 
43455, 43605, 43713, 44114, 44299, 46009, 46613, 46634, 48020, . 
49033, 49624, 49668, 49669, 51872, 53210, 53551, 55346, 55549, 
57645, 58503, 58584, 59170, 64116, 64435, 66039, 6 798} , 74349. 
- 496 L. 
8148, 1021/46, 15445, 15446, 15814, 16536, 16738, 16741, 16945, 
16953, 17192, 17193, 17253; 
30469a, 30641 a-e, 30642a, 30643, 30646 a-f, 30649 a-f, 30652 b, 
30653a, 30654, 30662d, 38944, 38945. 
_9.e!,~_~:_p~_ 
4 J 552/25, 5/649. 5/659, 5/805. 5/840, 5/938. 5/940, 5/1187, 
5/1200, 5/1201, 29/206, 29/207, 92/92, 92/174. 
Berlin Document Centre (BDC) 
Personal Files and Melllbl~ri>hip Cards of cir('[I 120 Rl'msdwid n!{'IIl!wrs 
of the NSDAP and SA. 
INTERVIEWS 
.----_._-
Otto and Lioni Alders 
Artur Bevernick 
Crete Busch 
Hans DUrhager 
Karl Engels 
Cerd Friele 
Robert and Millie FUhrer 
Ernst Ciesecke 
Hertha CUis 
Millie Hilbert 
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Olga Jung 
Fri tz .Knappcr 
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Eu~i Leyendecker 
Rudi Luchtenberg 
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Luise Paul 
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Otto and Klara Rau 
Dora Salz 
Crete Salz 
Hanni Schllfer 
Wilhelm Schlechtriem 
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Hargot Schroder 
Ludwig Stillger 
Alfred Straflweg 
Erich Thieler 
Klara TruslH:!im 
Alexander Vogel 
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